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

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THE

MILITARY LIFE

OF

FIELD MARSHAL

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

VOL. II.

Field Marshall H. G.
The Duke of Wellington
K. G. &c &c &c.

from a likeness taken at Paris 1814.

THE

MILITARY LIFE

OF

FIELD MARSHAL

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

K. G. &c. &c. &c.

BY

MAJOR BASIL JACKSON,

AND

CAPTAIN C. ROCHFORT SCOTT,

LATE OF THE ROYAL STAFF CORPS.

IRTUTIS FORTUNA COMES.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

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1840.

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ERRATA IN VOL. II.

Page 131. line 4. of note, for "*by these powerful projectiles,*" read "*by the projectiles thrown by these powerful mortars.*"
283. lines 22. and 31 for "*Ycla*" read "*Yecla.*"
317. line 21. for "*Gazon,*" read "*Gazan.*"
362. line 4. for "*Urogne*" read "*Urngne.*"
405. line 22. for "*them*" read "*it.*"
450. line 16. for "*arm*" read "army."
453. line 5. for "*Valançey*" read "*Valençay.*"
465. line 17. for "*its*" read "*his.*"

THE

LIFE

OF

FIELD MARSHAL

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

K.G. &c. &c. &c.

CHAPTER XXI.

KING JOSEPH, ACCOMPANIED BY SEBASTIANI, MARCHES AGAINST VENEGAS. — VICTOR WITHDRAWS FROM THE ALBERCHE. — SOULT ARRIVES AT PLASENCIA. — CRITICAL SITUATION OF THE ALLIED ARMIES. — THE BRITISH RETURN TO OROPESA, AND ARE FOLLOWED BY THE SPANIARDS. — THE ALLIES CROSS THE TAGUS. — THE SPANIARDS SURPRISED AT ARZOBISPO. — MARQUIS WELLESLEY ARRIVES AT SEVILLE. — GENERAL EGUIA SUCCEEDS CUESTA IN THE COMMAND. — DEFEAT OF VENEGAS. — THE BRITISH ARMY RETIRES TO BADAJOS. — LORD WELLINGTON'S PLAN FOR DEFENDING PORTUGAL. — GUERRILLAS. — DEFEAT OF THE SPANIARDS AT OCAÑA AND ALBA DE TORMES. — THE BRITISH ARMY MOVES TO THE EASTERN FRONTIER OF PORTUGAL. — OBSERVATIONS.

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1809.

IMMEDIATELY after the battle of Talavera, King Joseph became alarmed lest General Venegas should march on Madrid, which had been left so weakly guarded; he therefore moved with the reserve and Sebastiani's corps, to oppose his advance, while Victor was left in position behind the Alberche to watch the combined armies, with instructions to fall upon their rear guard, when Soult's operations should force them to retire. In the mean time, Sir Robert Wilson's corps, which had been called

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towards the army when the general action was expected, and had reached Marrupe, returned to Escalona on the 31st; and Marshal Victor, disturbed by this movement, withdrew his rear guard on the same night from Cazalegas, and retired to Maqueda.

The 29th and 30th were passed by the British general in establishing his hospitals at Talavera, and in fruitless endeavours to procure provisions for his starving army, and the necessary assistance to prevent the wounded men from perishing. Both the Spanish general and the inhabitants of the town were applied to in vain; they would neither furnish aid, nor even assist in burying the dead.

Sir A. Wellesley's Memorandum of Operations.

General Cuesta received intelligence on the 30th that rations for 12,000 men had been ordered at Fuente Roble, north of the Puerto de Baños; and for 24,000 men at Los Santos, near the same place. It was, however, expected that the troops guarding the Puerto or pass of Baños would stop Soult's force, or that the position of Beresford's corps, which had been directed to assemble in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, within the Spanish frontier, would induce the French marshal to desist from his intended march through the mountains.*

Sir Arthur sought to prevail on Cuesta to send a strong division of his army to the pass of Baños, which was slenderly protected; but the Spanish general refused to do so, and proposed that Sir Robert Wilson, whose presence at Escalona was

* It is almost incredible that the French should have collected the corps of Ney, Soult, and Mortier at Salamanca, and made preparations there for marching on Plasencia, without Marshal Beresford, the Duque del Parque, or the Junta of Old Castile, which was sitting at Ciudad Rodrigo, knowing any thing of their proceedings. Yet this is a fact!

then of great consequence, should march thither. On the evening of the 2d of August, Cuesta was at length persuaded to detach Bassecourt's division towards Baños; but on that day he received information of the French under Soult being at Plasencia. The Marquis de la Reyna, who had been entrusted with the defence of the pass, had retired on the enemy's approach, without firing a shot. On this emergency, Cuesta proposed that one half of the allied forces should move to the rear and attack Soult, and the other half follow Victor; a project which met with a direct negative from Sir Arthur, who would not divide the British army. But he offered to march against Soult, whose force he estimated at only 15,000 men, with his own army, provided Cuesta would remain at Talavera and protect his hospital.

Aug. 1.

This arrangement was finally agreed to; and Sir Arthur urged upon Cuesta the necessity of General Venegas being ordered to make a demonstration on Madrid, in order to keep the French forces divided, until the rear of the allies should be once more secured. The English army marched to Oropesa on the 3d August, and on the same day General Cuesta received accounts apprizing him of the real strength of the three corps brought by Soult into Estremadura, which amounted to 34,000 men. Conceiving, therefore, that the British army was not equal to a contest with such a force, nor his own to maintain the position it occupied against Victor, who had again advanced to Sta Olalla, the Spanish general resolved upon withdrawing from Talavera and uniting with Sir Arthur at Oropesa.

This determination, and the information on which it was based, Cuesta forthwith communicated to

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Sir Arthur, who earnestly entreated him to defer his march at least until the morning, in order to cover the evacuation of his hospital; but without waiting for any reply, the Spanish general carried his plan into immediate execution, and marching all night, joined the English army at Oropesa soon after daylight on the morning of the 4th; thus not only sacrificing the English hospital, but exposing the allied armies to be attacked at the same time both in front and rear.

The allies were now so situated that any longer delay, or a single false movement, would have endangered their safety; Soult having reached Naval Moral on the 3d, in which position he lay between the combined armies at Oropesa and the boat bridge of Almaraz, which, however, was said to have been taken up by De la Reyna after his retreat from the Puerto de Baños. In this exigency all the boldness and skill of the British general were required to extricate his army from its perilous situation. He had only 17,000 men; and Soult with double that number barred the valley of the Tagus, while Victor might be expected immediately from Talavera with 25,000. He could place no reliance either upon Cuesta or the Spanish troops, should he hazard a battle with Soult; and a defeat would be utter ruin. The only passage across the Tagus open to him was by the bridge of Arzobispo, which would lead him into a mountainous country, reported to be impracticable for artillery. Having well weighed all the circumstances of his situation, which to an ordinary mind would have been one of great embarrassment, he unhesitatingly resolved on crossing the river; a decision to which he was prompted by the

superior nature of his artillery; for rugged and impassable as the country southward of the Tagus was reported to be, he well knew that British artillery officers would contrive means to carry their guns wherever a mule could find a footing. Sir Arthur's immediate object was to secure a communication with Truxillo and Merida before the enemy could seize the Col de Mirabete, and cut off the road to those places.

His plan was opposed by the perverse Spanish general, who insisted that Oropesa was a favourable position for battle, and that, in short, he was determined to fight there. But Sir Arthur continued firm, and forthwith issued orders to march.

The baggage and ammunition were put in motion for Arzobispo early on the 4th; but the army remained for several hours afterwards in position to cover the passage of the wounded men and stores. By great exertions, and the sacrifice of much baggage, about 2000 of the former had been brought from Talavera; but 1500, who could not bear removal, were left in the hospitals and recommended to the humanity of the enemy. By two o'clock the whole force had crossed the Tagus, and was placed in position. Sending Craufurd's brigade to reach the bridge of Almaraz, Sir Arthur directed the movements of the main body of his army, which made a forced march of twenty-four miles on the following day to the neighbourhood of Val de la Casa, through a country scarcely practicable for wheel carriages. The extreme heat of the weather, want of sufficient food, and the difficulties of the road, caused sufferings to the troops almost insupportable; but their energy triumphed. At one place, after crossing the river Ibor, the guns

Sir J. Jones, vol. i. 239.

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were dragged up a mountain by the troops. When the Spaniards afterwards arrived at the same spot they abandoned their cannon in hopeless despair; and there it would have remained, had not Sir Arthur Wellesley succeeded by force of entreaty in prevailing upon them to follow the example of his own soldiers. The British army arrived at Deleytosa on the 7th, where it took up a position covering the main road to Truxillo.

The Spanish force did not pass the Tagus till the 5th; when, leaving two divisions of infantry and Alburquerque's cavalry at Arzobispo, the rest of the army took post at Paraleda de Garbin. On the 8th, a body of French troops crossed the river by a ford, and surprised the Spanish rear guard during their siesta, as calculated upon by Soult, causing it a loss of 400 men and thirty pieces of cannon, the greater portion of which was in batteries constructed for the defence of the bridge. Sir Arthur Wellesley observes upon this attack, —

Sir A. Wellesley's Memorandum of Operations. Gurwood.

"The French made much more of this affair than they ought. Nothing could behave worse than they did, excepting the Spaniards. They ought to have annihilated the Spanish army, but they were afraid to follow them, and did not even know that they had taken the greatest part of the cannon; they had not even patrolled the ground three days afterwards, when Colonel Waters went to Mortier with a flag of truce from me."

It is pleasing to record that Marshal Victor, on his return to Talavera, treated the unfortunate British wounded with the utmost humanity and attention.

Southey, vol. ii. 432.

"When Victor entered the town, he found some of the wounded, French and English alike, lying on the ground in the Plaza. After complimenting the English, and observing that they understood the laws and courtesies of war, he told them there was one thing which they did not

understand; and that was how to deal with the Spaniards. He then sent soldiers to every house, with orders immediately to receive and accommodate the wounded of the two nations. . . . . He ordered the townsmen to come with spades and besoms, remove and bury the dead, and cleanse the Plaza. He was speedily obeyed, and then the French said the place was fit for them to walk in."

In the midst of the difficulties which embarrassed the British army, news of the battle of Wagram, and overthrow of Austria, arrived at Deleytosa; intelligence which threw an additional gloom over the already unpromising aspect of affairs in Spain, and furnished ample food for the desponding, who began now to look upon the cause of the Peninsula as desperate, and to consider the military power of France as perfectly irresistible. But such unworthy sentiments found no home in the breast of Sir Arthur Wellesley, although he was fully alive to the difficulties of his own perplexing situation. On the contrary, he even at that time spoke with confidence of a favourable rèsult to the struggle, and inspired around him an unbounded reliance in the resources of his superior genius.

The Central Junta now expressed its sense of Sir Arthur's services by nominating him a Captain-general in the Spanish army, and by presenting him with six Andalusian horses in the name of King Ferdinand. These tokens of the Junta's approbation were accepted by Sir Arthur, on condition that his own sovereign should consent to his holding the appointment conferred upon him; but with respect to any emolument attached to it, he hoped the government would excuse him if he declined to become a burthen upon the finances of Spain during the contest for her independence.

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Early in August, Marquis Wellesley arrived at Seville, on a special mission to the Spanish government. The presence of a statesman of his commanding talents and personal weight was of the highest value at a time when little of honesty, talent, or true patriotism animated the Junta; and it was not long ere the good effects of his mission were seen in the altered conduct of that body.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 8.

"You have undertaken an Herculean task; and God knows that the chances of success are infinitely against you, particularly since the unfortunate turn which affairs have taken in Austria." So wrote Sir Arthur to his brother; and he had begun now to know something of the Spanish character, and of the men who misdirected the affairs of the country. In the same letter he declares, that to remain with his army in Spain would be impossible, owing to his inability to feed it; and observes, "But a starving army is actually worse than none. The soldiers lose their discipline and their spirit. They plunder, even in the presence of their officers. The officers are discontented, and are almost as bad as the men; and with the army which a fortnight ago beat double their numbers, I should now hesitate to meet a French corps of half their strength."

On the 11th of August, the head-quarters of the British army were transferred to Jaraicejo, the main body being in the vicinity of that place, while strong divisions continued at Almaraz and the Puerto de Mirabete; and the Spanish army moved to Deleytosa, occupying Mesa de Ibor and Campillo, by which the right flank of the combined armies was secured.

General Cuesta resigned the command of the

Spanish army on the 12th, and was succeeded by General Eguia. No man could have been found more unsuited to the important situation he had held: ignorant and intractable, he could neither devise beneficial plans himself, nor would he act upon those of his able coadjutor, whose measures he invariably counteracted, and thus exercised the most baneful influence upon the operations of the campaign. Sir Arthur, who commonly held unbounded influence over all those with whom he came in contact by means of his commanding talents, failed entirely with Cuesta. In one of his letters after Talavera, he says, "I certainly should get the better of every thing, if I could manage General Cuesta; but his temper and disposition are so bad that it is impossible." The same letter exhibits Sir Arthur's reasons for endeavouring to avoid another battle, if possible: —

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 1.

"I think the battle of the 28th is likely to be of great use to the Spaniards; but I do not think them yet in a state of discipline to contend with the French, and I prefer infinitely to endeavour to remove the enemy from this part of Spain by manœuvre, to the trial of another pitched battle.

"The French, in the last, threw their whole force upon us; and although it did not succeed, and will not succeed in future, we shall lose great numbers of men, which we can but ill afford. I dare not attempt to relieve ourselves from the weight of the attack by bringing forward the Spanish troops, owing to their miserable state of discipline, and their want of officers properly qualified. These troops are entirely incapable of performing any manœuvre, however simple. They would get into irretrievable confusion, and the result would probably be the loss of everything."

The defensive position on the Tagus thus forced upon Sir Arthur Wellesley, to cover the great road to Truxillo and the river Guadiana, threw the protection of Portugal entirely on Marshal Beres-

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1809. ford, whose troops were posted at Zarza Mayor, supported by four British battalions under General Catlin Craufurd at Castel Branco. The Marshal was, however, confident of being able to maintain himself on the Portugueze frontier against any attack the enemy would be in a condition to make, which relieved Sir Arthur from all apprehension for the safety of Portugal.

By the recent hurried movements, Sir Robert Wilson's division, which had been recalled from Escalona and put in communication with Cuesta's army, became isolated, and was compelled to provide for its own safety. Trusting to his activity and knowledge of the country, Sir Robert, an officer of great ability and enterprise, crossed the Tietar and made for the mountains, where, although completely beset by detachments of the enemy, he succeeded in baffling all their endeavours against him, and finally reached Bejar; but anxious to recover, if possible, his communication with the combined armies, he decided on the bold step of descending into the vale of Plasencia by the pass of Baños. By that time, however, Ney's corps was returning to Salamanca; and falling in with Wilson's division, an action ensued, which was gallantly sustained by his weak force of Portugueze and Spaniards for several hours, without the aid of artillery; but being at length defeated and dispersed, the fugitives escaped to Ciudad Rodrigo.

Aug. 12.

The last important operation of this period, took place in La Mancha against the corps of Venegas; which, as we have seen, had been prevented by the secret orders of the Junta from executing the concerted movement against Madrid, and by its inac-

tivity permitted Sebastiani to withdraw across the Tagus, and join Victor previously to the battle of Talavera. General Venegas made an abortive attempt to dislodge the 2000 French troops left in Toledo, after which he proceeded to Aranjuez. King Joseph and Sebastiani, who, as we have noticed, marched against him immediately after the battle, fell in with him on the 5th of August; and, although his advanced guard under Don Pedro Agustin Giron* gallantly repulsed the French, Venegas found it necessary to abandon the line of the Tagus, and take up a position at Almonacid, where, emboldened by his late success, he awaited the enemy, was defeated with great loss, and driven into the Sierra Morena.

July 29.

August 11.

The French now found that nothing could be effected against the strong position so judiciously taken up by the allies, and therefore began to draw off their troops. Soult and Ney moved to Plasencia; and the latter when prosecuting his further march to recover possession of Salamanca, — which a detachment from Ciudad Rodrigo had held since the departure of the French, — as well as to check the Marques de la Romana, who was expected to move southward from Galicia, fell in with and defeated Wilson's division, as we have already recounted.

August 9.

August 12.

Thus, by the middle of August, Ney was at Salamanca, Soult at Plasencia, Mortier at Oropesa and Arzobispo, Victor at Talavera and Toledo, Sebastiani in La Mancha, and Kellermann at Valladolid; a distribution from which Sir Arthur

* This officer was created a camp-marshal on the field for his gallantry. He afterwards succeeded to the hereditary title of Marques de las Amarillas, and is now Duque de Ahumado.

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Wellesley inferred that no immediate offensive operation would be undertaken by the enemy. At the same period the British army was at Jaraicejo; General Eguia, who had succeeded Cuesta, at Deleytosa; and General Venegas at La Carolina, in the Sierra Morena. It appears, however, that Soult was desirous to invade Portugal from Plasencia, while Ney should co-operate with him from Salamanca; but that Joseph, guided by the judgment of Marshal Jourdan, rejected the plan. Sir Arthur had no fears of anything serious being effected at that time against Portugal, as he did not consider the French strong enough for the undertaking.

The British army continued to suffer most severe privations; for, regardless of Sir Arthur Wellesley's repeated and urgent representations, no plan for feeding his army had been carried into effect by the Spanish authorities; and thus was an efficient army left to starve, while the all-but-useless Spanish troops were tolerably well supplied. Sir Arthur has recorded some extraordinary instances of forbearance, at the very time when he was accused of intercepting provisions destined for the Spanish army. In a letter to Cuesta he says,—

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 11.

"On the 7th, when the British troops were starving in the hills, I met a convoy of 350 mules loaded with provisions for the Spanish army. I would not allow one of them to be touched, and they all passed on. General Sherbrooke, on the following day, the 8th, gave a written order to another convoy, addressed to all British officers, to allow them to pass through the army unmolested. Yesterday I met on the road, and passed, not less than 500 mules loaded with provisions for the Spanish army; and no later than yesterday evening, Major Campbell, my aide-de-camp, gave an order to another large convoy, addressed to all British officers and soldiers, not to impede its progress."

The greatest command of temper was at all times shown by the British general in his communications with General Cuesta, who so constantly put it to severe trial. But his successor, Eguia, if he possessed any feelings of a gentleman, must have regretted that he ever questioned the probity of a man who replied to him thus :—

"I have had the honour of receiving your Excellency's letter of this date; and I feel much concerned that any thing should have occurred to induce your Excellency to express a doubt of the truth of what I have written to you. As, however, your Excellency entertains that doubt, any further correspondence between us becomes unnecessary; and accordingly this is the last letter which I shall have the honour of addressing you. Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 19.

"Although your Excellency has expressed a doubt of the truth of what I have written to you, I entertain none of what your Excellency has written to me; and I am well convinced that your Excellency has given orders, and that all the contents of the magazine at Truxillo will be given to the British troops, even though the Spanish troops should want food.

* * * * * * * *

"Whatever your Excellency may think of the truth or falsehood of my assertion, I repeat that want, and the apprehension of its further consequences, are the only reasons for my quitting Spain."

The British general had announced to General Eguia on the 17th August his intention of withdrawing the army, and he was not to be moved from this resolve by the instances of Don Lorenzo de Calvo, a member of the Junta deputed to see that proper supplies were furnished to his army. The falsehoods, subterfuges, and magnificent promises of De Calvo failed to change Sir Arthur's determination.

"You gave me assurances yesterday," he writes, "which you have repeated in your letter, that these privations shall not continue; that in three days there shall be plenty Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 20.

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of provisions; and that in the mean time we shall have all that the magazine at Truxillo contains.

"In answer, I have to observe to you, that I have received the same assurances from every Spanish commissioner who has been employed with the British army. Each in his turn has disappointed me; and although your rank is higher and your powers are greater than those of the other Spanish officers who have been with me, I acknowledge that in a case so critical as that of a starving army I feel no confidence in your assurances; and I give no credit to the accounts of the existence of resources said to be upon the road, (in what place not known,) or of any others in the magazine at Truxillo."

Will it be credited that at this time, when De Calvo was making such promises, he had actually directed the alcalde of Guadalupe to send to the head-quarters of the Spanish army provisions ordered by an English commissary, which had been procured and were to be sent to the magazines at Truxillo for the supply of both armies?

The want of proper food and constant exposure in bivouac caused sickness to prevail to a distressing extent throughout the army, and a great number of horses belonging to the cavalry and artillery had actually died of starvation. Under such circumstances, the order to break up and march towards Portugal was hailed throughout the suffering ranks with universal joy. To transport the sick and wounded it was necessary to leave behind a quantity of ammunition, as no carriages could be obtained from the Spaniards. This was handed over to the Spanish general, who had no difficulty in procuring conveyance; and on the 20th of August the army moved from Jaraicejo towards Truxillo, and subsequently continued its march to the frontier of Portugal by the routes of Merida and Caceres. Head-quarters were fixed at Badajos, and

cantonments were selected within the Spanish frontier, where the troops at length obtained rest and a sufficiency of food.

Sir Arthur Wellesley had been induced to halt for a few days at Merida in consequence of a despatch from the Marquis Wellesley, painting in strong colours the alarm of the junta and universal terror created by the withdrawal of the British army; and he proposed that, in conjunction with the Spanish force, a defensive position should be taken up behind the Guadiana, with a view to cover Andalusia. But Sir Arthur now possessed ample experience of the generals, troops, and authorities in Spain. He saw that, under existing circumstances, nothing was to be done with the Spanish armies, and he therefore resolved to engage in no future operations with them. In a long and able despatch to Marquis Wellesley, he entered into a review of the conditions, both implied and specified, upon which the two armies had been in co-operation, proving that the British were free, according as circumstances should render most expedient, either to continue the conjunction or separate. He pointed out that the Guadiana was not to be defended by a weaker army against a stronger, being fordable in many places, and offering no defensive position that he was aware of; and gave as his opinion, that the passages of that river were more effectually covered by the position now held in rear of the Tagus, than they would be by removing the Spanish army to any other position. He therefore recommended their continuing to hold the post near Almaraz, and that at Deleytosa, sending the pontoon bridge at the former to Badajos. It might be asked, was there no chance of resum-

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 24.

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ing the offensive? The reply is, that the same causes which led to defensive operations after a victory would produce a similar result in future. The French troops were at least equal in numbers to those of the allies, and superior in discipline and every military quality to the Spanish army. To advance again would only bring a repetition of what had occurred. The British army could not send detachments to protect the passes of Baños and Perales, and the Spaniards were incapable of defending them: besides, the enemy could at any time pass the mountains and strengthen the army in front of the allies, even if prevented from getting into their rear. Further, there existed no body of troops in the north of Spain to create a diversion: Blake had lost his army; Romana was still in Galicia, and could not quit the mountains, having neither cavalry nor artillery; the Duque del Parque had very few troops, and those he was unwilling to risk far from Ciudad Rodrigo.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 24.

"But I come," he writes, "to another topic, which is one of serious consideration, and has considerable weight in my judgment upon this whole subject; and that is the frequent, I ought to say constant and shameful, misbehaviour of the Spanish troops before the enemy. We in England never hear of their defeats and flights; but I have heard of Spanish officers telling of nineteen and twenty actions of the description of that at the bridge of Arzobispo, an account of which has, I believe, never been published.

"In the battle of Talavera, in which the Spanish army, with very trifling exceptions, was not engaged, whole corps threw away their arms, and ran off in my presence, when they were neither attacked nor threatened with an attack, but frightened, I believe, by their own fire.

"I refer your Excellency for evidence upon this subject to General Cuesta's orders, in which, after extolling the gallantry of his army in general, he declares his intention to decimate the runaways; an intention which he afterwards carried into execution.

"When these dastardly soldiers run away, they plunder every thing they meet; and in their flight from Talavera, they plundered the baggage of the British army, which was at the moment bravely engaged in their cause.

* * * * * * *

"Upon every ground, therefore, of objects, means, and risks, it is my opinion, that I ought to avoid entering into any further co-operation with the Spanish armies; and that, at all events, your Excellency should avoid holding out to the government any hope that I would consent to remain within the Spanish frontier, with any intention of co-operating in future with the Spanish troops."

Writing at the same period to Lord Castlereagh upon the situation and prospects of affairs in Spain, Sir Arthur sagaciously observes, —

"They have attempted to govern the kingdom in a state of revolution by an adherence to old rules and systems, and with the aid of what is called enthusiasm; and this last is in fact no aid to accomplish anything, and is only an excuse for the irregularity with which everything is done, and for the want of discipline and subordination of the armies. Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 25.

"People are very apt to believe that enthusiasm carried the French through their revolution, and was the parent of those exertions which have nearly conquered the world; but if the subject is nicely examined, it will be found that enthusiasm was the name only, but that force was the instrument which brought forward those great resources, under the system of terror which first stopped the allies; and that a perseverance in the same system of applying every individual and every description of property to the service of the army, by force, has since conquered Europe."

Sir Arthur adverts in the same letter to the condition of Portugal, and of the Portugueze troops, giving as his opinion that, with its army and militia complete, the British ought to be able to hold that country. He even then perceived what would be the proper method of defending it; namely, by retiring from its indefensible frontier, and confining all exertions to the preservation of that which was

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of highest importance, the capital; a plan so admirably carried out in the following year. He concludes this able letter with some observations on the question of occupying Cadiz, and shows that should the Junta consent to such a measure, and the British government avail itself of the permission, that it would be necessary to "lay down Portugal and take up Spain," making Cadiz the base of operations for an army to be employed in the field with the Spaniards, and the point to fall back upon instead of Lisbon, should retreat become necessary.

To Mr. Huskisson he writes thus strongly on the 30th August,—

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 30.

"I wish that the eyes of the people of England were open to the real state of affairs in Spain, as mine are; and I only hope, if they should not be so now, that they will not purchase the experience by the loss of an army.

"We have gained a great and glorious victory over more than double our numbers, which has proved to the French that they are not the first military nation in the world. But the want of common management in the Spaniards, and of the common assistance which every country gives most plentifully to the French, have deprived us of all the fruits of it.

"The Spaniards have neither numbers, efficiency, discipline, bravery, nor arrangement, to carry on the contest; and if I could consent to remain in Spain, its burthen and the disgrace of its failure would fall upon me."

No person who has followed the march of events since the commencement of operations against Victor, and duly considered the difficulties under which the British commander laboured, will charge him with precipitation in withdrawing from all co-operation with the Spanish armies, and directing his own thoughts, and the views of government, to the defence of Portugal, which country he had long seen must, *under existing circumstances*, be

the base of any great operations against the French power in the Peninsula.

On the 16th of September a notification was received that his Majesty had been pleased to elevate Sir Arthur Wellesley to the peerage by the titles of Baron Douro of Wellesley, and Viscount Wellington of Talavera and of Wellington in the county of Somerset. The British troops continued to suffer dreadfully from disease in their cantonments; in the course of a few weeks after the army reached Badajos, thousands were in hospital with intermittent fever. In all likelihood the state of debility to which a large portion of the troops had been reduced by previous want and exposure, not only rendered them now more susceptible of the ague that prevails during the autumnal months in that part of Estremadura through which the Guadiana flows, but also occasioned it to assume a form of unusual malignancy. Unfortunately, too, the hospitals were scantily supplied with the only specific then known for the distemper, Peruvian bark; and, unchecked by medicine, it had full sway, carrying thousands of the gallant victors of Talavera to an inglorious grave.

The position of the army near Badajos was admirably selected in reference to all the objects which the enemy might have in view; as, by a junction with a Spanish corps on its right, or with a Portugueze and Spanish force on its left, it stood prepared to protect either Portugal or the south of Spain; and thus, although the French had not less than 80,000 men disposable, they were unable to attempt any operation of importance. Still the prospect of the British army was cheerless in the extreme; its own weakness, and the bad condition

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of the only Spanish force with which it was in immediate communication, precluded all hope that any forward movement would be attempted; and the troops themselves, ignorant of the gigantic projects at that moment revolving in the mind of their great commander, despaired of the cause, and began to contemplate a speedy return to England. But while his soldiers lay inactive, a prey to sickness, and, we may add, despondency, Wellington was laying the foundation of his grand scheme for saving Portugal, and eventually delivering the entire Peninsula; a design which gave ample scope to his versatile genius, depending, as did its execution, upon his ability to direct, in all matters bearing on it, not only the military resources of Portugal, but likewise to sway both the British and Portugueze governments. It was a mighty undertaking, considering the paucity of his means as compared with an object of such magnitude; but he carried it out with wonderful vigour, perseverance, and success. We shall here describe its principal features.

Sherer, Mil. Memoirs, &c.

Satisfied that to defend the extensive frontier of Portugal with the force likely to be at his disposal was impossible, Lord Wellington confined his views to the protection of Lisbon; an object which could only be secured by abandoning the rest of the country to the invader, and barring his approach to that city by means of a very strong defensive position in its front. To understand the difficulties attending a frontier defence of that country, it is requisite to mention, that north of the Tagus several roads from Spain converge upon Lisbon, while the mountainous nature of the country generally, renders lateral communication between the main roads extremely difficult for

troops. But the chief objection to attempting to defend the frontier itself, arises from the circumstance of the Tagus being fordable at many places during the summer months, even so low down as Salvaterra: hence the most advantageous mode of penetrating to the capital is by two lines of operation, — one north and the other south of that river; as a force approaching by way of the Alemtejo must of necessity compel a defensive army operating north of it to fall back, in order to avoid being cut off from Lisbon.

Determined by the above considerations, Lord Wellington made choice of a position extending from Alhandra, on the Tagus, across to Torres Vedras and the ocean. The whole of this ground is strong by nature; but a minute examination of every part of it satisfied him that art could render it nearly impregnable, if properly defended. He therefore drew up for Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher, his commanding engineer, a memorandum, dated the 20th of October; in which, after specifying all his general views for defending Lisbon, he minutely enters into the subject of fortifying the lines of Torres Vedras, points out the best situations for forts and redoubts, and for the formation of entrenchments, inundations, and the creation of such other obstacles to the attack of an enemy as the nature of the ground would admit of; his object, in the first instance, being to ascertain the amount of labour and length of time required for the execution of the stupendous works contemplated, including roads of communication between the several parts of the position.

We shall not, in this place, describe more particularly the celebrated system of defence adopted

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by the British general, as a future opportunity will present itself for that purpose when we come to the campaign of 1810, which, in the opinion of all enlightened and unprejudiced military men, was the grandest effort of his genius; affording a most instructive lesson of an entirely novel character in the difficult art of war, that will be the admiration of future ages. We know of nothing to compare with it throughout the whole range of military history; and it may be affirmed, without fear of contradiction, that the conduct of the campaign of 1810 would alone have sufficed to stamp Wellington the first of commanders either ancient or modern: — but we are anticipating.

Towards the middle of September, Eguia, leaving a corps of 9000 men in Estremadura, which was placed under the command of the Duke of Alburquerque, moved with the bulk of his army into La Mancha, where he was joined by Venegas, who was placed under his orders, — their united force amounting to 50,000 men. This movement of concentration on the part of the Spaniards induced the French to march 30,000 men, under Victor, into that province; when the former retired to the Sierra Morena, and the French troops withdrew to the Tagus.

Lord Wellington, who had been absent from Badajos about three weeks in October, during which he had carefully examined all the country to a considerable distance in front of Lisbon, given instructions, as we have seen, to his commanding engineer, and transacted business at Lisbon, returned to head-quarters at the end of the month. In the mean time General Areizaga, an officer of little experience, was appointed to replace Eguia

in the command of the Spanish army of La Mancha; and the British general lost no time in impressing upon him, through the medium of Colonel Roche, an English officer at his head-quarters, the necessity of keeping the Spanish troops strictly on the defensive, and concentrated in strong positions, which would enable them, undisturbed, to acquire a system of discipline, while guerrillas and other irregular bodies should harass the enemy.

The guerrillas, who had by this time become formidable, were small parties of Spaniards composed of individuals who, from various causes, had been compelled to fly from their homes and to take arms against the French. These, entertaining an implacable animosity to their cruel oppressors, issued from their places of refuge in the mountains whenever small detachments were known to be moving, and falling upon the unwary foe seldom showed mercy to the vanquished. By degrees both the numbers and strength of these small bands increased, until at length a general incursive system was organized; and the guerrillas continued long to be the only Spanish bodies who inflicted any serious injury upon the enemy. Possessing a perfect knowledge of the country, and being undistinguished by any uniform, they were able to disperse and re-assemble at pleasure. They harassed the French by cutting off their communications, intercepting their supplies, and destroying small foraging parties, while they were themselves at all times secure in their mountain fastnesses. "To lead these guerrilla bands the priest girded up his black robe, and stuck pistols in his belt, — the student threw aside his books, and grasped a

Sherer, Mil. Memoirs, vol. i. 272.

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sword, — the shepherd forsook his flock, the husbandman his home."

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So rare were the occasions when any lustre shone on the Spanish arms, that an instance in which the corps of the Duque del Parque greatly distinguished itself must not be omitted. Before the middle of September the Marques de la Romana, with a corps of 13,000 men, arrived in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, from Galicia; and the command of it was taken from the Marques and given to Del Parque, who soon after commenced offensive operations against the French force in Old Castile, at the same time urging Lord Wellington to assist him with Portugueze or English troops; but the British commander being of opinion that his desultory and imprudent operations could produce no benefit, while they endangered the safety of his troops, declined to furnish him with any support, although prepared to make every effort to save Ciudad Rodrigo, if the enemy should manifest a design to attack that fortress. The Duque subsequently withdrew, and continued in the vicinity of San Felices for a few days, when hearing that the enemy were in movement from Salamanca to attack him, he retired to the left of the Agueda, near Ciudad Rodrigo.

The advance of the Duque del Parque, which the French imagined to be connected with a movement to be made by the British army, and with the march of General Eguia into La Mancha, induced Soult to abandon Plasencia on the 1st of October, and he moved to Oropesa. Del Parque soon afterwards occupied the strong position of

Oct. 18.

Tamames, near Ciudad Rodrigo, where he was attacked by a considerable part of Ney's corps,

commanded by General Marchand, (Ney having gone to France,) amounting to upwards of 11,000 men. The Spaniards fought well on this occasion, and maintained their position in spite of the vigorous efforts of the French to dislodge them, who were finally repulsed with considerable loss. Being joined by the corps of Ballasteros, the Duque moved forward on the 21st, and gained possession of Salamanca, which was abandoned by the enemy on his approach. Oct. 25.

On the 1st of November, Lord Wellington left Badajos for Seville, to confer with Marquis Wellesley, whom he accompanied to Cadiz, where that distinguished nobleman embarked for England, carrying with him a sovereign contempt for the wretched government of Spain, but full of a well-grounded confidence in the bold projects of his brother in reference to Portugal, and determined to exercise all his influence at home in furthering the great measures planned for the ensuing campaign.

The recent events in Leon induced the enemy to strengthen their force under Kellermann in Old Castile, and Gazan's division was despatched from Toledo through the Puerto Pico for that purpose. After the defeat of Tamames, Marchand had united with Kellermann, who, collecting all the troops of his government, Del Parque was speedily constrained to retire, and arrived at Bejar on the 8th November, where he fixed his head-quarters.

Notwithstanding the earnest endeavours of Lord Wellington to impress both upon the Supreme Junta and the Spanish leaders the absolute necessity of keeping their armies massed and in strong

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positions, the Spanish government, influenced by the action of Tamames and other events in Leon, considered that a favourable opportunity offered for obtaining possession of Madrid. General Areizaga was therefore instructed to advance towards the capital; while Del Parque from Castile, and Alburquerque from Estremadura, were directed to move into the valley of the Tagus, and when united march on Talavera. Thus these two armies, after the projected junction, would be precisely in the situation, with respect to Areizaga's army, that Sir Arthur Wellesley and Cuesta stood at the beginning of August with reference to the force of Venegas; with this difference, however, that Venegas could then have crossed the Tagus at Fuente Dueña, which there was little prospect of Areizaga being able to accomplish.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Nov. 19.

These ill-digested movements gave Lord Wellington the utmost concern, as he foresaw that they must terminate disastrously for the Spanish armies, and it was impossible for him to render them any assistance. He had no means of crossing the Tagus excepting at Arzobispo, the road to which bridge was at that season scarcely practicable for an army: to move on Truxillo, in order to be nearer the Spanish armies, would not, he conceived, materially benefit them. On the whole, he considered the affairs of Spain to be then in a worse situation than he had yet known them.

Areizaga reached Dos Barrios, near Ocaña, on the 10th November, and the same night made an attack upon a French corps of 5000 men, in which he sustained some loss, and the enemy made good their retreat. On the 13th he was at Santa Cruz de la Zarza, whence he returned to Ocaña on the

18th; and there, on the following day, he was attacked by the French under King Joseph in person, assisted by Marshals Soult and Mortier. The result was the defeat and dispersion of the Spanish army with a greater loss than had been sustained in any preceding action during the war. It amounted, according to the French account, to 4000 killed, 26,000 prisoners, and 50 pieces of cannon. The French army was 25,000 strong, and that of the Spaniards 50,000.

With respect to the Duque del Parque, we may merely observe, that he moved forward from Bejar on the 17th November; hoping to crush the small French force in his front, but after some manœuvring was eventually brought to action, and defeated by Kellermann at Alba de Tormes on the 28th November; and the next day a patrole of the enemy coming up with his army, it was seized with a panic and dispersed. The fugitives were, however, reassembled some time afterwards, to the amount of near 20,000 men.

Albùrquerque had in the mean time reached the bridge of Arzobispo, whence he fell back to the Guadiana by order of the Junta; and thus the positions of the Puerto de Mirabete, and the Mesa de Ibor (which being held, an enemy cannot cross the Tagus to any efficient purpose, between the bridge of Toledo and Villa Velha, in Portugal), were given up.

Lord Wellington had long contemplated moving his army from its present cantonments on the Guadiana across the Tagus to the frontier of Leon, but had delayed his march until he should see the result of Areizaga's battle, and whether his intended removal would be likely to endanger

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Seville. He felt assured that Portugal would be invaded duing the ensuing season, and that the first object of the French would be the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo; valuable to them, both as a base of operations against Portugal, and to serve as a link between any armies they might maintain in the south, with those in the north of Spain. Accordingly, on the 15th December, the army broke up, and proceeded by easy marches to the eastern frontier of Portugal, where the most advanced division under Brigadier-General R. Craufurd was posted in front of Almeida, and the rest of the army took up cantonments near the frontier of Beira, with the exception of a corps under General Hill, which was left upon the Tagus to maintain a communication with Badajos, and to watch any movements the enemy might make towards Alemtejo. His troops were stationed at Abrantes and Portalegre. Lord Wellington withdrew the Portugueze troops to Thomar, and fixed his own head-quarters at Viseu.

Nov. 14.

Lord Wellington had estimated that besides the military establishment of Portugal, amounting to 45,000 regular troops and the militia, he should require to have his own force completed to the number of 30,000 effective men. Change of air and the winter season served to restore the health of his soldiers; and a reinforcement being expected from England, the British general felt confident that he should be able to "fight a good battle for the defence of Portugal, and see whether that country could not be saved from the general wreck." In fixing the amount of his army at 30,000 men, he had stated to ministers the lowest number that he thought would suffice; knowing how greatly they

Gurwood, Despatches, &c. Jan. 14.

were embarrassed, not only to find disposable troops at that moment (owing to the unfortunate expedition to Walcheren), but also to furnish *bullion* for the performance of their pecuniary engagements with Portugal, as well as for the support of the British army in that country.

Circumstances had materially altered, it is true, since Lord Wellington's estimate of means for the defence of Portugal was framed on the 14th November. By the defeat of Del Parque the allies were weakened on the side of Ciudad Rodrigo, where the first burst of the impending tempest was expected to take effect; and the entire ruin of Areizaga's army threw open the whole of the south of Spain to the enemy. Still, notwithstanding these vexatious events, Lord Wellington saw no reason to despair of the cause in which he was engaged, and thus writes to Mr. Villiers*, our minister at Lisbon: —

"I conceive that the honour and interests of the country require that we should hold our ground here as long as possible; and, please God, I will maintain it as long as I can: and I will neither endeavour to shift from my own shoulders on those of the ministers the responsibility for the failure by calling for means which I know they cannot give, and which, perhaps, would not add materially to the facility of attaining our object; nor will I give to the ministers, who are not strong, and who must feel the delicacy of their own situation, an excuse for withdrawing the army from a position which, in my opinion, the honour and interest of the country require they should maintain as long as possible.† Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Jan. 14.

* Afterwards Earl of Clarendon.

† In our opinion, there is not a passage throughout the whole twelve volumes of the noble Duke's Despatches and Letters which does him greater honour than this: we might fancy ourselves perusing the speech of some illustrious Greek or Roman, as recorded by the pen of a Plutarch, — so exalted are the sentiments therein embodied. Fearful of

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"I think that if the Portuguese do their duty, I shall have enough to maintain it: if they do not, nothing that Great Britain can afford can save the country; and if from that cause I fail in saving it, and am obliged to go, I shall be able to carry away the British army."

We shall close this chapter with a few remarks upon the main incidents of the operations against Victor, which were marked by many untoward circumstances. We pass over the unavoidable but vexatious delay that occurred previous to the march on Plasencia; which was, however, of great value to the enemy, by affording longer time for the concentration of the force under Soult in Leon.

In the first place, the movements of the British army were crippled throughout the campaign by the want of the necessary supplies that were to have been furnished by the Spanish government, upon the faith of whose promises it entered Spain. In the next, the perverse character of the Spanish general, and total want of discipline in his army, rendered it impossible for Sir Arthur Wellesley to obtain a proper co-operation in the prosecution of his plans. Thirdly, the extraordinary and absurd proceeding of the Supreme Junta, in secretly directing Venegas, whose force was reputed the most efficient of the Spanish armies, not to perform the part assigned to him in the general plan of operations, whereby the French were enabled to concentrate, and fight the battle of Talavera. And lastly, the concentration of three of the enemy's corps beyond the mountains, by which a danger

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incurring the charge of adulation if we gave expression to the feelings with which we first perused the above extract, we shall do no more than suggest it as an appropriate inscription for the pedestal of one of the "testimonials" about to be erected to his Grace.

was incurred, whereof the British general had no knowledge until he was upon the point of being overwhelmed.

Yet, with all the difficulties that were opposed to the operations of the allied armies up to the time of their reaching the Alberche on the 22d July, a brilliant termination to the campaign, together with the possession of Madrid, might have resulted, had not Cuesta declined to attack the enemy on the 23d. Victor's force was under 28,000 men*; and although strongly posted, it can scarcely admit of a doubt that the allies would have defeated him, and he must either have moved with his discomfited army on Toledo to unite with Sebastiani, or retired upon Madrid. Pressing closely on Victor, the allies would have prevented King Joseph, in the former case, from joining him; who, under alarm for his capital, from the position of Sir Robert Wilson at Escalona (the strength of whose corps had been greatly exaggerated), would have retraced his steps for its protection. Supposing Victor to have sustained a loss of 5000 men on the Alberche, his army, after being joined by Sebastiani's corps, would not have exceeded 35,000 men, wherewith to oppose the British and the two Spanish armies of Cuesta and Venegas, forming an aggregate of 70,000, *flushed with success.* It may be objected that Soult was then preparing to descend into the plain of Plasencia with a force of 34,000 men; but we incline to think that under the above hypothetical circumstances, Marshal Soult would have hesitated to enter the valley of the

* Napier rates it at 25,000 men.

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Tagus, having Beresford and Del Parque so near the Pass of Baños; rendering a corps of 20,000 men necessary to secure his rear. However, of one thing we feel assured, —namely, that Wellington would never have been deterred from following up the tide of success to Madrid by any fears arising from the presence of Soult upon the Tagus; for by hazarding his army there, Soult would have had much more to apprehend with regard to his communications than his adversaries, to whom the line of La Mancha would have been always open to retire by on the Sierra Morena, or even to Cadiz, if necessary; and had not the Junta, laying aside their absurd jealousies, opened the gates of that city to the British army, there was nothing to prevent it embarking its artillery, &c. at Puerto de Sta Maria, and marching itself to Gibraltar.

As it was, a great victory, followed by some important moral results, were advantages not too dearly purchased at Talavera. The valiant stand made by the British troops during that hard-fought battle, against repeated and furious attacks of double their own number, established a superiority which influenced many an after contest. But in England the good effects of that triumph were more immediately and obviously apparent; for those who had contended against the employment of an army in Spain, on the ground that our generals and troops were no match for the marshals and soldiery of France, were compelled to admit that the latter were not invincible. And when they saw how much Lord Wellington had effected, with only 20,000 British troops, who had been within a few marches of Madrid, while at least 150,000 Frenchmen were south of the Pyrennees, the tone of despondency

so general at the commencement of the year was changed into one of hope and expectation. CHAP. XXI. 1809.

Amongst the moral effects produced by the battle of Talavera, an impression of due respect for British prowess upon the French*, was perhaps of less consequence than the revulsion of feeling it created in the Spaniards. The influence of Lord Wellington with the wretched government of Spain dates from that hard-fought action. And surely we ought not to be surprised at the little confidence previously evinced by the Spaniards towards our soldiers, when we reflect how little England herself was aware of their excellence; few occasions having as yet offered, during the war, of showing that the nation which was unrivalled on the ocean, could send forth troops capable of bearing the palm from the famed and dreaded legions of Napoleon. Further, at Talavera, England sealed by her blood the compact with Spain, and unequivocally proved herself hearty and uncompromising in the cause she had espoused.

It is unnecessary for us to comment more than we have done already, upon the folly and bad faith of the Junta and its generals. The latter, indeed, remind us rather of the turbaned leaders of Assye and Argaum, than of European commanders; whilst the behaviour of their troops on

* Even the French Emperor seems now, however, to have rated the British troops at their proper value, though he had still to be convinced of the talents of their general. He merely shrugged up his shoulders, Rovigo informs us, on hearing of the failure of the plan he had himself sketched out for enveloping the English army in the valley of the Tagus; but the battle of Talavera called forth a more decided proof of his dissatisfaction: the minister of war having thus written to Marshal Jourdan on the subject — "*Tant qu'on voudra attaquer de bonnes troupes, comme les troupes Anglaises, dans de bonnes positions, sans les reconnoître et s'assurer si on peut les enlever, on conduira des hommes à la mort en pure perte.*"

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many occasions would have disgraced the banners of Tippoo.

Unsupported by any Spanish army after the destruction of that under Areizaga at Ocaña, Lord Wellington concentrated his means for the defence of Portugal alone; and the Portugueze, rallying round a commander whose actions in the field had excited their admiration, while his uprightness had called forth their respect, he soon became satisfied that in basing the deliverance of the Peninsula upon Portugal he was not building on a foundation of sand.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE FRENCH INVADE ANDALUSIA. — DISSOLUTION OF THE SUPREME JUNTA. — ALBURQUERQUE RETIRES TO CADIZ, WHICH ADMITS A DIVISION OF BRITISH TROOPS. — LORD WELLINGTON'S MEASURES FOR DEFENDING PORTUGAL. — OPINIONS OF THE OPPOSITION RELATIVE TO THE DEFENCE OF PORTUGAL. — STATE OF THE PORTUGUEZE ARMY. — MARSHAL MASSENA ASSUMES THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY OF PORTUGAL. — CIUDAD RODRIGO TAKEN BY THE FRENCH. — ACTION OF THE COA. — ALMEIDA INVESTED. — REMARKS.

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NAPOLEON was now at the zenith of his fame and power. The humiliation of Austria had completed his triumph over Continental Europe, and no country remained to dispute his pretension to universal empire but England; and even she trembled before the might of that extraordinary man, who no longer shackled in Germany, and relieved from all fear of the war being carried into his own country by the disastrous result of the expedition to Walcheren, determined to pour such an overwhelming force into Spain as should overcome all opposition to his will, and expel Wellington's army from the Peninsula.

Oct. 14. 1809. Belmas, vol. i. 103.

In furtherance of this intention, no sooner had the peace of Vienna been signed, than 120,000 veteran troops were directed upon Bayonne. At the same time Marshal Soult was appointed to succeed Jourdan as major-general and chief of the staff of the army in Spain: with his able assistance, and thus reinforced, King Joseph purposed commencing operations by the conquest of Andalusia.

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The state of affairs in that province was not such as to hold out a hope of its offering any serious resistance. There was no organization, either political or military, of a nature to give unity to the measures of defence called for on so pressing an emergency. The people were unmanageable and their leaders hopeless, notwithstanding the assurances put forth by the Supreme Junta that no danger was to be apprehended. Areizaga (who had reassembled some 20,000 of the scared troops of Ocaña), it was asserted, could defend the Sierra Morena against the whole power of France; and Alburquerque would fall upon the enemy's rear from the side of Estremadura; a second Baylen might therefore be expected. But while thus striving to delude the public mind, they openly sent property to Cadiz, and announced that their sittings would be transferred from Seville to that city on the 1st of February. This intelligence caused great discontent amongst the inhabitants of Seville, who saw clearly that they were to be abandoned by the Supreme Junta; which, in effect, soon after issued a decree for a levy of 100,000 men, and a forced loan of half the jewels, plate, and money belonging to individuals, and then betook themselves without delay to the task of providing for their own safety. But, in the hope of appeasing the people, who had now become dangerously clamorous, they offered the command of Areizaga's army, and the defence of the Sierra Morena, to Romana; which that general thought proper to decline.

Romana, sanguine as he was of the eventual issue of the contest in which his country had engaged, could not but see what must be the result of any attempt to defend Andalusia with the undisci-

plined rabble collected for that purpose in the Sierra Morena; for strong as is this mountain barrier, and great as were the advantages its shelter seemed to offer (considering the vast disparity of the contending armies), yet it, like all other mountain lines of defence, can only be held by resolute troops, and such the Spaniards had too often proved themselves not to be.

In its whole extent the lofty mountain chain that embraces Andalusia, cutting off that province from the rest of Spain, is pierced only by three routes suited to the operations of an army; and of these (under the circumstances of the moment) the enemy could avail themselves of but one, namely, that which entering the province directly from La Mancha, traverses the Sierra Morena by the pass of Despeña-perros, and advancing by La Carolina and Baylen, reaches the Guadalquivir at Andujar: this is the great road from Madrid to Cadiz. The other two, are the roads from Badajos to Seville, and from Murcia to Granada; both leading too circuitously from the enemy's base of operations to be adopted by them, and both being liable to interruption, — the former from its proximity to the Portugueze frontier, the latter from its leaving the still unconquered kingdom of Valencia on its left flank.

The Spaniards, consequently, turned all their attention to the defence of the direct road into Andalusia; and having by a vast accumulation of field works added, they conceived, so greatly to the natural strength of the pass of Despeña-perros as to render it inattackable, they began once more to dream of offensive operations; and the Supreme Junta actually ordered Alburquerque to act upon

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the enemy's flank, by advancing along the valley of the Guadiana, at the very moment the French columns were marching to attack Areizaga's positions in the Sierra Morena.

The arrival of powerful reinforcements to the French army in Spain, towards the close of the year 1809, induced King Joseph to carry into effect his long-cherished project of invading Andalusia without further delay.

Marshal Soult was accordingly directed to move toward that province with the 1st, 4th, and 5th corps, and the guards (in all about 60,000 men); while General Reynier, with the 2d corps, took post in the valley of the Tagus to protect Madrid, watch the English army on the frontiers of Portugal, and cover the flank march of the force moving against Andalusia.*

Belmas, vol. i. 105.

La Pène, Conquête d'Andalousie.

The enemy established themselves at the foot of the Sierra Morena about the middle of January; Marshal Soult, with the 5th corps and reserves, taking post at Sta Cruz de Mudela, on the great road from Madrid (where, on the 18th, Joseph fixed his head-quarters), while Sebastiani, with the 4th corps, occupying Villa Nueva de los Infantes on the left, threatened to turn the pass of Despeñaperros by the mountain tracks which present themselves on that side; and at the same time Marshal Victor, with the 1st corps, establishing himself at Almaden de Azogue (70 miles off on the right), pushed his reconnoitring parties to Sta Eufemia and Belalcazar, leading the Spaniards to suppose

* Napoleon recommended that the 5th corps should be employed on this service, it being composed of the *best troops*. The following passage occurs in a letter from Berthier to King Joseph on this subject:—"*L'Empereur considère qu'il n'y a de dangereux en Espagne que les Anglais; que le reste n'est que de la canaille qui ne peut jamais tenir en campagne.*" — Belmas, vol. i. p. 423.

that the principal efforts of their adversaries would be directed in that quarter. The simultaneous advance of the corps assembled at these different points was fixed for the 20th of January.

The Spanish general, alarmed by the demonstrations on his flanks, and deeming the pass of Despeña-perros quite safe, from the numerous works which had been thrown up for its defence, drew off some of the troops from that point to reinforce his right, and consequently in no part did his extended position present a really strong front. On the day fixed, the enemy advanced to the attack. The intrenchments of the Spaniards on the main road, assailed in front and turned at the same time on both flanks, were carried one after another almost without firing a shot; and following up their success, the troops of the French centre reached La Carolina late in the night, driving the Spaniards before them in the greatest disorder.

Sebastiani, on the left, encountered a more obstinate resistance; but he eventually succeeded in carrying the positions of La Venta Nueva and Venta Quemada, their defenders becoming alarmed lest the loss of the principal pass of Despeña-perros should cause them to be cut off. Areizaga, with these troops, attempted to make a stand on the following morning behind the Guadalen at Arquillos, but was dislodged and driven across the Guadalquivir, leaving the bridges on that river near Baeza and Ubeda in the enemy's hands. The advanced guard of the French centre reached Andujar on the same day, and secured the bridge at that point.

La Pène, Conq. d'Andalousie.

Jan. 12.

Whilst these operations were in progress on the left and centre, Victor on the right, having alarmed Alburquerque for his communications with Seville,

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by pushing his parties towards Hinajosa and Guadalcanal, broke up from Almaden and marched, without artillery or baggage, in an opposite direction*, following a rude mountain path (left altogether unoccupied) which leads into the valley of the Guadalquivir by way of Torrecampo and Adamuz; and he thus reached Montoro at the same time that Soult and Sebastiani gained the bridges on the upper part of the river.

The three corps of the French army having thus successfully effected the passage of the Sierra Morena, were now again in communication with each other; they had moreover obtained complete command of the course of the Guadalquivir, and had no enemy's force of any description between them and Cadiz; for the wreck of Areizaga's army had fled eastward to Jaen, and Alburquerque's small corps was still on the north side of the mountains in Estremadura.

Fortunately for the Spanish cause, King Joseph deemed the dispersion of the runaways from Despeña-perros essential for the security of his army during its flank march along the valley of the Guadalquivir; and accordingly despatching Sebastiani in pursuit of Areizaga, he halted with the centre and right, until he heard of the success of the operations of his lieutenant.

Sebastiani immediately advanced against Jaen; from which place, though a very strong post, he dislodged Areizaga's dispirited troops without difficulty. They fled to Alcalá la Real; and there, hoping probably that the recollection of Alfonso the Eleventh's glorious victory would inspire his troops with courage, the Spanish general again de-

* Precis des Campagnes, &c., par de Lieut.-Col. Augoyat, p. 61.

termined to try the chance of battle; but all discipline was gone, and they would scarcely await the enemy's attack: 5000 of them, casting away their arms, fled to Gibraltar; Areizaga himself escaped with a few followers into Murcia; the rest dispersed and returned to their homes. The road to Granada being thus thrown open, Sebastiani pushed on, and entered that city on the 28th January.

Soult, who in the first instance had contented himself with sending forward parties of cavalry to scour the country to the westward, advanced to Cordoba on the 27th, on hearing of the success obtained over Areizaga on the left; and King Joseph established himself in the ancient capital of the Western Caliphs on the 28th, the same day that Sebastiani obtained possession of the scarcely less celebrated metropolis of the last Moorish kings of Spain.

The halt of the French at Andujar and Montoro now proved to have been fatal to their project of securing Cadiz; for Alburquerque no sooner became aware of the enemy's movements, than, finding it impossible to obey the numberless conflicting orders sent him by the Supreme Junta, he determined to be guided solely by his own judgment in the course he should pursue to counteract the design of his adversaries. Leaving, therefore, General Contreras in Estremadura with a force of 4500 men to garrison Badajos, he marched with all possible expedition to cover Seville, sending his cavalry and artillery round by the great road to that city by Santa Olalla and El Ronquillo, and proceeding himself with 8000 infantry to Guadalcanal, on which point he imagined Victor would direct his march after crossing the sierra. From

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The duke's troops, (who had performed a march which fully equalled that of General Craufurd's division on the last day of the battle of Talavera,) reached Carmona, weary, footsore, and desponding, late in the evening of the 24th January. Fortunately the enemy had not pushed on their parties to that place, for the appearance of a French dragoon would probably have sufficed to disperse them. Alburquerque could now afford time to give his soldiers a brief rest, finding that by his able and rapid movements he had succeeded in interposing his small corps between Cadiz and the French army.

On the news of the passes of the Sierra Morena having been forced reaching Seville, the populace, who attributed every misfortune that befel the Spanish armies to the misconduct of the Supreme Junta, became clamorous for the deposition of that body, and even with vindictive rage demanded the lives of several of its members. They decamped, therefore, without loss of time, to Cadiz, purposing to resume their authority within the walls of that

Jan. 24. fortress; and the Provincial Junta was re-established by acclamation. Preparations were now made to defend the city, the Sevillanos expressing their determination to rival in heroic self-devotion

the inhabitants of Zaragoza. This probably was but Andalusian bombast; but no opportunity was afforded of putting their courage to the test, the traitors in whose hands they had placed the reins of government having already decided on opening the gates of Seville, and giving in their adhesion to the intrusive king.

La Pène, Conquête d'Andalousie.

Alburquerque remained in position at Carmona until the 29th, hoping thereby to give time for both Seville and the Isla de Leon to be placed in a defensible state; but finding that a French column was creeping round his right flank by a road which from Ecija led to Utrera (in his rear) more directly than his own line of retreat to that place by the Chaussée, and that by remaining longer at Carmona, he might be cut off from Cadiz, it became necessary for him to decide upon abandoning either that place or Seville. Justly considering that the resistance of the latter, let it be ever so obstinate, would not deter the French from moving against the former, it being a point of so much greater importance, he resolved at once to leave Seville to its fate and throw himself into the Isla de Leon. It was fortunate that a man so decided as Alburquerque commanded this last remnant of the army of Andalusia, for half an hour's hesitation would have lost both it and Cadiz.

Falling back rapidly to Utrera, the Spanish rear guard reached that place as the French cavalry came in sight, advancing in an opposite direction, from Arajal; and Alburquerque had to engage in a cavalry skirmish to cover the march of his infantry and guns. Pushing on with all practicable expedition, followed for some distance, but little harassed by the cavalry of Victor's corps, the Spaniards

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reached the shore of the Bay of Cadiz on the 2d of February, and securing the Puente Zuazo, entered the Isla de Leon on the following morning. Alburquerque thus a second time saved Cadiz by the ability and celerity of his movements.

Soult had moved Victor's corps forward from Ecija on the 29th; but finding the position of Carmona abandoned, the French army inclining to the right was directed upon Seville*; which city, with its magnificent cannon foundry, gun-powder manufactory, stores, and arsenal containing 260 pieces of brass artillery, surrendered on the 31st January without firing a shot; and King Joseph now seeing that he should have but slight opposition to encounter in Andalusia, directed Sebastiani to establish himself on the coast of Granada, with a view to future operations against Valencia. That general accordingly, marching from Granada, pushed on through the mountains of Alhama and Loja to Malaga, dispersing in his way some large bodies of peasantry which had collected to dispute the passage at the old Moorish town of Alhama and in the vicinity of Antequera, and following up his advantages closely, entered Malaga pêle mêle with

* Several French historians have criticised this movement of Joseph's, maintaining that it was undertaken contrary to the advice of Marshal Soult (*Bignon*, vol. ix. p. 268.); and that by it the opportunity was lost of seizing upon the Isla de Leon (*Belmas*, vol. i. p. 109.; *Augoyat*, p. 62.). The opportunity was lost by halting at Montoro and Andujar; for had Victor's corps been pushed on rapidly from the former place after crossing the Sierra Morena, it might have reached Seville, and consequently Cadiz, before Alburquerque: but after the Spanish general had succeeded in gaining Carmona on the night of the 24th—the French being still on the Upper Guadalquivir—it became impossible to cut him off from the Isla de Leon, unless he committed some egregious mistake. That the French, after their arrival at Ecija (on the 28th) could, "by marching on Cadiz by Moron and Utrera, have reached that city *four days* before Alburquerque" (*Belmas*, vol. i. p. 109.), is an absurdity too manifest to require contradiction.

the fugitives on the 5th of February. Thus within a fortnight from the commencement of their operations, and with the loss of but 200 men, the enemy had made themselves masters of the whole of Andalusia, excepting the Isla de Leon and the rugged coast tract (the Alpujarras) lying between the Sierra Nevada and the Mediterranean; and even the rude mountaineers of this latter district soon afterwards submitted. But Cadiz — the grand object of their desires — had been saved; and failing in obtaining that, an army of 60,000 men had been paralysed, which might have been of much more essential service elsewhere.

Belmas, vol. i. 109

Meanwhile, the utmost confusion prevailed at Cadiz. The fugitive members of the Supreme Junta were not permitted to resume any authority within that city, and a municipal junta was elected by general ballot. But although denied all share of power, the members of the Supreme Junta, by their last public act, not only nominated a regency, but actually succeeded in forcing the municipal assembly to acquiesce in the measure; and the Bishop of Orense, General Castaños, Francisco de Saavedra, Antonio de Escaño, and Fernandez de Leon were appointed Regents until a general cortes could be assembled.

Had Marshal Victor, who, after the surrender of Seville, followed Alburquerque with his whole corps, made an energetic attempt upon Cadiz immediately on reaching the coast, it is thought, considering the anarchy that prevailed within its walls, and the wretched state of the defences of the Isla de Leon, that he might easily have succeeded in possessing himself of this last Spanish stronghold; for what resistance could have been

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offered by 8000 ill-disciplined troops, unsupported as they would have been by either the inhabitants or authorities of the place, against the French force of 25,000 men assembled on the shores of the Bay of Cadiz?

The capture of this important fortress would have been a severe blow to the Peninsular cause; and such a result might certainly have been obtained, by a little more daring and rapidity in the enemy's movements. In other respects their operations, as far as regards simply the invasion of Andalusia, were ably planned and scientifically conducted. But the invasion itself was the greatest mistake committed by the French during the Spanish contest; for the subjugation, and consequent occupation of Andalusia, diverted 60,000 men from Portugal, and perhaps saved Wellington. Thus we may consider the disastrous battle of Ocaña, which opened the Sierra Morena to the enemy, as more beneficial to the cause than the capitulation of Baylen! It has been pretended that the invasion of Andalusia was undertaken contrary to the wish of Napoleon; but we incline to think that Joseph, however strongly incited to the step by Soult,—who, it is said, wished to avoid performing a secondary part in the intended operations against Lord Wellington, — would never have dared to proceed in it without the sanction of the Emperor; and it is unquestionable that the latter, in ignorance of the British general's military genius and resources, deemed the army of Portugal fully adequate to the task of expelling the British, and again subjecting that country to his rule.

Jomini, Vie Politique et Militaire de Napoleon.

Alburquerque now exerted himself to place the Isla de Leon in a state to resist any sudden attack;

but considering his small force insufficient for its defence, an application for assistance was despatched to Lord Wellington, who lost no time in sending to Cadiz all the disposable British troops then at Lisbon, amounting to near 2000 men, under Major-General the Hon. W. Stewart; 1000 more were furnished from Gibraltar; and a Portugueze regiment 1300 strong soon after arriving, an Anglo-Portugueze force of more than 4000 troops was assembled at Cadiz by the 17th February. This opportune reinforcement restored confidence to the Spanish garrison, and dissipated the alarm of the junta and inhabitants of the city, who having in the first moment of fear and gratitude declared the Duke of Alburquèrque governor of the city, had now leisure to revert to the old system of intrigue and false accusations, to remove him from the command; and the rapid retreat which had saved their city by half an hour was now reprobated as too precipitate! This truly patriotic nobleman, contrary to the wish of the Regency, resigned the post to which he had been called by public acclamation but a few weeks before, rather than cause dissension; and went as ambassador to England, where he died in the course of a few months.

Having given the above slight sketch of the principal transactions in the south of Spain, we return to Portugal, where Lord Wellington, whose plans for protecting Lisbon being matured, calmly awaited the enemy's approach.

When Sir John Moore gave it as his opinion that Portugal could not be defended by the army under his orders, he little expected how greatly that opinion would embarrass Lord Wellington; who

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Apr. 2.

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had now to contend against a strong prejudice entertained by persons who ought to have been aware that the situation of the country was in many respects different from what Sir John Moore found it, as well as of the fact, that little or nothing was known of Portugal by that commander.

Lord Wellington was satisfied that while a British army kept the field in Portugal, the contest must continue in Spain; and that however desirous the French might be to force him out of the country, they would have a difficulty in bringing such an army to bear upon him as could effect that object, without abandoning others of material consequence, and exposing the whole fabric of their power in Spain to great risk. He also knew that an unsuccessful invasion would throw them into a very dangerous situation, having to retreat through a country so barren of resources for the support of a large army as Portugal.

He had taken infinite pains to obtain, by actual observation, a thorough knowledge of those intricate districts which lie between Lisbon and the eastern frontier; and having calmly and deliberately weighed all the circumstances of his difficult position, had arrived at the conclusion, that he should be able to maintain himself in advance of the capital of Portugal, whatever exertions might be made by the enemy to compel his withdrawal from the Peninsula; and in the event of failure he felt assured of effecting the embarkation of his army without loss.

By a royal decree published at Lisbon on the 23d of November, 1810, and dated at Rio Janeiro in July of the preceding year, Lord Wellington was confirmed in the appointment of Marshal-General of the

forces of Portugal; and the Regency were commanded to invite the Marshal-General to all their sittings on important deliberations, whether civil or financial.

Let us now see what steps were taken by Lord Wellington in furtherance of the gigantic project which his genius and fortitude had dictated. As Marshal-General of Portugal, he insisted upon holding absolute control over the operations of the Portugueze land forces of every description, independent of the local government. He then required of the Regency an enforcement of the ancient military laws of the kingdom, by which all men could be called on to bear arms. His next proceeding was to demand that while he faced the enemy in the field, steps should be taken to lay waste the country; to destroy the bridges, mills, dwellings, &c.; to compel the inhabitants to carry off their property; and, in short, to oppose every possible obstacle to the support and progress of the enemy upon whatever line he might select for his invasion.

At this period Lord Wellington's force in the field consisted of near 25,000 British, an equal number of regular Portugueze troops, well armed and equipped, and 26,000 militia. Besides these, there were the *ordenanças*, who, however, were of little account. Thus the British general had under his orders about 80,000 men.

The frontier of Portugal, from Braganza to the mouth of the Guadiana, has an extent of 400 miles; to defend which, with such a force, was out of the question. It therefore became necessary for Lord Wellington to confine his defensive operations to a limited space immediately covering Lisbon; and thus restricted, his system of defence comprised

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the country within the northern and eastern frontiers of Beira and the Tagus; while from the northern and southern provinces of the kingdom, irregular troops should act offensively, by closing upon the flanks and rear of the invaders.

From the enemy's principal force being collected on the Tormes, and a conviction that their first efforts would be directed against Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, in order to secure those fortresses as places of arms on which to base their invasive operations, Lord Wellington had posted divisions of his army at Pinhel, Celerico, Guarda, and Viseu, his cavalry being in the valley of the Mondego; while General Hill's corps remained, as before noticed, at Abrantes and Portalegre to observe the country south of the Tagus. The fortresses of Almeida and Elvas were partly garrisoned by regular Portugueze troops; and the remainder, excepting a regiment at Cadiz, were at Thomar and Abrantes. Twenty-one regiments, under British and Spanish leaders, occupied the country north of the Douro; four regiments were stationed in the Alemtejo, including the garrisons; and three regiments held the Algarve fortresses. The rest of the militia, consisting of twelve regiments, were in Portugueze Estremadura.

In this disposition, the strength of the combined army was in the centre, while militia and ordenança formed the wings; and by the admirable arrangements of Lord Wellington, upwards of 30,000 of his best troops could be assembled in two marches upon any point menaced by the enemy. In order to facilitate the operations of his right wing under General Hill, a bridge of boats was thrown across the Tagus at Abrantes, and another over the Ze-

zere: an excellent road was also formed from Abrantes by the left bank of the Tagus to Villa Velha, where a flying bridge communicated with a good road leading to Castel Branco.

Lord Wellington's views in thus posting his troops were — 1st, to watch, in a central situation, the proceedings of the enemy; 2dly, to be at hand to succour Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and perhaps to strike a blow to aid their defence; 3dly, to harass and retard the enemy's operations when he should commence the expected invasion, and probably give battle under favourable circumstances. But the grand defensive measure, and that upon which he relied for barring the enemy's progress to the capital, lay in a gigantic application of the principles of field fortification to a district marked out by nature for a defensive position; a description of which will be hereafter given.

Since the period when Lord Wellington devised his magnificent plan for the defence of Lisbon, and maintaining himself in Portugal, adversity had borne heavily on the affairs of Spain. By the inconsiderate conduct of the Supreme Junta, and rashness of the Spanish generals, the armies of Areizaga and Del Parque, instead of taking up strong defensive positions with a view to holding the enemy in check and keeping several corps employed in observing them, according to the British general's advice, had madly rushed forward to destruction. The consequences were, that as no Spanish force remained of sufficient strength to dispute the passage of the Sierra Morena, Andalusia had been overrun, Seville occupied, and the left flank of the main French army secured during the projected operations against Portugal.

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Thus circumstances were materially altered, and the aspect of affairs was become entirely different from what Lord Wellington had contemplated; for he now saw that no assistance of any consequence would be rendered by the Spaniards, and that the French could with safety dispose of a very large force for the attack of the allies. Nevertheless, he perceived no cause for immediate alarm; and confident that adequate provision had been made for securing the embarkation of the British army, whatever might be the result of the invasion of Portugal, he stood prepared nobly to perform his own part in the impending struggle, and to hold his ground so long as a single chance remained of saving the Peninsula.

But the difficulties which environed Lord Wellington in Portugal, were not the only obstacles that opposed themselves to the maintenance of the British army in the Peninsula. As if seeking by every possible means to serve the enemy and dispirit their own countrymen, the leading members of the Opposition loudly raised their voices against the folly of attempting to resist the will of Bonaparte; boldly asserting that no efforts on the part of Great Britain could avert the fate of the Peninsula, from which Wellington and his army would speedily be driven with ignominy, even if they were so fortunate as to make their escape. In the House of Peers, Lord Grenville asked, "was there any man that heard him, who in his conscience believed that even the sacrifice of the whole of that brave British army would secure the kingdom of Portugal? If I receive from any person an answer in the affirmative, I shall be able to judge by that answer of the capacity of such a person for the

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government of this country, or even for the transaction of public business in a deliberative assembly. By whatever circumstances, by whatever kind of fate it was, I must say that I always thought the object of the enterprise impossible; but now I believe it is known to all the people of this country that it has become certainly impossible."

General the Earl of Moira said, during the same debate, that "every thing which the ministers attempted betrayed, as the universal opinion of the public pronounced, a total want of judgment, foresight, and vigour; and as the climax of error, they now seemed resolved to defend Portugal, ... according to a plan of defence, too, which was perfectly impracticable."

It appears that the common council of the city of London participated in the sentiments of the opposition party; having petitioned parliament to institute an "inquiry into the circumstances connected with the failure of the late expedition into the interior of Spain," representing Lord Wellington's conduct as "exhibiting, with equal rashness and ostentation, nothing but a useless valour."

Feb. 26. Alison, vol. vii. 809.

Happily ministers were steadfast in their purpose to support the Peninuslar contest, and the requisite supplies were voted for the Portugueze troops. But still timidity marked their proceedings; and instead of reposing in Lord Wellington the confidence he had already merited by the wisdom of his conduct, and boldly reinforcing his army, all their measures were directed towards assuring its withdrawal in safety. Thus, although he had fixed 30,000 British troops, effective in the field, as the minimum for defending Portugal in conjunction with the Portugueze forces, he now found himself with less than

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25,000, when circumstances were infinitely more unfavourable than at the time that estimate was made.

But it is plain that ministers partook not in the fervour and magnanimity of their general. Confiding in the energy and resources of his own great mind, he shrank not from responsibility; they, on the contrary, sought to make him accountable for the consequences of retaining the army in Portugal. Fortunately he was equal to every emergency; and Lord Wellesley having accepted the department of foreign affairs under a new ministry, he felt assured of receiving that support at home which he had hitherto looked for in vain, and without which he never could have prosecuted those great views that eventually led to the liberation of the Peninsula, and so largely contributed to the overthrow of Napoleon.

The enemy might now be considered virtually masters of the whole of Spain, excepting Cadiz and Gibraltar; for the army of Blake had sustained a complete defeat at Belchite early in June, and the year 1809 closed with the capture of Gerona after a protracted and gallant defence; and experience having shown that no Spanish armies could arrest their progress, the French had only to suit their own convenience in taking military possession of whatever portions of Spain they pleased, as it was evident that no want of men for such a purpose was likely to be felt. And however difficult may be the complete subjugation of a strong country inhabited by a brave and high-spirited race, yet the disjointed efforts of a guerrilla warfare against the military power of France, though they might retard, could never avert the catastrophe.

Under the active superintendence of Marshal

Beresford, the Portugueze regular troops had arrived at a respectable state of discipline, notwithstanding the difficulties which had to be encountered amid such corruption as prevailed in every department, both civil and military, at Lisbon; but the plan of transferring British officers to serve with the Portugueze troops was found to succeed perfectly, and Lord Wellington now felt persuaded for the first time, that he was about to be aided by an efficient Peninsular force.

We do not think that military writers have given a due degree of credit to Marshal Beresford for his highly valuable services as commander-in-chief of the Portugueze army, which from the beginning of 1810 fought side by side with the British troops throughout the long and arduous contest maintained in the Peninsula: a proof, if any were necessary, that good officers only require a docile soldiery to form at any time an efficient army; but of this truth our Indian forces offer a far more striking example than that afforded by the Portugueze troops.

At the period now under consideration, when Lord Wellington had hopes, notwithstanding all his difficulties, of maintaining himself in Portugal, he had only 25,000 British and 30,000 Portugueze, effective troops; and, indeed, several regiments of the latter still remained in garrison to complete their course of training. The enemy, on the other hand, had received a reinforcement under Junot, whose corps (the 8th) arrived at Valladolid on the 14th of February, 30,000 strong, including 6000 cavalry. This force was soon after employed in besieging Astorga, which fell on the 22d of April, having gallantly held out during an entire month.

Belmas, vol. i. 115.

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Junot then moved towards the Tormes, and united with Ney, who had been making some demonstrations against Lord Wellington.

The French had long entertained hopes that Napoleon himself would arrive, and enjoy the triumph of driving the British army out of the Peninsula, and their disappointment was great to find that he had deputed this task to Marshal Massena, — "*l'enfant gaté de la victoire,*" — whom he appointed commander-in-chief of the whole of the north of Spain. The total amount of troops thereby placed under the marshal's orders was 110,000 men; of which number he was able to assemble 70,000 to march against Portugal, besides leaving several strong divisions to watch the northern provinces.

From the early part of March, the enemy had been extended by divisions, between the Tormes and San Felices, having posts on the Agueda. Brigadier-General R. Craufurd, in command of the light division of the British army and some Portugueze troops, had also posts established on that river; whilst his division lay between it and the Coa, supported by the 3d division under General Picton at Pinhel. It was Lord Wellington's intention to collect his army upon the latter river, in case the enemy should attack Ciudad Rodrigo with such a force only as would justify him in an attempt to relieve the fortress.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Mar. 11.

On the 19th of March, the French made a bold attempt to surprise one of Craufurd's advanced posts at the village of Barba del Puerco on the Agueda, which was repulsed in a gallant manner by Colonel Beckwith, in command of four companies of the 95th rifle corps.

Already had Lord Wellington formed an un-

favourable opinion of the enemy's proceedings, and been confirmed in his own defensive measures; as is shown by the following extract from a letter to Colonel Torrens, military secretary to the Duke of York: —

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Mar. 31.

"I can give you no news. The French threaten us on all points, and are most desirous to get rid of us. But they threaten upon too many points at a time to give me much uneasiness respecting any one in particular, and they shall not induce me to disconnect my army.

"I am in a situation in which no mischief can be done to the army, or to any part of it. I am prepared for all events; and if I am in a scrape, as appears to be the general belief in England, although certainly not my own, I'll get out of it."

At length Massena's preparations enabled him to open the campaign by the long-expected siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, which was fully invested on the 4th of June. This fortress, standing on an unfavourable site, — the works being commanded, — was not expected to make any protracted resistance against an attack from an army of 50,000 men well provided for the siege. Nevertheless, Herrasti, its governor, ably seconded by a brave *partisan* leader, — the afterwards well-known Julian Sanchez, who with 200 mounted followers had been shut into the place, — manfully held out, and by his vigour and activity reduced the besiegers to the necessity of proceeding by rule. Seeing, however, that there was no longer any chance of being succoured, and that the town must speedily fall, he ordered Julian Sanchez to attempt an escape; this he happily effected on the night of the 22d; cutting his way through the French posts, and

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joining, without loss, the advanced division of the allied army. A practicable breach having been made and the counterscarp blown in*, so that no further obstacle presented itself to an assault, the brave old governor hoisted a white flag at the moment when the besiegers had mustered for storming, having held out during thirty-six days.

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Lord Wellington, whose head-quarters had been removed from Viseu to the village of Alverca, midway between Almeida and Celerico, to be at hand, should any opportunity offer for striking a blow during the siege, was compelled to stand by and witness the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo. But, as Napier justly remarks, "It was not a single campaign, but a terrible war, that he had undertaken. If he lost but five thousand men, his own government would abandon the contest; if he lost fifteen thousand, he must abandon it himself. His whole disposable force did not exceed 56,000 men: of these 12,000 were with Hill, and one half of the remainder were untried and raw; but this included all, even to the Portugueze cavalry and garrisons." Deducting, therefore, General Hill's corps, together with 8000 Portugueze stationed at Thomar for its support, rendered necessary by French troops recrossing the Sierra Morena marching towards Estremadura, 25,000 men only remained for an enterprise against Massena. To attempt an interruption of the siege with such a disparity of force would have been madness; operating too upon a part where all advantages of ground were in favour of the enemy, from his great superiority in cavalry. Ro-

Napier, vol. v. 281.

* Counterscarp, the outer wall of the ditch; which in a regular attack is blown down, in order to facilitate the descent of the troops into the ditch preparatory to an attack.

mana, who had been recently appointed to succeed del Parque, came from Badajos to press upon Lord Wellington the measure of endeavouring to bring off the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo; but no importunity of friends, nor taunts from Massena, could induce him to peril the cause in which he was engaged by embarking in a chivalrous, and, as he felt convinced, hopeless effort in favour of the besieged.

For nearly three months General Craufurd's division had maintained its ground between the Azava (a small tributary to the Agueda) and the Coa, with surprising boldness, considering the proximity of the enemy; and the extraordinary alertness and discipline of the light division were the admiration of the army. On the 4th of July, however, the French crossed the Agueda in force near Marialva, and compelled Craufurd's advance to fall back on Almeida, which movement was effected in good order, covered by two troops of cavalry and two guns, that skirmished in a very bold manner with the enemy's advanced horsemen; and Captain Krauchenberg, with his single troop of the 1st German hussars, charged a squadron of the French, killed many men, and drove back the remainder. Craufurd now posted his infantry in a wood near Fort Concepcion, while his cavalry, reinforced by the Spanish bands of Julian Sanchez and Carrera, was placed higher up the rivulet of Dos Casas. On the 11th another skirmish occurred, in which Colonel Talbot of the 14th dragoons fell when gallantly charging a square of French infantry.

The temerity of Craufurd, increased by the impunity with which he had braved the entire French army for so long a time in such an advanced posi-

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tion, was in the end nearly proving fatal to his fine division. On the morning of the 24th July it was drawn up in front of the Coa, near Almeida, in a very faulty position, the only retreat across that river being by a single narrow bridge about a mile in its rear. As the morning mist cleared away, a strong force of the enemy, afterwards ascertained to consist of 24,000 infantry, 4000 cavalry, and 30 guns, was seen in march towards the Turones, a stream running parallel to the Coa. Craufurd's orders were to retire, without fighting, to the left bank of the latter river, whenever the enemy should advance against him in strength; but in violation of his chief's commands, and with unpardonable rashness, he awaited Marshal Ney's approach, who, perceiving at once the dangerous situation of the British, attacked them with great impetuosity, and they were only enabled to effect their retreat over the bridge by combining remarkable skill with most determined bravery. Long and gallantly did the French, astonished at the hardihood of this handful of opponents, strive to force the passage of the bridge; but, undismayed by numbers, Craufurd's troops held their position firmly; and after making repeated attempts upon them, at a great sacrifice of men, the French were forced to draw off, with a loss of 1000 men in killed and wounded. That of the allies was 320, of whom more than 40 were Portugueze.

Craufurd's danger was not yet past; for he durst not retire from the bridge, and the French might send a force to cross by that of Castel Bom, about two miles on the right of the British, and overpower them between the Coa and Pinhel rivers; a danger which could have been prevented by General Pic-

ton, had he thought proper to bring up his division from Pinhel; which he declined doing, although, having rode forward to the Coa, he saw the hazard to which Craufurd was exposed. The French did not attempt this manœuvre, and at night-fall the troops were withdrawn.

We must now take a glance at what was going forward in Estremadura. Before the middle of February, the enemy had collected a considerable force in that province, composed of the 2d corps, which, it will be recollected, had been left on the Tagus when Joseph invaded Andalusia, and the 4th (Mortier's), which had re-crossed the Sierra Morena, on the subjugation of that province. On learning that the French were in force upon the Guadiana, General Hill put his troops in motion, Feb. 12. and advanced from Abrantes to Portalegre; a movement which caused the French to retire from the vicinity of Badajos after summoning the fortress. About the middle of March, Mortier again passed into Andalusia, leaving the 2d corps, about 12,000 strong, under General Reynier, in the neighbourhood of Merida, where it remained till early in July; when Massena, being on the eve of entering Portugal, Reynier marched by Truxillo and Caceres, crossed she Tagus at Almaraz, and finally taking post at Coria, became the left of the army of Portugal. By this wide movement, he escaped an attack from General Hill, who had been closely observing him; and who immediately marched to Villa Velha, there passed the Tagus, and reached Castel Branco on the 21st July. Being soon afterwards joined by a body of Portugueze cavalry under General Fane, he encamped with 16,000 men and eighteen guns at Sarzedas, holding the former place

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with an advanced guard. To facilitate his communications over the Serra de Estrella with Guarda, the head-quarters of the 4th division, he posted a Portugueze brigade at Fundaõ, which covered the Estrada Nova,—a road from Abrantes to Almeida by Cardigos and Guarda, which avoids the mountains on the left bank of the Zezere. In this position he was supported by General Leith, who at the head of 2000 British infantry, recently landed at Lisbon, and 8000 Portugueze troops, was stationed at Thomar, ready to move either towards Lord Wellington or General Hill, as circumstances might require. Thus was the line of the Zezere well secured against attack.

General Reynier made some demonstrations from Coria upon Salvaterra, but nothing of moment occurred; and in the mean time, Massena, learning that he had crossed the Tagus, directed Ney to pass the Agueda, which led to the above-mentioned action of the Coa.

Almeida, which contained a Portugueze garrison commanded by Colonel Cox, an English officer, was now nominally invested; but with Ciudad Rodrigo as a place of arms, there was no absolute necessity for the enemy to prosecute the siege, as the former fortress could be easily masked, while Massena moved forward against Lord Wellington. The day after the Coa action, Loison's advanced guard was at Pinhel, while Reynier's corps lay between Zarza Mayor and Penamacor, having boats on the Tagus near Alcantara; so that there was nothing as yet in Massena's dispositions from which Wellington could infer by what line his adversary purposed advancing.

Anxious to retain his forward position as long as possible, Lord Wellington made no movement until

the 28th July, when he withdrew his infantry behind the Mondego, excepting the 4th division, which was continued at Guarda. Still the French seemed in no haste to commence serious operations, and even after this withdrew across the Coa, thereby leaving open the communication with Almeida.

The discouraging circumstances under which Lord Wellington was conducting this great contest are shown in a letter addressed to the Earl of Liverpool on the 19th August, from which we shall make a few extracts. He says, —.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 19.

"Nothing can be more irksome to me than the operations which have been carried on for the last year; and it is very obvious that a continuance of the same cautious system will lose the little reputation which I had acquired, and the good opinion of the people of this country. Nothing, therefore, could be more desirable to me personally than that either the contest should be given up at once, or that it should be continued with a force sufficient to render all opposition hopeless.

"In either case the obloquy heaped upon me by the ignorant of our own country, as well as of this, and by those of this whom I am obliged to force to exertion, and who, after all, will be but imperfectly protected in their persons and property, would fall upon the government. But seeing, as I do, more than a chance of final success if we can maintain our position in this country, although probably none of a departure from our cautious defensive system, I should not do my duty by the government if I did not inform them of the real situation of affairs, and urge them, with importunity even, to greater exertion.

"I acknowledge that it has appeared to me, till very lately, that the government themselves felt no confidence in the measures which they were adopting in this country; and not an officer has come from England who has not told me that it was generally expected that he would, on his arrival, find the army embarking; and even some have told me that this expectation was entertained by some of the King's ministers.

"These sentiments are not encouraging; and I acknowledge that I have been induced to attribute the little exertion which has lately been made in the cause to this

CHAP. XXII. want of confidence of the members of the government in the result of the contest."

1810. It is well known that although the Peninsular contest was popular in England, yet at this particular juncture, when, it must be allowed, the aspect of affairs seemed most unpromising, doubt and apprehension prevailed to a great extent in the public mind. It was impossible either for ministers or the people to form at that moment a correct notion of the state and prospect of things in Portugal; nay, even enlightened officers serving with the army were unequal to the task. There was but one man in existence capable of judging with accuracy, and well was it that he exercised influence enough to keep the British government steadfast in the cause. Wellington alone had justly calculated all the chances, and he alone knew the precise amount of his resources. It would be unjust then to blame too severely opinions formed from imperfect data. The preparations made at Torres Vedras — the excellence of the British, and improved state of the Portugueze army — an accurate estimate of the resources and difficulties of the French — but above all a just confidence in his own genius and ability, formed the foundation of our great captain's hopes and expectations; and the world at large knew comparatively little of these. But we shall shortly see how all corresponded to previous calculation, and combined to prepare a triumph far surpassing the most splendid of his numerous victories.

If any thing were wanting to confirm Lord Wellington in his far-stretching views for the deliverance of the Peninsula, it was at this period supplied by some intercepted letters, containing an accurate description from authentic sources of the state of af-

fairs in Spain. Copies and extracts of these were transmitted to England; and Lord Wellington thus writes upon the occasion:—

"His Majesty's government will see in these letters a description of the difficulties under which the enemy labour, in consequence of the operations of the guerrillas, notwithstanding the large force which, there is no doubt whatever, is employed in Spain; and the whole of the information before them will probably convince them, as it has me, that the enemy cannot conquer Spain without a force still larger; and that they cannot increase their force in the Peninsula, even admitting that they possess the military means, without increasing their pecuniary and other difficulties and distresses. Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 19.

"I beg also to draw the attention of his Majesty's government to the opinions delivered by these excellent authorities of the value of Portugal to the allies, of the mischiefs done to them by its continuance in our possession, and of the benefit which they expect to derive by depriving us of this possession.

"There are other evidences from these same authorities in these papers of the great interests involved in the continuance of the contest of the Peninsula, which equally deserve the attention of his Majesty's government; but I wish to draw their attention to those parts of the correspondence which relate to the British army and to this country, as confirming every opinion that I have ever given them upon this part of the subject.

"It will be unfortunate if Great Britain should not possess the means of securing still further the position of his Majesty's troops in Portugal, so as to ensure the continuance of the contest in the Peninsula, which it is evident must end favourably for his Majesty's interests, if his army can be maintained in the field in Portugal."

Throughout these pages, there is nothing we have sought to press more strongly upon the reader than the accurate perception of circumstances and great foresight of the illustrious subject of this biography; and we believe it is not too much to assert, that every important feature of the long and arduous struggle maintained in the Peninsula

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accorded most astonishingly with his predictions during its early stages. Perhaps it required no prophetic power to foretel that uniform disaster would attend all Spanish operations; but the following sentence, which occurs in a letter to Lord Castlereagh, written immediately after the battle of Talavera, looks surprisingly like the gift of *second sight*: — "The French, in the last battle, threw their whole force upon us; and although it did not succeed, and will not succeed in future, we shall lose great numbers of men which we can but ill afford." Now it is not more strange than true that, throughout the whole Peninsular war, "the most diligent research furnishes no instance of the French having, at the conclusion of any of the several general actions in the Peninsula, retained possession of any principal post, or prominent feature of ground, previously occupied by the British; nor, in their defensive general actions, of their having maintained any position from which the British made an effort to dislodge them."

Sir J. Jones. War in Spain, Preface.

CHAPTER XXIII.

FALL OF ALMEIDA. — THE FRENCH ADVANCE TO THE MONDEGO. — BATTLE OF BUSACO. — THE ALLIED ARMY RETIRES TO THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS. — DESCRIPTION OF THE LINES. — VEXATIOUS CONDUCT OF PRINCIPAL DE SOUZA, AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE REGENCY. — THE FRENCH WITHDRAW TO SANTAREM. — OBSERVATIONS ON THE CAMPAIGN.

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At length Massena caused Almeida to be really invested, and ground was broken before the place on the night of the 15th of August. Lord Wellington then recrossed the Mondego, occupying Pinhel, Freixadas, and Guarda with British troops, and keeping the Portugueze, who had been brought up from Thomar, &c. in the rear; his object in collecting the allied army again to the front being "to oblige the enemy to keep their forces assembled during the operations of the siege, and thus increase their difficulties as to subsistence, and afford more scope for the operations of the guerrillas, and opportunities for the resistance of the people of Castile." He had great hopes that a vigorous defence of Almeida would occupy the enemy for six weeks or two months; when the rains setting in, additional advantages would arise for the defence of the country. But while considering what measures to pursue in order to distress the enemy, or perhaps bring off the garrison eventually, a terrible disaster confounded all his calculations, and dealt a severe blow to his plans.

Mem. of Operations. Gurwood.

Almeida was a modern fortress of considerable strength, though not free from defects in its con-

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struction; and being well provided for defence, was expected to make a stout resistance. The first batteries opened their fire on the 26th, from 60 pieces of artillery. On the evening of that day, a shell falling among some barrels of gunpowder that stood at the door of the great magazine, caused an explosion which was felt like the shock of an earthquake; — levelling houses, destroying hundreds of the soldiers and inhabitants, injuring the defences, and striking terror and dismay into the Portugueze garrison. On the following morning, Massena summoned the place to surrender; but Colonel Cox, a resolute officer, would have held out for two or three days longer, in the hope of being relieved, notwithstanding the loss of nearly all the ammunition, had not his Portugueze lieutenant-governor openly mutinied, and the chief of artillery, whom he had sent to negotiate with the enemy, treacherously informed them of the real condition of the fortress. Cox was compelled to surrender on the 27th, and the regular troops of his garrison became prisoners of war; while the militia were, by the terms granted, to be dismissed to their homes, and not to serve again: conditions which were violated by Massena, who detained the whole in his camp; and having induced the regular regiment to take service with the French, it was placed under the command of the Marques d'Alorna, a renegade Portugueze nobleman.

In the mean time Marshal Mortier once more returned into Estremadura, a movement for which Massena had probably been waiting when he delayed the investment of Almeida; and the Spanish generals in that quarter having as usual neglected Lord Wellington's exhortations to remain tranquil

in good positions, the united forces of Romana and Ballasteros, amounting to 15,000 men, rashly ventured to approach the French corps. The consequence was, that Romana's advanced guard being attacked at Benvenida, lost 600 men, and the enemy afterwards killed or took 400 more while pursuing his main body.

The projects of Massena still continued to be undeveloped, and the movements of his troops threw no light whatever upon his intentions. Thus Reynier, after losing a squadron in a demonstration against Castel Branco, suddenly appeared at Sabugal; but straightway returning to Zarza Mayor, he threw a bridge of boats over the Tagus at Alcantara.

Massena's dilatoriness in commencing vigorous operations is altogether unaccountable. Two months had now elapsed since the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo; and, save the accidental acquisition of Almeida, nothing of consequence had been effected. At length, by the middle of September, the French commander had drawn together the different corps of his army; Reynier's being at Guarda, Ney's and the heavy cavalry at Macal da Chaõ, and Junot's at Pinhel. Several feints were then made with a view to deceive the British general as to the line of invasion selected; but having ascertained that the troops at Guarda were of Reynier's corps, Lord Wellington immediately despatched orders for Generals Hill and Leith to concentrate on the Alva.

The first movements of the enemy disclosed the line chosen by their general for advancing upon Lisbon; and the British commander was rejoiced to find that, in profound ignorance of the country, he had fixed on the most disadvantageous route

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of all those which offered themselves to his selection.

In the mean time, General Leith arrived on the Alva; and General Hill, anticipating the order sent to him from observing Reynier's movements, had, with great judgment, marched as expeditiously as possible to the same river, directing his artillery on Thomar.

The enemy's whole army had now entered the valley of the Mondego, and the 2d and 6th corps reached Celerico on the 16th September. On the 17th they crossed the bridge of Fornos, pushing an advanced guard to Mongualda; but the 8th corps still kept upon the road leading towards Oporto. In the mean time 10,000 Portugueze militia, under Trant, Wilson, and Miller, had been collected on the Douro for the protection of that city; and to secure Coimbra against an advanced guard, Lord Wellington sent thither a body of infantry.

While the enemy were advancing from Celerico upon Viseu, the Portugueze militia harassed their march; and Colonel Trant made a bold attempt, on the 20th, to carry off their military chest and reserve artillery near Tojal. It did not succeed; but a number of the enemy fell into his hands, and the convoy retired towards the Douro in much alarm and confusion.

The French were not concentrated at Viseu till the 23d, on which day their advanced guard crossed the Criz; and two days after the whole of the 2d and 6th corps passed that stream near St Combadaõ.

Lord Wellington, who had with great skill brought his army together, was now determined to fight a battle; the Serra de Alcoba, or de Busaco,

offering him an advantageous position for the purpose, in front of Coimbra. This lofty ridge, rising precipitously from the Mondego, extends northwards about eight miles, and is connected by a mountainous tract of country with the Serra de Caramula; which, stretching in a north-east direction beyond Viseu, divides the valley of the Mondego from that of the Douro. On the opposite or southern side of the Mondego another ridge of a similar nature, called the Serra da Murcella, runs off towards the Serra de Estrella. All the roads to Coimbra from the eastward traverse one or another of these serras, which are all difficult of access to an army.

The entire French army being now on the right bank of the Mondego, Lord Wellington moved Hill's corps from its position on the Alva across the former river, on the morning of the 26th; leaving Colonel Le Cor's Portugueze brigade on the Serra da Murcella to protect the right of the army, and Brigadier-General Fane with a division of Portugueze cavalry and the 13th light dragoons, in front of the Alva, to observe and check the enemy's cavalry. With the exception of these troops, the whole of the allied infantry was collected on the Serra de Busaco; while the main body of the cavalry observed the plain in rear of the left, and the road leading from Mortigaõ towards Oporto.

On the evening of the 26th September, near 70,000 Frenchmen were assembled at the foot of the Serra de Busaco, whose summit was crowned by 50,000 opponents, about one half of whom were British. General Hill's corps was posted on the

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right, across the road leading over the serra to Pena Cova. On its left was General Leith's division, having the Lusitanian legion in reserve. Picton, with the third division, was next to Leith; and between it and a convent standing on the highest part of the ridge was the 1st division, under Spencer, having one of its brigades (Pack's) considerably in advance, and on the descent of the mountain. On the left of Pack was the light division, commanded by Craufurd, nearly half a mile in front of the convent; a swell of ground before it serving to conceal its presence from the enemy. In rear of the light division stood a brigade of German infantry. The fourth division (General Cole) held the extreme left of the ridge, covering the road which led across to Mealhada, where the cavalry was stationed. Fifty pieces of cannon were planted on the most salient points of the position, and a line of skirmishers was thrown out along its front.

On this occasion the Portugueze were posted by brigades with the several divisions; the good effect of which arrangement was seen during the sharp conflict that ensued, when those young and hitherto contemned troops, by their steadiness and courage, showed themselves worthy of standing in line beside the British, and gained a reputation which was on no occasion forfeited during the Peninsular contest.

The ridge thus occupied was much too extensive for the number of defenders; but the facility of communication along its summit in a great measure compensated for this disadvantage, and the steepness of the ascent rendered it a position that most generals would have sought to turn rather than to attack.

But the hero of Genoa and Essling, accustomed in the Alps and Apennines to overcome far greater natural difficulties than those which here presented themselves, decided on assailing the allied army on the morrow.

A smart skirmish between the light troops of the two armies was kept up without intermission throughout the day (26th); but the firing ceased at night, and a solemn silence reigned throughout the hostile camps, ominous as the deceitful calm that precedes the hurricane.

The scene which presented itself to the chilled occupants of the bleak serra soon after dawn on the following morning, was truly sublime. Through the mists that still clung to the mountains' sides, huge but indistinct masses were seen moving in the depths below, and anon climbing the steep acclivities. Presently the sharp crack of a musket, succeeded by the lengthened hiss of a spent bullet, was followed by another and another, until every bush and tuft on the face of the serra seemed alive. This animating but comparatively harmless contention between the skirmishers continued while the solid masses of the enemy were making their way towards the summit, where thin lines of infantry, accommodating themselves to the contour of the mountain, stood calmly awaiting their approach, apparently presenting but a weak defence against the heavy columns of the French.

The right centre of the position was first assailed by two divisions of the 2d corps under Reynier; Ney, with three divisions, advancing shortly afterwards to that part of the ridge occupied by Craufurd, which, from the circumstance of the light division being concealed by the rising ground

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already mentioned, seemed to be guarded by the brigade of Germans alone.

Wellington's experience of battles soon taught him that the main object of the enemy was to obtain possession of the road which crosses the serra from St. Antonio de Cantara, and thus turn his right; for it appeared the French were not aware that the divisions of Leith and Hill extended beyond Reynier's point of attack. Pressing in force upon Picton's right, the enemy caused it to recede, and the 8th Portugueze regiment was broken. The leading battalions of the French then formed on the top of the serra between the 3d and 5th divisions; and, bringing forward their left, were preparing to sweep the ridge, when Wellington, who had flown to the point of danger, caused two guns to open with grape upon their flank, while a hot musketry fire was kept up on their front. For some time they stood firmly; but the 45th and 88th regiments, supported by the 8th Portugueze (which had rallied), coming to the charge, they were borne over the crest of the serra, and hurled down the deep descent with immense loss.

Meanwhile a body of the enemy's troops established on the serra had escaped observation; some rocky ground, and a mist which shrouded the crest of the mountain, having served to conceal its presence. General Leith was the first to perceive it; and having already moved forward one of his brigades on observing the vigorous attack made upon the 3d division, was prepared to fall upon these new adversaries. The distance this brigade had to move being considerable, some delay necessarily ensued; but no sooner was Colonel Cameron*, who

* Lieut.-General Sir John Cameron, K.C.B.

commnaded the leading regiment (the 9th), made aware of the state of affairs, than, pushing on rapidly, he formed his regiment under a heavy fire, charged the enemy without returning a shot, and in a few moments not a Frenchman remained on the position. The 9th then poured a destructive fire on the enemy as they ran down the hill side, but did not pursue them; a necessary exercise of discipline, which our troops were at all times prone to forget in their eagerness to follow up advantages. Fearful that this propensity might bring on evil consequences upon the present occasion, Lord Wellington rode up to General Hill and said, "If they attempt this point again, Hill, you will give them a volley and charge bayonets; but don't let your people follow them too far down the hill."* But the reception the enemy had already met with, satisfied them that nothing was to be effected on the right.

Sherer, Recollections of the Peninsula, p. 110.

Ney's attack succeeded no better than that of Reynier; Craufurd's disposition of the light division having deceived the enemy, when, as before stated, they pressed upwards to attack the German brigade. The skirmishers of the rifle corps and Portugueze caçadores were thickly placed on the face of the ascent, and caused some loss to the French as they approached; while a few guns planted on the rocky summit plied them with good effect. Loison's division, which led, nevertheless continued

*"I was particularly struck," observes Major Sherer, "with the style of this order—so decided, so manly, and breathing no doubt as to the repulse of any attack. Lord Wellington's simplicity of manner in delivering orders, and in command, is quite that of an able man. He has nothing of the truncheon about him; nothing full-mouthed, important, and fussy; his orders on the field are all short, quick, clear, and to the purpose."

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onwards with admirable steadiness in compact array; and having driven off all the skirmishers, was rapidly advancing towards the summit of the ridge, rending the air with animating cries of "*Vive l'Empereur,*" when Craufurd, who stood alone on a commanding rock, gave the word, and up rose the 43d and 52d regiments. Pouring a volley into the dense ranks of the astonished enemy, these distinguished corps instantly took advantage of the confusion their destructive fire had created, to charge with the bayonet: — the gleam of the British steel was enough; downwards the enemy rushed in indescribable confusion; and as but one narrow road offered the means of retreat, the whole column was thrown into disorder, and a dreadful carnage ensued. Nothing further of moment occurred, although the defeat of Ney's attack did not terminate the fighting. The loss of the French amounted to between six and seven thousand *hors de combat;* that of the allies to only 1300.

Lieut.-Col. Leach, 165.

Jomini, Vie Politique et Militaire de Napoleon.

Massena felt no inclination to renew his attempt on the formidable position of Busaco, defended by such troops as Wellington's had proved themselves to be; and, fortunately for him, a peasant gave information of a road which, from Mortigaõ, led across the rugged country between the Caramula and Alcoba ridges by Avelans de Cima to Serdaõ, on the great road from Oporto to Coimbra, thus turning the position of Busaco. Maintaining, therefore, a hot skirmish on the 28th, to cover the movement, he withdrew his troops gradually, and it was only towards evening that his intention became fully known. This flank march presented a tempting opportunity to the British general of becoming the assailant, but he prudently remained satisfied with the defensive victory he

had just obtained; for the conduct of the Portugueze troops had been such as to warrant his entertaining the utmost confidence in his ability to repel the French, should they attack him in his lines at Torres Vedras; and he justly calculated that the further he could draw the enemy into the country, the more disastrous must be their retreat out of it.

The position of Busaco was evacuated early on the 29th, when General Hill's corps retired towards Espinal and Thomar, while the main body of the allied army took the road to Coimbra, where it crossed the Mondego on the 1st October; a strong advanced guard of the enemy having appeared before that city on the previous day. The retreat was then continued by the routes of Soura and Pombal to Leyria.

The following extract of a letter written at this time by Lord Wellington to the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley, who had recently been accredited as minister to the Spanish Regency, shows how accurately he had estimated the value of his own measures and the strength of his opponent:—"We shall make our retreat to the positions in front of Lisbon without much difficulty or any loss. My opinion is, that the French are in a scrape. They are not sufficient for their purpose, particularly since their late loss, and that the Portuguese army has behaved so well; and they will find their retreat from this country a most difficult and dangerous operation."

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Oct. 3.

One of the defensive measures adopted by Lord Wellington for this memorable campaign, was explained in a proclamation issued by him to the Portugueze nation on the 4th of August; viz. to

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retard the present advance of the enemy, and compel them eventually to retreat, by the removal or destruction of every thing that could facilitate their movements, or contribute to their subsistence; but as the Government had taken no summary means to enforce this proclamation, vast numbers of the unfortunate inhabitants lingered about their homes; thousands of whom were now seen in a most pitiable condition on the line of march of the allied army: but we will borrow from an eye-witness a brief description of what the army now observed.

Sherer. Mil. Mem. &c. ii. 22.

"As the allied army pursued its leisurely and orderly march from the Mondego to the lines, it found the villages deserted; the mill in the valley motionless; the mountain cottages open and untenanted; the bells of the monastery silent; the white churches empty. The flanks of the British columns, during the three or four last marches, were literally covered with the flying population. A few of the richer fugitives, but a very few, still retained cabriolets and mules for their service. Those who had bullock cars, asses, or any mode of transporting their families and property, looked contented and grateful; for respectable men and delicate women of the middle classes might be seen on every side walking slowly and painfully on foot under heavy burdens. The weather happily was fine, for their flight was in the season of the vintage; the cheerful labours of which light and pleasing harvest, misery had suddenly broken in upon and suspended."

The French did not press the retreat of the British army, which was performed with much regularity. Some confusion was, however, created at Condeixa by the flying inhabitants crowding the bridge and narrow road, laden with whatever they could carry off, at a moment when a British division was endeavouring to pass along, and a troop of French cavalry hovered upon the flank; but happily no serious mischief occurred.

Having established his hospitals at Coimbra,

Massena quitted that city on the 4th October, leaving an inadequate guard for its protection, which afforded an opportunity for a dashing enterprise on the part of Colonel Trant with his Portugueze militia. This officer, in co-operation with Wilson and Miller, had closed upon the rear of the French, occupying the serras on both sides of the Mondego, and cutting off all communication with Almeida; but having preceded his colleagues and advanced on Coimbra (of his vicinity to which he had good reason to suppose the enemy's garrison was unacquainted), he fell so suddenly upon that place that no effectual resistance could be opposed; and 5000 men, chiefly sick and wounded, together with some depôts, were captured.

The allied army reached the defensive position prepared for its reception on the 8th October, having effected a deliberate retreat of more than 200 miles at the cost of a few cavalry skirmishes, and without leaving behind a straggler, abandoning a gun, or losing a baggage animal.

Marshal Massena had been following the retiring army, in utter ignorance of the stupendous barrier which was reared for its protection and the defence of Lisbon; yet his march forward was not that of a leader confident in his power to fulfil Napoleon's mandate, to "drive the English leopard into the sea." The truth is, that he had been greatly deceived in the strength of Lord Wellington's army, particularly with reference to the Portugueze troops, whose merits had been tested at Busaco, and he now felt some misgivings as to the issue of the campaign; for he knew that there existed some strong positions in front of Lisbon, and both Talavera and Busaco had shown

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with what a determined and invincible spirit the British army could maintain its ground. His onward march was rather in pursuance of the Emperor's commands* than in accordance with his own judgment, which would have prompted the wiser course of establishing his army upon the Mondego, and profiting by the resources of the northern provinces while awaiting his master's further instructions.

When within four or five marches of the "lines," he was informed that entrenchments existed, but had no means of ascertaining their strength and extent without having recourse to a reconnoissance. When, therefore, on the 10th of October, his advanced guard drove the allies from Sobral, and he had an opportunity of seeing some portion of the formidable barrier that opposed his further progress, and ascertained, from reports brought to him, the astounding fact that a strong fortified position of thirty miles extent stretched across from the Tagus to the sea, his surprise and mortification were complete.

He now allowed three days to elapse ere a reconnoissance was made; when, satisfied that little prospect of success awaited an attack upon the victors of Busaco, now so strongly intrenched, he caused his three corps to bivouac, and sat down quietly before the lines. During this reconnoissance there was some sharp skirmishing; and the 71st regiment resisted in the most gallant manner

* Napoleon learned in May 1810, *from the English newspapers*, that the force under Lord Wellington amounted to 23,000 English and Germans, and 22,000 Portugueze; but despising the latter, whom the French considered as mere *canaille*, he concluded that Massena's force of 72,000 men was more than sufficient to beat the allies.—*Letter from Berthier to Massena, May* 28.

a fierce attack made by a strong body of the enemy upon a redoubt it occupied near Sobral, and afterwards drove them at the point of the bayonet from a field-work of their own. After this affair, no part of the British position was attacked.

We shall now briefly describe the chief features of Lord Wellington's celebrated lines. To understand the principle upon which they were formed, it is only necessary to observe, that Lisbon, being situated at the extremity of a peninsula formed by the Tagus and the ocean, an army posted across that peninsula below the point where the Tagus ceases to be fordable, would bar the approach to the capital. "Nature," remarks Sir John Jones, one of our most distinguished officers of engineers, "drew the rude outline of a strong defensive position, and art rendered it perfect. A tract of country of thirty miles, extending from the mouth of the Zizandra on the ocean to Alhandra on the Tagus, was modelled into a field of battle; mountains were scarped perpendicularly, rivers dammed, and inundations formed; all roads favourable to the enemy were destroyed, and others made to facilitate the communications of the defenders; formidable works were erected to strengthen and support the weak points; whilst numerous cannon, planted on inaccessible posts, commanded the different approaches, and gave an equality of defence to the whole position." This line, following the inflections of the hills, was twenty-nine miles in length.

Account of the War, &c. vol. i. p. 306.

A second range of heights, running nearly parallel to the first, at a distance varying from six to ten miles, was fortified in like manner, to retire

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upon in the event of the most advanced line being forced; its length exceeded twenty miles.

There was yet another intrenched position, which covered Fort St. Julian, the place selected by Lord Wellington for the embarkation of the British troops, should they eventually be forced to abandon the country.

The second, or middle of these three lines of works, was the most important, and where the great stand was intended to be made; the original object of the first being to check the enemy for a time, and enable the allied army to enter and occupy the second, without hurry and confusion; whilst the third merely afforded a place of refuge, whence to embark unmolested; the works of St. Julian being sufficient to protect the departure of a rear guard. Peniche, Setuval, and Palmela were also strengthened, with the object of affording protection to those inhabitants of the country who might choose to emigrate; but Lord Wellington thought that, under any circumstances, Peniche might be permanently retained.

Without entering too far into detail, we shall now exhibit the chief advantages enjoyed by Lord Wellington over his adversary, and show the little prospect of success that would have attended any endeavour of the French to penetrate even the first line. It was entered by five roads practicable for artillery, — namely, two at Torres Vedras, two at Sobral, and one at Alhandra; and the object of all the redoubts, entrenchments, &c. was to bar those passes and to strengthen the ground between them. The right rested, as before observed, upon Alhandra and the Tagus; the ground there being naturally strong and flanked by gun-boats, no fears

were entertained in that quarter. The Monte Agraça, a lofty mountain, upon whose summit one large and three small field works were thrown up, armed with 44 guns, commanded the country around, and gave great strength to the centre. Torres Vedras was defended by a spacious field work, and many smaller ones, judiciously placed so as to command all the approaches. There was a paved road running at the foot of the hills along the entire front; namely, from Torres Vedras, by Runa, Sobral, and Arruda, to Alhandra.

But the main feature connected with this first position was the Monte Junto, a mountain which, rising opposite the centre, extends outwards directly from the line in question, thereby dividing the country between the Tagus and the sea into two nearly equal portions. And although not impassable for troops, the Monte Junto is traversed with difficulty; consequently all military communication between Sobral and Torres Vedras must either be by Runa, — which road lay under the guns of the allies, — or by gaining a more accessible part of the mountain chain to the northward; requiring a march of two days. Thus, while Lord Wellington could carry his troops with ease and rapidity from one point to another (having formed good roads for that purpose within his lines), the enemy could not move from Sobral to Torres Vedras, or vice versâ, in less time than we have named; for the road by Runa was so powerfully commanded that there could be no passage that way. This was an immense advantage in favour of the defence; since, however quick in their movements, the enemy could not possibly assemble all their forces to bear

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upon one part of the lines, without Lord Wellington having abundant time to meet their attack by a corresponding movement of concentration.

The lines were armed with six hundred pieces of artillery, planted in situations to sweep the approaches and converge their fire upon the points most open to attack. The troops were indefatigable in strengthening their several positions by every possible contrivance: huge oak and chestnut trees were dug up by the roots and dragged into situations chosen for the formation of *abbatis;* solid stone walls were built to serve as breast-works; ditches were excavated; and, in short, no measure of defence was neglected which could add to their security.

By Lord Wellington's admirable arrangements and great influence at Lisbon, the Portugueze authorities were constrained to exert themselves; and a numerous body, composed of militia, ordenança, and the civic guards, turned out to assist in what was considered a national measure. The presence of a powerful British fleet was at this time of the highest value; for the Royal Marines manned Fort St. Julian, while the defences on the right of the first line were, as already noticed, flanked by gun-boats worked with the boldness and alacrity that characterize the British navy. Before the end of October Romana's Spanish troops had joined from Estremadura; and some reinforcements arriving from England and Cadiz, the motley force collected behind the "lines" amounted to little short of 100,000 men,—of whom 55,000 were regular troops, British and Portugueze; these were posted so as to be ready to move when required, while the irregular troops garrisoned the chief part

of the forts and redoubts, and occupied the intrenchments.

The allied army being thus placed in security, we shall take advantage of the pause in military operations, to notice the difficulties thrown in the way of Lord Wellington's measures by some influential members of the Portugueze regency; who, jealous of the great powers with which he was invested, sought in every manner to obstruct his plans, and to force their own crude views for the conduct of the war upon his attention. The fall of Almeida furnished those meddling persons with a favourable occasion to attack the system upon which his lordship was acting; but how calmly does he rebuke their interference when he writes,—

" I now request the permission of the governors of the kingdom to say, that much as I wish to remove the impression which this misfortune has justly made on the public, I do not propose to alter the system and plan of operations, which have been determined, after the most serious deliberation, as most adequate to further the general cause of the allies, and consequently of Portugal. Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Sep. 6.

" I request the government to believe that I am not insensible of the value of their confidence, as well as of that of the public, as also that I am highly interested in removing the anxiety of the public upon the late misfortune; but I should forget my duty to my Sovereign, to the Prince Regent, and to the cause in general, if I should permit public clamour or panic to induce me to change, in the smallest degree, the system and plan of operations which I have adopted after mature consideration, and which daily experience shows to be the only one likely to produce a good end."

Again, on the 7th September, writing to the British Minister at Lisbon, Mr. Stuart, Lord Wellington says,—

" But in order to put an end at once o these miserable intrigues, I beg that you will inform the government that Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Sep. 7.

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I will not stay in the country, and that I shall advise the King's government to withdraw the assistance which his Majesty affords them, if they interfere in any manner with the appointments of Marshal Beresford's staff, for which he is responsible; or with the operations of the army; or with any points which, under the original arrangements with Marshal Beresford, were referred exclusively to his management.

* * * * * *

"But it appears that the government have lately discovered that we are all wrong: they have become impatient for the defeat of the enemy, and, in imitation of the Central Junta, call out for a battle and early success. If I had had the power, I would have prevented the Spanish armies from attending to this call, and the cause would now have been safe; but now, having the power in my hands, I will not lose the only chance which remains of saving the cause by paying the smallest attention to the senseless suggestions of the Portuguese government.

"I acknowledge that I am much hurt at this change of conduct in the Regency; and as I must attribute it to the persons recently introduced into the government, it affords additional reason with me for disapproving of their nomination, and I shall write upon the subject to the Prince Regent, if I should hear any more of this conduct."

It is painful to find that not only was he disturbed by the Souza faction in the government, but that the conduct of British officers caused him much trouble and concern at this period. Writing on the latter subject he says,—

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Sep. 11.

"Indeed, the temper of some of the officers of the British army gives me more concern than the folly of the Portuguese government. I have always been accustomed to have the confidence and support of the officers of the armies which I have commanded; but, for the first time, whether owing to the opposition in England, or whether the magnitude of the concern is too much for their minds and their nerves, or whether I am mistaken and they are right, I cannot tell; but there is a system of croaking in the army which is highly injurious to the public service, and which I must devise some means of putting an end to, or it will put an end to us. Officers have a right to form their own opinions upon events and transactions; but officers of high

rank or situation ought to keep their opinions to themselves: if they do not approve of the system of operations of their commander, they ought to withdraw from the army. And this is the point to which I must bring some, if I should not find that their own good sense prevents them from going on as they have done lately. Believe me that if any body else, knowing what I do, had commanded the army, they would now have been at Lisbon, if not in their ships.

"As for advancing into Spain, the idea is ridiculous. I can only tell you, that of which I am the most apprehensive is, that the enemy will raise the siege of Cadiz. Unless Heaven will perform a miracle, and give the Spaniards an army, arms, and equipments, we should be ruined by this measure, and then the cause is gone.

"Now, supposing that I am wrong in my plan of operations, and the principal officers of the British army still more wrong, and Principal Souza and the Bishop (of Oporto) right, and that I have it in my power to act offensively in Spain, how would it be when the French army in Andalusia would be brought against us? Would a Spanish force, which a part of that army keeps shut up in Cadiz, be equal to the whole of it in the field? Not unless by a miracle Heaven would add to their numbers!"

A month later, when about to occupy the lines, Lord Wellington was again disturbed by the foolish conduct of the Regency; and we find him pouring out the vials of his scorn in a letter to Mr. Stuart, as follows:—

"I beg that you will do me the favor to inform the Regency, and above all Principal Souza, that his Majesty and the Prince Regent having entrusted me with the command of their armies, and exclusively with the conduct of the military operations, I will not suffer them, or any body else, to interfere with them; that I know best where to station my troops, and where to make a stand against the enemy; and I shall not alter a system, formed upon mature consideration, upon any suggestion of theirs. Gurwood. Despatches &c. Oct. 6.

"I am responsible for what I do, and they are not; and I recommend them to look to the measures for which they are responsible, which I long ago recommended to them,—viz. to provide for the tranquillity of Lisbon, and for the food of the army and of the people while the troops shall be engaged with the enemy."

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Lord Wellington then proceeded to state that he had had no satisfaction in transacting business since Souza became a member of the government—that he hoped to see the successful termination of the military operations then in progress; and was determined if Principal Souza did not quit the country, that he would not remain himself.

In a subsequent letter to Mr. Stuart, his lordship details instances in which the Regency had neglected their own duties, and sought to interfere with the military operations. He complains that orders were not given in conformity to his proclamation; and that when the inhabitants of certain districts fled on the approach of the French, their provisions were left undestroyed and their mills uninjured. Charging the Regency with seeking popularity, he writes — "I avowed in my proclamation that I was the author of that measure, and the government might have sheltered themselves under that authority; but the principle of the government lately has been to seek for popularity, and they will not aid in any measure, however beneficial to the real interests of the country, which may be unpopular with the mob of Lisbon."

We cannot refrain from making one extract more: —

"I may have mistaken the system of defence to be adopted for this country; and Principal Souza and other members of the Regency may be better judges of the capacity of the troops, and of the operations to be carried on, than I am. In this case, they should desire his Majesty and the Prince Regent to remove me from the command of the army. But they cannot doubt my zeal for the cause in which we are engaged; and they know that there is not a moment of my time, nor a faculty of my mind, that is not devoted to promote it; and the records of the government will show what I have done for them and their

country. If, therefore, they do not manifest their dissatisfaction and want of confidence in the measures which I adopt by desiring that I should be removed, they are bound, as honest men and faithful servants to their Prince, to co-operate with me by all the means in their power; and thus should neither thwart them by opposition, nor render them nugatory by useless delays and discussions."

The above extracts show what vexatious interruptions were attempted by some meddling persons then at the head of Portugueze affairs, whose indiscreet proceedings were not always abortive; for although in many instances the mischievous effects of their perverse endeavours to assume the direction of affairs recoiled upon their own heads — like the crooked missile of the New Zealand savage when flung by an unskilful hand, — yet was much injury thereby produced; for the influence of those men was employed to counteract Lord Wellington's plans in every possible manner. Thus, no steps were taken by the government to remove the people, destroy provisions and forage, damage the mills, and otherwise carry into execution the important defensive measure recommended in his proclamation of the 4th August; and as he had not the means of putting the civil power in action, it had at the commencement of his retreat been only partially and imperfectly performed. It followed, from the hurried manner in which the measure had then to be enforced, that much misery was inflicted on the inhabitants, which might, by a timely interference of the government, have been averted; while considerable resources were unavoidably abandoned, whereon the enemy subsisted for a long period, greatly to the detriment of the country, and grievously to the disappointment of the British general.

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Previously to resuming the thread of events in Portugal, we shall cast a glance at the occurrences in Estremadura. It will be remembered that Marshal Mortier gained some advantages over the troops of the Marques de la Romana at Benvenida, on the 11th August; after which he again withdrew into Andalusia, whither Romana followed him, and obtained some successes against his small posts. After a short period, Mortier once more returned to Estremadura; and on the 14th September his cavalry suffered a defeat from that of Brig.-General Maddox (Portugueze), near Fuente de Cantos. On the 8th October, Mortier retired again into Andalusia; and Romana having no longer anything to apprehend from the French marshal, marched to unite his corps, about 5000 strong, with the allied army in front of Lisbon, as we have already seen.

We shall refrain from noticing here such military occurrences as took place connected with the defence of the Isla de Leon; but it is requisite that mention should be made of the assembling of the General Cortes, which took place at Cadiz with due solemnity on the 24th September. The members were chosen in the provinces and in the cities throughout Spain, so far as the military occupation of some portions of the country by the French would permit; and the colonies were represented by twenty-six members chosen from natives of Spanish America. It is not our business to enter into the constitution of this great council; neither is it necessary, in this place, to speak of its acts, further than to state, that it soon, virtually, assumed the executive power, dissolved the existing Regency, and appointed another composed of per-

sons more subservient to its views, of which General Blake was president. The excuse offered for this proceeding, was the wish expressed by the Regents themselves to be relieved from the weight of public affairs; but the real cause, probably, was an invitation they had given to the Duke of Orleans to repair to Spain and place himself at the head of the national armies,—the Cortes perceiving both the impolicy of committing such a trust to a Bourbon prince, and the danger in which it might place their own power. The Duke, therefore, who had proceeded to Cadiz in consequence of this invitation, was obliged to return to Palermo.

Massena's reconnoissances opened to him no prospect of assailing the allied position with success; and his army remained passive, but burning with rage and disappointment to see their enemies in such security before them, and furnished with supplies in abundance, while they were beginning to feel distressed for provisions. Besides, in addition to present mortification, they had the by-no-means consoling reflection that in all likelihood a disastrous retreat into Spain would terminate the campaign and disgrace their arms. Massena's object was now to feed his troops and maintain himself in front of the lines until reinforcements should arrive; that of his opponent to prevent supplies reaching him, and to force a retreat before he could be succoured. In this view he drew down upon the French rear the irregular Portugueze forces from the north; and Carlos d'España, a Spanish leader, was prevailed on to move forward and operate between Castel Branco and Abrantes, by which the French foragers were kept in check and restricted

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to the territory comprized between Leyria, Thomar, and the lines.

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In the beginning of November a small force was detached from the lines to the left bank of the Tagus, under Major-General Fane, in order to observe the enemy's movements on the opposite side, to prevent them from crossing if possible, and to endeavour to destroy the establishments of boats, timber, casks, &c. said to have been formed at different points along the course of the river.

Notwithstanding that Massena must long have given up all thoughts of being able to force the lines without great reinforcements, he persisted in maintaining his forward position, although the army was much straitened for provisions, and suffered from the harassing efforts of the irregular forces in its rear. Towards the end of October, however, indications of some change were observed; boats having been collected, and rafts formed, which, with other bridge materials, were reported to be lodged at Santarem, and at Barquinha, but for what object it was impossible to divine. The French general might be contemplating the passage of the Tagus into Spain — might entertain a design upon Abrantes — or, possibly, his intention was to secure the means of crossing the Zezere, if necessary.

All speculation was, however, set at rest on the 15th November. The morning twilight showed the French sentries as usual in front of Arruda; but when daylight appeared it was discovered that they were motionless — in fact "men of straw," each in full military costume, with a pole at his side to represent a musket. The enemy had disappeared — but whither? Doubtful whether they had retreated, or sought by a *ruse* to draw the allies from

their intrenched position, while they should pass round the Monte Junto and assail Torres Vedras, Lord Wellington kept the main body of his forces stationary; but ordered up the cavalry, and sent forward two divisions of infantry to ascertain what had become of the French. He also wrote to request that Admiral Berkeley would send some boats up the Tagus, to pass more troops across the river if necessary.

Early on the 16th it was ascertained that the enemy were moving to the rear, by the routes of Rio Mayor and Santarem. Thus had his admirable plans for defending Lisbon, maintaining his army in Portugal, and, as he trusted, laying a foundation for effectually resisting the French in the Peninsula, been crowned with complete success; and truly his feelings must have been enviable when he put his army in motion on the traces of the enemy. About 400 prisoners were taken, chiefly marauders.

The French were now reported to be in full retreat, and to have left only a rear guard at Santarem. It was concluded, from the circumstance of another bridge having been thrown over the Zezere to replace one which had been carried away by the floods, that their intention was to retire from Portugal by the route of Castel Branco. General Hill was immediately sent across the Tagus to succour Abrantes if necessary, and harass the enemy during their retreat.

Giving credit to the report of the French having merely a rear guard at Santarem, Lord Wellington prepared to attack it. The position of Santarem is very strong, being a mountain of considerable elevation, about three miles in length, which rises abruptly from the Tagus, having a range of lower

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eminences in front, forming what may be styled outworks to the main defence: these again overlook the two streams of the Rio Mayor. The ground towards Lisbon is an open flat, and the high road runs for about half a mile on the Ponte Seca, a raised causeway, by which alone Santarem could be approached; for, on one side of the Ponte Seca, an overflow of the Rio Mayor created an impassable sheet of water, which secured the enemy's right; while their left was covered by a sedgy marsh, intersected by deep cuts, that extended from the causeway to the Tagus, which, though not impassable, was difficult for troops to cross. At the end of the causeway an abbatis had been formed, over which were seen the muzzles of cannon placed in battery on a slight elevation, so as to enfilade the only approach.

Wellington made his dispositions for assaulting the position of Santarem on the 19th November; but fortunately some guns did not arrive in time, and not liking the aspect of the preparations for defence, he ordered the troops to retire.

It soon appeared that Massena intended to remain in Portugal, and with great judgment had selected an admirable defensive position, in imitation of his skilful opponent. Santarem, intrenched and occupied in strength, presented a bulwark which it would be requisite to force before any position of the French cantonments, extending from the vicinity of Pernes to the Zezere, could be reached; the nature of the country and state of the roads at that season not admitting of such operations as would be necessary in order to turn it. Thus he could remain secure so long as it suited his convenience, while he commanded two distinct

lines of retreat, and maintained a communication with Spain, by which his reinforcements and convoys could arrive; and, from the nature of the country around, he possessed the option of resuming the offensive at any time, and upon either side of the Tagus. General Foy was soon after sent to Paris to represent the state of affairs in Portugal to Napoleon.

Lord Wellington, firm in his determination not to endanger the cause in which he was engaged by hazarding a general action under disadvantageous circumstances, and confident that by persisting in the same prudent course which had hitherto baffled the invaders, he should be able to maintain himself in Portugal and defend Lisbon against any efforts they might make, resolved to adhere strictly to his *Fabian* policy, and confine his operations to harassing the flanks and rear of the enemy's army, in order to confine it within the narrowest limits; but to engage in no serious affair, the result of which should be doubtful. He felt assured that nothing but the occurrence of some misfortune to the allied army could relieve Massena from his present difficulties; it would consequently be forwarding the views of his adversary were he to place the fate of the campaign on the result of a general action, upon ground chosen by him. He therefore posted and intrenched his advanced troops immediately in front of Santarem, between the town of Rio Mayor and the Tagus; establishing the bulk of the allied army in cantonments at Alcoentre, Cartaxo (head-quarters), Alemquer, and other places in rear, so as to secure the roads leading towards the lines between the Tagus and the Monte Junto; while the position of Torres Vedras itself was occupied

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Dec. 1.

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in sufficient strength to repel any attack which might be made between the same mountain and the sea.

General Hill's corps remained on the left bank of the Tagus, prepared to oppose any attempt of the enemy to cross into Alemtejo; and the heights of Almada, which, on that side, command the anchorage of Lisbon, were now also strongly fortified, in order to ensure the safety of the city and shipping, in the event of the enemy's operations being afterwards transferred to the south bank of the river. Lord Wellington seized the first interval of leisure to make a careful reconnoissance, and give directions for the defensive measures to be adopted in this quarter; while workmen were still kept constantly employed in strengthening the lines of Torres Vedras, which might now bid defiance to any force in the power of the French to collect.

Illness having obliged General Hill to relinquish his command in Alemtejo and return to England, General Beresford was sent to replace him, who fixed his head-quarters at Chamusca, and posted his troops along the left bank of the Tagus, extending to the mouth of the Zezere; thus protecting the whole of Alemtejo, and cutting off Massena's communication with Soult in Andalusia.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Dec. 21.

It now appeared that the French considered Lord Wellington's intrenched position covering Lisbon as too strong to be attacked in front, and that some new plan of operations must be devised on the arrival of sufficient reinforcements. Lord Wellington himself thought it likely that as the enemy had not hesitated to withdraw the whole of their troops from the north of Spain and old Cas-

tile before the battle of Talavera, they would not scruple to abandon those countries again on the existing emergency, and that their object might be to occupy the countries north of the Douro and south of the Tagus, and thus distress the allied army for supplies. He had also to fear the withdrawal of the French army from Andalusia. Nevertheless he trusted to be able to hold his ground against all the force that could be brought against him. Although, under existing circumstances, Lord Wellington considered himself strong enough to attack and defeat the French in their present position, yet the loss of men would necessarily be very great, both in action and from sickness occasioned by the exposure of his troops to the weather at that season; while failure would be attended with the loss of the whole cause. Besides, he did not see the prospect of any advantages commensurate with the risk. Andalusia would probably be relieved of the enemy, whether he fought or not; and supposing the northern provinces of Spain should be disburthened of their pressure and presence by the course of events, or by the exertions of the allied army in Portugal, what would it advantage the cause? Had he not in the preceding year brought upon himself and General Cuesta five French corps, together with the king's guards and reserve? and yet when the whole of Castile, Leon, and Galicia had been thereby cleared of the enemy, no men whatever were raised by those provinces! During the present year too the inhabitants of the north of Spain had done nothing, although he had kept three of the enemy's corps — the most efficient in the kingdom — employed for eight months in another part of the Peninsula.

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Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Dec. 21.

"Your Lordship" (he writes to Lord Liverpool) "will probably deem this a melancholy picture of prospects in the Peninsula; but you may rely upon its truth. This state of affairs in Spain is the result of some defects in the national character, aggravated by the false principles on which all the affairs of that country have been conducted since it attempted to shake off the yoke of France. The Spaniards have, consequently, no army; no means of raising one; no authority to discipline an army, if they could raise one; no means to arm, equip, clothe, or feed any thing which could be collected under that name.

"The war in the Peninsula, therefore, as far as the Spaniards are concerned in it, cannot take a regular shape. It must be confined to the operations of the guerillas. As long as the French do not interfere with our supplies or the resources of the Portugueze government, or any point of our security, I think it very immaterial whether they are in Spain or Portugal. Indeed, adverting to the greater difficulties they have in subsisting in the latter country, and in keeping up their communications, I believe it is more advantagecus that they should be where they are. Their numbers are certainly diminishing daily, while they do us no mischief; on the contrary, we are nearer to our resources than ever we were, and they leave the whole of the north of Spain open to the operations of the guerillas.

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"It is certainly astonishing that the enemy have been able to remain in this country so long; and it is an extraordinary instance of what a French army can do. It is positively a fact, that they brought no provisions with them, and they have not received even a letter since they entered Portugal. With all our money, and having in our favour the good inclinations of the country, I assure you that I could not maintain one division in the district in which they have maintained not less than 60,000 men and 20,000 animals for more than two months. This time last year, I was obliged to move the British cavalry only from the district which they now occupy with their whole army, because it could not be subsisted. But they take every thing, and leave the unfortunate inhabitants to starve."

Towards the end of November, an attempt had been made by General Gardanne to join Marshal Massena, with a convoy of ammunition; and that officer penetrated to within ten or twelve miles of

the French posts on the Zezere; when, alarmed by a report that they had been withdrawn, he precipitately retired. Some ordenança under Colonel Grant fired upon the enemy, who immediately fell into disorder, abandoned the convoy, lost all their baggage, and some hundreds of their number. On regaining the frontier, this detachment met with General Drouet, commanding the 9th corps, which had moved forward to the Coa as a support to the army of Portugal; who decided on marching with 10,000 men to form a junction with Massena, by the left bank of the Mondego, while the remainder of his corps, under General Claparede, should take post at Guarda, to keep in check the Portugueze militia, which were spread over Beira; and, under such enterprising leaders as Silveira, Bacellar, Wilson, Trant, and Miller, not only cut off all communication between Massena's army and Spain, but threatened to oppose a serious obstacle to his retreat. But, unhappily, the ardour of Silveira prompted him to hazard an encounter with Claparede at Trancosa, in which he was defeated with considerable loss, and subsequently his militia were driven across the Douro. In the mean time, Drouet's march having been unopposed, he reached Leyria, and took post on the right flank of the French army; thus completely cutting off all communication between the allies and the northern provinces.

Dec. 30.

Dec. 27.

Napoleon, whose chief source of information respecting his army in Portugal had been the English newspapers, having learnt by the arrival in Paris of General Foy what was Massena's precise situation, now sent orders for him to maintain his present position between Santarem and the

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Zezere, and to besiege Abrantes; while all the disposable troops in the south of Spain were ordered to move into Alemtejo, to second the operations of the army of Portugal.

At this period Cadiz continued to be blockaded by Marshal Soult; but no serious operations had as yet been attempted against that city. The British division there had been for some time commanded by Lieutenant-General Graham *, who having greatly strengthened the defences of the Isla de Leon, no fears were now entertained for the safety of Cadiz.

* General Lord Lynedoch, G.C.B.

CHAPTER XXIV.

MARSHAL SOULT MARCHES FROM SEVILLE TO ATTACK BADAJOS.—OLIVENÇA TAKEN BY THE FRENCH.—DEATH OF ROMANA.—MENDIZABEL'S CORPS DESTROYED ON THE GEVORA.—SOULT INVESTS BADAJOS.—STATE OF MASSENA'S ARMY.—IT RETIRES FROM SANTAREM.—THE ALLIED ARMY FOLLOWS IN CLOSE PURSUIT.—BADAJOS SURRENDERED.—AFFAIRS OF FOZ DE ARONCE AND GUARDA.—ACTION OF SABUGAL.—REMARKS ON THE FRENCH MODE OF FIGHTING.—MORTIER TAKES CAMPO MAYOR, AND ABANDONS IT ON MARSHAL BERESFORD'S APPROACH.—AFFAIR NEAR BADAJOS.—OLIVENÇA TAKEN BY THE ALLIES.—LORD WELLINGTON VISITS ELVAS.—HE ORDERS BADAJOS TO BE INVESTED, AND RETURNS TO THE COA.—OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.—LORD BLAYNEY'S EXPEDITION.—FRENCH DISPOSITIONS AGAINST CADIZ.—MATAGORDA.—OPERATIONS AGAINST VICTOR.—BATTLE OF BARROSA.

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ALTHOUGH the efforts of the French in the preceding campaign were foiled by the admirable measures of Lord Wellington, still there existed just grounds for apprehending that his successful resistance was only destined to prolong the contest during another season. At the commencement of 1811, Massena remained apparently firm in his strong position of Santarem, having received, as we have seen, a large reinforcement under General Drouet. Rumours were soon heard that Marshal Soult was in motion from Seville towards Estremadura, at the head of 20,000 men, to co-operate with Massena*; and it was well known that towards the close of 1810, a French corps under General Caf-

* Napoleon was greatly displeased with Soult when Foy arrived to inform him of the state of affairs in Portugal, and reiterated his order to that marshal to enter Estremadura with the 5th corps, and what other troops could be spared from Andalusia, and advance to the Tagus to facilitate the throwing a bridge over that river by Massena; who

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farelli had entered Spain, followed by other reinforcements; the whole of which troops, united to those already in the northern provinces, formed an army of near 70,000 men, under the command of Marshal Bessieres, who was ordered to support and furnish all necessary assistance to the army in Portugal. In short, every thing betokened that a grand effort was about to be made to clear the Peninsula of British troops.

On receiving intelligence that Marshal Mortier, who commanded the advance of Soult's force, was on the point of entering Estremadura, Lord Wellington requested Romana to order General Mendizabel, who commanded a Spanish corps in that province, to defend the Guadiana as long as possible, and make preparations to destroy the bridges at Merida and Medellin. These objects were, however, neglected by that leader; so that, crossing the Guadiana unopposed, the French reached Merida on the 8th of January. Mendizabel then threw near 4000 of his best troops into Olivença; a place which was indefensible, owing to the bad condition of the works, and want of requisite stores

Jan. 22.

and provisions. It was invested by the French; and being surrendered in ten days, became a place of arms for carrying on the siege of Bajados, which Soult had determined to undertake immediately.

The cause of Spain sustained a severe loss at this time by the death of one of its most patriotic and

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was at the same time directed to make every effort to retain his position, and detain Wellington pent up in the angle of Lisbon.

In Berthier's letter to Soult is the following passage:—"His Majesty commands you, M. le Duc, to march a corps towards the Tagus, to co-operate in the main operation, which is the destruction of the British. Date 4th of Dec. 1810."—*Belmas*, vol. i. p. 465.

strenuous supporters: the Marquis Romana, who died at Cartaxa, the British head-quarters. By none was the loss more severely felt than Lord Wellington; who, in a letter to his brother, the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley, expresses himself very strongly on the subject. "His loss, he writes, "is irreparable. Under existing circumstances, I know not how he can be replaced; and we may expect that it will be followed by the fall of Badajos." Although not a leader of extraordinary military talent, Romana was the most useful of all the Spanish generals — indeed almost the only one who merited the confidence and esteem of Lord Wellington. Their conduct on most occasions caused him much anxiety and vexation; for often, with means in their power of checking the enemy at important points, they would miserably disappoint his hopes by their backwardness; though at other times they would blindly rush on to certain destruction.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Jan. 23.

In England, as usual, the Opposition prophets predicted the assured overthrow of the allies on the opening of the campaign; and, in order to facilitate the enemy's operations, the English newspapers carefully furnished them with the best, and indeed only intelligence they often obtained of what was going on in their front. Nay, it is notorious that the French marshals serving in the Peninsula looked eagerly for our public prints, as containing the only authentic information of what was passing within a few miles of them. On one occasion Lord Wellington writes thus to the Secretary of State:— "I enclose a newspaper giving an account of our works; the number of guns and men in each, and for what purpose constructed. Surely it must

Ib. Jan. 19.

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be admitted that those who carry on operations against an enemy possessed of all the information which our newspapers give to the French, do so under singular disadvantages."

Anxious to put Marquis Wellesley in possession of the fullest information regarding Peninsular affairs, Lord Wellington addressed a long private letter to that nobleman on the 26th January, the importance of which requires that we should at least furnish an abstract of its contents. He first calls his attention to the discussions which had taken place with the Portugueze Regency, and to the opposition and counteraction he was experiencing from that body. Secondly,—he wished to be informed whether the measures he had pursued as commander-in-chief of the Portugueze army met with the approval of the British government. Thirdly,—he was anxious to draw attention to the state of the pecuniary resources of the government of Portugal; to the defective manner in which the Portugueze troops were provisioned—thousands actually starving, because no means existed of paying for transport. Incidental to this subject, he mentions having stated, in 1808, that, with an intention of carrying Portugal through the war, and making its territory the basis of all military operations in the Peninsula, England ought to have actively controlled every department of the state; to have carried its resources to the highest pitch; to have seen them honestly applied exclusively to the objects of the war; and to have made up the deficiency, whatever it might be. Had such a proceeding been followed, he thought the expense would not have equalled what was now paid in subsidy; whereas, unless matters could be brought to the

state he had formerly recommended, he was of opinion that it would be necessary to increase the subsidy to the real amount of the expense of 30,000 men, which number the British government had engaged to maintain.

He next proceeds to draw a pitiable picture of the present condition of the Spanish government and army; states that the Cortes had done nothing, either to raise, discipline, pay, or support an army; and that the distresses of the Spaniards were worse even than those of the Portugueze,—possessing no money, no magazines, nothing, in short, that an army requires to keep it together.

Then follows a representation of the expediency of making an effort to put in motion against the enemy the largest force which the Peninsula could produce; and although the Spaniards might not be disposed to allow of that active interference in their affairs which would improve their circumstances, yet that, he urged, was no reason for doing nothing. To furnish subsidy without stipulating for the performance of certain services would, in his opinion, answer no purpose; but if he were allowed to furnish the Spanish armies with money and provisions occasionally, he thought that much assistance might be derived from their services, provided he had power to tell the Spanish government, that unless their troops co-operated strictly with him, all pecuniary assistance would be withdrawn.

He finally points out the difference between the organization of the French and other armies—the British in particular; and shows that a system suited to the former is totally inapplicable to the Spanish forces; and that from attempting to carry on war like the French, without magazines, pay,

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provisions, or any thing, neither subordination nor discipline existed among officers or soldiers; and that to establish either was not even attempted. The necessary result was dastardly conduct on the part of the troops, hatred towards them from their countrymen, and almost a preference to Joseph's government as a protection from the outrages of their own armies.

Writing to Lord Beresford at this period, the following passage occurs: —

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Jan. 24.

"But I declare, that notwithstanding all my practice, I have not health or spirits to go through all the difficulties of carrying on the service, crossed and thwarted as it is by the wants of the Portuguese and Spanish armies; the obstinacy with which they persevere in opposing and rendering fruitless all measures to set them right, or save them; and the difficulties thrown in our way by our own government and officers."

Soult now prepared to besiege the important fortress of Badajos, which contained a sufficient garrison, but was inadequately supplied with provisions. Mendizabel, with 10,000 Spanish troops and a brigade of Portugueze cavalry, was at hand to interrupt the enemy's operations, maintain a communication with the place, and assist the besieged. Lord Wellington had carefully pointed out a position for him to take up, on the heights of San Cristoval, behind the Gevora, which, though naturally very strong, might be rendered almost impregnable by means of intrenchments; and being held, the enemy could not obtain possession of Badajos, while it afforded great facilities for the attainment of Mendizabel's immediate objects. That leader, however, not only neglected to intrench his position, but allowed himself to be surprised by Soult and Mortier; and his army making little

or no resistance, was completely routed. Eight thousand prisoners, with all the guns, ammunition, &c., were taken. This disaster caused great disappointment to Lord Wellington, who was only awaiting the arrival of a reinforcement of more than 5000 British troops, which was daily expected at Lisbon, to detach such a force towards Badajos as should, in conjunction with Mendizabel's corps, have been sufficient to defeat Soult and relieve that fortress. The French immediately invested the place, and pushed the siege with vigour; but the governor, Don Rafael Menacho, was worthy of his trust: he inspirited the garrison by showing an example of activity and courage; and a favourable result might have rewarded his endeavours, had he not unfortunately been killed by a cannon shot in the covered way during a sally. On his death, the command devolved on General Imas, — a man unequal to the task, even had he been honest.

The destruction of Mendizabel's corps was an irreparable misfortune; for to relieve Badajos, after that event, would have required a much greater force than Wellington could venture to detach. Under these circumstances, he saw that a bold measure alone could save the besieged fortress; and determined, therefore, to fall upon Massena the instant his expected reinforcement should arrive, and endeavour to save Badajos by a victory in Portugal.

The French commander, who had been long occupied in collecting materials for the construction of a bridge across the Tagus, to enable him to penetrate into Alemtejo, and avail himself of its untouched resources, was by this time reduced to great straits. Provisions were scarce, sickness had

Belmas, vol. i. 139.

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thinned his ranks, and disunion prevailed amongst his principal officers. He possessed not the means of besieging Abrantes, as suggested by Napoleon, and knew not what progress Soult had made against Badajos. He *had learnt by the English newspapers* that the corps of that marshal had arrived on the frontier of Alemtejo,—he had even heard the salvos of his artillery in the direction of Badajos; but since the middle of February these sounds had ceased; and as no succours appeared, he was rather led to conclude that Soult had failed, than that Badajos had fallen.

Under these circumstances, feeling himself in no condition to withstand an attack upon his extended position, and not aware how greatly the fate of Badajos depended on his stay, he resolved to retreat. The preparatory movements were made

March 5.

with Massena's usual ability, and the French army was drawn off without suffering any interruption from the allies. Wellington was at Santarem on the 6th, but only ascertained the precise direction of his adversary's retreat on the 8th March, when his purpose to gain the Mondego was manifest; and, pressing forward, the allies reached Thomar the same evening.

Some idea of the horrors occasioned by warfare, as pursued by the French, may be gathered from the following frightful picture, furnished by Napier, of a scene witnessed at this period:—

Napier, vol. iii. 457.

"A large house, situated in an obscure part of the mountains, was discovered, filled with starving persons. Above thirty women and children had sunk; and, sitting by their bodies, were fifteen or sixteen survivors, of whom one only was a man, but all so enfeebled as to be unable to eat the little food we had to offer them. The youngest had fallen first. All the children were dead. None were emaciated in

the bodies; but the muscles of the face were invariably drawn transversely, giving the appearance of laughing, and presenting the most ghastly sight imaginable. The man seemed most eager for life; the women appeared patient and resigned, and even in this distress had arranged the bodies of those who first died with decency and care."

The enemy were at first thought to be collecting at Thomar; and the greater portion of Beresford's troops was therefore passed across the Tagus at Abrantes, and moved upon that place by Punhete, crossing the Zezere by a boat bridge taken from Abrantes; but when their line of retreat became known, Lord Wellington ordered a division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry to recross the Tagus, and, in conjunction with some troops remaining on the southern bank of that river, to move upon Badajos, which was then reported to be holding out stoutly. But it having been ascertained on the 9th that the entire French army, excepting Reynier's corps, was collected in front of Pombal, probably with an intention of receiving battle, Lord Wellington, who believed Badajos to be in no immediate danger, recalled those troops to assist in dislodging the enemy from their position.

In the mean time two divisions, which had been guarding the lines of Torres Vedras, advanced by the Leyria road; so that on the 11th the allied force before Pombal amounted to six divisions of infantry and the cavalry. But the French had drawn off during the preceding night, closely followed by the light division and other troops, who skirmished with their rear guard, commanded by Marshal Ney, which sustained some loss in defending the old castle and town of Pombal.

On the 12th, Ney took up a strong position at the end of a defile between Pombal and Redinha,

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skilfully disposing his force so as to deceive the British general with regard to its strength, and gallantly held his ground until compelled by superior numbers to retire; thus enabling the main body of the French army to gain an advance of some hours upon their pursuers. Two hundred men fell on each side in this affair.

We stop for a moment to observe, that although Massena's withdrawal from his position of Santarem, like the retreat from before the lines, was most ably conducted; yet we are disposed to think that, on both occasions, his operations have been over eulogized. Wellington was so fettered by the necessity of considering the security of the position of Torres Vedras as paramount to every other object, that he could not venture upon any movement which would endanger its safety. Solicitous, therefore, to avoid engaging in a serious affair of doubtful result, he of necessity held his troops back; and thus the French commander was enabled to accomplish some very delicate operations without material loss, and consequently with credit. On the whole, notwithstanding the acknowledged ability of Massena and the manœuvring qualities of the French troops, it is fairly to be presumed that he would not have got off quite so easily on the present occasion, had not Wellington been shackled on one hand by the "lines," and on the other by the uncertainty regarding Badajos.

Extreme barbarity marked the enemy's retreat: on the night of its commencement the towns of Torres Novas, Thomar, and Pernes were plundered, and many houses destroyed; although their inhabitants had been induced, by promises of good treatment, to remain. Subsequently every town

and village traversed by the French was burnt, Massena himself ordering the convent of Alcobaça to be destroyed; and the town of Leyria, with the bishop's palace, shared the same fate. In the words of an eye-witness, "Flames, ruin, murder, and devastation marked their tracks * * * Their army disgraced the name of Europeans." Lieut.-Col. Leach, p. 200.

On the 13th, the enemy were discovered very strongly posted near Condeixa. Their purpose had been to seize Coimbra, and there pass the Mondego; but fortunately the bridge was broken; and Colonel Trant with a few hundred militia showed so bold a countenance when the French under Montbrun approached the city, that the latter was led to believe it occupied in strength. Meanwhile the baggage of the enemy having been observed in motion towards the Ponte da Murcella, Lord Wellington truly conjectured that Trant had not given up Coimbra; he therefore sought to compel them to abandon the position of Condeixa, which was considered unassailable in front, by moving a division under General Picton through the mountains on their left. This manœuvre had the desired effect; for on observing the march of Picton to turn their flank, though at a distance of eight miles, the French became alarmed, and hastily evacuating the position of Condeixa, pushed on across the mountains to Casal Nova, about three miles distant, whither they were followed by the allies as rapidly as the obstacles in their way and the flames of the town of Condeixa would permit. A communication was then opened with Trant, and the British cavalry succeeded in cutting off a portion of Montbrun's dragoons.

Lord Wellington here received the mortifying

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intelligence that Badajos had fallen on the 10th; and immediately directed the 4th division to march towards the Alemtejo, where he purposed assembling a considerable force under Marshal Beresford with a view to retaking that fortress. It appeared that on the death of the brave Menacho all vigour ceased within its walls; and the crest of the glacis being speedily crowned by the flying sap without resistance, the enemy gained possession of a ravelin; and having established a breaching battery against the body of the place on the 9th, General Imas capitulated on the following day, although no practicable breach had been made, and he was aware, through a telegraphic communication, that Massena had commenced his retreat, and that the fortress would be immediately relieved. Thus owing to the supineness and cowardice—if not treachery—of General Imas, this important fortress, with a garrison of 9000 men, surrendered to 13,000 Frenchmen!

We return with satisfaction, from this disgraceful and calamitous occurrence, to the valley of the Mondego. On the 14th, another affair took place, occasioned by the heedlessness of the officer commanding the leading brigade, in which some advantage was gained by the allies; and during the night the enemy were induced to abandon the strong position of Miranda de Corvo, in consequence of the junction of two divisions under Generals Cole* (who was proceeding towards the Alemtejo) and Nightingall at Espinhal, which crossing the Deixa turned their position. By these successful operations, Coimbra and Upper Beira were saved from being ravaged; a communication

* General the Honourable Sir G. L. Cole, G.C.B.

was opened with the northern provinces; and the French were compelled to retire by Ponte da Murcella, upon which road they could be greatly harassed in flank by militia, while the allied army pressed upon their rear.

The retreat was now confined to a narrow line between the mountains and the Mondego; and, to facilitate his movements, Massena destroyed a great quantity of ammunition as well as baggage. Having passed the Ceira, a strong position was taken up by the enemy on its right bank, leaving one corps as an advanced guard in front of Foz de Aronce, on the other side of the stream. Having examined their position, Lord Wellington resolved on dislodging them; an operation which was effected by keeping their right in play with the light division and General Pack's brigade, while the third division attacked their left. The first charge overthrew this wing; and a battery of horse artillery opening opportunely upon the broken battalions, the enemy fled towards the river in the utmost confusion. It was by this time nearly dark; and numbers missing the fords were drowned, while others were crushed to death by the pressure along a narrow bridge. During the night Ney blew up the bridge, and retired, having lost at least 500 men in this disastrous affair.

The allied army was forced to halt on the 16th, partly on account of the destruction of the bridge over the Ceira, but chiefly from having outmarched its supplies. Indeed for several days the Portugueze troops had been fed from the scanty supplies provided for the British army. They were literally starving, two brigades having "had nothing to eat for four days, although constantly marching, or en-

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Mar. 16.

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gaged with the enemy." Thus was Lord Wellington deprived of the greater part of the native force, which remained in the rear; and knowing how much his operations would be impeded by this neglect of the government in not providing for their own troops, and even fearful of being again reduced to act on the defensive, he penned an indignant though temperate remonstrance on this subject, to be laid before the Portugueze Regency and the Prince Regent of Great Britain.

We may here notice, that a strong and inconvenient instance of the contempt which Spaniards in general entertain for the Portugueze, was shown in the positive refusal of the Spanish muleteers — who afforded almost the only means of transport for the British army — to attend on the Portugueze troops; and the only mode of effecting any transport for them was by keeping the muleteers in ignorance that the supplies were for their use.

During the night of the 16th a trestle bridge was thrown over the Ceira by the Royal Staff Corps, and the army crossed in pursuit of the enemy on the following morning. Massena was found to have placed his army in position behind the Alva and on the Serra de Moita; and, hoping to maintain himself for some days, had sent out his foragers to procure supplies. But his opponent too well knew the advantage of pressing a retreating enemy to allow him any respite; and the bridges of Murcella and Pombeira having been destroyed, he directed one to be forthwith constructed.

Napier, vol. iii. 476.

"The Alva was deep, wide, and rapid; yet the Staff Corps succeeded in forming a most ingenious raft bridge, and the light division immediately passed between Ponte Murcella and Pombeira; and at

the same time the right wing of the army entered Arganil, while Trant and Wilson closed on the other side of the Mondego."

Massena, once more forced to retreat rapidly, was compelled to sacrifice much ammunition and baggage, and even to abandon many distant foraging parties, which fell into the hands of the allies. He reached Celerico on the 21st with the main body of his army, Reynier occupying Guarda.

The allied army was still suffering for want of provisions, its means of transport being totally inadequate to carry forward a sufficient supply during such rapid movements. A halt became therefore unavoidable. Meanwhile disunion prevailed in the enemy's camp: whether good or otherwise, Massena's plans were continually thwarted. He appears to have entertained a project of crossing the Estrella to Coria in the valley of the Tagus, and thus to open a communication with the armies of the south and centre; a plan objected to by Ney, who, in defiance of Massena's orders, marched towards Almeida. He was forthwith superseded in his command, and sent to Paris. But his disobedience greatly annoyed and perplexed Massena; and moreover, Ney was so great a favourite with the troops that their quarrel rendered the former unpopular.

Jomini, Vie Pol. et Mil.

Pressed by such an adversary as Lord Wellington, while his measures were so openly counteracted, Massena's was no enviable situation. Still he hoped to maintain himself in Portugal, assisted by the co-operation of Soult, until he should once more be in a condition to resume the offensive. But Wellington had by this time measured his opponent's capacity; while numerous occasions

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had satisfied him that not only in fighting, but even in what the French troops were on all sides allowed to excel, manœuvring, the British soldiers were superior: he therefore determined that the enemy should not remain in their strong position of Guarda. Assembling his army early on the 29th March, he formed five columns of attack, which simultaneously ascended the Guarda mountain by different paths, supported on the wings and in the centre by other bodies of troops. But no sooner were the columns perceived by the French, than confusion arose amongst them, and their position, one of the strongest in the country, was abandoned with precipitation, and, without firing a shot, they hurried down the only road open to them, and did not halt until they had placed the Coa between them and their pursuers.

Massena now took up a position on the right bank of that river near Sabugal, having an advanced guard on the opposite side. His present position, could it have been maintained, was convenient for operating either towards the Tagus, or upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida; but at daylight on the 3d April his relentless pursuer was manœuvring to turn his left wing, envelop, and cut it off before it could be succoured. For this object the cavalry, which formed the extreme right of the allied army, was directed to cross the Upper Coa; the light division forded a little lower down; the 3d division lower still; and the 5th with the artillery were to force the bridge of Sabugal; the 1st and 7th divisions being kept in reserve. The intended operation was not, however, successfully executed; for the morning proved foggy, and the several columns were unable to time their ad-

vance so as to reach their respective stations, as previously calculated. In the obscurity of mist and rain, a brigade of the light division rapidly mounting the hill upon which the French were posted was carried too forward, and became closely engaged with the whole of Reynier's corps. Colonel Beckwith of the rifles, who commanded it, had the audacity to charge, and actually gained some advantage; but his little brigade, composed of only the 43d regiment, five companies of rifles, and three of Colonel Elder's caçadores, was immediately exposed to a flank fire of grape from two guns, while an overwhelming force attacked it in front and on its flanks. Beckwith, however, stood firm, until the 52d regiment coming up to his support, the enemy were again charged and driven back. After repeated efforts, these troops established themselves in an extensive enclosure on the summit of the hill, where they repulsed every attack of the enemy. The 3d division fortunately now came up; and the 5th, having carried the bridge, was quickly mounting the hill. But for this opportune succour, the light troops must have been destroyed; for Reynier was then placing an overwhelming body of infantry on their left flank. The enemy now drew off, having lost about 1500 men in this sharp conflict, wherein such a determined spirit was shown by the handful of British troops engaged. In his official despatch, Lord Wellington passed a high and well-merited encomium on those gallant troops;—his words are, "I consider the action that was fought by the light division, by Colonel Beckwith's brigade principally, with the whole of the 2d corps, to be one of the

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Apr. 9.

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most glorious that British troops were ever engaged in."

The superiority of the British mode of fighting was strongly exemplified on this occasion; and Lord Wellington observes, "These attacks of columns against our lines are very contemptible." And, adverting to the recent operations, he writes, "We have given the French a handsome dressing; and I think they will not say again that we are not a manœuvring army. We may not manœuvre so beautifully as they do; but I do not desire better sport than to meet one of their columns *en masse* with our lines. The poor 2d corps received a terrible beating from the 43d and 52d on the 3d."

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Apr. 9. Ibid. Apr. 8.

We cannot help remarking here on the extraordinary pertinacity with which the French troops adhered to their favourite method of fighting in column, — a system they invariably followed throughout the Peninsular war, and afterwards at Waterloo. It is really astonishing that such able tacticians as Napoleon and many of his marshals unquestionably were, should not have sought to change a mode of combating so pernicious when employed against British troops. But woful experience never convinced them of their folly in moving forward helpless masses exposed to the fire of good infantry drawn up in line, whose murderous fire effectually prevented deployment, while almost every shot took effect in one part or another of the *colonne serrée*. We shall have many opportunities, as this history proceeds, of showing with what ease British troops in line at all times repelled the enemy's masses, and also how seldom if ever they failed to drive off the French, how-

ever strongly posted, when they themselves attacked in line.

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After the action of Sabugal, Massena lost no time in crossing the Portugueze frontier and gaining Ciudad Rodrigo, whence he proceeded to Salamanca. Lord Wellington immediately caused Almeida to be blockaded; and being convinced that Massena could not for some time renew his operations, ordered the Portugueze militia and ordenança to their homes, with injunctions to be ready to take the field again at the shortest notice.

Let us here pause for an instant to express a hope, that the masterly combinations of our great Captain in his defence of Portugal, as well as the vigour and wisdom with which they were carried out, have been properly felt and appreciated by the reader. History furnishes no parallel to this grand epoch of our military history. Portugal was the fulcrum on which perhaps the fate of England lay balanced; for no man can say what might have been the consequences, had the British army been defeated and ejected from the Peninsula: but the genius of Wellington touched the beam, and Britain triumphed.

Napoleon has been lauded to the skies by the military writers of France, whose prolific pens, like the scissors of their *marchandes-de-modes*, give law to the rest of the world; but let them cite any portion of their hero's career, splendid though it was, which surpasses this great period in Wellington's history. True, it exhibits no dazzling victories to captivate the imagination, — nothing to put into song as clap-traps for the multitude; but to the reflecting mind it presents a noble dis-

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play of the highest qualities of a great captain, and will be held up in after times as the grandest triumph achieved throughout the war.

But to resume our narrative. — We have seen how Badajos unfortunately fell when on the point of being relieved, after Massena broke up from Santarem. On the reduction of that fortress Soult returned to Andalusia, leaving Mortier to attack Campo Mayor, — a weak place, defended by only 200 men and a few guns, which nevertheless held out for several days under Major Tallaia, a brave Portugueze officer. In the mean time Marshal Beresford, whom Lord Wellington had detached when the French began their retreat, and subsequently reinforced, was approaching, at the head of 22,000 men, to relieve Campo Mayor and invest Badajos. The former place, however, had just surrendered; but Beresford hoped by a rapid movement to surprise the besieging force. In this view his advanced guard of 2000 cavalry, accompanied by a strong detachment of infantry, reached Campo Mayor just as the enemy, who had determined to

March 26.

abandon the place, were moving out. A spirited but desultory cavalry action followed, and part of the allied horse harassed the enemy during their march to Badajos. On this occasion the 13th dragoons showed an excess of gallantry which endangered their being cut off; the Portugueze troopers were equally rash, and the allies had 70 men captured close to the bridge of Badajos. Their killed and wounded amounted to 100, and the enemy lost 300 men.

Beresford immediately took possession of Campo Mayor, and quartered his troops round Elvas. They needed repose, particularly the 4th division,

which had been marching incessantly since the 6th of the month.

To lay down a bridge, — form a *tête-de-pont* over the Guadiana opposite Jurumenha, — and invest Badajos, in the first instance on the left bank of the river; employing cavalry, Spanish troops, or militia to do the same on the opposite side, — were the instructions of Lord Wellington to Marshal Beresford; and the Portugueze government, which had been applied to for means to effect these objects, had stated that all *matériel*, and every requisite, were ready at Elvas, when in reality few things had been collected.

In order to pass the Guadiana, a bridge resting on trestles where the water was shallow, and upon boats where it deepened, was thrown across by Captain Squires of the Engineers; but a sudden rise of the river swept away the trestles. The Spanish boats, five in number, were then used as flying bridges for the cavalry and artillery, and the infantry passed over by a bridge formed of casks and pontoons.

Meanwhile the French were busy in provisioning and repairing the fortress of Badajos, and took no steps to impede or prevent the passage of the Guadiana until it was too late. But on the 7th of April, Latour Maubourg, not aware that the allied troops had crossed, moved with 3500 men and some guns to oppose their passing the river; and, though a day too late for that object, succeeded in surprising and capturing a squadron of the 13th dragoons, after which he retired unmolested by the allies.

Measures were now taken to construct more durable bridges; extensive intrenchments were

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traced out; and a Portugueze regiment was appointed to labour on the purposed works, under protection of a strong detachment.

Beresford summoned Olivença on the 9th; but the governor refusing to surrender, Major Dickson*, who commanded the Portugueze artillery, was sent to Elvas to select battering guns for the siege; while Beresford, leaving General Cole with the 4th division, Madden's Portugueze cavalry, and a brigade of guns to reduce the place, — which was susequently breached in one day, and surrendered on the next, — marched with a view of forcing the French out of Estremadura, preparatory to besieging Badajos. General Cole, arriving from Olivença, joined the Marshal on the 16th at Zafra; and Latour Maubourg retired on the 18th to Guadalcanal, on the south side of the Sierra Morena.

April 15.

By this time operations had ceased, as we have seen, upon the Coa; and, anxious to see how matters fared in Estremadura, Lord Wellington seized the opportunity, and crossed the country to Elvas, where he arrived on the 21st of April, and was met by Marshal Beresford. On the 22d, Lord Wellington, taking with him a large escort of cavalry, forded the Guadiana, and made a reconnoissance of Badajos. A convoy destined for the fortress chancing to arrive at the moment, an attempt was made to cut it off; but a sally from the place secured the convoy, and killed or wounded 100 men of our cavalry.

The appearance of Lord Wellington was hailed with joy by the troops in Estremadura, who hoped that it presaged some event of importance in that

* Major-General Sir Alexander Dickson, G.C.B. and K.C.H.

quarter. They had already begun to repine at the comparative inactivity of their general, who as yet had effected little, although at the head of so considerable a force. Writing from Elvas, Lord Wellington says, "I am afraid that we have lost some valuable time here; and I am come here principally to put matters in the right road, and to come to an understanding with Castaños, and if possible with Blake, respecting our future operations." Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Apr. 21.

That Soult would march from Seville and seek to obstruct the siege of Badajos, Lord Wellington did not doubt; he was, therefore, very solicitous to procure the consent of the several Spanish commanders around to co-operate with Beresford, and be prepared to join the Anglo-Portugueze force, should a concentration become necessary, in order to repel the expected effort of Soult to relieve that fortress. To these propositions the Spanish generals assented; as likewise to another, that when united the officer of highest rank should command the whole. Having thus secured to Marshal Beresford the direction of military operations in the event of the several armies being required to act together, he furnished that officer with detailed memoranda respecting the operations he wished to have carried on, in which able documents he anticipates almost every circumstance likely to arise relative to the approaching siege; and authorizes Beresford to fight a general action with Soult, if necessary. Another memorandum was addressed, at the same time, to the several Spanish leaders, pointing out the objects in view, and the method by which they would most effectually conduce to their success. Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Apr. 23.

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1811. Having now put matters in train on the Guadiana, Lord Wellington hastened northwards, where his presence was greatly needed; Massena being again in the field for the purpose of relieving Almeida. But before we follow him, and trace the interesting operations that ensued, it will be proper to give a brief account of what had been passing in other parts of the Peninsula, during the period the English army had been occupying the attention of the major part of its invaders in a remote corner of Portugal.

1810. Early in the summer of 1810, Marshal Macdonald had succeeded to the command of the French army in Catalonia, having under his orders General Suchet with a considerable force in Aragon.

June 8. He commenced operations by the capture of Mequinenza, — a necessary prelude to the siege of Tortosa; which latter fortress was of immense importance, being the link of communication between Valencia and Catalonia. Suchet was directed to invest this place with 10,000 men. He appeared before it on the 4th of July, and on the 8th made several vigorous attempts to carry the tête-de-pont on the right bank of the Ebro, but was repulsed; and finding the place amply provided in every respect to stand a siege, and commanded by a man of resolution, he was under the necessity of taking up a position of observation, until the stores, ammunition, and artillery necessary for his purpose could be brought from Mequinenza. In order to cover the transport of these essentials (which was attended with great difficulties), Marshal Macdonald with the 7th corps took post at Cervera, thereby at the same time threatening Tarragona; and a division of Suchet's army was

pushed forward on the side of Valencia, to prevent any interruption being attempted by the army of that kingdom.

The only assemblage of Spanish troops which, however, at this time deserved the name of an army in this part of the Peninsula, was that of Catalonia, commanded by Don Henrique O'Donnel, an officer who had gained the confidence of the Catalans by the success with which he had conducted several daring enterprises against the enemy. This general, seeing how fruitless it would be, with the means at his command, to attempt to raise the siege of Tortosa, determined, after provisioning and placing a strong garrison in that fortress, to make an attempt to draw the enemy off by carrying on offensive operations in another quarter; and as nearly the whole of the troops of both Macdonald and Suchet were concentrated in Lower Catalonia to ensure the reduction of Tortosa, he thought a favourable opportunity was offered for striking a blow in the upper part of that province. Assembling, therefore, all the troops that could be spared from Tarragona and other points at Villa Franca, he pushed forward some parties towards Cervera to deceive the enemy as to his intentions, whilst he proceeded to the eastward with the principal part of his force, and by a rapid march fell most unexpectedly upon the division of General Schwarz, scattered in various posts along the sea-coast southward of Gerona. The surprise was complete: Schwarz with 700 men surrendered at La Bisbal, and 800 prisoners were made at other points.

Sep. 6.

Belmas, vol. i. 151.

But though entire success crowned this daring enterprise, — for such it was, having been conducted

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1810. in the midst of fortresses occupied by the enemy, and in presence, it may be said, of a vastly superior force, — yet it did not produce the effect expected from it; for Macdonald remained immovable at Cervera, and the loss fell heavier on the Spaniards than on their enemies, O'Donnel having received a wound, — the sixteenth since the commencement of the war, — which incapacitated him for service in the field for a long period.*

Southey, vol. iii. 12.

No other attempt was made to interrupt or delay the siege of Tortosa; nevertheless the trenches were not opened before the place until the 20th of

1811. December, and on the 2d of January it surrendered with a garrison of 8000 men. Its capture was speedily followed by that of the fort of the Col de Balaquer, situated midway between Tortosa and Tarragona; which latter was now the only fortress remaining to the Spaniards in Catalonia, and of it Marshal Macdonald took immediate steps to deprive them.

We shall readily be spared entering into any details of the ill-concerted movements of the Spanish forces in this quarter, from the period between the surrender of Tolosa and the fall of Tarragona, (which fortress was carried by assault on the 29th of July following), their attempts to impede the operations of the enemy presenting a melancholy picture of the want of every soldier-like quality on the part of the troops, and of the most deplorable incapacity on that of the leaders. In fact, from the time when (on O'Donnel's being obliged to retire from the field) the command fell into the in-

* He was created Conde de la Bisbal for his conduct on this occasion; a title by which, it is much to be lamented, he became so well known at a later period of his life, — A. D. 1820–3.

competent hands of such generals as Francisco Palafox, Campoverde, and Sarsfield, the armies of Catalonia and Aragon gradually dwindled, until they became scarcely more numerous, and decidedly less formidable, than the guerrilla bands, which, recruited by the boldest spirits from their deserted ranks, were now daily rising up on all sides, declaring a war of extermination against their oppressors.

To such an extent had these independent bands increased, that the whole of the north of Spain, from Galicia to the Eastern Pyrenees, was overrun with them; and doubtless great was the injury they inflicted on the enemy, by interrupting their communications, cutting off their hospitals, intercepting their convoys, and slaughtering their stragglers; but from the manner in which the French themselves carried on the war—that is, by plunder and exactions—they did not suffer from the loss of their supplies and magazines in the way that armies differently circumstanced would have done; nor were their operations, therefore, in the same degree cramped and retarded. The plan adopted by Lord Wellington in Portugal was, in fact, the only one that struck at the heart of the predatory French system of conducting the war; and this was so sensibly felt as to draw from them many *philanthropical* strictures on the inhumanity of the measures his lordship adopted for the defence of that country.

The people of Andalusia were the last to be goaded into resistance by the exactions of the invaders; but though the mountains of Ronda and Granada presented equal facilities for carrying on a guerrilla warfare as even Biscay or Catalonia, yet

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the habit of smuggling had deadened the feeling of patriotism in the breasts of these rude *serranos:* no chieftains of any military capacity stepped forward to lead them against the enemy; and they received but feeble support from Gibraltar, which failed to assume that influence over the operations in the south of Spain which, from its strength, position, and resources, it might reasonably have been expected to exercise.

The only effort made by the British garrison of sufficient importance to be here adverted to, was an attempt to obtain possession of Malaga in the autumn of 1810. The force destined for this service was placed under the command of Major-Gen. Lord Blayney; and consisted of a British battalion, part of a Spanish regiment drawn from the garrison of Ceuta, and a weak corps of Italian, German, and other deserters,—in all about 1500 men. The plan proposed was to make a false attack on some part of the coast to the eastward of Gibraltar, in order to draw Sebastiani from Malaga, and having done so, to re-embark the troops, and proceed with them to secure that city ere the enemy could march back to it.

The French having formed a depôt of artillery, stores, &c. at the castle of Fuengirola, with the view of besieging Marbella, Lord Blayney justly considered that it was the only place between Gibraltar and Malaga on which an attack would give Sebastiani any uneasiness; and accordingly he landed his motley assemblage in a sandy cove, about five miles to the westward of the castle, which itself is situated about twenty miles west of Malaga. It is an old, ill-constructed, square, stone-built fort, of small dimensions and feeble profile; without out-

Oct. 14th.

works of any description, and having its walls exposed to their very base. There seemed, therefore, little probability of its being able to hold out, if vigorously attacked; and Lord Blayney determined to attempt its capture. Nevertheless, contemptible as its defences were, either scaling ladders or artillery were required to effect an entrance; and the garrison, perceiving that our troops were provided with neither, declined all parley. A fire of artillery was then opened upon the sea front of the fort from the Topaze frigate and several gunboats, and a musketry fire was kept up by the troops on the land side; neither of which produced any effect. Some guns were therefore landed in the course of the night, and on the following morning a line-of-battle ship, with the 82d regt. on board, arrived. Such an accession of strength, both on sea and land, promised to insure success. Orders were forthwith sent for the troops to be disembarked; but ere this could be accomplished, the garrison, aware that relief was approaching, made a sortie, and captured the principal battery.

Lord Blayney was on board one of the gunboats at this time; but landing immediately, he put himself at the head of the first troops he could collect, and retook the guns at the point of the bayonet. So completely, however, did this sally occupy the attention of the besiegers, that the advance of Sebastiani from Malaga, with a formidable force, was not perceived until a body of his cavalry was on the point of falling upon their left flank; and so totally unexpected were these new enemies, that Lord Blayney persisted in believing them to be Spanish troops until it was too late to make any disposition

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to receive them. He then endeavoured by personal bravery to make amends for his improvidence, but all resistance was vain. Two companies of the 82d, which had been landed, were drawn up on the beach, and covered the embarkation of such of the fugitives as took that direction; but the greater part fled towards Marbella, and 300, with Lord Blayney himself, were made prisoners.

(February.) We must now go back a little in our narrative, and turn towards Cadiz; before which, place it will be remembered, we left Marshal Victor with the 1st corps of the French army, having been foiled in his attempt to gain possession of the Isla de Leon, — the bulwark of that important fortress, — by the rapid and skilful march of the Duke of Albuquerque.

Marshal Soult arrived immediately afterwards to direct in person the operations of the siege*, bringing with him a considerable augmentation of force. The various towns on the margin of the bay were forthwith occupied, and a line of posts was established from San Lucar to Chiclana. On the 10th of February the place was summoned, to which a suitable reply was returned; and since the favourable moment for seizing on the Isla de Leon had been let slip, it now became necessary to collect the materials for carrying on the siege in form. In the mean time, the arrival of an English force and other reinforcements placed it in perfect security. Nevertheless, the siege was pressed with as much vigour as the want of the command of the sea would allow; batteries being established

* King Joseph also was present for a short time during the early part of the siege. His head-quarters were at Puerto Sta Maria, where, thirteen years afterwards, the Duc d'Angoulême fixed his.

on all the favourable points where guns could be brought to bear upon the anchorage and defences of the Isla de Leon. The only success, however, that attended the enemy's operations was the destruction of the little fort of Matagorda, situated on a rocky islet within a short distance of the Trocadero — a low tongue of land so named, which from the town of Puerto Real juts into the bay of Cadiz towards the fort of Puntales, situated on the isthmus connecting the city with the Isle of Leon.

This little fort was gallantly held by a garrison of 140 men, under Captain M'Laine of the 94th regiment, for fifty-five days; when, being reduced to a mere pile of ruins, it was abandoned on the night of the 22d of April. The sole advantage the destruction of Matagorda afforded the enemy, was that of enabling them to establish their mortar batteries within three miles * of the beleaguered city, by which a few houses were afterwards destroyed.

Soult having been called away from Cadiz to direct the more pressing operations on the side of Estremadura, Victor was left in command of the besieging army, which, early in 1811, was so reduced in numbers by the heavy draughts made upon it to meet other services, as scarcely to exceed 20,000 men: — a number quite inadequate to guard a line of investment extending from west to east upwards of twenty-five miles, round a fortress

January, 1811.

* The celebrated *obusiers à la Villantroys* (of which one is exhibited in St. James's Park) were cast for this occasion at Seville. The inhabitants of Cadiz had to thank the municipal junta of that city for what mischief was done by these powerful projectiles; since it neglected to destroy the foundry on the approach of the French, as recommended by the Supreme Junta.

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containing a garrison of equal amount, and, at the same time, to cover the communications with both Granada and Seville, which the Serranos were constantly threatening.

The Spanish governor at this period was Don Manuel de la Peña, an officer who had served with much credit on various occasions as a general of division, but had never directed the operations of an army; and the English troops were commanded by Lieutenant-General Graham *, a gallant soldier, but equally inexperienced in the direction of an army in the field.

Both were full of zeal, and considered the moment favourable for striking such a blow at their weakened enemy as should oblige him to raise the siege; but unfortunately no better plan of effecting this object suggested itself to them, than that of embarking the principal part of their united forces and conveying it to Tarifa, sixty miles to the eastward of the point they purposed marching back to surprise, having previously also to drive in the enemy's posts established midway at Vejer and Casa Vieja! In pursuance of this plan, a mixed force of about 11,000 men was prepared for embarkation; and on the 21st of February the first division, composed of British troops, was shipped off in such vessels as were ready, and sailed for Tarifa. The wind, however, disconcerted the allied generals' arrangements at the very outset; for the ships were driven past their destined port, and obliged to make for Gibraltar. The troops were landed at Algeciras on the 23d, and the following day marched across the mountains to Ta-

* General Lord Lynedoch, G.C.B. and G.C.M.G.

rifa; but as there was no road practicable for artillery between the two places, the vessels having the guns on board were obliged to wait until the weather moderated, when, by great exertion on the part of the sailors, they were conveyed to Tarifa. Here the 28th regiment and flank companies of the 9th and 82d joined the expedition, as also several Spanish battalions from San Roque; and on the 27th La Peña arrived with his corps from Cadiz (six days after the British force had left that place!) The Spanish general, as had been previously agreed, now assumed the chief command of the allied army, which consisted of 13,000 infantry and 800 cavalry (of whom 4000 of the former were British, and 180 of the latter Hanoverians); and on the 28th of February commenced his march towards Cadiz. We will not follow his eccentric movements. It is enough to say, that after marching over mountains and through lagunes, — the latter of which did not lie on the road, — first towards Medina Sidonia, and then towards the coast, (giving due notice to the enemy of his approach by disturbing their posts in all directions,) he, on the morning of the 5th of March, once more got all his force collected on the sea coast near the Torre Barrosa, four miles from the Isla de Leon.

Whilst the combined army was thus leisurely advancing to take Victor *by surprise*, General Zayas, who had been left in command of 6000 Spanish troops in the Isla de Leon, proceeded, in compliance with his instructions, to throw a bridge across the Santi Petri river at its sea-mouth; and, strange to say, he succeeded in so doing, thereby proving that the allied generals might have spared

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their troops the trouble and fatigue of an embarkation, a disembarkation, and a march of 90 miles; since this was the point which, after all their wanderings, they were destined to reach. The success of Zayas was, however, excessively ill-timed; for it attracted the attention of the enemy to the point to which, of all others, it was least desirable it should be drawn.

March 3.

Victor immediately sent a force to drive the Spaniards back into the Isla. Zayas defended himself obstinately; and, though compelled to give ground, succeeded in maintaining his bridge-head. The French marshal now became aware that something serious was intended; and rightly guessing the quarter in which the storm was about to burst, collected the major part of his force between Medina Sidonia and Chiclana, ready to fall upon the allied army as soon as the extraordinary project of its generals should be more clearly developed.

La Peña, with the leading division of the Spanish army, had arrived at Barrosa early on the morning of the 5th, and immediately ordered the advanced guard, under Lardizabel, to open the communication with the Isla de Leon by falling upon the rear of the French force holding Zayas in check. This was gallantly executed, though at a considerable loss. Shortly afterwards the British troops, composing the rear guard, came up; so that by mid-day the whole allied army found itself securely established on the left flank of the enemy's lines, having a sure communication open with the Isla de Leon. It occupied the only little hillock (which has been dignified by the name of the Heights of Barrosa) that is to be seen for miles on either side along the open coast, here washed by the Atlantic. A plain covered

with heath, and broken only here and there by a rough gully or watercourse, extended inland for several miles, — in fact, as far as Chiclana; but neither that town, nor the marshy banks of the Santi Petri river (to the northward and westward), could be seen for a thick pine forest, which stretched across the plain to within a quarter of a mile of the sea. Along this open space, that is, between the wood and the coast, lay the line of communication with the bridge of boats established at the mouth of the Santi Petri, distant about four miles from the Torre Barrosa. Having thus happily been permitted to attain the principal object for which they had left Cadiz, — namely, the facility of undertaking an offensive operation against the besieging army, — the English troops, notwithstanding that they had been marching incessantly for the last sixteen hours, fully expected and impatiently awaited the order to move forward to attack the enemy wherever they might be. But the Spanish commander-in-chief was alarmed for the safety of his bridge; the enemy's troops, which had been driven off in the morning, having received considerable reinforcements, and seeming disposed to return to the attack, by forcing the passage of a deep and muddy creek, which, winding through the pine forest, communicates with the river Santi Petri, and was thus on the left and rear of the position occupied by the allied army at Barrosa.

Victor, in fact, had sent a division of 3000 men under General Villatte to alarm the allies for their communication with the Isle of Leon, while he collected the divisions of Ruffin and Laval in the pine forest, in advance of Chiclana, to fall upon them during their flank march along the coast;

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and so surely did he calculate on a successful issue, that instead of directing Latour Mourbourg's division (2000 strong) to join him from Medina Sidonia, he ordered that general to move with it on Vejer, to cut off the retreat of the allies on Gibraltar.

La Peña, however, seems to have thought that the only misfortune which could possibly happen to him would be the loss of his communication with Cadiz; and accordingly he directed General Graham to march through the pine forest, to a position he purposed occupying on some sand-hills about midway between Barrosa and the Santi Petri; its left resting on the before-mentioned Almanza creek, below where a mill and bridge afforded the only means of passing it, and its right upon the sea near the Torre Bermeja.

In vain General Graham urged to him that the French would not venture to attack the Bermeja position, whilst the one they then occupied was held in force; and that it was of importance to preserve this latter, as it offered advantages for acting offensively. La Peña was immovable, and Graham reluctantly obeyed. The British column had proceeded more than half-way to its prescribed position, when information was brought that the enemy had debouched from the forest in great force, and were advancing rapidly towards Barrosa. Graham, impressed with the erroneous notion that La Peña had intended to maintain that position with the main body of the Spanish army left there when he commenced his march, did not hesitate a moment in retracing his steps to proceed to its assistance. To countermarch his column in a thick forest was, however, utterly impossible; it was

therefore simply faced to the right about, and then marched back as expeditiously as practicable. Great confusion unavoidably ensued; the different regiments became intermixed, and every thing like a regular formation was out of the question. In this state the British troops issued from the wood, and found themselves in presence of an enemy double in number. One dense French column (Laval's) was advancing along the edge of the forest close upon their left flank; another (Ruffin's) was already in possession of the hill of Barrosa, from which a Spanish rear guard, and all the baggage of the allied army, were retreating in indescribable confusion, — a small rear guard of English, under the command of Lt.-Col. Brown of the 28th regiment, alone was making a gallant attempt to gain time for the fugitives. MS. Notes.

Graham saw at a glance that there was nothing for it but to attack; for the enemy, by advancing along the open space bordering the sea, might now reach the Bermeja position much sooner than he possibly could by retracing his steps through the forest; and justly mistrusting the ability of the Spaniards to hold their ground until he could arrive to their succour, he saw that to fall back under such circumstances would be fatal to the entire British division. His determination was quickly taken: the troops were formed in line just as they happened to issue from the wood *; and the whole — rather as a dense swarm of skirmishers than as a compact line — pushed forward to the attack; the right wing bearing away to assail Ruffin's

* It may be gratifying to *men of small stature* to know that the battle of Barrosa — than in which British valour never shone more conspicuously — was fought throughout with the rear rank in front.

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corps on the hill, the left to make head against Laval's. In the opening thus left Major Duncan of the Royal Artillery drew up ten guns, which pouring their fire upon the enemy's right column with wonderful rapidity and precision, rendered abortive all their attempts to deploy. They exchanged nevertheless a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, though evidently at a disadvantage, and seemed little disposed to yield ground. At this moment Graham's horse was shot, and rolled to the earth. Whilst yet endeavouring to disengage himself from the struggling animal, the gallant general said with the greatest composure to those who had hurried to his assistance, "I should like to charge those fellows." These words were quickly passed along the ranks of the 87th regiment, and replied to with a general cheer; and, fixing their bayonets as they went, that gallant corps, under Major Gough*, three companies of the Coldstream Guards, led by Lt.-Colonel Jackson †, and some detachments of other corps, rushed impetuously upon the enemy's column, — the fate of which was quickly decided.

Meanwhile the enemy's left had been as rudely assailed, and driven from the hill with equal gallantry by the remainder of the battalion of guards, and the 28th and 67th regiments.

Retiring concentrically, the two French corps again united, and attempted a new formation; but Duncan, taking up an advanced position with his guns, gave them no respite; and they were driven from the field in a state of utter disorganization,

* Major-General Sir Hugh Gough, K.C.B.
† Lieutenant-General Sir R. D. Jackson, K.C.B.

leaving 440 prisoners, six guns, and an eagle in the victors' hands, and the field strewed with 2000 killed and wounded—amongst the former were Generals Ruffin and Chaudron Rousseau. The loss of the English was proportionately severe, for it amounted to 1200 *hors de combat.*

La Peña, quite unconscious of the enemy's vicinity, had quitted the hill of Barrosa when the rear of the English column entered the pine wood, and leaving a few battalions to escort the baggage, marched rapidly by the sea beach to secure the position of Bermeja. Here he was established when the action commenced; and apprehending, from the demonstrations made along the Almanza creek, that the left of his own position was about to be seriously attacked, would not venture to detach any part of his force to support the English army. Indeed, having placed himself in a position nearly surrounded with wood, he could not see the field of battle, and consequently knew not on which side to move to be of any assistance; and he naturally supposed that the English were still in the pine forest. Two Spanish regiments, however, which had not reached Bermeja when the firing commenced, faced about without orders from La Peña, and came up at the close of the action.

The English remained for several hours on the field of battle, burying their dead and carrying off their wounded; but as they could not obtain supplies of any kind, General Graham, indignant at La Peña's conduct, withdrew on the following morning to the Isla.

The Spaniards did not stir from their position at Bermeja, though their general expressed great anxiety to follow up the victory he had the vanity

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to claim. Victor retired to Chiclana, where he took up a defensive position, and called a council of war, — two measures indicative of a very unpromising state of affairs with a French army. In fact, he halted so near the field of battle merely to give Latour Maubourg a chance of escaping from the perilous enterprise on which he had sent him towards Vejer; for his mind was made up to fall back to Puerto Real if his adversaries followed up their success, and he thought it very doubtful whether he should not be obliged to raise the siege altogether. The unfortunate misunderstanding between the generals of the allied army relieved Victor from his difficulties, and enabled him to re-occupy all his posts round the bay of Cadiz on the 8th March; but he sent off pressing demands for reinforcements.

The operations of the allies in this military *extravaganza* are as far beneath criticism, as the gallantry of the British troops in the action with which it terminated is beyond all praise. As regards the movements of the French, it may perhaps seem unjust to blame Victor for the scattered condition of his army at the decisive moment for action, since that very dispersion, by threatening many points at the same time, caused the alarm which led the Spanish general to seek his bridge in such haste; but if this result had not been calculated upon from a knowledge of his adversary's character, then the French general's dispositions were faulty in the extreme.

CHAPTER XXV.

MASSENA ATTEMPTS TO RELIEVE ALMEIDA. — BATTLE OF FUENTES DE HONOR. — OBSERVATIONS. — THE GARRISON OF ALMEIDA ESCAPES. — OPERATIONS IN ALEMTEJO. — FIRST SIEGE OF BADAJOS. — BATTLE OF ALBUERA. — OBSERVATIONS. — LORD WELLINGTON ARRIVES AT ELVAS. — BADAJOS AGAIN BESIEGED. — THE SIEGE RAISED BY MARMONT AND SOULT. — WELLINGTON CROSSES THE GUADIANA, AND TAKES POST NEAR ELVAS. — MARMONT AND SOULT SEPARATE. — LORD WELLINGTON MOVES TO THE TAGUS, AND EVENTUALLY TO THE VICINITY OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

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MARSHAL MASSENA having made extraordinary exertions to reorganize his army, and been reinforced by two divisions of the 9th corps, together with some cavalry and artillery of the Imperial guard under Bessières, was again at the head of a formidable force. On the 2d May, his army, amounting to 40,000 effective infantry and 5000 cavalry, crossed the frontier of Portugal, escorting a convoy of stores and provisions for the relief of Almeida. Lord Wellington, who had only 34,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry, cantoned on the Azava and Dos Casas rivers, immediately collected his force to frustrate the enemy's object.

Almeida stands on the summit of a range of heights that divides the river Coa from the Turones, and is nearly two miles distant from the first-named of those streams, on its right bank. Both flow in a northerly direction; the former to the Douro, the other to the Agueda; the Turones being an inconsiderable stream, but the Coa (at certain seasons) deep and rapid, with rocky inacces-

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sible banks, and offering but few points of passage. In fact, at this time, the only communications across it suited to an army were by the bridges of Sabugal and Castel Bom (twenty-five miles apart); those of Almeida and Pinhel having been destroyed by the enemy in their retreat from Portugal. In dry weather the Coa is fordable in many places; but at the period of which we write none of the fords could be depended on.

Almeida being on the enemy's side of the Coa, Lord Wellington, in order to keep up the blockade of the fortress, was compelled to take post with that river in his rear; and as the bridge at Sabugal offered the most sure and convenient means of passing the treacherous stream, he was desirous to keep open a communication with that place by his right, while the left of his army was of necessity near Almeida, to prevent the enemy holding any intercourse with the garrison round that flank. Trusting to the excellence of his troops, Lord Wellington hoped to manœuvre so as to defeat Massena's project, and at the same time protect points clearly too distant from each other for the force at his disposal.

Eastward of the Coa, and nearly parallel to it, runs, as we have mentioned, the Turones; and about a mile and a half yet further in advance of this stream, flowing in the same direction, is the Dos Casas, an equally inconsiderable river, but sunk deep in a rocky ravine, on whose left bank stands the village of Fuentes de Honor. The ground between these two streams is elevated, and presents a flat and open surface; while to the south the banks of the ravines lose much of their asperity, rendering the country in that direction fa-

vourable for the movements of an army; but the character of the scene changes on approaching Nava de Aver, where an undulated country extends southward to the foot of the lofty Sierra de Gata.

The divisions of Generals Spencer, Picton, and Houston* were placed in rear of Fuentes de Honor, the village itself being occupied by a chosen body of troops under Lieut.-Colonel Williams.† On the left, but somewhat detached, the division of General Campbell took post opposite the village of Alameda, where there was a bridge over the Dos Casas; and the light division under Craufurd was placed between that point and the village of Fuentes. Sir W. Erskine's division stood on the extreme left, guarding the high road from Ciudad Rodrigo to Almeida, which crosses the above-named stream by a ford near the then ruined Fort Concepcion, the fortress itself being closely watched by General Pack's brigade. At the distance of two miles beyond the extreme right, Julian Sanchez with his guerrilla horse took post near Nava de Aver.

Such was the first disposition; but aware of the facility with which the enemy might pass between Nava de Aver and Fuentes, Lord Wellington subsequently moved the light division to the rear of the latter village, and had thus three fourths of his force massed upon Fuentes, ready to anticipate the enemy at whatever point they might choose for their attack.

On the 3d May, the enemy advanced to the Dos

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* General Sir William Houston, Bart., G.C.B.

† The late Major-General Sir William Williams, K.C.B.

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Casas, their left being in front of Fuentes de Honor, and their right extending to the village of Alameda; the convoy remaining at Gallegos. The same afternoon they made a sudden and vigorous effort to carry the village of Fuentes, the possession of which was disputed with the greatest obstinacy. Lieut.-Colonel Williams being wounded, the command devolved on Lieut.-Colonel Cameron, who successfully resisted the fierce attacks of the enemy. Both parties received reinforcements, and the close and deadly strife continued until darkness closed the scene, when the French withdrew across the river.

On the following day both armies remained tranquil; and Massena, who was not present during the affair of the 3d, now examined the ground, and decided on throwing his principal force upon the British right. Anticipating his opponent's design, and also anxious to secure the communication with Sabugal, Lord Wellington moved Houston's division on the evening of the 4th from the rear of Fuentes, and posted it behind the village of Pozo Velho in an open wood midway between Fuentes and Nava de Aver.

Soon after daylight on the morning of the 5th the French were seen in movement, bearing towards the ground in front of the British right. The light division and the cavalry, with a troop of horse artillery, were immediately ordered towards the 7th (Houston's) division, while the remainder of the troops supported this movement by closing somewhat to the right. It has been observed that the ravine of Dos Casas, though presenting a considerable impediment to the motions of troops below Fuentes, nearly disappears above that village, where

the character of the ground is that of gentle slopes. CHAP. XXV.

The action began with an attack upon the left wing of the 7th division, posted in the village of Pozo Velho, which was attended with some success. The French cavalry under Montbrun then passed that place, and Julian Sanchez immediately taking alarm, hastily abandoned Nava de Aver, and retired across the Turones; thereby uncovering the right of the 7th division, which was instantly turned by Montbrun's horse. A body of British cavalry strove to check his further advance, but was speedily compelled to retire; and the troop of horse artillery*, deprived of its support, became surrounded. In a few minutes, however, to the surprise and admiration of both friend and foe, the guns were seen to emerge from amongst the enemy's squadrons, through which they had burst at full speed, and gaining the allied line, unlimbered, and poured a destructive fire into the enemy's ranks before they had recovered from the astonishment excited by a feat which British horse artillery alone could have achieved. In the mean time the 7th and light divisions fell back; and Colonel Sydney Beckwith's brigade, though enveloped by clouds of French cavalry, laughed at their futile attempts upon its squares, which were withdrawn in a most masterly manner. 1811.

This successful operation of the French forced Lord Wellington to relinquish the communication with Sabugal, and the 7th division was moved across the Turones to Freneda; whence his new

* Commanded by Captain (Major) Norman Ramsay;—killed at Waterloo.

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line extended to Fuentes de Honor. The right wing of the army thus thrown back formed an elbow with the centre and left, which still retained their original position behind the Dos Casas; and the masses of infantry formed *en potence* to defend the key of the position, looked so formidable, that the French, although elated by their temporary advantage, drew up and attempted no further serious attack in that quarter, but continued to ply the allied troops with a destructive cannonade.

The principal effort of the enemy was now again directed against the village of Fuentes, where a fierce and bloody struggle long left it doubtful whether the enemy or its intrepid defenders would prevail. At one moment the French had actually penetrated beyond the village, and attempted a formation to assail the plateau; but they were immediately attacked and driven back into the streets by the 74th, 83d, and 88th regiments. Both sides were strongly reinforced; and the contest was maintained with the utmost courage and obstinacy until late in the evening, when the French once more withdrew. Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron of the 79th was mortally wounded early in the day, when the command in the village devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel Cadogan of the 71st regiment.

Lord Wellington expected a renewal of the attack on the morrow; and although he felt little doubt respecting the issue of the contest, no precaution was neglected to strengthen the position of his army, and secure its retreat should a retrograde movement become necessary. His line, which extended across the table-land between the Turones and Dos Casas, was intrenched during the night; and

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Captain Tod*, with two companies of the Royal Staff Corps, was despatched to throw temporary bridges over the Coa below Almeida. The point selected for this purpose was near the broken bridge of Pinhel; and by extraordinary exertion that able officer constructed two rough but ingenious bridges with such materials as could be collected in the adjacent villages, which were ready by mid-day on the 6th.†

The fighting on the 3d and 5th convinced Massena that he could make no impression on the British troops, and he wisely refrained from any further attack. Both armies remained gazing at each other during the 6th and 7th; but on the 8th the enemy began to draw off towards the Agueda, and, crossing that river two days afterwards, Almeida was abandoned to its fate.

Marmont, Duke of Ragusa, now assumed the command of the army of Portugal; Massena—no longer "*l'enfant gaté de la victoire*"—having been recalled by the Emperor.

The French presumed to claim a victory in consequence of their advantage over Wellington's right wing; but, with far better reason, the British could boast of having effectually defeated the sole object of Massena's operation,—the relief of Almeida,—and that with a far inferior force. Thus Wellington attained his purpose, while that of his opponent miscarried; and if victory belong to

* Lieut.-Colonel Alexander Tod.

† No writer seems to have been aware of the existence of these bridges, which rendered the retreat of the army on Celerico quite secure; nor is the character of the Coa generally known: it is a mountain stream, fordable in numerous parts during summer, but liable to rise very suddenly; and throughout the rainy season is deep, rapid, and impassable.

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the general who is *successful*, the former may undoubtedly claim the palm on this occasion. The allies lost 1500 men, of whom 300 were prisoners: the enemy's loss was far greater.

None of the multifarious proceedings in which mankind engage are so little susceptible of rule as military operations; and to form a judgment with respect to any measure in the field, whether it be a movement or a battle, many circumstances must be taken into account. On the occasion in question, Wellington ought, according to the pretended rules of military science, to have retired behind the Coa; for in numbers he was inferior, he had a defective position, and a difficult retreat. But what were the real facts of the case? His army was as much superior to the enemy in battle as inferior in numbers, — which had been proved in twenty affairs of late, commencing with Craufurd's action, on nearly the same ground, when less than 3500 bayonets, including a Portugueze battalion, held the whole of Ney's corps in check, and finally succeeded in passing the Coa by a single bridge, despite the enemy's efforts to prevent it.

But there were higher considerations which influenced Wellington. The honour of his army made it imperative that the attempt of the French to retrieve the blunders of their invasion of and retreat from Portugal, by gaining a great battle, should be signally foiled; and besides, the possession of Almeida was of the utmost importance to the future operations of the British. By retiring, both of these objects would have been lost, and the same battle must have been fought elsewhere under less favourable circumstances; while the French would have boasted that the British had shrunk from

meeting them in a fair field, and that hunger alone was the enemy that had prevented their success in Portugal. In short, the passage of the Coa by the allies would have given immense moral advantages to the enemy, and Wellington knew as well as Bonaparte that "moral is to physical force in the ratio of three to one." We may add, that in warfare as in other matters, rules must often be violated; or rather, that genius begins where rules end. Had Wellington allowed himself to be fettered by rules, he would neither have conquered at Assye, nor would he have crossed the deep and rapid Douro in Soult's teeth without a bridge. Lord Wellington's moral courage, his daring and invincible spirit, seconded by such instruments as the British army afforded, enabled him, when circumstances required it, to set rules at defiance, and still to conquer.

But to return. The object now was to prevent the escape of the garrison of Almeida, and the allied troops were so disposed that such an event seemed almost impossible; nevertheless it occurred, to the deep mortification of Lord Wellington and his army. It seems that a French soldier contrived to make his way into the fortress, bearing an order for its evacuation; which was executed on the night of the 10th with equal boldness and address. Having injured the defences to the utmost of his power, General Brenier sallied out at the head of his garrison, broke through the pickets, and pushing on rapidly, gained the bridge over the Agueda beyond Barba del Puerco; a strong post, which by a fatal neglect on the part of a deceased general officer was found unoccupied. In the meantime the alarm had spread; and troops hurrying towards the firing kept up by the pickets, which hung on

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the flanks and rear of the French, arrived as they were descending to the bridge. Many were slain, 300 taken, and the pursuit was rashly continued after passing the river; but the enemy's 2d corps, from San Felices, drawn up in order of battle, received the fortunate garrison, and drove back its pursuers with some loss. This unlucky affair created a great sensation in the British army at the time, all concerned seeking to cast the blame from their own shoulders; but war presents a wide field for the occurrence of accidents and chances, as well as of enterprise. Having in this manner recovered the garrison of Almeida, Marmont retired with the greater part of his army towards Salamanca.

Nothing marks superiority more than a power of withdrawing the mind from contemplating matters of pressing and absorbing interest, and fixing it intently on such as are of more remote consequence. It will be seen on numerous occasions, as this biography proceeds, that Wellington could sit down on the eve of battle, or pending the most delicate operations, and write an elaborate despatch, whether upon intricate financial questions, or yet more perplexing political transactions, with as much freedom from preoccupation of mind as if he were quietly in winter quarters, and no enemy within fifty miles.

Take as an instance the letters and despatches dated on the 6th and 7th May, when, after the obstinate struggles of Fuentes de Honor, he was in hourly expectation of a renewal of the attack. They are as forcible, lucid, and important as any amongst the published despatches. One in particular, addressed to the Earl of Liverpool, bears the stamp of entire freedom of mind. It was in reply to some weighty queries offered to his consideration by that

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. May 11.

nobleman respecting the general conduct of the war in the Peninsula, and the hopes and intentions of the British commander in his ulterior operations. The answers convey an opinion that the radical defect in Spain and Portugal was a want of money even to carry on the ordinary measures of the governments, — if such they could be styled, — much more to defray the expenses of a protracted war. He incontestibly proves, however, that this defect was not to be remedied by subsidies, but by the Peninsular governments finding means to increase their own pecuniary resources.

Adverting to the efforts of England in Portugal, he was decidedly of opinion that 30,000 effective British troops would be sufficient to maintain themselves in that country, — supposing its defence to be the sole object in view, — supported by a reserve in England or Ireland, kept ready to sail at a moment's notice. Then follows a sketch of his own plans; the first object being to regain Badajos, the possession of that fortress being necessary for many reasons. He then takes a glance at probable operations, supposing his projected attack on Badajos to prove successful: — points which are discussed with the usual ability of the noble writer. He next passes on to a question raised respecting maritime operations on the Spanish coasts, which Ministers appeared disposed to undertake: these he deprecates on every account; concluding his observations with the following advice to the British Government: —

" Depend upon it that Portugal should be the foundation of all your operations in the Peninsula, of whatever nature they may be; upon which point I have never altered my opinion. If they are to be offensive, and Spain is to be the Gurwood. Despatches, &c. May 7.

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theatre of them, your commanders must be in a situation to be entirely independent of all Spanish authorities; by which means alone they will be enabled to draw some resources from the country, and some assistance from the Spanish armies."

The operations of Marshal Beresford, which were closely linked with those of Lord Wellington, now call our attention to Estremadura. It will be remembered that, previous to quitting Elvas, his lordship had smoothed most of the difficulties, and put every thing in train for an effective co-operation with Beresford by the Spanish leaders, who soon after acceded to every proposal made to them by Lord Wellington, and Badajos was invested by the combined armies. During a close reconnoissance made by Lord Wellington and Marshal Beresford, it had been ascertained that the only chance of reducing the fortress, with the means at the disposal of the latter, lay in attacking the castle, which stands on a steep and commanding height at the junction of the Rivillas stream with the Guadiana. The strong natural defence at this point was not merely strengthened by a high wall, built on the crest of the hill; but a good fort situated on the heights of Cristoval, on the northern bank of the Guadiana, flanked the castle front, and commanded its interior. It was evident, therefore, that if the fort were taken, and batteries erected within it, the enemy would be unable to stand and dispute a breach in the castle wall, which from its uncovered position might be battered from a distance; and it having been ascertained in the night by officers of engineers that there was no difficulty in crossing the Rivillas and ascending to the foot of the wall, that mode of attack was determined on.

By the 23d April two bridges were completed

over the Guadiana for the conveyance of stores and artillery, and the investment of the fortress was fixed for the following day; but a sudden rise of the river the same night carried away both bridges, and the operation was necessarily postponed. Another bridge was prepared in a few days, and on the 8th May the siege commenced by the erection of a battery against Fort San Cristoval. Little progress had been made by the 10th, owing to the rocky nature of the soil and inexperience of the workmen, when by a spirited sally the enemy obtained a temporary possession of the unfinished work. They were immediately driven back; but the besiegers, following eagerly, and, it may be added, heedlessly, became exposed to a hot fire of grape, both in front and flank, which occasioned them a heavy loss.

The battery opened its fire on the 11th; but the artillery (Portugueze) was found to be so bad that additional guns were ordered up from Elvas, and ground was about to be broken against the castle, when intelligence arrived that Marshal Soult had arrived at Llerena with an army to relieve the place. The siege was therefore raised, and Marshal Beresford marched the main body of his force to Valverde de Leganes on the 14th, where an arrangement was made with Generals Castaños and Blake for the concentration of the allied armies near Albuera, to give battle to the enemy. In his instructions to Sir W. Beresford, Lord Wellington had pointed out the ground near Albuera as the most eligible part for assembling the troops, being

Report of Operations. Sir B. D'Urban.*

* Lieut.-General Sir Benjamin D'Urban, K.C.B. and K.C.H. He was quartermaster-general to the allied British and Portugueze.

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centrically situated with reference to the several roads by which an army could advance from the Sierra Morena upon Badajos.

The combined force now under the direction of Marshal Beresford amounted to 27,000 infantry, of whom 7000 were British, and only 2000 cavalry. The Spaniards were posted on the right, the British occupied the centre, and the Portugueze the left; the cavalry, under General Lumley, being in rear of the centre. The little river Albuera flowed in front of the allied position; and though fordable in every part, was in places, particularly before the left wing, difficult to pass, owing to the ruggedness of its banks. The high road from Seville to Badajos traverses the village of Albuera, crossing the river by a handsome stone bridge; and a little lower down there stood another bridge, which was old and narrow. The village, behind which was the left centre of the position, being occupied in strength, that part of the line was tolerably well secured; but above the village there was nothing to prevent the enemy crossing the stream, its banks being practicable everywhere.

Soult had 20,000 veteran infantry, with 4000 cavalry; and aware that the whole of the *British* force was not present, expected probably another *Gevora*. About nine o'clock on the morning of the 16th he made a feint, as if to attack the village and centre of the allies; but having collected a strong force on his left under cover of a wooded hill, he pushed it vigorously against their right, hoping to overwhelm it before it could receive support. In anticipation of his attack, Beresford had directed the Spaniards posted on that flank to execute a change of front, and form a line perpendicular to

their original position. This operation was not performed without demur and difficulty, and had not the desired effect; for after a gallant resistance, the Spaniards gave way, and the French establishing themselves on the abandoned ground (which rather commanded the rest of the position) were enabled to sweep with their artillery the whole of the allied line. To dislodge them became absolutely necessary; and Major-General W. Stewart, whose division had been withdrawn from the centre to support the Spaniards, was directed to effect this object. The leading brigade, under Colonel Colborne *, was accordingly precipitated into action during a thick rain, and was hastily advancing under a heavy fire against the French infantry, which remained still in columns of attack, when a body of Polish lancers and some squadrons of French hussars, taking advantage of the obscurity and confusion which prevailed, galloped round Colborne's exposed battalions, assailed them in rear, slew a great many men, and drove some hundreds into the hands of the French infantry. But General Lumley having observed this misfortune, immediately detached two squadrons of the 4th dragoons and some Spanish cavalry to the spot, who avenged their fate by falling furiously upon the hussars and lancers, few of whom escaped their violence. Fortunately the 31st regiment had not deployed; and with this battalion Colborne maintained the hill until the British artillery under Major Hartman and General Houghton's brigade came up and restored the battle.

Fierce was now the conflict sustained by this small

* Lieut.-General Sir John Colborne, G.C.B. and G.C.H.

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body of British troops against the overwhelming but paralysed force of the enemy: for, still in columns, they could not take advantage of their position and superiority; while, exposed to so deadly a fire of musketry, deployment was impossible. Perhaps the British infantry never appeared to greater advantage than on this occasion, when two thirds of their number fell, including General Houghton, Colonel Duckworth, and most of the field officers.

Report of Operations. Sir B. D'Urban.

"It was an incessant fire of musketry, very often at the distance of twenty paces, only interrupted at intervals upon the part of the British by partial charges of the bayonet. The French, treble their number, fought in their best manner, and made incredible efforts, but in vain,—nothing could shake or overcome the troops who opposed them; and this period of the battle was fruitful beyond all former example in traits of devoted heroism and contempt of death."

At length ammunition began to fail, and a column of the enemy established itself in a more forward situation on the right flank.

Now was the crisis of the battle, and a moment's delay would have been fatal. Happily Colonel Hardinge*, an able and distinguished staff officer, perceiving how matters stood, with great promptness and decision rode up to General Cole, whose division had reached the ground after the battle commenced, and now stood as a reserve in rear of the right, and pointed out to him the necessity of reinforcing the troops engaged. The fusilier brigade under Sir William Myers, and Colonel Hawk-

* Major-General the Right Hon. Sir Henry Hardinge, K.C.B.

shaw's battalion of the Lusitanian legion, were in consequence ordered to advance; and these gallant troops moving forward with order and celerity upon the right of Houghton's brigade, speedily convinced the enemy that the day was not yet won. At the same time Lieut.-Col. Abercrombie pressed onwards with the 2d brigade of General Stewart's division, which was on the left of Houghton's brigade. The struggle for victory was now furious: Myers was killed; General Cole and most of the field officers were wounded. Still the British gained ground, notwithstanding their immense loss of men; until the hostile columns, embarrassed by their own denseness, astonished and dismayed, broke and fled.

Meanwhile Marshal Beresford, who during the hottest of the action exposed himself with the most daring intrepidity, perceiving that the moment for deciding the fortune of the day was arrived, ordered Alten with his Germans and the Portugueze troops on the left to close up and turn the enemy's right; but these reserves never reached the enemy, they having already recrossed the Albuera.

General Lumley throughout the day had done wonders with his small body of cavalry; having kept the numerous squadrons of the enemy in check, and by the most gallant and judicious conduct supported the efforts of the infantry. Some sharp fighting also occurred at the village of Albuera, where General Alten and the German light infantry were posted, covered by the Portugueze artillery under Major Dickson, which was admirably served, and did great execution.

This battle was pronounced by Lord Wellington to be "one of the most glorious and honourable

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. May 20.

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to the character of the British troops of any that had been fought during the war." As regards them, it was likewise the most sanguinary; their loss amounting to 3500, out of 7000 in the field. The Spaniards lost 2000, the Portugueze 400, and the Germans 120. The enemy had two generals of division killed, five wounded, and their total loss was 9000 men. The battle commenced at nine in the morning, and continued till two. The Spaniards stood well; but for want of discipline were totally unable to manœuvre, which threw upon the British the burden of the battle. The small number of Portugueze engaged maintained the character they had acquired at Busaco; and it is but due to the French to say that their efforts were worthy of their great reputation.

A difference of opinion will often prevail with respect to military operations, proceeding from a variety of causes; and the battle of Albuera has furnished much food for discussion. For ourselves we do not see how Sir William Beresford could have avoided fighting, (leaving other considerations apart,) with the code of instructions furnished by Lord Wellington; of which the following is an extract:— "If Sir William Beresford should think his strength sufficient to fight a general action to save the siege of Badajos, he will collect his troops to fight it. I believe that, upon the whole, the most central and advantageous place to collect his troops will be at Albuera." Thus Sir William had little of choice in the matter; for not only was he ordered to fight, but his field of battle was actually pointed out.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Apr. 23.

As regards the French marshal the case was widely different. His object was to relieve Badajos;

and at the head of the force he commanded, comprising a numerous cavalry, there can be no question but he might have manœuvred in the valley of the Guadiana, and thrown what he pleased into the place, without the possibility of Marshal Beresford, with an army composed of three nations, the greater part very indifferent troops, being able to prevent it. But few leaders have self-denial enough to resist a tempting opportunity of acquiring glory; and Soult having before him an untried general, and a very inferior army to his own in point of composition, which was also far from strongly posted, conceived the circumstances propitious for adding to his fame: and in all probability his calculations would not have been disappointed, but for the opportune arrival of General Cole's division after the battle began. His dispositions were worthy of the high reputation he enjoyed, and a preponderating force was ably lodged upon the right of the allied position, where his troops ought to have been deployed; but here, as on most occasions when opposed to the British, they seemed to think that all was done when masses became established on a commanding part of the allied position:—a fatal mistake.

Report of Operations. Sir B. D'Urban.

The hostile armies remained in presence during the 17th, when the allies fully expected a renewed attack; and on the following day the enemy began their retreat towards Andalusia by the road of Almendralejos, leaving behind a considerable number of wounded, the movement being covered by their numerous cavalry. Badajos was reinvested on the southern bank of the Guadiana at daybreak on the 19th; on which day Lord Wellington arrived at Elvas, and was in communication with Marshal

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Beresford. He did not think it expedient to press the pursuit of the enemy; recommended much caution; and was unwilling that the troops should be far removed from their main object, the siege of Badajos. On the 21st he rode over the field of battle, and expressed his satisfaction at what had been achieved.

At this period the army had the gratification of being rejoined by Lieut.-General Hill, who had been for many months absent on account of ill health. His return relieved Sir William Beresford of the command of the corps in Estremadura, at a moment when his presence was greatly needed at the head-quarters of the Portugueze army, which, as already observed, had greatly declined in efficiency. General Hill's corps took post at Almendralejos, to hold in check the beaten enemy, who occupied Llerena, and to cover the operations of the siege of Badajos.

May 27. Lord Wellington now assumed the personal command of this force, which was speedily reinforced by the arrival of the 3d and 7th divisions from the army on the Coa; and having caused Badajos to be invested on the northern side, he determined to press the siege with all possible vigour; in which he was ably seconded by Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher, the chief engineer, and Major Dickson, who directed the artillery. But the *matériel* at the disposal of these officers was exceedingly limited. The garrison was rated at 3000 men, amply provided with food and stores for two months' consumption; and their artillery, which numbered 150 pieces, was of an excellent description.

The plan of attack adopted previous to the recent

interruption of the siege was now resumed, and by the 2d June the batteries were completed on both sides of the river. They opened on the 3d; and the fire was so well sustained, that by the 6th a breach in Cristoval was reported practicable, and an assault took place at midnight. But the advance of the storming party on reaching the breach, discovered that the enemy had been employed after nightfall in removing the rubbish, and that seven feet of the escarp was standing clear. The gallant fellows might then have retired with little loss; but their spirit led them to persevere for more than an hour in impracticable attempts to surmount the obstacle, and also to carry the fort by escalade; in hopes of which ladders were applied to almost every face and flank of the work with astonishing resolution, while shells, grenades, stones, &c. were showered from above, till 102 men out of 180 fell, and the remainder retired.

In the course of the two following days the breach was widened; and being made practicable, a second assault took place immediately that it became dark. But in the interim the little garrison had been strengthened, and every preparation made to repel an attack: unfortunately too, the commanding officer and the engineer conducting the detachment were early killed; and though the troops leaped into the ditch with the utmost gallantry, and hastened on, as they imagined, towards the breach, they had no longer a leader to guide them, and lost their way. The summit of the breach was covered with shells, which were rolled down upon the assailants; while grenades, bags of powder, and various combustibles were thrown upon them without intermission. Again ladders were applied, and the men

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bravely mounted them; but such as reached the parapet were bayoneted, and the ladders were thrown down. At length an order was given for their unavailing efforts to be discontinued; and the men reluctantly retired, having lost 140 out of 200 who went forward to the assault.*

The failure against Cristoval saved Badajos, as the breach in the castle was practicable, and the besiegers only waited the fall of that fort to make the assault; an enterprise necessarily dependent on the possession of the latter, as we have already noticed.

Lord Wellington had pressed measures against Badajos, being aware that Marmont and Soult, (the latter having been reinforced from Cadiz,) would speedily be in co-operation to raise the siege, which his strength would by no means enable him to continue in presence of their armies when combined; nor could he hope to fight them with advantage on the south side of the Guadiana, keeping the city blockaded. In order, however, to be in some degree prepared for the enemy's expected operations, Sir Brent Spencer, who was left in command of the army on the Coa, received directions to move his divisions towards Villa Velha, so soon as he should ascertain that Marmont's army was in motion towards Almaraz.

The failure against San Cristoval on the 9th, determined Lord Wellington to abandon the undertaking, which had evidently become hopeless for want of adequate means. Accordingly, having re-

* We must not deprive extraordinary valour of its meed, especially as no more substantial recompence than the "bubble reputation" was obtained by Ensign Dyas, of the 51st regiment. That officer was a volunteer for the dangerous duty, and led the forlorn hope at both assaults of San Cristoval.

moved all the guns and stores, the siege was raised on the night of the 11th; and the British commander prepared to make head against the French armies, having received information that Marmont had marched by the Puerto de Baños and Plasencia to Almaraz, whence he might be expected in a few days at Merida; and that Drouet's corps, 8000 strong, had moved from Toledo to unite with Soult, who, on being assured of Drouet's approach, advanced to Los Santos, near which place a slight cavalry skirmish occurred to the credit of the allies.

Drouet, having marched rapidly, formed a junction with Soult on the 14th, who then moved forward to Fuente del Maestro; this had the effect of inducing Hill to concentrate the covering force at Albuera, where it checked the advance of Soult, till the approach of Marmont rendered a retreat necessary, when it was withdrawn by the fords of the Guadiana on the 17th. Soult then marched to Merida; and reaching that place on the 18th, established a communication with Marmont. On the following day the enemy's advanced guard entered Badajos. Meanwhile Almeida having been too hastily rendered defenceless by General Pack, the force under Sir Brent Spencer, with the exception of the 5th division and some Portugueze cavalry, — which troops were kept in Lower Beira, awaiting the departure for Almaraz of the last of the enemy's divisions, — joined the main body of the army on the 20th June, then encamped on the Caya, about Torre del Moro, its right being upon the Ponte de Caya, and its left reaching to Campo Mayor. The heights in rear of the latter place were selected for a position, whose front was well

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flanked by the guns of that fortress, and which was further strengthened by field works.

The important fortress of Elvas was now in danger, owing to the gross neglect of the Portugueze government in misapplying its magazines, and Lord Wellington saw himself compelled to order up provisions from his own stores for the supply of that place. This circumstance also obliged him to maintain his ground, and risk being attacked by a very superior force; the three armies of Andalusia, Castile, and the centre of Spain being united under Marmont. "I should and shall avoid a general action, if I can," he writes on this occasion; "but I must put a good countenance upon the state of affairs, and matters must be risked till provisions be placed in Elvas." In addition to the want of magazines, that fortress required much to be done to strengthen the works, as well as to put its armament in a proper condition; to all of which points Lord Wellington now devoted every care and attention.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. June 17.

The combined French armies exceeded 70,000 men, of whom 8000 were cavalry; while the allied army amounted but to 56,000, including 3500 horse. It was therefore a most favourable opportunity for the former to fight a general action; and that they would do so was the opinion of Lord Wellington. But, contrary to his expectations, Marmont contented himself with attempting a reconnoissance of his opponent's position, on the 22d, by the whole of the French cavalry in two bodies, which passed the Guadiana, and advanced very close to the allied army, whose masses were effectually concealed by the ground. The object of the Marshal, which was doubtless to ascertain how the allies were

posted, being thereby defeated, he withdrew his cavalry, which had succeeded in capturing a picket of 60 men belonging to the 11th light dragoons, (a regiment recently arrived from England,) its commander having mistaken the enemy for Portugueze.

When Blake withdrew the Spanish force from the allied army, Lord Wellington proposed to him an operation whereby he hoped to alarm Soult. The project was, for Blake to descend the Guadiana by its right bank, cross over at Mertola, and falling suddenly upon Seville, — that city having been left but weakly guarded, — destroy the arsenal, foundry, and magazines collected there to supply the beseiging force before Cadiz. This, it was expected, would have the effect of drawing Soult to the southward. Blake marched on the 18th of June, and crossed at Mertola on the 22d.

No movement of importance was made by the enemy, after the fruitless attempt to ascertain the position of the allied troops on the 23d; their army remaining upon the Guadiana, between Badajos and Merida, occupied chiefly in procuring subsistence. Towards the end of June, they withdrew from the immediate neighbourhood of Badajos; the army of Portugal taking post on the right of the Guadiana between Montanches and Merida, and the army of the south on the left of that river, extending towards Zafra.

Early in July, however, it was ascertained, by an intercepted letter from Marmont to Berthier, that Soult had marched into Andalusia, leaving behind him the 5th corps and the greater part of his cavalry. Thus far therefore a benefit had resulted from Blake's movement; but it was productive of no other advantage: he failed in an

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attempt to obtain possession of the castle of Niebla, on the night of the 30th of June, (in which place the enemy had a garrison of 300 infantry,) and then retired towards the Guadiana; shortly after which he embarked for Cadiz, leaving a division under Ballasteros, and the cavalry of the 5th army, under the Conde de Penne Villemur, in the Condado (county) de Niebla.

On the 14th of July Marmont quitted the Guadiana, and moved towards Almaraz, purposing to take up a position on the Tagus, leaving in Estremadura the 5th corps, belonging to Soult's army. This movement determined Lord Wellington to canton his army upon both banks of the Tagus, and await some reinforcements that were expected, while preparations should be silently going on for an enterprise against Ciudad Rodrigo; which, looking to the improved condition of his army, both in numbers and efficiency, he saw good reason to hope would be attended with success; and if it should fail, the attempt would remove the war to the strongest frontier of Portugal, where, if obliged to resume the defensive, the strength of his army would be centrically situated, while the enemy's armies of the north and of the south would be disunited.

Gurwood. Despatches &c. July 18.

Lord Wellington did not determine upon this operation until after he had duly considered what would be the effect of another attempt upon Badajos, as well as of an endeavour to relieve Cadiz; neither of which projects offered to his mind such advantages as he hoped to derive from attacking Ciudad Rodrigo. He now caused a fine battering train, which had recently arrived from England, to be shipped at Lisbon for Oporto, whence it was

taken in boats as far as Lamego on the Douro; the whole arrangements being confided to Major Dickson of the artillery. But the defenceless state of Almeida was now felt as a serious drawback; a secure depôt for the guns and stores near the scene of action being a great desideratum.

Meanwhile, Marmont having gained the valley of the Tagus, proceeded to occupy Talavera and other points. A division was placed at Truxillo, and another occupied Plasencia, with posts in the passes of Bejar and Baños; the 5th corps, under Girard, left, as we before noticed, in Estremadura, took post at Zafra, thereby serving as a link between Marmont and Soult, and as a support to Badajos. In this disposition of the French armies, which was made by Napoleon himself, Castile and Leon were left under the protection of the army of the north, now commanded by General Dorsenne (Bessières having returned to France), while Marmont's line of communication was with Madrid, which city was to be his depôt and base; the two commanders being instructed to concert operations, and to combine their forces whenever an opportunity should offer for striking a blow at the allied army.

Lord Wellington's* arrangements for his meditated enterprise having been put in a state of forwardness, he once more approached the Coa, and, on the 10th of August, his head-quarters were established at Fuente Guinaldo; General Hill remaining in Alemtejo with 14,000 men, to watch the enemy's 5th corps, under Girard.

* Lord Wellington obtained the rank of GENERAL in Spain and Portugal on the 31st of July, 1811.

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At this period the Spaniards, with their characteristic want of foresight and judgment, importuned Lord Wellington with various impracticable schemes. Castaños was desirous that he should take a position in the Sierra Morena; a measure by which he would have been placed between Marmont and Soult, have lost his communication with Lisbon, and brought starvation on his army. In reply, he recommended the Spanish general to endeavour to organize regular resources for the armies of Spain, to procure proper equipments, and to establish discipline, before thinking of any plans of co-operation with the allied army. Writing to the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley on the subject of some opinions entertained at Cadiz, he says: —

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. July 24.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 2.

"Great Britain did not bring Spain into the contest: on the contrary, the war, in its commencement, and throughout its progress, has been carried on by the Spaniards without reference to our opinions, and generally in direct contradiction to our recommendation; and then we are to be blamed and abused, because, contrary to our own judgments and the plain dictates of military expediency, we do not choose to enter upon wild and visionary schemes which we have not the means of accomplishing.

* * * * *

"Who lost the battle of Ocaña, contrary to our advice and entreaties? Who gave up Badajos treacherously, when we were moving to their assistance? Are we to blame if the Spanish armies are not in such a state as that they can be opposed to the enemy? or, if the Cortes have neglected their duty, — have usurped the powers of the Executive Government, — and have mis-spent their time in fruitless debates? Are we in fault because, by the mismanagement of the American colonies, the world has been deprived of its usual supply of specie, and Great Britain, in particular, cannot find money to carry on her own operations, or aid the allies?

"Let any one Spanish transaction be examined, and the inexperience and folly of the principal people in Spain will be manifest. I apprized ——— of my intention and plan

for attacking Ciudad Rodrigo, and him alone, the success of which depends principally upon the length of time during which I can keep it concealed from the enemy. Some Spanish women at Portalegre were apprized of the plan by him, and it must reach the enemy!!! Yet ——— is one of the best of them."

From such persons it was impossible for Lord Wellington to obtain any kind of effective co-operation. Blake, as we have seen, miserably disappointed his hopes in the south, by abandoning the chief object for which he had been sent thither. Could a corps of 12,000 men have been maintained in the Condado de Niebla, or the Serranía de Ronda, it would have been a "thorn in the enemy's side, to which he must have paid attention." Unprotected as Seville was during the period the French were concentrated in Estremadura, a blow might have been struck there, which would have compelled them to raise the siege of Cadiz; for its defenceless walls contained the arsenal and magazines which supplied all the wants of the besiegers. On this subject Lord Wellington writes: —

"I have not talked with Castaños, or any body, upon this plan. The truth is, that it is impossible for any rational man to talk to any of them. They are visionaries and enthusiasts, who will not look at things as they really are; and, although they cannot be ignorant of the truth of all we say of the miserably inefficient state of their army, they talk and act as if it was an army, till some dreadful disaster happens; and they are highly offended if in any discussion the truth, which ought never to be concealed in such a discussion, is even hinted." Gurwood. Despatches, &c. July 20.

At the period when Lord Wellington moved his army to the vicinity of the Coa, preparatory to his attack of Ciudad Rodrigo, the condition of the allies was more promising than it had been since the commencement of the contest; for his army having

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been reinforced, was, including Hill's corps, little short of 60,000 men, the greater part inured to war; and the staff and commissariat had attained to a competent knowledge of their important duties. Additional means of obtaining intelligence of the enemy's proceedings had, by this time, been organized, which materially assisted the British general's plans. Money, however, was more scarce than ever; the army was two months in arrear of pay; and, what was of more consequence, the Spanish muleteers, who furnished the chief transport of the army, and without whose aid no movement could be made, had received no payment for six months. Yet these men continued to serve; and thus practically showed their respect towards our great commander, and confidence in the honour of the British government.

On the opposite side of Spain, the Catalans suffered a severe blow by the capture of Tarragona; which important place Suchet carried by storm on the 28th of June, having during his operations shown great talent, vigour, and, we regret to add, cruelty. We shall not detain the reader with any account of General Abadia's proceedings in the north, where he had succeeded Santocildes in the command. With his army of 9000 men he could make no head against Dorsenne, who commanded 20,000 near Astorga. Although in danger, Abadia had the good fortune not to lose his army, which was a great merit in a Spanish general. The movement of the allied army towards the Coa had the effect of arresting Dorsenne at a moment when Gallicia was in a state of consternation; and that general, to secure his own safety, withdrew to the mountains, while Souham, who was hastening from

Burgos to support him, halted at Rio Seco. The French were successful in Murcia, whither Blake had gone by sea from Cadiz towards the close of July. Thus reinforced, the troops assembled in that province numbered near 20,000. Soult having collected the whole of his disposable force, marched against this army (if it may be so denominated), and completely routed it at Lorca, on the 9th of August. Nevertheless Blake retained his credit with the government, and was soon after intrusted with the defence of Valencia.

In a letter written by Lord Wellington to General Dumouriez, while the army was on the Caya, we find some valuable remarks respecting the warfare in the Peninsula. It is in French; and the following translation of extracts will be found interesting: —

"I have now for upwards of three years been conducting the operations of this most extraordinary of wars. Although our allies are on their own soil, and that every man (without an exception in Portugal, and almost the same in Spain) is the enemy of the French, they have rarely mustered more than one half of the strength of the invaders, and never, not even at the present time, above two thirds. In addition to this disadvantage, we have no chief to whom all submit; and amongst the Spaniards there are no generals, no staff officers, no disciplined troops, nor any cavalry. The two Peninsular governments began the war without magazines or any military resources whatever, and with no money nor financial expedient; added to which, the men at the head of affairs are as weak as the resources at their disposal are contemptible. Under these circumstances, you must be surprised that we should still be able to continue the struggle, even with the hope of ultimate success. Gurwood. Despatches, &c. July 5.

"I believe that neither Bonaparte, nor the rest of the world, have reckoned on the difficulties attending the subjugation of the Peninsula, when opposed by a good army in Portugal. His efforts have been gigantic, worthy alike of his reputation and of the means at his disposal; still they have been found insufficient. And I believe that the

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ancient *dictum* of Henry the Fourth, namely, that, in this country, small armies get beaten and large ones starve, will be exemplified in our day; and that Bonaparte can never feed, even in the modern French style, a sufficient army for the conquest of the Peninsular kingdoms, provided the allies have an army strong enough to stop his progress.

* * * * * * *

"It might be supposed that, when the entire disposable force of the enemy is assembled in Estremadura, the destruction of the French scattered about in other parts of Spain would be certain; and that the whole country being their enemies (as I verily believe is the case), a general insurrection would result. No such thing; and this is the most singular feature of the war! For the third time, in less than two years, all the disposable force of the enemy has been thrown upon me; but to the advantage of none save the guerrillas, who momentarily obtain possession of the open country of Castile, while the large towns remain under the power of the French. On the present occasion, however, they have been compelled to abandon some important points, such as Asturias and Astorga; and the guerrillas being in greater force, and possessing more experience, have struck some blows which ought to produce effect.

"You will perceive by this little relation of facts the nature of the war we are engaged in. Patience,—nay, the utmost degree of patience, is requisite on our part; but we have every thing to hope from time, which will eventually give experience, generals, and armies to my friends the Spaniards. Besides, it is impossible that Europe can submit much longer to the degrading tyranny under which it now groans."

CHAPTER XXVI.

MILITARY LIFE WHEN CAMPAIGNING. — MARMONT ADVANCES TO PROVISION CIUDAD RODRIGO. — AFFAIR OF EL BODON. — THE ALLIED ARMY OFFERS BATTLE ON THE COA. — GENERAL HILL SURPRISES GIRARD AT ARROYO MOLINOS. — GALLANT DEFENCE OF TARIFA. — SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO. — BLAKE'S ARMY SURRENDERS AT VALENCIA. — SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF BADAJOS. — MARMONT ADVANCES INTO PORTUGAL. — HE RETIRES INTO SPAIN ON THE APPROACH OF LORD WELLINGTON.

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It will doubtless be a relief to our readers if, pausing for a few moments in the relation of battles, sieges, and military operations with which our narrative unavoidably abounds, we devote a brief space to describe the mode of life followed by the actors in such scenes, when winter afforded them a respite from their duties in the field.

The intervals in war are often long, frequent, and wearisome; but experience suggests a variety of methods to make them pass agreeably; and British officers, beyond those of other nations, possess the art of combining relaxation and pleasure with hardships and strict duty. In an early part of this work we have alluded to the efforts of its illustrious subject to relieve the monotony of the march by sporting and mirth; and we may observe here, that he was not less successful in his endeavours to enliven those around him during the Peninsular campaigns. Previously to the period of the contest up to which we have brought our history, coursing, shooting, and fishing were sports very generally pursued in the several divisions of the

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army, — greyhounds and pointers forming part of the equipment of many individuals. But now fox-hounds and harriers were to be seen lending animation to the fine mountain scenery of the Beira frontier; and we may aver, without fear of contradiction, that the Quorn or Belvoir hounds never drew together more numerous "fields" of *red-coats*, than were there to be seen, — mounted on charger, cob, or baggage-animal, — aspiring to the honour of bearing off the brush. Into the exhilarating and healthful amusement of hunting no one entered more heartily than Lord Wellington, who at this time established regular days for his own pack to meet; the places for throwing off being made generally known, in order that all who chose to partake of the sport might attend; — a practice observed ever after, when the troops were not in the field; and many a distinguished officer now looks back with pleasure to those merry meetings.

But it was not recreation only that Lord Wellington had in view, when inviting his officers to join in the pleasure of the chace. He justly regarded hunting as an amusement which, by leading its votaries to observe and study the features of a country, gradually familiarized them with every variety of ground, and insensibly conveyed to them that most essential of all military acquirements, the *coup-d'œil*, without the possession of which the study of the art of war may be said to be vain and profitless. A facility of reconnoitring and describing ground was thus acquired, which often afterwards proved of infinite service; for, as Machiavelli well observes, "a clear knowledge of one country leads us to that of any other." Then, again, on these occasions Lord Wellington met and con-

versed with his generals; who thus, without the formality of a visit or of a letter, could make known particulars relating to their troops, which gave him an insight into the state of his army, such as few commanders have succeeded in obtaining.

Nor did Lord Wellington evince less desire to afford amusement and occupation to the soldiers; for by encouraging races, theatrical exhibitions, and other pastimes in which they could partake, he found means to effect his purpose. By such a system all were kept in good humour; while the spirit of hospitality and good-fellowship that universally prevailed, tended in no degree to injure the discipline and efficiency of the army.

Let it not be supposed that, even when in the field, a soldier's life is altogether destitute of enjoyment. His viands, it is true, are coarse and ofttimes scanty, but he is no martyr to dyspepsia; and, with a never-failing appetite, possesses a stomach equal to the task of digesting the toughest of all known aliment — ration beef. His is a life of high excitement, and totally devoid of care; resembling, in the latter respect, that of the gipsy bands so numerous throughout Europe; the members of which, despising the artificial state of existence led by civilized man, cling to the habits of a kind of savage life with a pertinacity only to be accounted for by supposing it in an extraordinary degree congenial to the nature of untutored man. The above, it will be said, is the bright side of the medal. Alas! the other exhibits, in strong relief, the demoralizing and brutalizing effects of warfare, — over which we must be permitted to draw a veil.

Previously to resuming the thread of events, it

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is requisite to mention that, about this period, the guerrillas were in full activity, and many leaders obtained renown by a system alike suited to the nature of the country and its state of disorganization. Each province had its hero, whose actions were compared with those of the *Cid*. But, setting aside Spanish bombast, it is certain that the French suffered severely from those hornets, which, ever buzzing around them, often inflicted a severe sting. Don Julian Sanchez was the guerrilla best known to the British, and he was a favourable specimen of the semi-bandits in question. One of his exploits was carrying off General Regnaud, the French governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, with his staff and a small escort, from under the walls of that fortress, on the 15th of October; and the prisoners, together with a number of cattle belonging to the garrison, captured on the same occasion, were taken in triumph to Lord Wellington's head-quarters.

The possession of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos afforded the French such great facilities in their operations against Portugal and the South of Spain, that Lord Wellington determined, if possible, to wrest from them both of those fortresses; and learning that the former was but scantily provisioned, he broke up suddenly from the Tagus, to try the effect of a blockade; but unfortunately arrived too late, a convoy with supplies having entered it on the 6th August. To undertake the siege was a hazardous measure, as the advance of the enemy would compel him either to fight a battle against a superior force, or to abandon the greater part of his battering train; for the Agueda, a river liable to rise several feet in a few hours, and at all times difficult for an

army to pass, would have been in his rear; moreover he knew that Marmont, besides having received a strong reinforcement, might be joined by Count Dorsenne from the north, and would therefore be able to march upon Rodrigo with a force against which the allied army could not venture to contend.

Nevertheless, the indefatigable British commander devoted an entire week to a minute reconnoissance of the country around the fortress, being daily on horseback from three o'clock in the morning till six in the evening: when, satisfied that he could take up no position to cover the siege without exposing his army to great danger, he decided on resuming his plan of a blockade. A chain of posts was therefore drawn around it, and he then quietly awaited the result.

Marquis Londonderry's Narrative.

Many weeks passed without any report of a movement on the part of the enemy; but at length Marmont quitted Plasencia, and, marching by Baños, on the 22d September formed a junction at Tamames with Dorsenne, who had under him the corps of Souham from Rio Seco. Their united force was 60,000 men; to oppose which Wellington could only bring 40,000, his army having of late been very sickly. Marmont's object was to escort a large convoy of provisions into the blockaded fortress; and this he effected on the 24th.

On receiving intelligence of the enemy's movements, Lord Wellington brought up his divisions from their cantonments between Guinaldo and the Tagus, and posted them as follows: — the light division near Martiago, on the enemy's side of the Agueda; the 5th at Payo, watching the pass of

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Perales; the 4th under General Cole at Guinaldo, and the 3d (Picton's) on the heights of El Bodon, having an advanced guard on the hill of Pastores. The lower Agueda was observed by Carlos de España, with whom was Julian Sanchez. The cavalry took post on the Upper Azava. Lieut.-General Graham, who had recently joined the army from Cadiz, and from his seniority became second in command, assumed the direction of the left wing.

The reasons assigned by the British general for this wide dislocation of his force at such a time were, to enable him to ascertain precisely the amount of Marmont's army, and then to prevent the relief of Rodrigo, save by a force superior to his own. But the position of Guinaldo, which had been intrenched, was indicated as the point of concentration for the troops if pressed by the enemy.

The French marshal having accomplished the purpose for which he had moved forward his army, would probably have retired without making any attempt upon the allies, notwithstanding his great superiority, had not their loose distribution presented a favourable opportunity for attacking them. Thus induced, he caused Montbrun, with a heavy column of infantry, thirty squadrons of cavalry, and twelve guns, to cross the Agueda early on the 25th September, to attack whatever might be in his front. Pushing forward on the road to Guinaldo, his cavalry turned the left of Picton's division at El Bodon, while the French infantry made a demonstration of forcing it on the side next the Agueda. The only force at hand to oppose the enemy's formidable cavalry consisted of the 5th and 77th British and 21st Portugueze regiments, three squadrons of horse, and a brigade of Portugueze artillery, under Major-

General Colville*: these troops were posted on a hill to the left of, but commanding, the road by which the enemy were advancing.

The French cavalry commenced the attack in a very spirited manner, and were met with the utmost resolution by the allied troops; one regiment of whom, the 5th, under Major Ridge, actually charged a body of them, overthrew it, and recovered some guns which had been momentarily in the possession of the enemy. After maintaining their ground for a considerable time, during which the little band of horsemen under General Alten repeatedly checked the enemy's advance, the troops were ordered to retire. The two British battalions then formed one square, and the Portugueze regiment another, in which order they retreated; and although the British square was many times charged, it always repelled the French cavalry.

Picton could take no part in this brilliant affair; but he brought off the right brigade of his division with a good countenance, also formed in squares; and having effected a junction with Colville's battalions, the whole moved across the open plain, extending to Guinaldo, without hurry or confusion, bidding defiance to the enemy's cavalry, though suffering much from their artillery. Meanwhile, the officer commanding the advanced guard of this division† posted near Pastores, finding his direct line of retreat by El Bodon intercepted, with much judgment crossed the Agueda by a ford in his front; marched to Robleda, where he captured a patrol of French dragoons; and repassing

* General the Hon. Sir C. Colville, G.C.B.
† Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. R. Trench, 74th regiment.

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that river at a ford higher up, effected his junction with the rest of the division the same evening at Guinaldo.

The left wing of the army was by this time concentrated at Nava de Aver; and Lord Wellington would have retired immediately to a position previously selected on the Coa, had he not been compelled to await the light division, which Craufurd, fearful of being intercepted, was seeking by a circuitous march to keep clear of the enemy. His intention was, however, frustrated, owing to Perales and Gata, on the south side of the mountains, being occupied by French troops, which constrained him to retrace his steps, and cross the Agueda at Robleda, according to his instructions. This circumstance occasioned the divisions of Cole and Picton to remain at Guinaldo.

On the morning of the 26th, Marmont assembled 35,000 infantry and his numerous cavalry directly in front of this position. Lord Wellington, who was obliged either to receive battle, or sacrifice the finest division of his army, determined to stand fast. He could not strengthen his front, having on his left an extensive plain, which required to be well protected, as the French were so strong in cavalry; and to his right it was necessary to guard against the force at Perales. Happily Marmont, in ignorance of his opponent's circumstances, delayed to attack; and while he was leisurely inspecting his troops, and causing them to perform several evolutions, which they did with great precision, almost within gun-shot of the British, who stood with piled arms surveying the imposing display, Craufurd made good his junction with the army, and took post on the right. Thus did Marmont's vanity — for he

was proud of his talent for manœuvring troops — deprive him of a golden opportunity to wipe out the disgrace that on so many occasions had tarnished the French arms since Wellington and his army had been opposed to them.

Having by extraordinary audacity deceived Marmont, who by sunset on the 26th had collected his entire army in front of Guinaldo, Lord Wellington withdrew at night, and marched upon Alfayates. Two columns of the enemy followed next morning, and attacked the rear guard of the allies at Aldea da Ponta. Twice that village was carried; but the French were both times driven out of it by General Cole's division. On the same evening the whole of the allied army was skilfully concentrated on the heights behind Soito; having the Serra das Mesas on its right, and the left at Rendo on the Coa. Here Lord Wellington determined to receive battle, although posted in front of that river. The position was strong, being upon the chord of an arc formed by the Coa near Sabugal; and thus both flanks were protected. Marmont, however, declined the challenge, and withdrew his army to Ciudad Rodrigo. It then separated; Dorsenne's corps moved to the Douro, leaving a strong garrison at Salamanca; the army of Portugal returned to Plasencia; and Souham's division took post at Alba de Tormes. Wellington now placed his army in cantonments on both banks of the Coa, and fixed his head-quarters at Freneda.

At this period General Hill was vigilantly watching the enemy in Estremadura from his cantonments around Portalegre; and Castaños, trusting to his support, established himself at Caceres, where he was employed in collecting and organizing a body

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of Spaniards. With a view to disturb the Spanish general's arrangements and cut off his resources, Soult ordered Girard, who with a division of 5000 men of the 5th corps (now commanded by Drouet, Comte d'Erlon) was south of the Guadiana, to cross that river and move towards Caceres. On this movement being reported to Lord Wellington, he directed General Hill to endeavour to force Girard's division to withdraw from this forward position. Accordingly, having concerted his measures with the Spanish general, Hill marched with a portion of his force from Portalegre on the 22d October, directing it by Alburquerque and Aliseda on Caceres. At the first-named place he learnt that the enemy, after having pushed on to Aliseda, had retired to Arroyo del Puerco; and that Aliseda was occupied by the Spanish cavalry of the Conde de Penne Villemur. To this place the British column marched on the following day (25th), and formed its junction with the Spaniards; and Penne Villemur, pushing on with his horse, came up with the enemy's advanced guard, and drove it back to Malpartida; which place the allies reached at daybreak next morning. The enemy had, however, retreated during the night; and Girard, learning that a British force was moving against him, abandoned Caceres also.

General Hill being uncertain of the route taken by his adversary, halted at Malpartida during the remainder of the 26th; but ascertaining in the course of the evening that the enemy were marching by Torre Mocha towards Merida, he pushed on next morning by a shorter road to that city, through Aldea del Cano and La Casa de San Antonio, hoping to bring them to action on the march.

Girard meanwhile, pursuing his route leisurely, halted on the 27th at Arroyo Molinos, leaving a rear guard at Albala. Hill learning this on the march, saw at once that his adversary was ignorant of the movements and of the vicinity of the allies, and determined, therefore, to endeavour to cut him off from his line of retreat, by making a forced march to his own left on Alcuescar.

On reaching this place, the British general became satisfied that Girard had not the slightest suspicion of impending danger; and accordingly, taking every precaution against giving the alarm, dispositions were made for beating up the French general's quarters at an early hour on the morrow.

Arroyo Molinos stands at the southern base of the Sierra de Montanches, which, rising ruggedly at the back of the little town, is traversed by no paths but those of the goatherd, — escape from it in that direction was therefore difficult; and, on the other hand, the allied troops had manœuvred so as to be able to intercept all the issues from the place directed towards the Guadiana. The enemy were thus taken, *flagranti delicto*.

At two o'clock on the morning of the 28th the allied troops, drenched with rain, moved from their comfortless bivouac, and defiled by a bad road towards the sequestered little town wherein the French had been comfortably housed during the past night, little anticipating the practical lesson they were about to receive of the advantage of early rising. When arrived within half a mile of the place, the troops were halted and formed, into three columns, under cover of a rising ground, which effectually concealed their movements; and brief instructions having been given to their leaders, the

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whole moved simultaneously to the point of attack. One column, led by Lieut.-Colonel Stewart, proceeded straight to the town. The second, under Major-General Howard, supported by Lieut.-Colonel Wilson's brigade and some Portugueze, marched rapidly, in order, by a wide movement, to gain the right of Arroyo Molinos, and intercept the enemy's retreat on Medellin. The cavalry, including some Spaniards, forming the third column, moved forward between the two infantry columns, ready to act as occasion should require.

The operation was well timed, as the enemy were already forming on the Medellin road preparatory to marching, when Stewart's brigade rushed into the town and fell with the bayonet upon their rear guard. The French hastily formed into two squares, while some cavalry drew up on their left, and opening a fire upon the British, compelled Stewart to deploy the 92d regiment, and to post the 71st behind a wall on its left; at the same time two Portugueze guns plied them with grape. The 92d was about to charge, when Wilson's brigade came upon the left flank and rear of the enemy, and at the same instant the Spanish horse and a few of the allied cavalry rode forward and dispersed their dragoons. The French thus exposed to an attack in front, while another brigade, already in possession of the only road by which they could retire, was closing rapidly upon their left flank, suddenly broke their ranks, and, rushing towards the Sierra de Montanches at their back, sought in confused crowds to scramble up its steep acclivity. The British followed; and the leading regiment (34th) became mingled with the flying Frenchmen, the greater part of whom threw down their arms and

surrendered. Girard, with a small remnant of his troops, escaped across the mountains to Serena, pursued for several leagues by a corps of Spaniards under Murillo, accompanied by a few British and Portugueze. 1811.

The enemy left 1500 prisoners, all their baggage, and three guns in the hands of the victors. Among those taken were General Brun, Colonel the Prince d'Aremberg, and a chief of the staff. The first brigade of Girard's division had, fortunately for it, marched at five o'clock, and thereby escaped the surprise.

General Hill had the satisfaction of performing this brilliant exploit with a very trifling loss; and the whole army exulted in the success which had crowned his masterly movements. Lord Wellington testified the gratification he felt by strongly urging upon government the propriety of H. R. Highness the Prince Regent of England bestowing some mark of his favour upon General Hill, for this and former distinguished services; particularizing the passage of the Douro and Talavera, as occasions in which he had borne a conspicuous part. His lordship's recommendation met with immediate attention, and the ribbon of the Bath was conferred on the victor of Arroyo Molinos.

After this success General Hill's corps resumed its cantonments in the vicinity of Portalegre, where it remained stationary until towards the close of the year, when it moved into Estremadura, with the view of diverting the enemy's attention from Tarifa, and from General Ballasteros, whose corps, as far as regards numbers, had become formidable in the vicinity of Gibraltar. On the 1st of January 1812. Hill advanced from Merida, to attack the enemy's

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1812. 5th corps under Drouet, posted at Almendralejos; but the French general, abandoning a large magazine, retired upon Zafra, and thence to Llerena. In following this movement, a British detachment having pushed forward to Fuente del Maestre, a sharp cavalry skirmish ensued with the enemy's rear guard, which terminated to the advantage of the allies. General Hill then returned to Merida, and thence to Portalegre, cantoning his corps between that place and Castel Branco, his presence in Portugal being necessary to carry out Lord Wellington's contemplated projects.

1811. With respect to the operations of Ballasteros, we may briefly mention that, relying on the protection of Gibraltar, and favoured by the intricacies of the Ronda mountains, he ventured to harass the French posts of communication between Cadiz and Malaga; and Soult, fearful lest this corps of 8000 men, if allowed time to acquire discipline, should become formidable, despatched a strong division under Godinot to crush it. Ballasteros saved himself, however, by a speedy retreat under the guns of Gibraltar, where he remained until the danger was past. He then again issued forth; and marching suddenly to Bornos, surprised and routed with some loss a body of 2000 men under General Semele.

Godinot, unable, it is said, to support the disgrace attendant on his non-success, shot himself on his return to Seville.

Meanwhile, with the view of supporting Ballasteros, strong detachments of British and Spanish troops had been sent from Gibraltar and Cadiz to occupy Tarifa; and the enemy, aware of the baneful influence this place, if strongly occupied, might

exert over the operations before Cadiz, lost no time in sending a force of 10,000 men under General Laval to reduce it.

Though a walled town, Tarifa has no pretensions to be called a fortress; its old Moorish ramparts being only a few feet thick, but badly flanked by small projecting towers, and totally unprotected by ditches or any description of outworks. It stands at the mouth of a ravine opening to the sea, which washes its south* wall; and is commanded by hills to the north and east. On the remaining side, a low sandy tongue stretches nearly half a mile into the sea, the extreme point of which is connected by a narrow causeway and bridge with a flat, rocky island, partially fortified and containing some barracks. A battery, occupying the summit of a sandhill about midway between the town and island, covered the communication along the sea-beach to the westward.

General Copons commanded the Spanish troops, and Colonel Skerret the English; and those officers, on the opinion of the commanding engineer †, decided on defending the place against the formidable force sent to besiege it; the embarkation of the garrison seeming, in any case, to be secured by the possession of the island.

The enemy appeared before Tarifa towards the close of December, and broke ground on both the hills bounding the valley above the town. In forty-eight hours after their batteries had opened, a breach was formed in the east wall; and at 8 A.M. on the last day of the year, 2000 men advanced to

* More properly *south-east*, for the town (of which the general lines form a square) stands with its angles towards the cardinal points.

† Captain Smith; now Colonel Sir C. F. Smith, C.B.

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the assault. The garrison, consisting of 1200 British and 900 Spanish troops, was well disposed to give the assailants a warm reception, and each corps composing it, eagerly claimed the post of honour—the breach; the defence of which fell to the lot of the 87th regiment.

MS. Notes, by Major E. P. White, R. S. C.

The enemy advanced to the assault in very extended order, issuing from their trenches from right to left along the whole front of their attack, but converging towards the breach, which was situated in the bottom of the valley, on the left or south side of a rivulet, that, after flowing through it, obtains admission to the town by means of an iron-grated portcullis. The distance the assailants had to advance from their works varied from 300 to 150 yards, and was without cover of any description. By some strange oversight too, the French engineers had selected the only part of the enciente to breach, which was well flanked: so that they were exposed to a most galling cross fire of musketry, as well as to the grape of some pieces of artillery which were brought to bear from the north tower of the town, so as completely to rake their columns as they poured down the side of the hill to gain the breach.

Despite these difficulties and blunders, the enemy continued for some time to press forward with great spirit; but so fierce was the fire kept up from the walls, and such the devastation spread in their ranks by Mitchell's * guns, which vomited forth one incessant blaze of fire, that at length they turned and fled without reaching even the foot of the breach; disregarding equally the encouraging

* Captain (now Lieut.-Colonel) E. T. Mitchell, C.B., Royal Artillery.

gestures and loudly ejaculated maledictions of their officers, who on their parts displayed the most heroic courage and self-devotion. Two of them even looked over the gap made in the battered wall, but drew back quickly on seeing the formidable array of bayonets ready to receive them: seven were found stretched on the breach; and two others, who had found shelter under the portcullis, came forward and surrendered themselves after the firing had ceased. The loss of the enemy must have been excessively severe, for 200 dead bodies were counted within short musket range of the walls; that of the allies was but trifling.

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After this signal failure, Laval, burying his guns, hastily withdrew towards Seville, whither he was summoned by Soult, in consequence of General Hill's movement (already noticed) against Drouet.

Lord Wellington had been long labouring with the most unwearied diligence, to overcome the difficulties that presented themselves to his meditated enterprise on Ciudad Rodrigo. To maintain a close blockade of that fortress had been found impracticable, owing to the exhausted state of the neighbouring country; and a siege was consequently determined on. As a preliminary step to this measure, Almeida had been put into a respectable state of defence; and within its walls were deposited the battering train and stores brought up the Douro, which river the British general had rendered navigable for boats as high up as the confluence of the Agueda, thereby causing an immense saving in land carriage across a mountainous country. Happily, Marmont did not entertain the slightest suspicion of the contemplated undertaking. Aware, indeed, that sickness had greatly diminished the

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allied ranks, he was fully persuaded that Lord Wellington would remain quiet during the winter months; and under this impression had detached three divisions of infantry and a body of horse from his own army into Valencia, and directed Dorsenne to send two divisions of his corps into the Asturias and against the guerrillas of the Montaña. It was evident, therefore, that he could not reassemble a force of sufficient strength to interrupt the siege, for some weeks.

Ciudad Rodrigo stands upon an eminence that rises abruptly from an extensive plain on the right bank of the Agueda; which river is encased by rugged banks, and though at times fordable in many places, at others is liable to rise rapidly to the height of many feet, producing a rush of water that no temporary bridge can withstand. From these peculiarities in its character, this stream constitutes the strength of the fortress, and was on the present occasion the main obstacle to the siege. A trestle bridge of a peculiar construction and great strength was, however, projected by Major Sturgeon of the Royal Staff Corps, to overcome these difficulties; and being approved of by Lord Wellington, the artificers of that corps speedily completed it; so that by the commencement of January, all things were prepared for one of the boldest operations on record.

Art had done little to enable Ciudad Rodrigo to offer a protracted resistance to an attack in form; but nevertheless its defences were sufficiently formidable to deter most generals from attempting its capture in any other way. It is encompassed by a narrow rampart of old construction, without flanks,

to which at some more recent period a *fausse-braie* * had been attached; but owing to the latter being formed on the slope of the hill, it afforded but trifling protection, especially on the north side, where a hill of nearly equal height to the ramparts, called the Lower Teson, rises within 180 yards of the works; and this again is overlooked by another eminence, the Upper Teson, at the distance of 600 yards, which latter has a command of 13 feet over the ramparts. On the southern and eastern sides there are small ravelins, but none on the northern; nor is there a covered way in any part.

Massena's attack had shown that the fortress could be breached from a distance on its northern side; and as success on the present occasion depended upon the rapidity of the siege, Lord Wellington selected the same part for his operations, which were directed by Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher; the artillery being commanded by Major Dickson. Gabions and fascines having been prepared by the troops in their cantonments, and the bridge before alluded to laid about six miles below the town, at the ford of Marialva, every thing was in readiness to open the siege on the 6th January; but a heavy fall of snow and the inclemency of the weather prevented any movement till the 8th, when the light division forded the Agueda and formed the investment. On the evening of that day a detachment under Lieut.-Colonel Colborne stormed and carried a detached redoubt situated on the Upper Teson,—the point chosen for breaking ground

* A fausse-braie is a low work united to the escarp of the body of the place. It was rejected by Vauban when he improved the science of fortification, as it greatly lessens the height of the main escarp, thereby facilitating escalade.

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against the fortress. Next day the first parallel was established, and the batteries were traced out; and during the night of the 13th the convent of Santa Cruz, on the right of the attack, was carried by assault, a lodgment formed, and a communication established with it by the flying sap. On the 14th the enemy made a vigorous sortie, and succeeded in filling in a portion of the sap before they were repulsed. The batteries, nevertheless, opened the same afternoon; and, in the words of Lord Londonderry,—

"A spectacle more strikingly magnificent it has rarely been the good fortune even of a British soldier to witness. The evening chanced to be remarkably beautiful and still; there was not a cloud in the sky, nor a breath of wind astir, when suddenly the roar of artillery broke in upon its calmness, and volumes of smoke rose slowly from our batteries. These, floating gently towards the town, soon enveloped the lower parts of the hill, and even the ramparts and bastions, in a dense veil; whilst the towers and summits, lifting their heads over the haze, showed like fairy buildings, or those unsubstantial castles which are sometimes seen in the clouds on a summer's day."

At night the fortified convent of San Francisco, which flanked the left of the approaches, was carried by escalade, and a lodgment established in the suburbs. The second parallel was then completed, and the sap promised soon to reach the crest of the glacis, in order to blow down the counterscarp; but by the 19th, the accurate fire of our artillery having effected two practicable breaches in the fausse-braie and body of the place, Lord Wellington, on the report of Major Sturgeon, who had closely examined the place, decided on attempting to carry it by storm that night.

Seated in rear of one of the advanced approaches, he wrote his short and clear instructions for the

assault. The large breach, which presented an opening 100 feet wide; was to be stormed by Picton's division; and the small one (thirty feet wide) by the Light division. General Pack at the same time, with a body of Portugueze, was to threaten an escalade on the opposite side of the fortress; and to aid the principal attack a detachment of troops under Major O'Toole, guided by Major Sturgeon, was to assail an outwork near the bridge, to prevent its guns being of use during the assault. The storming party for the large breach was composed of 500 volunteers, commanded by Major Manners of the 74th Regt.; Lieut. Mackie of the 88th leading the forlorn hope,

Three hundred volunteers, led by Major Napier * of the 52d Regt., with a forlorn hope of twenty-five men, headed by Lieutenant Gurwood †, formed the storming party of the Light division.

"The evening was calm; and the moon in her first quarter shed over the scene a feeble light, which, without disclosing the shape or form of particular objects, rendered their rude outline distinctly visible. There stood the fortress, a confused mass of masonry, with its breaches like shadows cast upon the wall; whilst not a gun was fired from it, and all within was as still and motionless as if it were already a ruin, or that its inhabitants were buried in sleep. On our side, again, the trenches, crowded with armed men, among whom not so much as a whisper might be heard, presented no unapt resemblance to a dark thunder-cloud, or to a volcano in that state of tremendous quiet which usually precedes its most violent eruptions." Marquis of Londonderry's Narrative.

A few minutes after seven o'clock, the word being quietly passed along that all was in readiness, the troops issued from their cover with the intrepid

* Major-General Sir George T. Napier, K.C.B.

† Lieut.-Colonel Gurwood, C.B., compiler of the Duke of Wellington's Despatches.

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coolness that characterizes British soldiers, and advanced to the several points of attack with all the precision of a piece of perfect machinery obeying the impulse of the power by which it acts. A party of soldiers preceded each storming division, furnished with bags of hay, wherewith to diminish the depth of the ditch. Major-General M'Kinnon's brigade of Picton's division descended in front of the main breach, along the foot of which shells and various combustibles had been placed. These were prematurely exploded, and did little mischief; but the garrison poured down a fire of grape and musketry on the assailants, which proved far more destructive, though it nowise checked their ardour. Before, however, the regiments under M'Kinnon could arrive at the breach, the 5th, led by Major Ridge, and the 94th, by Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, having escaladed the fausse-braie, rushed towards the main breach, which they impetuously mounted, notwithstanding the concentrated fire of the besieged; but on gaining the summit they found it retrenched — that is, cut off by a ditch and parapet from the rest of the rampart.

While these troops were thus bravely winning their way at the main breach, the small one, which had not been retrenched, was assailed by the regiments of the light division; and so furious was the rush that a few minutes sufficed to overcome the enemy's resistance, and they were soon enabled to form upon the rampart. Some battalions then moved on to attack the enemy, who were valiantly maintaining their retrenchment; but before they could close with them, the stormers at the great breach had overcome this obstacle; and at the same time Pack's troops, having converted their demon-

stration into a real attack, were heard shouting victory from another quarter. At this moment, and when the fortress was won, a mine in the ditch of the retrenchment unhappily exploded, which cut short the brave M'Kinnon's triumph, and many gallant fellows were blown up along with him. But the army had to lament a yet greater loss: the daring leader of the Light division, the intrepid Craufurd, having met his death-wound at the beginning of the attack. The French troops offered no resistance after entrance to the town had been gained, but fled in all directions, seeking refuge in the houses. About 300 had fallen during the assault; but the survivors, when collected, amounted to 78 officers and 1700 men. The loss of the British during the siege and in the assault amounted to more than 1000, whereof about one half were killed or wounded during the storming.

Thus was a most important fortress, adequately garrisoned and gallantly defended, carried in the short period of 12 days, through the prompt measures of Lord Wellington, ably and zealously seconded by his devoted army. When we consider the inclement season at which this grand enterprise was effected; the secrecy with which the preparations for it were made; the hazardous nature of the operation, — a treacherous river being in the rear; — and finally, the vast superiority of the protecting armies of Marmont and Dorsenne; it must be considered a most daring as well as splendid exploit. By his own sovereign Lord Wellington was rewarded with an earldom, and 2000*l.* a year to support the dignity; the Spaniards created him Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo; and the Portugueze conferred on him the title of Marquis of Torres Vedras

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Intelligence of this siege did not reach Marmont till the 15th January, when he ordered his army to concentrate in all haste at Salamanca, and apprized Berthier (Napoleon's Major-General) that he might prepare to expect events both fortunate and glorious for the French army. But in a subsequent despatch, written after the fall of Rodrigo, he expressed his grievous disappointment at the result of the siege; and, in allusion to its short duration, added, "There is something so incomprehensible in this, that I permit myself no observation."

Lord Wellington had in the mean time directed General Hill to place 5000 men at Castel Branco, purposing to call these troops to his aid, should Marmont, whose army was assembled on the Tormes by the 25th, advance towards him. But the French marshal made no forward movement; and the captured fortress having been put in a defensible state, and given up to the Spaniards, his lordship speedily moved southward to join his able lieutenant, purposing to follow up the blow he had inflicted by the still more audacious undertaking of besieging Badajos.

Before proceeding with our narrative of this great enterprize, it may be well to notice the contemporaneous operations in progress on the eastern side of the Peninsula. The events passing in that quarter may, however, be summed up in a few words, as a detailed account of the lamentable blunders of the Spanish leaders could furnish our readers with but little gratification. We shall

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therefore merely observe, that the capture of Blake's army, cooped up, to the number of 20,000 men, in the populous and defenceless city of Valencia, closed the career of that brave but headstrong

general, and crowned a series of able operations carried on by Suchet against the native forces of Catalonia, Aragon, and Valencia. Blake's was the last great Spanish effort to make head against the French, and from this time forth his countrymen wisely remained satisfied to act a secondary part in the contest.

We return to Lord Wellington's operations. — Active but secret measures had been going on for some weeks, having reference to the investment of Badajos. The requisite gabions and fascines were prepared at Elvas; tools and stores were conveyed thither; a pontoon equipment was moved up from Abrantes; and the battering train, which had been embarked at Lisbon in large vessels, as if for some distant service, was trans-shipped, on gaining the open sea, into small craft, and conveyed by this means some distance up the river Caldaõ, or of St. Ubes, and landed at Alcacer do Sal, whence the guns were transported by land to the Guadiana.

Leaving a division of infantry, with a small portion of cavalry, on the Agueda, to watch the proceedings of the enemy on that frontier, Lord Wellington crossed the Tagus at Villa Velha, and established his head-quarters at Elvas on the 11th of March. All the preparations for besieging Badajos being completed by the 15th, a pontoon bridge was thrown over the Guadiana; two flying bridges being also placed on the same river. On the 16th, Marshal Beresford crossed to the left bank with 12,000 men, and invested the fortress without opposition. The covering force, under Generals Graham and Hill, occupied Merida, Llerena, and Almendralejos; watching the country to the southward, where Soult had an army of

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35,000 men, which, it was expected, would seek to form a junction with that of Marmont, in order to advance to the relief of Badajos. General Phillippon, who commanded in the fortress, — a man of talent and courage, — had done much to strengthen its works since the former attacks; and his garrison, animated by the recollection of its successful resistance on those occasions, prepared for a stout defence.

Lord Wellington had neither the means nor time to reduce the fortress by a regular attack; and as its walls, like those of Ciudad Rodrigo, could be breached from a distance, he determined, by a bold effort, to make himself master of a detached fort, called the Picurina, from whose site the escarp of one front could be seen low enough to be breached with effect. In saying that the army was unprovided with the means of reducing the fortress by a regular attack, we allude principally to the defective condition of the engineer department. Our engineer officers were not a whit behind the rest of the army in zeal; but they wanted experience, and were without the assistance of a body of men trained to the business of a siege: they laboured, therefore, under great disadvantages on this as well as other occasions.

During the night of the 17th, which was wet and stormy, ground was broken within 160 yards of Fort Picurina, undiscovered by the enemy. On the 19th the garrison made a spirited sortie, in which 150 of the besiegers were killed or wounded; but no material check was given by it to the operations of the siege. The weather proved a far greater impediment, being very tempestuous; while such torrents of rain descended as threatened to put a stop

to the operation. A great rise of the Guadiana swept away the pontoon bridge; the flying bridges could not be worked, and the passage of all supplies was suspended. Beside these mishaps the trenches were always full of water; and the earth thrown up would retain no shape, and much of it was speedily washed down again. A change, however, occurred on the 24th, when the batteries were completed; and on the following day, a fire opened on Picurina to beat down the palisades and injure its defences. Little damage was, however, effected; but, pressed for time, Lord Wellington ordered the fort to be stormed the same night. The direction of this duty fell to Major-General Kempt *, who commanded in the trenches. The troops, 500 in number, from the 3d division, assailed it; and, after a very gallant defence, succeeded in their object, though at a heavy cost of life,—4 officers and 50 men being killed, and 15 officers and 250 men wounded. The garrison consisted of 250 men, of whom all but 80 were either destroyed during the assault, or drowned in attempting to escape across the inundation. A great commotion was excited in the place by this attack, and there was a heavy firing on both sides; a sortie also was made, but the enemy were speedily driven back.

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The second parallel was now formed in advance of the fort; breaching batteries were erected within it; and after five days' firing two breaches were formed, one in a face of La Trinidad bastion, the other in the flank, which defended it, of the bastion of Sta Maria; and the assault was ordered on the evening

* The Right Hon. Sir J. Kempt, G.C.B.

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of the 5th of April. But it appearing that the main breach was prepared for an obstinate resistance, Lord Wellington deferred the assault, and ordered all the batteries to converge their fire upon the old wall of the curtain, between the two bastions breached, so as in one day to form a third opening into the place, which the besieged would not have time to retrench. This being effected, preparations were made for storming the fortress on the night of the 6th. The Light division, under Colonel Barnard, was ordered to attack the breach in the flank of Sta Maria bastion; the 4th division to assault that in the Trinidad; General Colville was directed to detach part of his division against the breach in the curtain; and, at the same time, Picton, with the 3d division, received orders to escalade the castle walls, and Leith, with the 5th, to scale the San Vincente bastion, on the opposite side of the town.

In darkness and silence the five storming columns issued from the parallels about 10 o'clock. On reaching the crest of the glacis, numerous fireballs were thrown from the place, which, casting a vivid light around, betrayed the situations of the assailants; exposing, at the same time, to view the thickly manned walls and gaping breaches. But before these could be reached, a murderous fire from the parapets opened, furnishing them with the only light to guide them on their way, and laying hundreds prostrate on the glacis. With unshaken resolution ladders were placed, and the troops descended the counterscarp into the ditch, which soon contained a dense mass whereon the enemy continued to pour destruction. Confusion necessarily arose. The 4th division mistook a ruined

ravelin for their destined breach; the Light division also missed its way, and amid the general tumult, getting too far to the right, became intermingled with the 4th division. The officers had the utmost difficulty in separating their men, and hundreds of brave fellows thus uselessly fell ere the breaches were yet assailed. These, however, were at length discovered, and the leading files rushed up the rough ascents exposed to a concentrated fire of musketry; while grenades, shells, burning composition, and missiles of every kind were cast on their devoted heads. Pressing upwards, some individuals of the gallant crowd gained the summit of the great breach, notwithstanding that planks covered with iron spikes and other obstacles had been laid down. But to pass farther was impossible; for here beams, to which sword-blades were fixed like chevaux-de-frise, stretched across; while from behind an interior retrenchment a well-sustained fire of musketry killed in succession the intrepid soldiers who sought to overcome the obstructions opposed to them. Long did they persevere in fruitless efforts to force a passage, and the annals of war afford no instances of greater daring and contempt of death than were shown on this occasion.

Hopeless of success, and no longer even striving to obtain it, the disappointed troops sullenly remained to be slaughtered in the ditch. This state of things being represented to Lord Wellington, he yielded to stern necessity, and ordered them to be withdrawn, purposing to make a renewed assault a little before dawn. At that moment a report came in from Picton, who, having succeeded in his attack of the castle after an obstinate conflict, had formed his division within its walls, ready to de-

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scend into the town at daylight. Leith's attempt had also been crowned with success; and Walker's brigade, moving by the ramparts, came upon the enemy posted at the breaches, who then gave way. Troops now gained an entrance by these, and the fortress was won. Phillippon, with a portion of his brave garrison, took refuge in Fort San Cristoval, which was surrendered soon after daylight; the rest were taken prisoners in the town.

Thus was a fortress with three good breaches in its walls carried only at last by escalade in other quarters. From the unavoidable confusion that prevailed in the ditch, where it was impossible to restore order, or even to obtain the semblance of a formation, the highly disciplined British troops became little better than an heroic mob, which rushed into the yawning breaches and was there destroyed in successive and vain attempts to force a passage. The breach in the curtain did not appear to have been attempted, as no bodies were found upon it next morning, whereas the other two were absolutely choked with them; and as there had not been time to isolate it by a retrenchment, the stormers might have made good an entrance there. On the whole, we may gather from the instance of Badajos that, unless the counterscarp of a place be blown down to enable the troops to preserve their formation in an assault, and also that the garrison be greatly weakened by a long defence, there is little prospect of success against a determined resistance. With good engineers and sufficient time, it is far more desirable to proceed by rule; for the summit of a breach being reached by sapping, the fortress must then surrender.

The total loss during the siege amounted to

5000, of whom 59 officers and 744 men were killed, and 258 officers and 2600 men wounded, during the assault: Generals Picton, Colville, Kempt, Walker, and Bowes were amongst the latter. 4000 of the enemy were taken in the place.

"No language can do justice to the conduct of the British troops on this great occasion, which, for extraordinary bravery eclipsed all their previous exploits.* And let us not omit to accord the meed of praise due to the brave enemy who offered so gallant a resistance; but, to do the French justice, their defence of fortresses was admirable throughout the Peninsular contest.

We shall not describe the disgraceful scenes that followed this capture, wherein the same men who but a few moments before were heroes in the breach, now sank, alas! below the level of humanity, causing the admiration excited by their intrepidity to sink into a mingled feeling of pity, disgust, and abhorrence. And yet, however unworthy of soldiers belonging to a civilized, and, we

* The following fragment of a conversation which occurred at St. Helena, relative to the capture of Badajos, between Napoleon and a talented officer of the Royal Engineers who served at the siege of that place, may be read with interest. It is given in French, as a specimen of the ex-emperor's style.

Napoléon. "Vous avez manqué la brèche à Badajos?—un peu brusqué la chose."

Engineer. "Il a fallu hazarder un assaut, et s'il n'avoit pas réussi, nous aurions été forcés de lever le siège. Dans la suite, il seroit devenu douteux si, avec les moyens qui nous restaient, la forteresse eut pu être prise."

Napoléon. "Eh! Cependant les places se prennent.—Vous aviez du canon à Elvas.—De combien est Elvas éloigné de Badajos?—Ah! trois lieues.—Ce seraient donc les projectiles et le transport qui auraient causé des difficultés? . . . . . Mais la Guadiana est navigable; n'est-ce-pas?—Non, ah!—Que faisiez-vous donc de votre argent? . . . . . Quand il n'y a pas d'autres moyens de se rendre maître d'une place, il faut ouvrir la bourse et fermer les yeux."—(*Notes of Major Basil Jackson, who was present on the occasion.*)

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trust, highly moral country, their conduct at Badajos may have been, it was almost praiseworthy as compared with some instances furnished by the annals of warfare between foreign powers. But we seek not to palliate the behaviour of our countrymen by asserting that other soldiers have done worse; it is rather to congratulate the world that some improvement has taken place.

The barbarous practice of sacking a town carried by storm arose in a remote age, when the people themselves fought in defence of their walls, their families, and property; but for centuries past, in European warfare, the inhabitants of a beleaguered fortress have been usually passive sufferers, exercising no influence whatever over its garrison, and their property ought consequently to be considered inviolable. Formerly too, it was the savage custom to put the garrison of a place taken by storm to the sword; but in Spain the British soldiers did not tarnish their laurels by deliberate murder, for few of the enemy ever fell after they ceased to offer opposition. We may also observe here, that though much plundering undoubtedly occurred at Badajos and on other occasions, yet no houses were wantonly destroyed, and comparatively few crimes of a revolting nature were perpetrated. A great step was therefore made in Spain towards mitigating the horrors of war, and worthy of the sons of Britain. Let us not stop here, but strive to set an example of humanity, Christian duty, and reverence for the laws of an omnipotent Maker; showing by our conduct that we execrate customs conceived in a barbarous age, and thereby vindicate our claim to be considered as men and Christians.

We are conscious that few commanders would seek by severity alone to curb the licentiousness of the soldiery after a successful assault; but the two great engines for the maintenance of order are reward and punishment: a general should therefore be armed strongly with the means of applying both, as occasion may require. Gold will often prevail where every better incentive would fail; and the certainty of a liberal reward as prize-money, in lieu of plunder, might have the effect of preventing the recurrence of such wild disorders as were seen at Rodrigo, Badajos, and San Sebastian.

The French, who almost invariably in their own sieges proceeded according to the slow but sure rules of science, were confounded by the boldness and amazing celerity of Lord Wellington's mode of taking fortresses; which, let it be borne in mind, was not the result of choice, but of necessity.

Calculating on a protracted siege, Marshal Soult began to assemble troops at Seville on the 24th, whom he purposed uniting with those under Drouet, in expectation of a great battle for the preservation of Badajos. The immediate object of the latter was to maintain himself in the district of La Serena, in order to keep open a communication with Marmont by Medellin and Truxillo; but Hill and Graham forced him into the Sierra Morena by the roads leading to Cordoba. Quitting Seville on the 1st April, Soult effected a junction with Drouet, and his whole army was concentrated at Llerena on the 6th, and reached Villa Franca the following day; but while marching forward on the 8th Soult received the mortifying intelligence that Badajos had fallen. Being apprized at the same time that Marmont, whom he had

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hoped to join, was still in the north, he directly fell back to Llerena. The allied cavalry, commanded by Sir Stapleton Cotton, following closely, gained some advantage over that of the enemy near Usagre; after which the French under Drouet retired behind the Guadalquiver, while Soult repaired to Seville to organize defensive measures against the allies, expecting Lord Wellington would follow him into Andalusia.

The British general, however, found it expedient to defer his intention of marching southward; the presence of his army being required to oppose Marmont, who had advanced from Salamanca during the progress of the recent siege, and, leaving a division before Ciudad Rodrigo, made a demonstration against Almeida. He subsequently passed the Coa at Sabugal, put to flight a body of militia, and penetrated to Castel Branco, unchecked by the 5th division of the allied army, which had been left in observation on the frontier of Beira. This irruption by Marmont would have signified little, had Rodrigo been adequately garrisoned and supplied; for his battering train having been captured in that fortress, he had not the means of undertaking a siege. But owing to gross negligence on the part of the Spaniards, that place had not been provisioned; and Lord Wellington was now constrained to forego his views upon Andalusia, and march into Beira. Having therefore taken steps to restore Badajos to a defensible condition, he put his army in motion towards the north, leaving Sir Rowland Hill with 12,000 men in Estremadura to watch the Andalusian frontier.

On Lord Wellington's approach, Marmont drew back into Spain; and the head-quarters of the allied

army being once more established at Fuente Guinaldo, cantonments were selected for the troops between the Coa and the Agueda. Here the army was permitted to rest after its glorious labours, — accomplished before the usual season for commencing military operations had arrived. Some magazines previously formed north of the Douro now amply supplied its wants; and the only success of which Marmont could boast during his brief inroad, viz. the destruction of a magazine at Celerico, was unfelt by the allies.

To comment at length on the recent brilliant successes is needless: with the power of assembling 80,000 men, the French marshals suffered their able opponent to snatch from them two fortresses of first-rate importance under the circumstances of the contest. Napoleon himself was not astonished by these events, for he knew how much may be achieved in war by greatly daring; but the conviction now forced itself upon his unwilling mind, that the combined energies of England, Spain, and Portugal, wielded by one who had successively either defeated or outmanœuvred his most experienced generals, must eventually wrest the Peninsula from his powerful grasp. Notwithstanding which — such is the infatuation of ambition — he was then on the eve of plunging into a war with Russia! And his star, already waning in Spain, became obscured in the snowy regions of the north.

CHAPTER XXVII.

LORD WELLESLEY RESIGNS THE DIRECTION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. — SIR ROWLAND HILL CAPTURES AND DESTROYS THE FORTS AND BRIDGES AT ALMARAZ. — LORD WELLINGTON ADVANCES TO THE TORMES, AND CAPTURES THE FORTS AT SALAMANCA. — THE ALLIED ARMY FOLLOWS THE ENEMY TO THE DOURO. — IT RETURNS TO THE TORMES. — BATTLE OF SALAMANCA. — THE DEFEATED ARMY IS PUSHED BEYOND THE DOURO. — THE ALLIED ARMY ENTERS MADRID. — SURRENDER OF THE RETIRO. — MOVEMENTS OF HILL AND DROUET IN ESTREMADURA. — SOULT RAISES THE BLOCKADE OF CADIZ, AND WITHDRAWS FROM ANDALUSIA. — A BRITISH FORCE LANDS AT ALICANT. — WELLINGTON MOVES TO THE NORTH, AND FAILS TO TAKE THE CASTLE OF BURGOS. — HE RETIRES TO THE TORMES. — IS JOINED BY HILL FROM ARANJUEZ. — OFFERS BATTLE AT THE ARAPILES. — RETREATS TO THE AGUEDA. — VISITS CADIZ.

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THE satisfaction experienced by the Earl of Wellington at the result of his recent operations was tempered by learning that Marquis Wellesley had resigned the direction of foreign affairs; partly in consequence of an unwillingness to hold a subordinate situation under Mr. Percival, but mainly from his inability to obtain such support for Lord Wellington and the war he was conducting as his lordship conceived to be necessary to insure its successful termination. This unwelcome news relaxed not the efforts of the British general; who, in possession of the long-coveted frontier fortresses (Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo), and at the head of a veteran army, now contemplated assuming the offensive, and marching against Marmont. As a preliminary measure, however, it was desirable to secure his right flank during a forward operation; and as the boat bridge at Al-

maraz afforded a safe and easy communication between Marmont and Soult, whereby as necessity arose they were enabled to furnish each other assistance; and this being moreover the only passage suited to the movements of an army below Toledo (the country on the left bank of the river from Toledo to Almaraz being scarcely practicable for a large military force), it became of importance to destroy that bridge previous to commencing an operation in Leon.

A plan for destroying the bridge at Almaraz, which had been for some time contemplated by Lord Wellington, was now communicated to Sir Rowland Hill, who remained, as we have seen, southward of the Guadiana; and, in obedience to the instructions that general received, he quitted Almendralejos on the 12th of May at the head of 6000 men, and, crossing that river at Merida, moved on Truxillo.

To protect their important communication by Almaraz the French, besides two bridge heads, had erected formidable forts on both sides of the Tagus, which were strongly garrisoned. Marching rapidly by Jaraicejo, Sir Rowland Hill reached the range of mountains on which stands the castle of Mirabete (about five miles from Almaraz) on the 18th of May; when, finding the passage for his artillery effectually barred by intrenchments, he boldly resolved upon attempting the enterprise with infantry alone. Leaving, therefore, his guns on the crest of the ridge, he moved by a mountain track leading through the village of Romangorda, and after dark descended towards the river with 2000 men under Major-General Howard. The head of this column arrived soon after

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dawn within a short distance of the principal fort, constructed on a height a few hundred yards in advance of the bridge head; but such were the difficulties of the route, that some hours elapsed ere the rear of the troops closed up: a deep ravine now fortunately concealed them from the enemy, who remained ignorant that danger was so near until the British rushed forward to the assault. A feint having been made the same morning on the works at Mirabete, caused the enemy, however, to be on the alert, who, manning the walls on the first alarm, kept up a well-sustained fire on the assailants; but the troops placed around having succeeded in driving the French from the parapets, ladders were applied, and they were quickly crowned with British soldiers. The fort contained a tower, intended as a refuge for the garrison; but the enemy fled from the fort, neglecting its tower, seeking to gain the bridge. This, however, the officer who commanded on the opposite bank had thought proper to cut, and 250 of the fugitives were thereby made prisoners. Alarmed for his own safety, this dastardly officer now abandoned the fort intrusted to his charge, and retired with its garrison to Talavera; for which pusillanimous conduct he was afterwards deservedly shot. Thus did a small body of infantry become possessed of these formidable forts on both sides of the river, with a loss of only 33 men killed and 147 wounded. The works were immediately destroyed, and on the same day the troops withdrew.

Both Soult and Marmont were roused by Sir Rowland Hill's movement towards the Tagus; and the latter on reaching Almaraz a few days after Sir Rowland's successful attack, had the mortification

to find piles of ruin where he had left well-constructed forts, and an impassable river between his force and the garrison of the castle of Mirabete, which remained isolated until it was eventually relieved by some troops from the army of the centre, who crossed at Arzobispo. Soult on his side pressed forward from Seville; but hearing on the march that Sir Rowland, having effected his purpose, had passed Truxillo on his return to the Guadiana, abandoned the hope of intercepting him, and retraced his steps to the south.

Lord Wellington, while thus depriving the French of their communication across the Tagus, saw the importance, in aid of his projected movement, of establishing a permanent communication for the use of his own army across that river. Alcantara offered the most eligible point for this purpose, as the approach to it from the south was covered by Badajos; but an arch of the stupendous Roman bridge, 90 feet in height, which there spans the Tagus, had been destroyed in 1809, leaving a chasm 100 feet wide, which it had been reported impossible to repair; while the banks, lofty and precipitous, with the stream at times an impetuous torrent, rendered a boat bridge wholly unsuited to the object.

Major Sturgeon of the Royal Staff Corps was sent to examine the broken arch, and his fertile invention suggested an application of cordage, which was prepared at Elvas, and on being stretched across was found fully adequate to the purpose; a small battering train being shortly after taken over by Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson of the Royal Artillery without the least difficulty. The allied army re-

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mained quiet while its commander was thus busily preparing for active operations: his measures being at length completed, and a month's provision for the whole army having been collected and stored at Ciudad Rodrigo, the army suddenly broke up from its cantonments, passed the Agueda on the 13th June, and on the 17th appeared before Salamanca, crossing the Tormes by fords both above and below the city; while Marmont drew back on the approach of the allies, leaving garrisons in the forts which he had caused to be constructed at Salamanca.

Previously to putting his troops in motion, Lord Wellington had ascertained from an intercepted return that the army of Portugal amounted to 53,000 effective men; but though this number was greater than that at which he had estimated it, the enemy's superiority did not deter him from undertaking offensive measures. He sought, however, to have his operations supported on his left; and for this purpose urged the Conde de Amarante to move from Braganza, and in conjunction with a Portugueze force under General D' Urban to menace the enemy's right flank upon the Douro, as well as cut off their communication with Zamora, Benavente, and Astorga. Castaños had promised to attack the last-named place with the army of Galicia; and the guerrilla chiefs in the north had been incited to furnish occupation to Marmont's detachments, and thereby prevent his whole force being concentrated to meet the allied army. Meanwhile it was hoped that Soult would find ample employment in blockading Cadiz, checking Ballasteros, and giving attention to Sir Rowland Hill in Estremadura; independent of which, the de-

struction of the bridge at Almaraz was a serious obstacle to his assisting Marmont.

Salamanca, standing on the right bank of the Tormes, had long served as a depôt for the army of Portugal; to protect which, command the passage of the river, and keep the citizens in subjection, three forts had been constructed with materials obtained by the demolition of several convents and colleges. These forts were found to be much stronger than Lord Wellington had been led to suppose, and a regular attack was necessary to reduce them. A division under General Henry Clinton was therefore appointed to that duty; while the rest of the army took up a formidable position on the heights of San Christoval, three miles in advance of the city, having its right on the Tormes, near Cabrerizos, and its left in front of Villares.

Four iron eighteen-pounders had followed the army from Almeida, and three howitzers were furnished by the field artillery. Ground was broken before the principal fort (San Vincente) on the 17th, and the artillery opened its fire on the 19th; but the ammunition failed before a breach could be made. On the 20th Lieut.-Colonel Dickson brought up a brigade of six iron howitzers, which, originally prepared at Elvas for the reduction of the forts at Almaraz, crossed by the rope bridge at Alcantara on the 11th, and moved by Perales and Ciudad Rodrigo.

Jones's Sieges, vol. i. 272.

Meanwhile Marmont with 25,000 men approached the allied position, and on the 20th took up ground in its front. On the 22d the French army being joined by 15,000 troops, Marmont extended his left, and seized a height which projected from the right of the allied position; but the

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enemy were driven from it by the 7th division. The French then withdrew from their hazardous position to some heights about six miles in rear; their right resting on Cabeza Vellosa, and their left on the Tormes at Huerta, where there was a ford. They now made demonstrations as if to cross the river, — probably with a view to encourage the troops left in the forts, as well as to alarm Lord Wellington for his communications; but his lordship was not moved from his purpose, and merely sent Baron Bock's brigade of German cavalry over the river to watch the enemy's movements, and changed the front of his army, placing its right at the ford of Sta Marta, and its left at Morisco, while the light division was in advance at Aldea Lengua. Thus posted, he stood ready to operate on either side of the Tormes.*

During the night of the 24th Marmont crossed by the Huerta ford with several strong divisions, of which Lord Wellington being apprized at dawn, another brigade of cavalry and two divisions of infantry under General Graham were forthwith sent across the river by the ford of Sta Marta, and the rest of the army was concentrated between Cabrerizos and Morisco. Pressing on Bock's cavalry, which retired with great steadiness, the enemy reached Calvarassa de Abajo, on the road to Salamanca; but perceiving Graham's troops drawn up in order of battle between them and the city, and that more were ready to give support, they halted.

* As a remarkable instance of Lord Wellington's highly gifted nature, we may mention that while the French army was manœuvring in view, he penned a long and very able letter, on the 25th of June, to the British minister at Lisbon on the subject of establishing a bank in that city on the principle of the Bank of England, as proposed by Chevalier de Souza.

The same evening Marmont withdrew his army, repassed the river at Huerta, and resumed his former position; Graham's divisions at the same time rejoining the main body of the allies.

Meanwhile an unsuccessful attempt had been made in the night of the 23d to carry one of the small forts (Cayetano), whose defences were injured, by escalade at the gorge; on which occasion Major-General Bowes was killed when gallantly cheering his men to the attack. A suspension of the siege now occurred for want of ammunition, and it was not resumed till the afternoon of the 26th; when hot shot being directed into the roof of the convent of San Vincente, it was speedily on fire. In the first instance the garrison succeeded in extinguishing the flames; but the use of hot shot being resumed on the following day, about noon the whole building was in a blaze, and at the same time a practicable breach having been effected in the gorge of Cayetano, the troops were formed ready for the assault, when a white flag was displayed. A short negotiation ensued, which proving unsatisfactory to Lord Wellington, he gave the word to storm; and the two small forts being immediately carried, the commandant of San Vincente asked for terms and surrendered.

Seven hundred prisoners, and thirty pieces of artillery, with provisions and clothing, fell into the hands of the allies, whose loss during the operations since the passage of the Tormes amounted to thirty-six officers and 450 men killed and wounded. The works were destroyed, and the guns and stores delivered over to the Spaniards.

Marmont now withdrew the garrison from Alba de Tormes, and retired across the Douro, taking June 29.

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up a position along its northern bank, his left resting on the Pisuerga (which was unfordable) at Simancas, his centre being at Tordesillas, and right on the heights opposite Pollos. Lord Wellington followed the enemy's movements closely, watching a favourable opportunity for bringing them to action; but his cautious adversary gave him no opening, and the allied army took post opposite to that of the French, establishing its head-quarters at Rueda. The enemy's position was very strong; for Zamora and Toro covered their right; the river Pisuerga, a fortified post at Simancas, and Valladolid occupied in force, secured the left; while 100 pieces of cannon protected the bridge of Tordesillas and the fords of the Douro along the front, between Toro and the Pisuerga.

On the 7th July the enemy's army was augmented by a force brought by General Bonnet from Asturias, and Marmont then extended his right to Toro, and commenced repairing the bridge at that place. This induced Lord Wellington to stretch the left of the allies to the Guareña. No movement of consequence occurred, however, till the 15th; when, and during the following day, Marmont concentrated his whole force between Toro and San Roman, and on the evening of the 16th a considerable body of troops passed the Douro at the first-named place. The same night Lord Wellington moved his army to the left, intending to assemble it on the Guareña; but in the mean time the French divisions recrossed the river at Toro, and their whole army marched to Tordesillas, where it passed the Douro on the morning of the 17th, and took post at La Nava del Rey, having marched forty miles without halting. By this suc-

cessful manœuvre Marmont regained his communication with the army of the centre, which was moving from Madrid to his support. Two divisions of the allied infantry and a brigade of cavalry, which, while the rest of the army was united on the left, had remained at Castrejon under Sir S. Cotton, were now exposed to danger. Lord Wellington therefore ordered the 5th division to Torrecilla de la Orden, and three brigades of cavalry to Alaejos to cover Cotton's retreat; his lordship himself proceeding to Castrejon.

The troops were attacked at daylight on the 18th, and maintained their ground till reinforced by the cavalry; but on their left being turned by Alaejos, they retired to Torrecilla de la Orden, and thence to the Guareña, closely followed by the enemy. Lord Wellington, who directed the operations in person, accompanied by Marshal Beresford, was in great peril that day from the audacity of some French horsemen: the British generals and their staff having been enveloped while watching the enemy's movements, were compelled to open their way sword in hand.

The armies were now in presence near Castrillo, having the Guareña, an inconsiderable stream, flowing between them; and Marmont pushed a column across it with the intention of gaining an important ridge above Castrillo, at the junction of the Guareña with the little stream from Canzel, and thereby to press on the left of the allies; but General Cole's division repulsed the attack, while Alten's brigade of cavalry drove off the enemy's horse, capturing General Carier and near 300 men.

On the afternoon of the 19th the enemy withdrew from their right, and marched to their left on

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Tarazona, with a seeming intention of turning the right of the allies; the whole of whom crossed the Upper Guareña at Vallesa and El Olmo, in expectation of a battle on the plain in the vicinity of the former place. At daylight, however, the whole of the enemy's army was seen continuing its march to the left, which obliged the allies to make a corresponding movement to their right; but the French columns had gained a considerable advance, and passing the Guareña higher up at Cantalapiedra, formed on a range of heights which extend nearly to Salamanca. Throwing back the right flank of his army, Lord Wellington moved it along the low ground, parallel to the direction of the enemy's march, till it reached the heights of Cabeza Vellosa, where it took up a position; a division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry being detached to Aldea Lengua on the Tormes to watch closely the enemy's motions, who occupied Babilafuente and Villaruela. This day's movements afforded a military spectacle of an uncommon kind: the two armies marched on parallel lines at the distance of half cannon shot, through an open country, where at any moment they might clash in battle; but save the report of an occasional gun, nothing disturbed the silence and grandeur of the scene presented by 90,000 men moving in the most perfect order upon so narrow a space.

Reluctant to fight a battle, save under such advantages as without much risk should produce a favourable result to the campaign,—advantages which his skilful opponent seemed little likely to give,—Lord Wellington now saw himself on the point of yielding to necessity, and retiring to Ciudad Rodrigo, without having effected any other good

than that of relieving a great portion of Spain from the presence of the enemy during the important period of gathering in the harvest; for it was known that General Chauvel, with the cavalry and horse artillery of the army of the north, would in a few days unite with Marmont; and moreover that King Joseph was collecting a force at Madrid, which also might soon be expected to arrive on the Tormes. Still his lordship resolved to cover Salamanca as long as possible, though at the same time determined not to lose his communication with Ciudad Rodrigo, nor, unless compelled, to fight a battle, save under promising circumstances. In numbers the hostile armies already in presence were nearly equal, but the enemy had a great superiority in artillery.

In the course of his operations the British general was again embarrassed for money. "I have never been in such distress as at present," he wrote on the 15th July; "and some *serious* misfortune must happen if the government do not attend seriously to the subject, and adopt some measures to supply us regularly with money." Still he contrived to subsist his army—upon credit; but the troops suffered much inconvenience from being several months in arrear of pay.

On the 21st Lord Wellington moved his army to its old position of San Christoval; and the same day the enemy crossed the Tormes by the fords between Alba and Huerta, directing their columns towards the roads leading to Ciudad Rodrigo. In the evening the allied army—excepting the 3d division and D'Urban's Portugueze cavalry, which remained at Cabrerizos—also crossed the river, and took up a position between Sta Marta on the

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Tormes and two remarkably bold rocky heights, called the Arapiles. The enemy occupied the villages of La Peña and Calvarassa de Abajo in front, but their precise position was concealed by a thick wood.

July 21.

During the night the enemy took possession of Calvarassa de Arriba, and early on the following morning a detachment of their troops was observed stealing towards the two peaks of Arapiles; upon which Lord Wellington sent a battalion of caçadores to seize the most distant of those hills. This intention being perceived by the enemy, they suddenly broke their ranks, and making a rush, succeeded in getting possession of it; but were repulsed in an attempt to establish themselves on the other hill. The British general then saw the necessity of extending his right wing, and of occupying the hamlet of Arapiles, which was about a mile and a half distant on the prolongation of the right of his position; and concluding from the nature of Marmont's movements that he sought to strike a blow on the left bank of the Tormes, he forthwith ordered the 3d division and D'Urban's cavalry, posted at Cabrerizos, to cross the river, and place themselves behind the village of Aldea Tejada, in readiness to cover the Ciudad Rodrigo road. He also moved up Carlos da España's infantry and Brig.-General Bradford's Portugueze brigade to the neighbourhood of Las Torres, to serve as a connecting link between those troops and the 4th division, which was now posted in rear of the Arapiles hamlet.

By these changes the allied line was placed nearly perpendicular to its original position, its left occupying the nearer peak of the Arapiles, and its

right extending to Aldea Tejada; but an interval of nearly two miles occurred between the actual and apparent right, for the 3d division was concealed by the nature of the ground. Deceived by this circumstance, the French marshal imagined the right of the allied army to be "in the air," and planned his manœuvres accordingly.

The British continued tranquil in this situation, while various evolutions having no apparent object were performed by the enemy; but about two o'clock a cloud of skirmishers issued from their left wing, and, at the same moment, a heavy cannonade opened upon the allied troops. Presently the enemy were observed moving to their left, along some heights little more than half a mile in front of Lord Wellington's position, with the evident intention of interposing a force between the allied army and its line of retreat on Ciudad Rodrigo.

Informed of this movement by Lieut.-Colonel Sturgeon, Wellington hastened to the Arapile hill, whence he had the satisfaction of perceiving the enemy incautiously extending their line, and thereby dangerously exposing their left wing. "At last I have them!" was his exulting exclamation, as he prepared to take advantage of Marmont's error. He immediately reinforced his right with the 5th division (General Leith), which took post on the right of the 4th, under General Cole, having the 6th and 7th divisions, commanded by Generals H. Clinton and Hope, in second line. The 1st and light divisions, under Generals Campbell and Alten, with Pack's Portugueze brigade, were placed as a reserve behind the Arapile hill. The British cavalry, under Sir S. Cotton, was posted prin-

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cipally on the right; the rest being disposed with the infantry in second line.

On these arrangements being effected, the 3d division, with D'Urban's cavalry and two squadrons of the 14th light dragoons, under Lieut.-Colonel Hervey, were ordered to advance from Aldea Tejada and fall on the enemy's left flank; while the 4th and 5th divisions, Bradford's Portugueze brigade, and the heavy cavalry should attack them in front. Accordingly General Pakenham, who during Picton's absence on account of illness commanded the 3d division, carried it forward with the greatest celerity, supported by D'Urban and Hervey, and was close upon the enemy's flank before they were sure of his object: to effect a change of front under such circumstances was impracticable, and in a few minutes their extreme left was overthrown. Pressing onwards the assailants drove all before them, outflanking the French at every point where they attempted to make a stand, and capturing 3000 prisoners.

Nearly at the same time Pack's brigade advanced against the enemy's Arapile hill, while Cole and Leith attacked the front of their position, which was immediately forced; and Cotton's heavy cavalry making an opportune and irresistible charge upon a body of their disordered infantry, it was routed and cut to pieces: but the brave General Le Marchant fell at the head of his brigade. Meanwhile the allied infantry kept moving forward its right so as continually to acquire strength upon the enemy's flank; but Pack having failed to carry the Arapile hill, they were enabled to throw some troops on the left of the 4th division, which, having carried the crests of the heights in its front, was

met and strongly opposed by that of Bonnet. General Cole was wounded, and his division compelled to give way; but Marshal Beresford, who chanced to be on the spot, immediately brought up a brigade of the 5th division, which by a change of front took the enemy in flank with a destructive fire, and drove them back. A brigade of Clinton's division now carried the Arapile; and the French left and centre were completely defeated.

The right of the enemy, however, strengthened by troops who had fled from the left, and by others who had retired from the Arapile hill, now rallied on some strong ground nearly at right angles to the front of their original position, and supported by a reserve, and by the cavalry on their flanks, again awaited the attack; while their artillery, posted on advanced knolls, stood ready to sweep the whole face of the steep and rocky heights thus occupied. But, although daylight had almost closed, Lord Wellington would not rest satisfied with an incomplete victory. The 6th division, supported by other troops, was therefore ordered to attack the enemy's position in front; while the 1st and light divisions, with a British brigade and one of Portugueze from the 4th, were directed to turn their right. The French stood their ground, and the 6th division suffered severe loss; nevertheless, undismayed by the tremendous fire of the enemy, it mounted the hill, and charged them with the bayonet. The enemy then retired in the utmost disorder, and were pursued in the direction of Huerta and the fords of the Tormes; but darkness favoured the fugitives. One hour longer of daylight, and nearly the whole of the beaten army would have been taken.

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This great battle lasted from three in the afternoon till near ten. The trophies of victory were 7000 prisoners (exclusive of the wounded), 11 guns, and 2 eagles. Three French generals were slain and four wounded; amongst the latter was Marmont, who lost an arm by the bursting of a shell. The allies had 5000 men hors de combat. Generals Beresford, Cotton, Cole, Leith, and Alten were wounded.

Truly the events of war often baffle all calculation and foresight. Hopeless of an opportunity to attack his hitherto wary opponent, Lord Wellington was about to regain the frontier of Portugal, and had even caused his orders for retreating from the Tormes to be written, although they were not issued; when Marmont, wearied of imitating Turenne, adopted the manœuvre of Soubise at Rosbach, and Wellington, not less than Frederick, knew that an attack in force upon an extremity of a weakened line must lead to victory.

Jomini. Précis de l'Art de la Guerre, i. 144.

It has been justly observed by a high military authority, that "one of the greatest talents of a general is to know when to act offensively in the course of a defensive struggle." A movement to gain the flank or rear of an enemy, so wide as to give that enemy time to beat an isolated portion of the army during the progress of the operation, is confessedly one of extreme danger, and consequently just such a one as a skilful general watching his opportunity in a defensive position would eagerly embrace. The movement of Marmont at Salamanca was of this nature; and we have seen how severely he was punished for his imprudence.*

* "The danger which may result from a movement of this nature," (remarks the talented writer above quoted, *Précis*, vol. ii. p. 411.), "depends, however, on the quick and sure coup d'œil of the adversary, as

It is possible that the French marshal deceived himself in the character of his opponent, — as most Frenchmen have done, still do, and probably will ever persist in doing, — and attributed the impunity with which he had braved the allied army in front of Salamanca on a former occasion, to timidity on the part of its general; but even in that case, he ought to have recollected that "*bis peccare in bello non licet:*" and had Marmont known better whom he had to deal with, he would have been aware of the danger of sinning *even once* against the art of war in his presence.

Some French historians, to gloss over the defeat of Salamanca, have attributed it to the wound received by Marmont early in the day; but the truth is, the French army was placed in a vicious position, which ensured its discomfiture if vigorously attacked. This is candidly admitted by one writer of that nation*; and every competent and unprejudiced soldier must allow, that from the onset the French army had not the slightest chance that day. The action was pithily described at the time by a French officer, as the "*beating of forty thousand men in forty minutes.*" Napier.

But to resume.—The Spaniards had unfortunately evacuated the castle of Alba de Tormes contrary to Lord Wellington's express desire, and the enemy were thus enabled to cross the river at that point

well as on his accustomed system of conducting the war. We can easily understand why so many such movements have failed against some, and succeeded against others; why a movement which would have been too wide (*etendu*) in presence of Frederick, Napoleon, or Wellington, met with certain success against generals of mediocrity, wanting the tact to seize opportunely the initiative, or who themselves were in the habit of making unconnected movements."

* "Il est permis de croire, que son éloignement (Marmont's) du lieu de l'action, n'influa pas sur la perte de la bataille, ni même sur ses suites." — *Augoyat*, p. 133.

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without hinderance; while the allied army marched on Huerta, its general conceiving the passage at Alba to be closed against the French, and their retreat consequently cut off. This blunder of the Spaniards saved the enemy several thousand men, who must otherwise have been taken. Next morning the allied cavalry came up with the enemy's rear guard near La Serna, and General Bock with his Germans fell upon three squares of infantry, broke them, and captured 900 prisoners. The retreat of the defeated army by Valladolid towards Burgos was afterwards covered by Chauvel's cavalry and artillery, which joined it on the 24th.

Satisfied that Marmont's army, now commanded by General Clauzel, could not reappear in the field for some time, Lord Wellington did not pursue it beyond Valladolid; besides, the army of the centre now demanded his attention. King Joseph had quitted Madrid with 14,000 men on the 20th, and did not learn the issue of the battle of Salamanca until he had reached Blasco Sancho (between Arevalo and Avila) on the 25th; he then drew back, and reaching Segovia on the 27th, soon after regained the capital. The army of the centre being thus widely separated from that of Clauzel, Lord Wellington determined to move the main body of his army upon Madrid; and to watch the line of the Douro during this operation, he left the 6th division and a brigade of British cavalry at Cuellar, to act in conjunction with the Spanish army of Galicia under Santocildes, which, 8000 strong, had already crossed to the south bank of that river.

On the 9th August the allied army reached San Ildefonso; and defiling on the two following days by the passes of Guadarrama and Navacerrada, de-

scended into New Castile. An unfortunate affair occurred on the evening of the 11th near Majalahonda. About 2000 French cavalry, who had been driven off in the morning, having approached the posts of D'Urban's Portugueze horse, that general advanced upon their leading squadrons, supported by a battery of horse artillery; but these troops, which had behaved most gallantly but a few days before at Salamanca, did not on the present occasion partake of their commander's spirit, and turning from the encounter, fled to the rear, leaving the British artillery at the enemy's mercy. Happily a brigade of German cavalry was at hand, which charged and stopped the enemy; but many of those fine troopers went down, and three guns remained in the enemy's possession, though afterwards recovered through the inability of their captors to carry them off.

Leaving 1800 men in the fortified post of the Retiro, Joseph abandoned his capital on the 11th, retiring by Aranjuez to Ocaña, whence he subsequently took the direction of Valencia. The allied army made its entry on the following day amid the most extravagant demonstrations of joy from the citizens, who, so long oppressed by the invaders, seemed now almost ready to worship the man by whom, under divine Providence, their deliverance had been accomplished.

The Retiro was reconnoitred by Lord Wellington on the same afternoon. This intrenched post was found to consist of a large enclosed space,—requiring several thousand men to defend it,—having within it a small work of little strength. His lordship ordered the outer enclosure to be carried, and guns to be placed in battery against the inner fort. This was effected on the following

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day; but before their fire opened, the commandant, knowing that he could offer no effectual resistance, surrendered his post, containing 180 pieces of cannon, 20,000 stand of arms, and a great quantity of ammunition and stores of all kinds. And thus was Joseph's army deprived of 1800 men by leaving them in the Retiro.

Don Carlos de España was nominated governor of Madrid, and a new constitution prepared by the Cortes was proclaimed amidst the rejoicings of the people, who for many days gave themselves up to a delirious joy that amazed the British troops; who, however, fully appreciated the kindness and good cheer which met them on all sides.

But his intercourse with the Spaniards in their capital did not tend to raise them in the estimation of Lord Wellington; for we find him thus writing of them, —

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 18.

"I do not expect much from their exertions, notwithstanding all we have done for them. They cry *Viva*, and are very fond of us, and hate the French; but they are in general the most incapable of useful exertion of all the nations that I have known: the most vain, and at the same time the most ignorant, particularly of military affairs, and above all of military affairs in their own country."

And again, —

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 23.

"What can be done for this lost nation? As for raising men or supplies, or taking any one measure to enable them to carry on the war, that is out of the question. Indeed, there is nobody to excite them to exertion, or to take advantage of the enthusiasm of the people, or of their enmity against the French. Even the guerrillas are getting quietly into the large towns, and amusing themselves in collecting plunder of a better and more valuable description; and nobody looks forward to the exertions to be made, whether to improve or to secure our advantages.

"This is a faithful picture of the state of affairs; and though I still hope to be able to maintain our position in

Castille, and even to improve our advantages, I shudder when I reflect upon the enormity of the task which I have undertaken, with inadequate powers myself to do anything; and without assistance of any kind from the Spaniards, or, I may say, from any individual of the Spanish nation." CHAP. XXVII. 1812.

We must now go back a little to the period when Sir Rowland Hill, having secured Lord Wellington's right flank by destroying the bridge and forts at Almaraz, returned to the southward of the Guadiana. Soult, occupied before Cadiz, — which he had uselessly bombarded in May, — and in checking Ballasteros, had not sought to disturb Sir Rowland; whom, however, he was anxious to force across the Tagus. The preservation of Ballasteros' corps, under these circumstances, was of great moment; but, with the blindness of his countrymen, that general advanced into the open country with 8000 men, attacked General Conroux in an intrenched position at Bornos, and was of course defeated with heavy loss. Meanwhile Sir Rowland Hill, having been reinforced, advanced to Zafra; upon which Drouet fell back to Azagua. At this time the reckless conduct of the allied cavalry enabled the enemy to boast of having obtained an advantage over it. A body of French horse was attacked by General Slade without orders, and driven from Llera to Maquilla, a distance of eight miles; but Lallemand with a reserve there fell upon Slade's disordered troops, put fifty men hors de combat, and captured more than double that number, at the same time releasing many Frenchmen who had been taken. June 1. June 11.

The defeat and consequent dispersion of Ballasteros' corps now enabled Soult to strengthen Drouet, upon which Sir Rowland Hill retired to Albuera; where, being joined by a Spanish division and some additional Portugueze troops, he found himself at

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the head of 23,000 men. Drouet, who had 21,000, did not pass Almendralejos. As both generals were known to have discretionary orders, a battle was expected; but Hill being uncertain whether the state of Lord Wellington's affairs on the Tormes was such as to justify his fighting, nobly resisted the temptation presented of adding to his renown. The French subsequently drew back; and Sir Rowland again advanced to Zafra, occupying Merida with a strong division. After this no event of any consequence occurred till the 24th July; when General Lallemand having forced back some Portugueze horse from Ribera to Villa Franca, Generals Long and Slade attacked him with the allied cavalry, and the enemy were driven to Llera with a loss of forty men. A few days afterwards Drouet marched towards the Guadiana, threatening the division at Merida; but a movement by Hill from Zafra to Villa Franca caused him to return to La Serena.

Meanwhile the battle of Salamanca having shaken every position of the enemy throughout Spain, Lord Wellington felt that he might act with vigour in the south; he therefore directed Sir Rowland Hill to force Drouet out of Estremadura, and menace Andalusia, while General Cook, who commanded the British at Cadiz, should attack the enemy's works before that city. But the prudent Soult had already perceived the necessity of withdrawing from the south; and having destroyed a great number of guns as well as a vast quantity of stores, he broke up the long-continued blockade of the Isla de Leon on the 24th August, and, sending Drouet orders to quit Estremadura and join him in Granada, proceeded to Seville, which city he quitted on the night of the 26th, leaving it oc-

cupied by a rear guard. This, on the following morning, was surprised by a combined British and Spanish force under Colonel Skerret and General Cruz Murgeon, which had been despatched from Cadiz to Ayamonte some time before, with a view to draw the enemy's attention to that side; and now, deeming the time favourable for striking a blow, marching rapidly by Manzanilla and San Lucar la Mayor, appeared suddenly before Triana —a suburb of Seville, on the right bank of the Guadalquivir, and connected with the city by a boat-bridge. The French attempted to destroy the bridge and effect an unmolested retreat; but, assisted by the inhabitants, the allies were enabled to cross by it in time to make 200 prisoners. A division of the enemy's corps from before Cadiz, about 7000 strong, approached Seville the same evening; but finding it occupied by the allies, imagined Sir Rowland Hill's force to be there, and made, in consequence, a hasty move to the right on Carmona, followed by Ballasteros, who hung on its flank during the march to Granada. When Drouet quitted Estremadura, Sir Rowland Hill moved towards the Tagus, which river he passed at Almaraz, and thence gained Toledo.

The state of affairs which followed the battle of Salamanca, although highly gratifying to Lord Wellington, was still of a nature to increase rather than lessen his anxiety with respect to the future; for, deriving no support from the Spaniards, he felt that neither the strength of his army nor the resources of his genius could carry him successfully through the campaign, if the several French armies in the north, the east, and the south should combine their operations, and, discarding all minor

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objects, proceed to act against him with energy and skill. But he knew that the French commanders were jealous of each other, and little disposed to yield obedience to King Joseph; who besides, even had he been capable of controlling Napoleon's generals, possessed no capacity for directing great military operations. Trusting, therefore, that division would continue to reign among the French, Lord Wellington prepared for active measures against the army of the north, which, having pressed forward to the Douro, caused General Clinton to recede from that river.

" By the end of August the following were the situations of the respective French armies in Spain: —Marshal Soult, who had been joined by Drouet, was in Granada, pointing his march towards Valencia, in which province a junction had taken place between Joseph and Suchet on the 29th; upwards of sixty thousand Frenchmen would therefore ere long be assembled in that quarter. The army of Portugal under Clauzel was on the Douro, about 23,000 strong, but expecting reinforcements from the north, and from France; and Massena had recently been placed at the head of a French corps in the province of Alava. At this period Lord Wellington had 40,000 British and Portugueze at and near Madrid; and Sir Rowland Hill, with about half that number of troops, was on his way from Estremadura to Toledo, by way of Almaraz. Of Spaniards there was a rabble in Leon, styled the army of Galicia; and Ballasteros with another ill-disciplined body was in Granada; while in Catalonia and other parts of the kingdom there were also various assemblages of men in arms: but the weight of the Spanish forces was rarely felt in

the field. Astorga, however, had capitulated to the Galician army after a ten weeks' siege, 1200 men laying down their arms on condition of being exchanged; and about the same time a guerrilla force captured 700 more in Guadalaxara. Another guerrilla band also succeeded in recovering Bilbao, aided by a British squadron, which was now on the coast of Guipuscoa under Sir Home Popham. August 15.

Lord Wellington had been promised a co-operation on the coast of Catalonia from the British force in Sicily; but Lord William Bentinck, who commanded the troops on that island, entertained an ill-advised scheme of debarking on the coast of Italy, and on relinquishing that intention despatched only 6000 men, chiefly foreigners, under Lieut.-General Maitland, to Catalonia; but long ere they arrived Suchet had effectually put down some bands, which, had they been united with a British corps of sufficient strength, would have created a formidable force, that might have prevented the French general from rendering any assistance to the army of the centre. Finding that nothing was to be effected in Catalonia, and hearing that O'Donnel had retired into Murcia, after suffering defeat at Castalla on the 21st of July, thereby leaving Alicante exposed, General Maitland took possession of that place.

Matters were in this state when Lord Wellington, — knowing that Joseph had gone to Valencia, and that Clauzel, after liberating the French garrisons of Zamora and Toro, had established himself at Valladolid, pushing his parties to the Douro, — decided on marching against the army of Portugal: his objects being to secure a communication with the Galician army, and by its medium with the British squadron on the north coast; to drive back Clauzel's

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army; and strengthen the situation of the allies upon the Douro, preparatory to the expected advance of Joseph and Soult from the side of Valencia towards the Tagus.

A considerable portion of the allied army had been sent from Madrid to the Escurial and San Ildefonso for shelter during the extreme heat of the season, but the troops were only permitted a brief repose. Towards the end of August the 1st, 3d, and 7th divisions, a brigade of cavalry, and the Portugueze brigades of Bradford and Pack, were ordered to Arevalo to join the 6th division, which Clinton had withdrawn from the Douro.

Leaving the 3d and light divisions at Madrid, and the 4th at the Escurial, Lord Wellington quitted the capital on the 1st of September, and joining the troops assembled at Arevalo, advanced northward to the Douro, which he crossed on the 6th, and driving Clauzel from Valladolid, pursued his march towards Burgos; but did not press the enemy, being desirous to form a junction with the army of Galicia previous to engaging them; and this, owing to dilatoriness on the part of Santocildes, was not effected till the 16th, at Pampaliego. Strengthened by 11,000 Spaniards, — all that the vaunted army of Galicia could produce, — Lord Wellington would have given battle to Clauzel on the following day; but the French general, finding the allies had been reinforced, withdrew from his position covering Burgos, and leaving a competent garrison in the castle of that place, quitted it on the morning of the 18th, and drew off to the eastward. Souham, now joining with 9000 men from the army of the north, assumed the chief command of this force, and took up a position at Briviesca.

The castle of Burgos was the chief depôt of the enemy; its capture, therefore, would materially affect their future proceedings, while its occupation by the Spaniards would afford a point of support to the ulterior operations of the allied army. It was immediately invested. The castle hill was found to have successive lines of works from the base to the summit, disposed to suit the irregular nature of its faces. Divided from the castle hill by a rugged ravine, another mound, called the *Cerro de San Miguel*, rises to an almost equal elevation; the tops of the two hills being about 300 yards apart. San Miguel was surmounted by a small horn-work, whose interior lay open to a fort (Napoleon) on the castle hill, while its branches were well flanked from other parts.

The plan of attack adopted was to carry the horn-work of San Miguel by assault, form a lodgment within it, and erect a battery to injure the several works on the castle hill preparatory to their being stormed in succession. Accordingly, the first evening, while two detachments vainly endeavoured to escalade the faces of the demi-bastions, whose escarp measured 45 feet at an angle of 50°, Major Cocks at the head of a third party forced an entrance over the tall palisades at the gorge. This capture cost the allied army near 400 men in killed and wounded, many of whom fell under the fire from Fort Napoleon.*

Sept. 19.

Notes by Lieut.-Col. Reid, R.E

* The horn-work of San Miguel was constructed by order of Napoleon. During the conversation at Longwood, of which a portion has been quoted at page 203., Bonaparte observed, with reference to the attack on the castle of Burgos, "J'y fis construire une redoute sur une hauteur."

Engineer. "Il y avait un ouvrage à corne sur une hauteur."

Napoléon. "Est-ce qu'il fut emporté?" "Oui, dès la première nuit."—"D'assaut?" "Oui, d'assaut."—"Il n'était donc pas défendu?" "Il était très bien défendu, mais on l'a pénétré par la gorge."—

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1812. The siege equipment consisted of only three heavy guns, five howitzers, and a very scanty supply of shot; but, relying on the bravery of his troops, Lord Wellington hoped to effect his object. Batteries were now formed on San Miguel, and under cover of their fire an attempt was made by the besiegers to establish themselves within the lower line of works on the opposite hill.

Sept. 22. The storming party gallantly planted their ladders and strove to effect a lodgment, but after a sharp contest were driven down with considerable loss. Then followed an attempt to breach the wall, which was rendered abortive by two of the three guns becoming disabled by the superior fire of the enemy. The sap was next tried, and pushed so near to the wall that missiles of all kinds were thrown by hand upon the heads of the workmen. Recourse was then had to the formation of a gallery under ground, by means of which a mine was exploded, and a breach at length made on the night of the 29th September; but the opening was not deemed sufficiently wide to be assaulted, and by daylight the garrison had placed obstacles on its summit which rendered it impracticable. Another gallery was therefore formed under the wall, and

Oct. 4. the explosion of a mine produced a good breach, which was carried immediately by the 24th Regt.

Oct. 5. A sally from the garrison, however, caused the destruction of this lodgment. The two succeeding days were passed in extending the sap, which by great perseverance was pushed within ten yards of the next line. Much loss was, however, sustained,

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"Est-ce que la gorge n'était pas palissadée?" "Les troupes ont passé par dessus les palissades." (*Notes by Major Basil Jackson, who was present on the occasion.*)

owing to the proximity of the enemy, who rolled down shells, which destroyed the gabions, and killed the men who were working behind them; and on the night of the 8th a fierce rush being made by the garrison, the guard was overpowered, and the trench was held by the enemy long enough to enable them to destroy the work of the besiegers. It then became evident that to persevere with the sap on so confined a space, unaided by artillery, would be of no avail; and some ammunition having arrived from Santander, the howitzers were placed in battery; and an opening being effected, an assault took place on the 18th. The second line was gallantly carried, and some soldiers of the German legion even escaladed the third line.* Complete success was expected; when the enemy, finding that they were only attacked by small bodies, rallied upon the different parties, and drove them out with a heavy loss. This was the fifth assault that had been made, and the final effort of the besiegers, who had been now thirty days before the place. The siege failed entirely for want of adequate means of attacking a fort of such strength.† The casualties on the side of the allies amounted to 2000 men, which number was about the strength of the garrison. General Du Breton and his brave troops merited every credit for their able and gallant defence.

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* The Hon. Major Cocks, of the 79th regiment, fell on this occasion, when rallying the troops in the trenches. He was originally in the cavalry, and had on many occasions shown uncommon ability, and extraordinary daring.

† "There were ample means, both at Madrid and Santander, for the siege of the strongest fortresses. That which was wanting at both places was means of transporting ordnance and military stores to the place where it was desirable to use them."—*Despatches*, Nov. 23.

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On the day of the last assault the enemy's movements led Lord Wellington to think that an attempt would be made to raise the siege; he therefore assembled his troops in front of Burgos, excepting those employed in the operation, the enemy's army being also collected near Monasterio. On the evening of the 20th the allied outposts were driven in; but two divisions under Sir Edward Paget (who had recently joined the army) immediately recovered the lost ground.

In the beginning of October, Lord Wellington had received a notification of his appointment to the command of the Spanish armies,— an office he had on a former occasion declined; but considering that, in the actual disjointed state of the country, one head should direct the operations of the national forces, he accepted the honour conferred upon him, subject to the approval of his own government: to which he did not forget to suggest that any subsidies granted to Spain ought to be applied to the maintenance of its troops; neither did he omit to let it be understood that the Spanish government must not pretend to direct the operations of the war in consequence of its appointing him to command the forces of the state.

The French army under Souham having been reinforced by 10,000 men from France, in addition to what that general had brought with him from the army of the north, at this time numbered 44,000, with 60 pieces of artillery; while the allied army amounted to only 33,000 men, including 13,000 Galicians and other Spaniards, with 42 guns, twelve of which were Spanish. Finding himself greatly superior in strength to his opponent,

Napier, vol. v. 287.

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Napier, vol. v. 292.

Souham was about to attack him, when letters arrived from Joseph strictly enjoining him not to engage. On the same day Lord Wellington received a despatch from Sir R. Hill, informing him that he was threatened by Joseph and Soult, who having united their armies near Almanza on the 3d October, had on the 6th frightened the commandant of Chinchilla castle into surrendering it, and were advancing towards the Tagus.

In the actual condition of Spain, the evacuation of Andalusia by the enemy at this time was a disadvantage to the allies; for the energies of 40,000* of their veteran troops, commanded by their best general, had hitherto been wasted before Cadiz, — against which place nothing could be effected; — whereas by the junction of this force with that under Joseph in Murcia, an army of 70,000 men was produced ready to march towards the Tagus, recover Madrid, and, by combining its operations with those of the army of Portugal, force Lord Wellington back upon Ciudad Rodrigo. Such a result now seemed inevitable; Souham's army alone being sufficient to occupy that of Wellington, and Sir R. Hill, with 20,000 Anglo-Portugueze aided by 14,000 Spaniards, being unable to offer any effectual resistance to the united armies of Joseph and Soult. This was a moment when Ballasteros might have rendered essential service, had he, in conformity with Lord Wellington's desire, entered La Mancha at the head of 25,000 Spaniards; as such a force pushed forward on that side would, at the least, have compelled the enemy to leave a strong corps to keep his army in check and protect

* Including Drouet's force, which was entirely occupied in covering Soult's operations before Cadiz.

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Madrid, after they had repossessed themselves of that city; and their means of acting against the allied army thus crippled, it might have been able to maintain the line of the Douro, and its central position with respect to the French armies. But unhappily Ballasteros, — a leader distinguished only up to this time by his bombastic proclamations and precipitate retreats under the guns of Gibraltar, — though he afterwards (1823) became more celebrated by his cowardice or treachery, — with preposterous vanity took umbrage at Lord Wellington's appointment, and addressed an angry remonstrance to the government, alleging that such a measure cast a slur upon the Spanish name, and modestly hinting that it exhibited a glaring oversight of his own merits; conduct for which he was deprived of his command, and exiled to Ceuta. But by sacrificing the interests of his country to his own selfish feelings, and ceasing to act offensively at a critical moment, the opportunity was lost of securing *all* the fruits of the glorious victory of Salamanca.

Finding, from the turn which affairs had taken, that his strength was wholly inadequate to the maintenance of the position he had assumed in the heart of Spain, — that he was unable "to resist the armies of the north, the centre, of Soult, of Portugal, and part of that of Suchet, in co-operation at the same moment," Lord Wellington resolved on repassing the Douro and uniting with Sir R. Hill, whom he ordered to withdraw from the vicinity of Aranjuez towards Arevalo on the Adaja. He accordingly raised the siege of Burgos on the night of the 21st of October; and to avoid a considerable circuit by a bad road, which

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Oct. 27.

would have afforded the enemy an opportunity of embarrassing the retreat of the allied army, he determined to cross the Arlanzon at Burgos, although the bridges there were closely enfiladed by the guns of the castle. The army quitted its position after dark, without being observed by the enemy; and having taken the precaution of muffling the wheels of the gun-carriages with straw, the troops defiled past the castle in silence, and two divisions had crossed the Arlanzon ere the garrison became aware of the operation, although the moon shone brightly at the time: but the clatter occasioned by some guerrilla horsemen, who imprudently galloped along the road, having alarmed the French, they immediately opened a heavy fire, and some loss was occasioned by the first discharges. Such, however, is the uncertainty of firing by night, that the range was soon lost, and few casualties occurred afterwards. By this bold measure, Lord Wellington gained a march on Souham, who did not come up with the allies in force till midday on the 23d, when the enemy's horse pressed hard on their rear-guard. Some cavalry fighting ensued; and numbers prevailed over the gallant bearing of the British and German dragoons near the Venta de Pozo. But Colonel Halkett's* German infantry being placed by Lord Wellington in a position to cover the retreat of the disordered horsemen, the French were repelled by a destructive fire of musketry. Crossing the Pisuerga the same day, the army gained a position behind the Carrion, on the evening of the 24th, having the left at Villa Muriel and the right

* Lieut.-General Sir Colin Halkett, K.C.B.

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at Dueñas, where it was joined by a battalion of Guards, which had landed at Coruña. The army halted on the 25th, and its left was attacked on that day at Villa Muriel, but the enemy were repulsed by the 5th division.

Lord Wellington had directed the bridges over the Carrion and Pisuerga to be destroyed, but his orders were not effectually executed; in consequence of which the enemy crossed both rivers, and, by their passage of the latter at Tariejo, endangered the retreat of the allied army. A column was, however, sent to attack them; upon which they repassed the river. Marching then to gain the left of the allies, the enemy crossed the Carrion by a ford at Villa Muriel, and took possession of a village on that flank. Some Spanish troops were sent to dislodge them; but they were repulsed. General Alava gallantly strove to rally his countrymen, and was wounded in the attempt; but the French would not move out until attacked by the Brunswick Oels. They then evacuated the post; and, at the same time, other columns of the enemy were driven across the Carrion by the 5th division.

After destroying all the bridges on the lower Pisuerga, the allied army crossed the Douro on the 29th of October, at Tudela and Puente de Duero; the bridges at those places were then also blown up, as well as all the others by which the enemy might pass the Douro, including that at Gamora. But the French, having seen that there was only a weak guard left to observe the broken bridge at Tordesillas, caused a party of volunteers to swim across in the night, which dislodged it; and steps were immediately taken to repair the bridge. On hearing of

this enterprise, Lord Wellington placed his army in front of Tordesillas, where it remained till the 6th of November, when, the bridge at Toro having also been restored by the enemy, he withdrew on the following day to Torrecilla de la Orden, and, on the 8th, regained his old position of San Cristoval, in front of Salamanca.

Meanwhile Sir R. Hill had been retiring before King Joseph and Soult, by the valley of the Guadarrama, in order to form a junction with Lord Wellington at Arevalo, bringing with him the garrison of Madrid; but subsequent instructions caused him to move by Fontiveros to Alba de Tormes, Wellington's plans having been deranged by the facility with which the enemy had repaired the bridge on the Douro at Toro. For had he, according to his original intention, united with Hill on the Adaja, in order to attack Soult, who was advancing from Madrid, Souham, by crossing the Douro at Toro and Tordesillas, would have been able to fall upon his rear: and, on the other hand, had he brought Sir R. Hill's troops to the Douro, a junction in front of Tordesillas would have answered no useful purpose, as Wellington had no means of passing the Douro to attack Souham; and, with the ability to do so, the measure could not have been thought of while Joseph and Soult were at hand to possess themselves of his communications with Portugal. Thus his central position affording him no advantage, he decided to concentrate on the Tormes; which river Sir Rowland passed at Alba on the same day that Lord Wellington reached the position of San Cristoval; and leaving troops to occupy that town and its castle, took post with his main body at Calvarassa

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Nov. 8.

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de Arriba; the light division and Spanish infantry entering Salamanca.

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The allied army was thus *à cheval* on the Tormes, its left being on the heights of San Cristoval, and its extreme right at Alba, having the whole of the cavalry in front, on the right bank of the river. The bridge of Salamanca and the fords gave the means of strengthening either wing by a shorter line than the enemy could move upon; and with 52,000 Anglo-Portugueze troops, and 16,000 Spaniards, Lord Wellington was not unwilling to receive battle on ground chosen by himself, notwithstanding the great superiority of the French, whose combined armies, now in his front, he could not estimate at less than 90,000 men.

On the 10th, the enemy made a demonstration in great force upon Alba; but finding the allied troops posted there firm, they contented themselves with a heavy cannonade. At length, adopting a plan proposed by Soult, and trestle bridges having been prepared for the passage of their ar-

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tillery, the French crossed the Tormes at the fords of Encinas, about five miles above Alba. Wellington immediately broke up from San Cristoval, and directed his troops upon the Arapiles. He then marched with a body of cavalry and the 2d division, purposing to attack such of the enemy as had crossed the river; but on approaching Mozarbes, he found them in great strength, and well posted near that place; upon which he ordered the evacuation of Alba, and the destruction of its bridge; leaving 300 Spaniards in the castle, with instructions to abandon it next day, should his army retire.

Early on the morning of the 15th, the allied

army was assembled in position at the Arapiles; but the wary Soult, profiting by Marmont's experience, held aloof; and, although he drew round towards the Ciudad Rodrigo road, was careful not to come within Wellington's reach, who stood overlooking the scene of his splendid triumph, rather hoping that Soult's great superiority would induce him to venture an attack, than that he would give him an opportunity to pounce upon him as he had on Marmont. But the French marshal wisely, perhaps, avoided all collision; and Wellington, seeing his communication with Ciudad Rodrigo in danger by the enemy's movement towards his right, suddenly quitted the Arapiles in the afternoon, and marching in three columns, passed the French left almost within cannon range, and encamped that night on the Valmuza.

The enemy suffered the allies to continue their march towards Rodrigo, without pressing upon them in force; but a strong advanced guard hung upon their rear, which overtook the right column on the 17th, as it passed the Huerba, causing it some loss by a cannonade. The same day, a party of French cavalry, having penetrated between the 5th and 7th divisions, which belonged to the column commanded by Sir Edward Paget, succeeded in making that general a prisoner, as he was riding accompanied by only one officer and an orderly dragoon.

The army suffered great distress during this retreat; for the rain, being almost incessant, rendered the roads so bad as to be scarcely passable, while the smaller streams often made the fords breast deep. Arriving at their destined place of rest, wet, weary, and hungry, the soldiers lay down

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upon the saturated ground, generally uncheered by a blaze, and unable to dry their clothes. "Many of the divisions had neither bread, biscuits, nor flour: and the men had only a ration of lean, overdriven beef, heated upon smoking ashes, and devoured half raw."

Sherer, ii. 209.

The army reached the vicinity of Ciudad Rodrigo on the 18th, having suffered great loss between the Tormes and the Agueda, and standing much in need of an interval of repose after the fatigues of such a campaign, wherein the divisions employed at Burgos had enjoyed little or no rest since it opened on the 13th of June.

The enemy having withdrawn from the Tormes, Lord Wellington took immediate steps to afford his troops the rest of which they stood so much in need after their long and painful retreat, by distributing them in cantonments: those under Sir R. Hill in the province of Coria, having a detachment at Bejar to cover the pass of Baños; and the remainder in the province of Beira, on the Douro, Mondego, and Coa; excepting the light division, and General Alten's brigade of cavalry, which continued on the Agueda. The extreme left of the cantonments was at Lamego; and head-quarters were established at Freneda, a village on the eastern side of the Coa, about thirty miles from Ciudad Rodrigo.

Though the retreat from Burgos had been thus successfully effected in presence of a vastly superior force, and with inconsiderable loss, yet, from the moment a retrograde movement commenced, the troops had manifested a recklessness and want of discipline which occasioned great pain and anxiety to their commander. Every requisite mea-

sure had been taken by Lord Wellington to insure the issue of a regular supply of provisions during the retreat; the troops had not been hurried forward by long marches; had neither been unnecessarily harassed by moving in the night, nor been hard pressed by the enemy; had not witnessed the mortifying spectacle of stores, treasure, and provisions being destroyed, nor of sick and wounded comrades abandoned; and yet irregularities and outrages had been committed, no less disgraceful and injurious to the troops themselves, than detrimental to the people in whose cause they were engaged.

Lord Wellington, in a severe letter addressed to the officers commanding divisions and brigades, attributed the existing evils to the habitual inattention of regimental officers to the details of their various duties, particularly as regarded the conduct, discipline, and comforts of the soldiers. This letter drew forth murmurs from officers of all grades; few being found to admit the justness of their great general's reproaches, though all saw clearly enough the state of insubordination and disorder to which their men had arrived. Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Nov. 28.

Notwithstanding its unlooked-for termination, this was, perhaps, the most important of the Peninsular campaigns; for the acquisition of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos secured Portugal on its most vulnerable sides; while the capture or destruction of the enemy's ordnance, arsenals, and magazines in those fortresses, and at Salamanca, Valladolid, Madrid, and in Andalusia, would cripple their operations in the ensuing campaign. As already observed, the withdrawal of the French from Andalusia, and their concentration in the heart of Spain,

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was disadvantageous to the allies, —*divide et impera*, being the true policy in war, —for the Spaniards were at no time, nor in any part of the kingdom, able to rise in strength when relieved from the presence of the French. But the victory at Salamanca produced immense moral results, affecting not only the people of the Peninsula and England, but having due weight at St. Petersburg*; while the enemy's marshals stood in such awe of Wellington and his army, that, with near 90,000 Frenchmen on the Tormes, they were afraid to attack 52,000 British and Portugueze — the Spaniards present being scarcely deemed of any value by either side.

The aspect of the war at the close of 1812 warranted Lord Wellington's hopes, that, provided he could take the field with increased strength in the ensuing campaign, an effectual blow might be struck; but, conscious that, unless seconded by an efficient Spanish force, his efforts to clear Spain of the enemy could not be crowned with success, he resolved to visit Cadiz, and endeavour to prevail on the Cortes to enter into his views for regenerating, if possible, the military force of the country. He accordingly departed from Freneda on the 12th, and reached Cadiz on the 24th of December.

* Bonaparte was then invading Russia with an army of 400,000 men.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

OPINION OF THE OPPOSITION, IN REGARD TO THE PENINSULAR WAR. —POWERS REQUIRED FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF SPAIN BY LORD WELLINGTON, AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE SPANISH ARMIES. — OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT. — LORD WELLINGTON QUITS CADIZ, AND PROCEEDS TO LISBON, AND RETURNS THENCE TO HIS HEAD-QUARTERS AT FRENEDA. — SITUATION OF THE FRENCH ARMIES. — OPERATIONS OF THE GUERRILLAS. — DIFFICULTIES THROWN IN LORD WELLINGTON'S WAY ON ALL SIDES. — HE REMONSTRATES WITH THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT ON THE BREACH OF THEIR ENGAGEMENTS. — INTRODUCES REFORMS IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SPANISH ARMY. — CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE MINISTER AT WAR. — LORD WELLINGTON'S OPINION OF THE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. — HONOURS CONFERRED ON THE BRITISH GENERAL. — LORD WELLINGTON'S MEASURES THWARTED FOR OBTAINING SUPPLIES FOR THE ARMY. — HIS OBSERVATIONS ON THE FRENCH SYSTEM OF SUPPLYING THEIR ARMIES IN THE FIELD. — THE SITUATION OF LORD WELLINGTON COMPARED WITH THAT OF HIS ADVERSARIES.

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THE failure of the attack on the castle of Burgos, and the retreat which unavoidably resulted therefrom, afforded the opponents of the British ministry a glorious occasion for again questioning the policy of proceeding with the Spanish war; but with singular inconsistency, those very persons who had ever maintained that the war was a useless waste of blood and treasure, — the deliverance of the Peninsula being, according to their ideas, an undertaking beyond the utmost means of Great Britain to accomplish, — now blamed ministers for not having conducted that war on a more extensive scale! Some even — at a moment when not a French soldier remained in Portugal, Andalusia, or Galicia, and when Napoleon had lost 200,000 men

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in the disastrous Russian campaign — were so blinded by party feeling, as to declare that the liberation of the Peninsula from the yoke of France was no nearer its accomplishment, than when Lord Wellington retired behind the lines of Torres Vedras; and one, whose strong political bias has often warped his judgment, was found to affirm, that the victory of Salamanca — a victory which, considering the disparity in numbers of the belligerents, could not possibly have been looked for; that had been seized with the rapidity of an eagle's swoop; and of which the consequences had been felt in the farthest extremities of Europe — "possessed none of the characteristics which distinguished the battles of Marlborough!"

Hansard's Parl. Deb. xxiv. 207.

Certain it is, that, from the want of adequate reinforcements, the results which might have been expected from such a victory were not so important to Spain as they might have been; for, had the propitious moment been seized to strengthen Lord Wellington's army, whilst the forces of the enemy were weakened by the gigantic efforts of Napoleon to conquer Russia, most assuredly the castle of Burgos would not have arrested the British general's victorious career.

Amongst the Spaniards, however, but one opinion prevailed as to the services Lord Wellington had rendered their country, and this opinion had been evinced by the determination of the government and Cortes to invest him with the chief command of the national armies. Nevertheless, with a people so prone to procrastinate and argue as the Spaniards, his lordship justly considered that his presence at Cadiz would save much time in removing any objections that might be raised to the adoption

of certain measures he had proposed to render that appointment of effect; and with this view, he repaired to the seat of government, as we have before stated, towards the end of December, resolutely determined to resign the command of the Spanish armies, should his remonstrance prove unavailing; since, unless sufficient powers were placed in his hands, it would be impossible for him to perform the duties of that office either with satisfaction to himself or advantage to the common cause.

The powers which he required were — 1st, That the promotion and appointment of officers to all extraordinary commands should be conferred solely at his recommendation. Despatches, Cadiz, Dec. 25.

2dly, That he should have the power of dismissing from the service, those whom he might consider deserving such a punishment; a power with which, in the actual state of the Spanish army, he conceived it absolutely necessary its commander-in-chief should be invested.

3dly. That the resources of the state which were applicable to the payment, equipment, or supply of the troops, should be applied in the manner he might recommend; for, the resources of the government not being sufficient for the maintenance and support in the field of all the troops appearing as effective on the returns of the Spanish armies, and many of those troops not being in a state of efficiency and discipline to take the field, he felt it was necessary that he should be allowed to judge which of the armies, and in what numbers, it would be advisable to employ in aid of his operations; otherwise, he might find himself in the unpleasant situation of giving commands to troops which could not be obeyed.

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4thly, That the chief of the staff, and such other staff officers of the Spanish army as might be considered necessary, should be attached to his head-quarters, to become the channel for communicating his orders, as well as those of the government, to the Spanish troops; and that the government should direct all military reports of every description to be sent to him as commander-in-chief, who, of course, would make his reports to the minister of war, for the information of the government.

On these points Lord Wellington requested to have a decided answer at an early period, as his absence from the army could necessarily be but of short duration. His continuing to hold the command which had been conferred on him, he distinctly stated, must depend upon the granting of the powers above specified; but at the same time he assured the government, that his desire to serve and advance the cause of Spain would remain the same, whatever might be its decision; and that he should always be found ready, as he ever had been, to co-operate with any officer who might be appointed to command the Spanish forces.

These proposals struck at the root of many of the evils which existed in the Spanish army; and as that of placing the resources to be set apart for the maintenance of the troops under his control, threatened to dry up the impure current which for ages had been suffered to circulate through every department of the state, it was to be expected that its adoption would be resisted with vampire pertinacity. Nevertheless, with his customary straightforwardness, energy, and firmness of purpose, Lord Wellington persevered in his endeavours to "organize the poles," as he humorously writes to

Despatches, &c. Cadiz, Jan. 3.

Major-General the Hon. C. Stewart, in allusion to the difficulty of bringing all parties to his way of thinking, and eventually got every thing arranged "nearly as he wished."

The different Spanish armies, which, scattered in small ineffective bodies throughout the Peninsula, had hitherto acted without concert, been subsisted by a most oppressive system of requisition, and whose operations had been directed without any reference to the common weal, were now organized in four distinct armies (besides two of reserve), to each of which the resources of certain provinces, not occupied by the enemy, were allotted. Generals were also named to command these armies, in whom Lord Wellington had confidence; and being, at the same time, appointed captains-general of the provinces set apart for the subsistence of their respective armies, the military authority in each division was by this means "brought into one hand." *

The British general was desirous of rendering the military force of Spain yet more effective, and of draining the country of other sources of corruption, by placing the civil power (that of *Xefe-politico* or political chief) in the hands of the captains-general of these military divisions; but the libellous press of Cadiz, by sounding the trumpet of alarm, respecting the danger to be apprehended

* 1st army, General Copons — Arragon and Catalonia.
2d do. (formerly 2d and 3d), Gen. Elio — New Castile, Valencia, and Murcia.
3d do. (formerly 4th), Duque del Parque — Granada and Jaen.
4th do. (5th, 6th, and 7th), Gen. Castaños — Estremadura, Leon, Old Castile, Asturias, and Galicia.
Army of reserve of Andalusia, Gen. Henrique O'Donnel — Seville and Cordoba.
Ditto of Galicia — General Lacy.

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from the union of such powers in the hands of military officers at the suggestion of a foreigner, alarmed the government, and prevented the adoption of this measure, as well as that of uniting in each military division the offices of intendant-general of the army, and intendant-general of the different provinces allotted for its support.

The government of Spain was well enough disposed to accede to all Lord Wellington's proposals, but, unfortunately, it was so constituted as to possess no real authority. The General Cortes, on assembling within the walls of Cadiz in the autumn of 1810, had reinstalled the regency nominated by the Supreme Junta when that body resigned the reins of government in the spring of that year. This step had been forced upon them, no less by the necessity of divesting themselves of the executive power, and placing it in the hands of a few, than by that of rendering obedience to public opinion: but, claiming to themselves the national sovereignty, as the representatives of the people, they had, before taking it, exacted from the Regents an oath of obedience to their decrees and to the constitution which they might promulgate; thereby rendering the Regents mere puppets in their hands.*

The Cortes, in their turn, were completely overawed by the mob of Cadiz; and that mob being directed in all its feelings and movements by a

* The Bishop of Orensë refused to take the oaths required, and several changes had from time to time been made in the regency, since the assembling of the Cortes. At the time of Lord Wellington's visit to Cadiz, it consisted of the Duque del Infantado, Don Joaquin Mosquera, Don Juan Maria Villavicencio, Don Rodriguez de Rivas, and the Conde de la Bisbal.

licentious press, this latter power held an absolute control over the government.

The Cortes—that is to say, the majority of the members—would willingly have relieved themselves from this irksome state of subservience, by removing the seat of government to some other more convenient place; but this measure was no less opposed by the ultra-liberal faction of that assembly, than by the populace and press of Cadiz, all foreseeing that their power would cease whenever real freedom of action and debate were obtained by the Cortes.

Conceiving that the promulgation of a free constitution would prove the panacea for all the evils from which Spain was suffering, the Cortes devoted their time principally to the erection of this *Château en Espagne*; and, in the words of Lord Wellington, at length framed one "very much on the principle that a painter paints a picture, viz. to be looked at;" adding, "and I have not met any one of the members" (of the Cortes), "or any person of any description, either at Cadiz or elsewhere, who considers the constitution as the embodying of a system according to which Spain is, or can be, governed." Despatches, &c. Frenedn, Jan. 27

The tree of liberty took root indeed, and flourished luxuriantly within the walls of Cadiz; but beyond that sea-girt fortress, the soil of Spain proved little favourable to the growth of so delicate an exotic, and the blight of superstition nipped it in the bud, as it attempted to put forth its tender shoots. "*Les habitans preferent aux théories des Cortes, les ordres d'un souverain de votre maison,*" wrote Joseph to his brother Napoleon, in an intercepted letter of which the key was discovered:

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—a pithy text, on which, as Lord Wellington observed, "much might be written."

What his lordship *did write* upon it is so much to the purpose, and conveys such just views of the wants of Spain at that period, that we should scarcely be pardoned for omitting to lay it before our readers.

Despatches, &c. Jan. 29.

*"To Don Diego de la Vega Infanzon.**

* * * * *

"I am not an advocate for King Joseph's judgment, or for his veracity; but although we rarely find the truth in the public reports of the French government, or of their officers, I believe we may venture to depend upon the truth of what is written in cipher; and we may believe, at least, that Joseph thought he was making an accurate representation to his brother of the sentiments of the people of Spain.

"Unfortunately I know, as I believe I told you, not that this representation is accurate, (that is to say, that the people of Spain do not prefer the house of Napoleon to the theories of the Cortes,) but it is so far true as that the people do not like those theories.

"You have no executive government; and the people feel that that which you have established as such, has neither authority to control them nor to protect them.

"You have a legislative assembly, which has proclaimed itself supreme, and has divested itself of all interference with the executive government; yet the executive government is its creature: at the same time that, by a refinement of theory, it is not possible either that the legislative assembly should have a knowledge of the measures of the executive government, or that the executive government should know what are the feelings and sentiments of the legislative assembly. The government and the assembly, instead of drawing together, are like two independent powers, jealous and afraid of each other; and the consequence is, that the machine of government is at a stand. To this add, that the whole system is governed by little

* One of the most talented members of the Cortes,

local views, as propounded by the daily press of Cadiz — of all others the least enlightened, and the most licentious.

"All countries which begin as yours did incur some risks of failure; and I acknowledge that I was in hopes that the blockade of Cadiz would have at least this good effect, that it would allow time and opportunity for the fever of theory in the Cortes to evaporate; and that, when the communication with the interior of Spain should be opened, the Cortes would have passed through the ordeal of inexperience, and that Spain would eventually have the advantage of a free constitution and of an enlightened government. We have still to look for these blessings; and, unfortunately, I am apprehensive that the Cortes have immersed themselves to such a degree in theory that they cannot be looked for under the existing system."

Proceeding then in his usual clear and forcible style to point out the remedies which ought to be applied in this deranged state of the mechanism of the government, his lordship concludes his strictures on the subject with the following statesman-like views: —

"The theory of all legislation is founded in justice; and if we could be certain that legislative assemblies would on all occasions act according to the principles of justice, there would be no occasion for those checks and guards which we have seen established under the best systems. Unfortunately, however, we have seen that legislative assemblies are swayed by the fears and passions of individuals: when unchecked, they are tyrannical and unjust; nay more, it unfortunately happens too frequently that the most tyrannical and unjust measures are the most popular. Those measures are particularly popular which deprive rich and powerful individuals of their properties * under the pretence of the public advantage; and I tremble for a country in which, as in Spain, there is no barrier for the preservation of private property, excepting the justice of a legislative assembly possessing supreme powers.

* In little more than ten years after this was written, it was actually proposed in the Cortes to deprive the Duke of Wellington — the deliverer of their country — of the estates granted to him in 1813, "in testimony of the sincere gratitude of the Spanish nation," on the grounds of public expediency!

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"You should therefore either turn the council of state into a house of lords, or make a house of lords of the grandees, giving them concurrent powers of legislation with the Cortes; and you should leave the patronage now in the hands of the council of state in the hands of the crown.

"By these measures you will give your government some chance of standing, and your country some chance of avoiding farther revolutions. This is not to be expected, even under the most successful result of the war, unless some measures are adopted of the kind of which I have above sketched the outline.

"I have written you a very long letter, which at least shows that I take an interest in the future welfare of Spain. I should be sorry if, after all, you were to fail in establishing a system of government founded on principles of justice which should secure the liberty of your country, and should again fall under the degrading despotism from which you have had a chance of escaping. But you may depend upon it, that whatever may be your wishes, and however good the intentions of the greater number of persons of whom the Cortes is composed, this misfortune will happen to you, if you are not guided by experience and by the example of those countries in which freedom exists, instead of by the wild theories of modern days."

Lord Wellington's reception at Cadiz had been truly flattering; the inhabitants of all classes evinced the most enthusiastic admiration of their liberator, and the Cortes sent a deputation to congratulate him on his arrival. In return for this compliment his lordship expressed a wish to offer his thanks in person; and on the 30th of December, in a brief but effective speech, repeated his acknowledgments to that august assembly for the various marks of favour and confidence which it had bestowed upon him; assuring it, at the same time, that his efforts would be unceasingly directed to forward the just and interesting cause of the Spanish nation.

On the 1st of January his lordship published an

address to the Spanish army, and on the same day wrote letters to the generals appointed under him to the command of the different Spanish corps, explaining his wishes with regard to the arrangements to be made for the subsistence of the troops under their respective orders.

A further sojourn of some days was requisite to complete the arrangements agreed upon with the government for the command of the army, and to get the official business into proper train; but on the 9th of January, having accomplished a task scarcely less difficult of execution than any of those fable relates to have been performed on the same spot by the city's reputed founder, Lord Wellington left Cadiz and proceeded to Xeres, whence he took the road to Badajos; and learning there that every thing remained quiet on the Tormes, repaired to Lisbon.

The journey through Portugal was performed with his lordship's accustomed celerity; and the spontaneous outbreak of admiration and gratitude that greeted him in every town through which he passed on his way to the Portugueze capital, was doubtless infinitely more gratifying to him than the classic formality of the most gorgeous triumphal procession could possibly have been.

At Lisbon the feeling of admiration knew no bounds: public fêtes were given in his honour, and the city was voluntarily illuminated during the three nights the deliverer of Portugal remained within its walls.

Lord Wellington reached his head-quarters at Freneda on the 25th of January. The positions of the enemy remained nearly the same as at the period of his departure for Cadiz; viz. Joseph once more occupied the palace of the Kings of Spain at

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1813. Madrid, surrounded by his guards; the three armies of Portugal, the centre, and south, were distributed in very extended cantonments between the sources of the Ezla and the Tagus; and the army of the north was engaged in a vain attempt to put down the guerrilla bands in Biscay and Navarre.

So formidable had these bands now become, that the French armies may at this time be said to have conquered but the ground they actually occupied; for their communication with France was completely cut off, and every despatch-bag or mule-load of ammunition required the protection of a strong column to insure its reaching its destination.

Amongst the military bandits who thus annoyed the French, Francisco Longa, Francisco Espoz y Mina, and Juan Martin Diez (*El Empecinado* *) were the most distinguished. The first named in particular evinced great talent and daring; on one occasion destroying a French column under General Fromant when returning from a predatory excursion near Miranda de Duero, and following up the blow immediately by the capture of the garrison of the strong post of Salinas de Anaña.

1812. Nov. 28.

Lord Wellington devoted the time which of necessity elapsed before he could again take the field in rendering his army as effective as possible. He had strongly pressed the English government to reinforce the army acting under his orders, rather than — as there seemed to be an inclination — that collected on the eastern coast of Spain; representing that if the latter, quitting the coast, was destined

Despatches, &c. Cadiz, Dec. 26.

* So called from his complexion resembling in colour the peculiarly dark mud (*pecina*) found in the stream that waters his native town, — Castrillo de Duero.

to take the field on a great scale, it would be better to incorporate it with the army under his command; as such a measure would be more efficient against the enemy, and would also save expense. Hitherto, the attempt of the Anglo-Sicilian army to cause a diversion in his favour had proved perfectly abortive.

Lord Wellington at the same time had likewise to resist a proposition, made without due reflection, to send inexperienced regiments from England to relieve some of those belonging to his army, which, having served several campaigns, made but a sorry figure on the muster rolls; for experience had shown Lord Wellington "that a soldier who had gone through one campaign was of more service than two or even three newly arrived from England;" and this was the constant burthen of his numerous remonstrances against this unwise measure.

Despatches, &c. Cadiz, Dec. 26.

The want of confidence his lordship felt in several of the general officers under his command also occasioned him much embarrassment. It was necessary that they should be removed; and the delicacy of his proceedings in accomplishing this object, without unnecessarily wounding the feelings of those whom it affected, cannot be too highly commended.—"*Resistez aux empeños**," he writes on one occasion to General Castaños, "*et nommez ceux qui vous croyez pouvoir le mieux servir la patrie.*" This was the upright principle that guided his own conduct throughout life, and no doubt greatly influenced his success.

Despatches, &c. Freneda, March 22.

* A Spanish word in very general use, signifying a pledge to employ one's good offices to serve a party, without reference to his claims, qualifications, or deserts.

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But the matter which of all others gave Lord Wellington the most concern and annoyance at this time, was the conduct of the imbecile government of Spain; which, by departing constantly from the agreements entered into for the command of the Spanish armies, made of no avail all his measures for rendering them effective. General officers were deprived of their commands, and troops were moved by order of the government, without his being consulted; the resources of the different provinces were not drawn out in the manner he had proposed and the government had sanctioned; military establishments were formed without his advice or concurrence; and, in fact, the agreement entered into at Cadiz, and ratified by a decree of the Cortes, seemed to be already considered a dead letter.

The injudicious interference of the government in these matters, if persisted in, would not only have disconcerted all the British general's plans for the ensuing campaign, but seemed likely to produce insubordination in those who were to act under him. But the matter connected with this subject that occasioned him most vexation, was the nefarious mode in which the plan adopted by the Cortes, at his suggestion, for realizing the resources of the country was carried into effect; for he clearly foresaw, that however well the Spanish troops might be disciplined and instructed whilst in comfortable winter quarters, it would be impossible to keep them together so as to act effectively in the field, unless means were taken to furnish them with food, clothing, and an occasional issue of money; and by the plan pursued in the collection of the revenues it was evident that but a very small portion,

if any, would find its way into the military chest, or be devoted to the purposes of the war. For if, as his lordship observed in a letter to the Conde de la Bisbal, pensions and the salaries of employments of all descriptions, and other expenses, were to be paid from the amount of the nine-tenths of the revenues supposed to be allotted to the support of the armies, it was quite certain that the arrangement entered into by the government was nugatory — "Spain might have an army of pensioners, and of persons in civil and other employments, but would not have one of soldiers."

Despatches, &c. Freneda, March 28.

On this subject Lord Wellington writes to the Minister of War, Don J. de Carvajal, —

"The government may rest assured, that if effectual measures are not taken to realize the revenues of the country, and to apply them to the expenses of the state, the time which has elapsed, and the trouble which has been taken to assemble troops, and to discipline them, will be lost. Discipline cannot be brought to perfection, nor will the troops render any service, if they are neither paid nor fed; and the result of the effort made to raise an army will be the having made a number of persons miserable by tearing them from their families, without the cause deriving any benefit therefrom."

Ibid. March 23.

The strong and reiterated remonstrances addressed by Lord Wellington to the Spanish government on this and other matters connected with the command of the army being unattended with any beneficial results, his lordship deemed it necessary to take steps to bring the whole correspondence which had passed on the subject before the Cortes; and with this view addressed a letter, from which we take the following extract, to Don Diego de la Vega Infanzon.

"I am fully alive to the importance which has been attached throughout Spain, as well as in England and in other

Ibid. April 3.

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parts of Europe, to the circumstance of my having been entrusted with the command of the Spanish armies; and the officers of the Spanish staff who are here with me will, I am convinced, do justice to the interest, the devotion, and diligence with which I have laboured to place the military affairs of the country in the state in which they ought to be. But I have a character to lose; and in proportion as expectation has been raised by my appointment, will be the extent of the disappointment and regret at finding that things are no better than they were before.

"I confess that I do not feel inclined to become the object of these disagreeable sensations, either in Spain, in England, or throughout Europe; and unless some measures can be adopted to prevail upon the government to force the minister at war to perform the engagements of the government with me, I must, however unwillingly, resign a situation and trust which I should not have accepted if these engagements had not been entered into, and I had not believed that they would have been adhered to.

* * * * *

"I have now to tell you, that I propose to take the field at the head of the allied British and Portuguese army as soon as the rain shall have fallen, and the appearance of the green forage will enable me to support the cavalry of the army; but I am sorry to tell you that, owing to the measures which are the subject of this letter, I do not believe that a single Spanish soldier will be able to take the field till after the harvest."

The representations thus strongly urged, and others on the same subject pressed with equal force upon the Spanish government through Sir Henry Wellesley, produced at length some effect; and by adopting a similarly vigorous course towards the government of Portugal, some of the abuses which still pervaded every establishment of that kingdom were in a measure removed, and steps taken to obviate the inconvenience which had resulted during the late operations in the field from the want of pay for the Portugueze troops; the miserable state in which they were kept from this want,

having been offered as an excuse for their misconduct before the enemy on several occasions.

The organization of the Spanish forces now occupied much of Lord Wellington's attention; and in a letter to the Conde de la Bisbal, commanding the army of reserve of Andalusia, he points out the defects of its actual organization, and the measures he proposes adopting to place it in a more efficient state. It had not escaped his observation that the infantry regiments were too strong to be manageable in the field, considering the state of instruction of the troops; that they contained a large proportion of men who either from youth and weakness or age and infirmities were unfit for active service, and in the event of taking the field would become a burthen to the army; that they had no depôts of reserves, and therefore when by the casualties of war the strength of a regiment became reduced, it must go bodily into garrison.

Despatches, &c. Freneda, April 24.

Ibid. Feb. 27.

To remedy these defects he proposed that each regiment should be broken into two battalions: if both were effective and able to take the field, they would thereby be much more manageable in manœuvre; and, in the other case, the weaker and less effective battalion could serve as a reserve to the other, by furnishing it with trained recruits to keep up its number to the full complement; and the 2d battalions could, at the same time, be usefully employed to garrison the fortresses, and in various other ways. For, under the circumstances of the moment, it seemed probable that even the government contributions could not be realized without military assistance.

Whilst thus occupied in framing measures to render the Spanish army eventually of some utility,

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the government, with its wonted presumptuous confidence, was urging Lord Wellington to commence operations; calling upon him to afford protection to certain districts threatened by the enemy on the south bank of the Tagus.

Despatches, &c. Freneda, March 11.

His lordship, with great temper, pointed out to the minister of war, that from various causes, the Anglo-Portugueze army was not yet ready to take the field; and that with regard to the Spanish troops, there was not a single battalion in a state to be actively employed; nor, had the case been otherwise, was there a depôt of provisions formed which would support a battalion in operation for a single day, nor a shilling of money in any military chest.

His lordship farther represented that the discipline and organization of the Spanish troops would be interrupted by their being thus prematurely called into action; and consequently that, independent of the present inconvenience such a measure would occasion, it might prove fatal in the ensuing campaign to the efficiency of the troops employed on such service.

Of the inexpediency of moving troops on all occasions merely to save a few villages, his lordship in conclusion observes, —

"One of the misfortunes attending the existing war in the Peninsula is the necessity of sacrificing the interests of individuals to the cause of the nation, and to the great object of its ultimate salvation; and I have entered into detail, as far as I am able, in my answer to the government upon this subject, because I am certain that they will receive many complaints of the same kind, and that many individuals who are not protected will think that they might be so."

At this time the continuance of the war with the

United States of America, which had broken out in the summer of the preceding year, gave Lord Wellington much uneasiness; for, dependent as his army was on the free navigation of the sea for its supplies of stores, money, clothing, &c., the interruption our vessels experienced from the privateers of that nation, which infested the coasts of Spain and Portugal, proved at times a serious inconvenience.

The opinion of Lord Wellington with regard to the military operations in Canada, affords another striking instance of his prescience. Thus he writes to Earl Bathurst on this subject: —

"I am very glad to find that you are going to reinforce Sir G. Prevost; and I only hope that the troops will go in time, and that Sir George will not be induced by any hopes of trifling advantages to depart from a strong defensive system. He may depend upon it, that he will not be strong enough, either in men or means, to establish himself in any conquest he might make. The attempt would only weaken him, and his losses augment the spirits and hopes of the enemy, even if not attended by worse consequences; whereas, by the other system, he will throw the difficulties and risk upon them, and they will most probably be foiled. If they should be so, and they should receive a check at sea, their arrogance will be lowered a little, which will give me more satisfaction than any thing that has occurred for a length of time, and they will be obliged to ask for peace." Despatches, &c. Freneda, Feb. 10.

During the pause which occurred at this period in the military operations, the services Lord Wellington had rendered were acknowledged by fresh honours bestowed on him by the Regents of Great Britain and Portugal. The former, on the 1st of January, appointed him colonel of the Blues, and on the 4th of March bestowed on him the order of the Garter; the latter, as if actuated by a pro-

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phetic spirit, conferred upon him the title of *Duque da Victoria.**

As if the difficulties thrown in Lord Wellington's way at this eventful period, by the Spanish and Portugueze governments, were not of themselves sufficient to derange the working of the complicated machinery which he had been charged to put in motion, dissatisfaction was expressed by certain gentlemen lolling on their cushioned seats in Whitehall, at the steps which had been taken by Sir Charles Stuart † and himself to insure the supply of corn for the army in Spain by making purchases of that essential article in Brazil, America, and Egypt.

This measure had been rendered necessary, in the first instance, by the failure of the harvest in Great Britain in 1810; and, subsequently, to provide for the case of a war with the United States, which had now actually occurred. And Lord Wellington justly considered, that having a large establishment of officers capable of superintending and of carrying into execution transactions of this description ‡, he was performing his duty to the public in employing *them* in that manner, "rather than in contracting for services with merchants whose object was their own advantage, — at what cost of money or inconvenience to the public was to them a matter of indifference."

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* The announcement of this honour reached Lord Wellington just two months previous to the battle of Vitoria, fought on the 21st June. During the preceding year, his lordship had been decorated with the order of the Golden Fleece, created a Grandee and Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo by the government of Spain; had received the title of Marquis of Torres Vedras from that of Portugal, and in the English peerage had been raised to a Marquisate.

† British minister at Lisbon.

‡ Commissariat.

In the letter to Sir Charles Stuart, from which the foregoing extract is taken, his lordship farther observes on this subject, —

Despatches, &c. Freneda, May 3.

"The government appears to me to have forgotten all that has passed on the particular subject of your purchases, — the advantages derived from them in saving a starving people during the scarcity of 1810-11; in bringing large sums of money into the military chest which otherwise would not have found their way there; and in *positive profit in money*, I believe, in every one of these transactions.

* * * * * *

"I admit that your time and mine would be much better employed than in speculating in corn, &c.; but when it is necessary to carry on an extensive system of war with one sixth of the money in specie which would be necessary to carry it on, we must consider questions and adopt measures of this description, and we ought to have the confidence and support of the government in adopting them.

* * * * * *

"These transactions, however, must be discontinued in future, according to the orders of government; and I only hope that they will take care to keep the stores supplied with corn, and the military chest with money, as well as both objects have been accomplished hitherto, at an equally cheap rate to the public."

The system adopted by Lord Wellington and Sir Charles Stuart had not only saved the people of Portugal from starvation, during a year of invasion and another of scarcity, but by it large sums had been brought into the military chest; for besides the money actually gained to the public by these transactions, more than two thirds of the Portugueze subsidy had been paid in corn thus imported; so that the specie sent from England on that account had been rendered available for the payment of the troops, &c. And, we may here observe, that much more necessity existed for husbanding the resources of the army during this mo-

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mentous and protracted contest, and a far greater share of credit is due to Lord Wellington and Sir Charles Stuart for their admirable monetary arrangements during its progress, than has generally been supposed.

The British commander, considering the efficient state of his own and the Portugueze troops, as well as the progress which had been made in equipping and disciplining the Spanish armies, and calculating on the unity that the supreme command with which he was now invested would enable him to impart to the operations of the impending campaign, looked confidently forward to the result of any conflict in the field; but at the same time he foresaw that every battle gained would necessarily draw him farther from his base of operations, and thereby increase the difficulties of obtaining supplies; and, consequently, the permanency of any advantages resulting from his success in the field, would altogether depend upon the perfection of his financial and commissariat arrangements, and his being able to keep together a respectable force to make head against the enemy; — that it was, in fact, a war of resources he was engaged in.

This he impressed strongly and repeatedly upon the English government.

Despatches, &c. Freneda, March 28.

"If we cannot realize the subsidy without falling on the resources of the British army," he writes to Earl Bathurst, "and can get nothing from the country, we shall end the next campaign as we did the last. That is, after we shall have consumed what we can seize of the harvest, *we* must retire; and when *we* shall retire, nobody else can remain forward."

At the same time Lord Wellington saw that the

keeping together, *in a state for service*, a large body of Spanish troops would be necessary to insure the success of his operations; as their presence in the field would spare his own more efficient troops from undertaking what may be termed the secondary operations of the campaign. This, however, could only be done by drawing out the resources of Spain herself; and with that object he constantly spurred the Spanish government to exertion, candidly stating — and thereby working on the national *foible* — that "it was not reasonable to expect pecuniary sacrifices from Great Britain, when it was obvious that the country possessed resources which, if duly administered and really applied to the object of maintaining troops in the field, would be more than sufficient for the purpose."

Despatches, &c. Freneda, May 18.

The situation of the enemy in regard to the realization of the resources of the portion of the country whereof they retained possession differed widely from that of Lord Wellington, and gave them, in many respects, decided advantages, not only over him, but over the government of Spain itself; for the French plan of living upon the country wherein they carried the war, could not be adopted by the English army towards a people whom it had been sent to relieve from oppression; and even had such a compulsory system of subsisting the allied army been authorized by the government of Spain, — a government whose authority extended scarcely beyond the walls of Cadiz, — it could not have been carried into effect; since, independent of the loss of all discipline which it would have occasioned, the exactions of the troops would have involved the army in a guer-

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rilla warfare that would have rendered it inefficient yet more speedily than the want of supplies; for the English army—we may say the army of England, for such it was — could ill afford to have its strength diminished by the slaughter of its sick, wounded, and stragglers, by an exasperated peasantry.

The impolicy and inhumanity of a system which has so greatly tended to increase the horrors of war, are pointed out by Lord Wellington with his usual sagacity and perspicuity in some observations on a memorandum relating to this subject, submitted by General Whittingham; and as this subject is one of paramount interest to the community at large, we shall give our readers his lordship's observations at length.

Despatches, &c. Freneda, May 9.

"There exists no doubt that the French troops do draw supplies from the seat of their operations in all parts of Europe; that this advantage is not enjoyed by their enemies in some instances at all, in others in a very inconsiderable degree, and in none to so great a degree as it is by the French. It is likewise true that to this system, whose date is that of the Revolutionary war (as what the King of Prussia did in this way was trifling), is to be attributed both the system of tactics and of politics of the present day.

"I must observe, however, that much has been done of late years to show the French government that they could not rely upon this system. Those who study accurately the nature of their operations against the allied armies in the Peninsula, and of their recent operations in Russia, will find ample reason for the belief that the system of making the operations of war produce the resources for carrying on war, — or, in other words, the system of making war a resource, and profitable and advantageous to a state, instead of being expensive and burthensome, — must be got the better of.

"These observations, however, are only general; and General Whittingham complains, with great reason, that the French, by means of their system, live in countries in

Spain, in which the Spaniards starve; and it is likewise true that the *starvation* of the Spanish armies is more burthensome to the country than the plentiful mode of living of the French.

"I will go farther than General Whittingham, and state that notwithstanding that the British army pay for all the supplies they receive from the country, the British troops, if deprived of their magazines, would starve in a district in Spain in which the French army would live in plenty.

"To what are these facts to be attributed? Certainly not to the inclination of the inhabitants of the country to the enemy; certainly not to the superior abilities of the officers of the civil departments of the French armies, at least not on comparison with the civil officers of the British army; but to the system of terror on which the French and all under their authority invariably act, and to which no power in Europe ever has, or ever can have, recourse.

"It is not difficult to make allotments of districts, and supplies to be drawn from them; and perhaps, to go one step further, to make the magistrates of villages allot to individuals their share of the burthen to be borne by the village. But if there is no compulsion, who will obey?

"Let any person attend to the detail of a French operation of this description, — he will see the use of the bayonet in every part of it; he will see the compulsory quartering of soldiers on individuals called refractory, and the necessity of incurring large expenses laid upon these individuals, besides serious inconveniences; he will see women, children, &c. taken as hostages, &c. &c.; and, in short, every thing done to compel the individual and village to obey the requisition, and to instil terror into others who might be inclined to resist.

"In what country, excepting in France in the first days of the Revolution, could such a system be carried into execution by its own government and army? In what country could we, as allies, venture to follow such an example?

"Till these questions can be answered, it is useless to discuss the advantages which the French derive from this system, and the disadvantages which their enemies feel in not adopting it.

"Having gone thus far, I need not consider this subject farther; but I have long and maturely considered all the modes of subsisting armies, and I think I could show that neither the Spanish nor the British soldiers are of the

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description, nor in the state of discipline, owing likewise to the want of the same vigorous system, to carry into execution these systems of requisition so easily managed by their enemy."

Such were the observations of Lord Wellington on this deeply interesting and most important subject. The views they disclose are those of an enlightened statesman, a consummate general, and a sound Christian: — further comment is superfluous.

Amongst various other matters brought under Lord Wellington's consideration at this period, was a plan for fomenting an insurrection in Italy —a wild project, of which, with his usual discernment, he altogether disapproved.

Despatches, &c. Freneda, March 21.

"The question of insurrection in any country," he observes, "must always be one of great doubt; but it appears to me that if such a measure should be adopted by any country at any time, it ought to be by Germany at present. It appears that the people cannot be in a worse condition than they are; their enemy is humbled, and there is a formidable and victorious army on the frontier ready to give support to their efforts. But those who are about to involve their country in these troubles must not imagine that their task is an easy one, or that the contest, or its evils, will be of short duration. They little know the character of their enemy, and have studied his conduct but little, if they do not expect a most vigorous contest, if once they draw the sword, and are not prepared, as he is, to endure every thing and to go to all extremities to attain their object."

This subject was again brought under his lordship's consideration when on the point of opening the campaign; and his opinion was seriously asked as to the propriety of withdrawing the Anglo-Sicilian force from the eastern coast of Spain (from whose co-operation he expected to derive material assistance), and employing it to revolutionize Italy!

When we consider the numerous important

matters which at this time occupied Lord Wellington's attention, in addition to the manifold duties which necessarily devolved upon him as the commander of a large army in the field, we are irresistibly led to compare the situation of our Great Captain with that of the adversaries—the élite of Napoleon's lieutenants—against whom he had successively to contend.

On the one side we see a general placed at the head of the armies of three distinct nations, over no one of which he had complete control; whose means of supporting those armies in which he could place confidence were limited and precarious, and whose measures for subsisting that which he was striving to render efficient were thwarted and disregarded at every moment; whose plans for conducting the war not only encountered constant opposition from the Peninsular governments, but were severely criticized at home; and, finally, whose operations were influenced and crippled by the necessity of being sparing of the lives of his choicest troops, well knowing they could not, or would not, be replaced. On the other side, we find generals commanding armies which, though composed of the natives of various countries, were organized on one common system, and subjected to one code of discipline; who, discarding all humane and merciful considerations, paid and subsisted their troops by a most cruel system of plunder and exaction; who acted upon plans laid down for their guidance by the mighty genius of one man, whose will knew no control; and who regarded not the price of human blood, at which their marshal's baton was purchased,—knowing that *success*, in the balance of their ruler's favour, outweighed all

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other considerations. In fine, the English general had to collect, organize, subsist, and direct an army; whilst his opponents had one ready formed and disciplined to their hands, which they had but to put in motion, to insure its subsistence; for, from their system of conducting the war, and the advantage arising from a superiority of numbers, which hitherto had enabled them to act constantly on the offensive, the French generals had but to change the scene of operations whenever their troops had exhausted the resources of the country wherein they were acting.

How few have hitherto been aware of the difficulties the British commander had to combat, conceiving that, as the generalissimo of the united English, Spanish, and Portugueze armies, his orders were as implicitly obeyed as even those of Napoleon! How few, in comparing his glorious achievements with those of the mighty ruler of France, have duly considered the amount of *means* each had at his disposal! The one we see, however, begging his way, step by step and day by day, to the temple of Fame; the other borne onwards by a nation of soldiers,—commanding rather than courting the favour of the goddess; but the strides which eventually gave our great commander the pre-eminence were henceforth to be more rapid.

CHAPTER XXIX.

OPERATIONS OF THE ANGLO-SICILIAN ARMY ON THE EASTERN COAST OF SPAIN. — SIR JOHN MURRAY ARRIVES TO ASSUME THE COMMAND. — LORD WELLINGTON SENDS HIM INSTRUCTIONS, POINTING OUT THE OBJECTS TO BE ATTAINED BY THAT ARMY. — PREMATURE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES. — BATTLE OF CASTALLA. — LORD WELLINGTON'S EXERTIONS TO RESTORE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE ANGLO-PORTUGUEZE ARMY. — SECRECY WITH WHICH HIS DESIGNS WERE CONCEALED. — STRENGTH OF THE ALLIED AND FRENCH ARMIES. — MOVEMENTS OF THE ENEMY DURING THE SPRING. — VIEWS OF NAPOLEON AND JOSEPH BONAPARTE. — RECALL OF MARSHAL SOULT. — JOSEPH QUITS MADRID AND REPAIRS TO VALLADOLID. — CHANGES IN THE POSITION OF THE FRENCH ARMIES CONSEQUENT TO THIS MOVE. — OPERATIONS AGAINST THE GUERRILLAS IN BISCAY AND NAVARRE. — PLAN OF LORD WELLINGTON FOR THE APPROACHING CAMPAIGN.

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It appears to have been considered by the British ministry, that in the campaign about to open much might be effected by the Anglo-Sicilian army on the eastern coast of Spain, and that it was therefore advisable to equip that force in such a way as to enable it to penetrate into the interior of the country, and act in a measure independently of the main army. In that opinion Lord Wellington by no means coincided. The resources of the government were, according to his judgment, quite inadequate to equip *two* armies for the field, in the way they ought to be equipped to be effective; and the attempt to do so would therefore tend but to cripple the army acting in the interior of Spain, upon whose success every thing depended, without doing much good to the other; for though that army might be of infinite service by occupying a

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considerable portion of the enemy's force,—more particularly if employed in co-operation with a naval force, so as to distract the enemy's attention by threatening the whole line of coast,—yet any success it might obtain in the field would be unavailing, unless the army operating in the heart of the country could keep its ground.

The Anglo-Sicilian army collected on the eastern coast of Spain had hitherto performed but slight service in the common cause. The command of it had been held by several officers in such rapid succession, that no one of them had been able to carry out any plan for rendering it efficient, and but little cordiality had hitherto prevailed between the English generals and those commanding the Spanish armies with which it was intended to co-operate. Towards the end of February, Lieut.-General Sir John Murray arrived at Alicante to assume the command of this army; placed, however, under the orders of Lord Wellington, and in a measure subject also to the control of Lord William Bentinck, who commanded the British forces in Sicily!

Shortly after his arrival, Sir John Murray, conceiving it advisable to extend the range of his cantonments, with the view of obtaining increased means of subsistence, determined on making a forward movement; and accordingly, on the 6th of March, the army advanced in four columns towards the Xucar, along the banks of which river the French army of Marshal Suchet was distributed, covered by a strongly intrenched camp at San Felipe.

The enemy were not caught napping, as Sir John had anticipated; nevertheless, after some

sharp fighting at and about Alcoy, the right of the Anglo-Sicilian army was established at that town, and the left was at the same time advanced to Villena. Satisfied with the result of his operations, the English general attempted nothing further in this quarter; but, conceiving that the alarm his offensive demonstration must have created would cause the enemy to concentrate their force on the right bank of the Xucar, he judged the moment favourable for attempting a coup-de-main upon Valencia. The recall of some of his best troops to Sicily by Lord William Bentinck, obliged him, however, to abandon this project when on the eve of execution; and Sir John's dreams of offensive operations were for a time dispelled.

Despatches, &c. Freneda, March 3.

Lord Wellington had written to Sir John Murray immediately on hearing of his having arrived to assume the command of the Anglo-Sicilian force, acquainting him that as the season was not sufficiently advanced to enable the main army to take the field, he thought it would be only risking the loss of the detached corps by employing them in partial attempts elsewhere; and announcing his intention of furnishing him with specific instructions, as to the part he would have to act in the general plan, when the proper season for taking the field should arrive: the plans his lordship had in view, he very judiciously kept to himself.

Ibid. March 29.

On receiving Sir John Murray's account of his first successes (very shortly after writing the foregoing), his lordship intimated to him that he had not decided on the nature of the operations he was to carry on,—whether he should make an offensive movement along the coast, resting his right flank upon the Mediterranean, or whether he should

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embark the British force and attack Tarragona, whilst the Spanish army of Elio took possession of Valencia,—as every thing must necessarily depend on the state of efficiency of the Spanish armies, of which he had not yet received the returns; but he acquainted Sir John that as soon as the equinoctial rains should have fallen, he would be able to fix the day on which he could move, and would then write to him to begin his operations. This letter was evidently designed to keep Sir John Murray quiet, and ready to act upon the *decisive point* whenever the proper time should arrive. Lord Wellington also wrote to General Elio, directing him to hold the army under his command in readiness to co-operate with the Anglo-Sicilian force.

Sir John Murray's offensive operations, though somewhat premature, were not contrary to any instructions with which he had been furnished, nor to those he now received from Lord Wellington; indeed, they tended rather than otherwise to favour the execution of the plans which his lordship contemplated, by drawing the enemy's force away from the projected point of attack.

On the 14th of April, "a memorandum on the operations to be carried on, on the eastern coast of the Peninsula," was transmitted to Sir John Murray, which it was calculated would reach him towards the end of the month; so that by allowing also a reasonable time for Sir John to make the necessary arrangements for carrying his instructions into effect, Lord Wellington reckoned on the two armies taking the field at about the same period.

Despatches, &c. Freneda, April 14.

This memorandum began by stating that it was obvious operations could not be commenced with advantage by the Anglo-Sicilian force, until the

allied British and Portugueze army could take the field in Castille, which it was intended it should do in the first days of the month of May. It pointed out the objects of the army of the eastern coast of Spain to be—1st, to obtain possession of the open part of the kingdom of Valencia; 2dly, to obtain an establishment on the sea coast north of the Ebro, so as to open a communication with the Spanish army of Catalonia; and, eventually and 3dly, to oblige the enemy to retire from the Lower Ebro. It explained at the same time that circumstances might arise which would render it expedient that the object mentioned in the third instance should precede that specified in the second; and that if Sir John Murray had the means of embarking 10,000 infantry and artillery, the endeavour to obtain both the first and second objects might be combined with great advantage: namely, the second object by attacking Tarragona briskly with the above-named force; whilst to obtain the first the Spanish armies of General Elio and the Duque del Parque should endeavour to possess themselves of the greater part of the fertile kingdom of Valencia, from which Suchet would be compelled to withdraw the major part of his force to succour Tarragona.

There was a very fair prospect, if vigorous measures were adopted, that both these objects might be gained; but in any case the attainment of one seemed certain. For if the enemy collected so formidable a force to relieve Tarragona as would oblige Sir John Murray to raise the siege, then the operation against Valencia could not but be successful; and, on the other hand, if the French marshal did not collect the greater part of his

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army to succour Tarragona, it was supposed the English general could have no reason to abandon the enterprise against that fortress. It was further pointed out to Sir John Murray, that if he were obliged to embark from Tarragona without effecting the reduction of that place, the return of his troops to the kingdom of Valencia would secure the first object.

To carry out these plans, Sir John Murray was directed to embark the British and Sicilian corps and Whittingham's Spanish division, "to the number of at least 10,000 men, or more if possible," as soon as the army of the Duque del Parque, proceeding from Jaen, was in communication with Elio's army; and these latter were ordered to act on the defensive so long as the enemy in their front remained in force, and even to retire upon the lines of Alicante if necessary; but to follow them up when it should be found that Suchet began to weaken his force in Valencia, and take possession of as large a portion of that kingdom as might be in their power.

The 13th article of these instructions (which we give at length, as reference will hereafter be made to it) stated, that

"It must be understood, however, by the general officers at the head of these troops, that the success of all our endeavours in the ensuing campaign will depend upon none of the corps being beaten of which the operating armies will be composed, and that they will be in sufficient numbers to turn the enemy rather than attack him in a strong position; and that I shall forgive any thing excepting that one of the corps should be beaten or dispersed."

Of the remaining articles it is necessary to notice but the 15th, which directed, that

"If Sir John Murray should be obliged to raise the siege

of Tarragona and embark, or at all events when he returns to the kingdom of Valencia, he is to land as far to the north as may be in his power, in order to join immediately on the right of the troops under General Elio and the Duque del Parque."

At the very moment that Lord Wellington was penning these instructions for Sir John Murray, that officer was writing the report of the operations in which he had thought proper prematurely to hazard the army under his command.

Obliged by the ill-timed recall of a portion of his force to Sicily to abandon the projected attack on Valencia, Sir John Murray, though aware that the greater part of Suchet's army was now collected in his front, still continued to occupy his advanced position towards the Xucar; to which, early in April, the army of Elio also drew near, with the intention of combining an offensive movement against the enemy.

For this purpose, taking post with the principal part of his force at Sax and Elda, Elio left a strong division of his army at Ycla, communicating by its right with Murray at Villena.

Suchet, observing that the posts of the allies were too far apart to render each other support, and moreover were separated by a rugged mountainous country, ably formed the project of attacking them in detail. Collecting his army for this purpose at Fuente de la Higuera on the night of the 10th April, he sent Harispe's division to attack the Spaniards isolated at Ycla, whilst with the rest of his troops he took post at Caudete, to cover its flank march from the allies at Villena. The Spanish corps, attacked by Harispe at daybreak on the following morning, was completely surprized, and nearly destroyed—1200 men laying down

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their arms. Suchet then moved forward upon Villena, from whence the allies withdrew on his approach; sacrificing, however, an entire Spanish battalion, which Elio insisted on leaving to garrison the old castle at that place, it being surrendered to the enemy on the morning of the 12th.

Sir John Murray, meanwhile, had fallen back to some strong ground at Castalla (where he determined to await the enemy), leaving a brigade under Colonel Adam * to dispute the defile of Biar; by which the road from Villena approached his position. The enemy's advance was most gallantly checked by this brigade; but at length, turned on both flanks and attacked by an overwhelming force in front, it was compelled to retire, and with admirable order took up its assigned post in the selected position.

The force under Sir John Murray, including the Spanish divisions of Roche and Whittingham, amounted to about 17,000 men — English, French, Germans and Italians, Maltese, Sicilians, Portugueze, and Spaniards, — a motley crew that could be little depended upon; but the position was strong, and judiciously occupied. Whittingham's corps was posted on the left, where the ground was steepest; Adam's and M'Kenzie's brigades were drawn up in the centre, the right of the latter resting on the castellated little town that gave its name to the battle; and the right wing, consisting of Clinton's brigade and Roche's Spaniards, was thrown back at a right angle behind a very rugged water-course, thus serving as a reserve to the rest of the army, and securing the line of retreat, which went off in that direction.

* Rt. Hon. Lieut.-General Sir Frederick Adam, K.C.B.

Suchet had with him about 15,000 men; but, entertaining a very mean opinion of the mixed force before him, concluded that a demonstration of his formidable cavalry on the right flank of the allies, to threaten their communication with Alicante, would suffice to determine them to retreat.

Accordingly, soon after noon on the 13th, he commenced his operations by ostentatiously parading his deep column of horse along the front of the allied line, directing it to sweep round the plain to the eastward of Castalla, and gain the right flank and rear of Murray's position. Meanwhile, pushing forward a cloud of skirmishers against the front of the position, he formed his infantry columns under their shelter, ready to fall upon the centre of the allied army when the favourable moment should arrive. His plan, however, completely miscarried. The French cavalry excited no alarm; and their infantry columns, despite the impetuosity of their attack, were repulsed at all points with great slaughter, and retired in the utmost confusion.

The English general did not follow up his advantages, alleging in excuse the great superiority of the enemy in cavalry; though, with extraordinary inconsistency, he deployed his infantry in the plain at the foot of his position, effecting a pedantic change of front of his whole army. M'Kenzie's brigade, however, pushed on after the enemy's disordered columns, by direction of Major-General Donkin (the Quarter-Master General), and would probably, even unsupported, have destroyed their army (such was its disorganized state as it hurried from the field to regain the narrow pass of

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Biar) but for Sir John Murray's reiterated orders of recall.

By moving rapidly to its right on Alcoy, the allied army might have reached San Felipe before the enemy; but though the British commander seems to have had the ability to conceive, he wanted the resolution to conduct military operations. He advanced to Alcoy on the 14th, and was afraid to push on.

The enemy's loss was very severe. Suchet himself admitted it to be 800; so that probably it was double that amount. The allies had about 700 killed and wounded.

The generalship of neither party merits praise. Murray, instead of taking up a defensive position, ought to have fallen with his whole force upon his adversary, and crushed the head of his column as it debouched from the defile of Biar. Suchet's temerity was unpardonable in attacking a strong position occupied by a superior force, having a road through a narrow pass in his rear for his sole retreat, and a Spanish army on his right flank. As for Elio, who commanded that army, and was but a few miles from the field of battle, he neither made a movement to succour the Anglo-Sicilian army, nor to gain the communications of the enemy, though he might have done either.

The bravery exhibited by the British troops engaged on this occasion was never surpassed; and General Donkin and Colonel Adam particularly distinguished themselves throughout the operations.

Lord Wellington estimated at its just value the success claimed by Sir J. Murray. It was evident that the advantage rather remained with the enemy,

who had inflicted a severe loss on Elio's army. Nevertheless the Anglo-Sicilian army had shown that if judiciously directed, much might be expected from it; and the instructions which had now been transmitted for its commander's guidance led Lord Wellington to hope that by directing its efforts to the objects specified therein, full occupation would be afforded to Marshal Suchet, and that the right flank and rear of his own army would be thereby secured during the operations he meditated against the enemy assembled in his front.

The guerrilla bands of Duran and the *Empecinado* were at the same time directed to watch the movements of the belligerents in Valencia and Catalonia, and place themselves so as to intercept the communication between the enemy's armies in the eastern provinces of Spain and those occupying the capital and northern parts of the kingdom.

Whilst occupied with the important concerns which we have but briefly enumerated in the preceding chapter, Lord Wellington's attention was unremittingly directed to restoring the health and discipline of his troops, which had suffered materially on the retreat from Burgos. Indeed, at the commencement of the year, the diseases produced by exposure to the weather, insufficient clothing, fatigue, excesses, and irregularity in the supply of food, had rendered nearly one third of the allied army ineffective. Rest and a return to order and strict discipline * soon, however, recruited the

* That strict, not harsh discipline, is essential to the well-being of an army, no person who has served with one will deny. Lord Wellington never exacted from the soldier more than he was able to bear, and was ever attentive to his comforts when such did not interfere with the good of the service. The following letter shows that he did not lose sight of those who had conduced to his successes, even when they could be no

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ranks; and as the season for taking the field approached, nearly the whole of the infantry being under tents, the different divisions and brigades were assembled without difficulty, and practised, under the command of their respective generals, in manœuvres on an extensive scale, thereby training both officers and men for the rapid movements and long marches which their commander hoped would be required of them; for Lord Wellington openly expressed his hopes of being able "to make a short and brilliant campaign of it;" and all ranks of his army, knowing that as far as depended on him the expectations to which this promise gave birth would not be disappointed, seconded his views with spirit and alacrity.

Anticipating the increased difficulties which would be experienced in bringing up the requisite supplies from Lisbon, Oporto, &c., as the army moved towards the French territory, Lord Wellington considered it important to have the means at hand to open a more direct communication with England by the ports on the northern coast of Spain; and with this view wrote to Earl Bathurst, early in April, representing the necessity of having a sufficient naval force in that quarter; and that no

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longer useful to him, — a charge which malevolence has attempted to fix upon the noble Duke.

"*To Sir E. Littlehales, Bart.*

"My dear Sir, "Freneda, 7th May, 1813.

"I enclose a memorial from a soldier, who, it appears, has been pensioned in Ireland on account of his wounds received in this country; and who, I believe, has not received what he ought. I shall be obliged to you if you will inquire into the circumstances, and see that he is redressed, if the case is as I suppose it to be; and, at all events, send for this poor fellow, and get him employed as he desires, if he is so sober and well-behaved as to deserve employment or notice.

"Believe me, &c."

time might be lost, he shortly afterwards addressed the admiral commanding on the Lisbon station, on the same subject, suggesting to him that as it was "not impossible" the army might have to communicate with the shipping in one of the ports of the north coast of Spain during the approaching campaign, it might be desirable, if he did not possess the means of extending naval protection to that part of the Peninsular shore, that he should apply for an augmentation to the strength of his squadron.

Despatches, &c. Freneda, April 28.

Lord Wellington's prudence in abstaining from correspondence on this evidently important subject at an earlier period, is very manifest; for had he done so, not only might his intentions have become publicly known, but the very act of assembling a squadron on the Guipuzcoan coast would have given the enemy a suspicion of the quarter towards which his designs were directed, and enabled them to prepare against the threatened blow.

The long-desired period for opening the campaign had at length, however, arrived; rest and wholesome food had restored the health of the troops; the ranks had been recruited by draughts from England; the commissariat arrangements had been brought to the highest state of perfection; a pontoon establishment had been prepared capable of bridging the largest rivers in the country, though, from motives of prudence, it was not brought up to the army until the last moment; and finally the vast plains of Leon and Castile were clothed with verdure.

The Spanish troops intended to co-operate in the field, having meanwhile been armed, clothed, instructed, and disciplined, waited no less anxiously than those of England and Portugal the development

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of the vast designs of their great leader. Of these, however, all was still conjecture. The pernicious system of issuing "orders of the day," wherein the movements to be executed by every division of the army were given in minute detail, had never been adopted by Lord Wellington; nevertheless, the necessity of combining his operations with those of the Spanish generals had hitherto rendered a partial disclosure of his plans necessary, by which opportunities had been afforded the enemy of becoming acquainted with them. Now, however, for the first time, the English general found himself unfettered. The necessity for consulting others no longer existed; and holding with the great Frederick, that, if his nightcap knew what his head contained he would throw it in the fire, he was resolved to avail himself of the advantage of secrecy to the fullest extent.

On all occasions he spoke confidently of driving the enemy out of Spain, if the Spanish armies could be brought into the field to be useful; but the utmost he had ever divulged of his plans was, that he should not commence operations until the green forage was on the field to feed his cavalry. This the want of rain had retarded much beyond the usual period; but a yet more important reason led the British commander to look impatiently forward to the rains of the vernal equinox—viz. that after they had fallen, he knew the roads by which he purposed moving his army would be passable throughout the summer, and that, consequently, his operations would not be liable to experience a check when once in progress.

The army under Lord Wellington's immediate direction was far greater than any he had yet been

able to collect during the preceding campaigns; for the Anglo-Portugueze troops alone mustered 70,000 sabres and bayonets. To act in conjunction with this force his lordship hoped to bring into the field the Spanish army of Galicia, 12,000 strong; a similar number under the Duque del Parque; and the army of reserve of Andalusia, 15,000: whilst to oppose Suchet in the east, besides the Anglo-Sicilian army, numbering 16,000, were the armies of Catalonia, 6000 well-disciplined troops; and that of Elio, amounting to 12,000. And in other parts of Spain, the irregular bands of the Empecinado, Villacampo, Mina, Porlier, &c., amounted to 37,000 more; making a total of 180,000 men under arms.

The British general had taken care to have the most distinguished Spanish generals selected to command the different armies about to be actively employed. Accordingly, Castaños was appointed by the Regency to the command of the army of Galicia; but as the number it could muster fit to take the field was not considered sufficiently great for a general of his standing to place himself at its head, it was entrusted to the command of Don Pedro Agustin Giron. Castaños, however, being captain-general of the provinces of Leon, Castile, Galicia, and Estremadura, Lord Wellington saw how advantageous it would be, with a view to draw out the resources of the country about to become the scene of operations, that he should be with him; and this zealous officer accordingly kept near, and in constant communication with the British head-quarters during the campaign. Don Henrique O'Donnel, Conde de la Bisbal, commanded the army of Andalusia; and Morillo, Carlos de

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España*, Longa, and Julian Sanchez were also employed in minor commands.

The amount of the enemy's force in the Peninsula had suffered but little diminution during the winter of 1812-13; for though heavy draughts had been made on it to meet the storm gathering in Germany, the deficiency had been made good by conscripts; and King Joseph still found himself at the head of nearly 200,000 men present under arms.†

Augoyat. Précis, &c. p. 150.

This force, divided into the armies of the North, of Portugal, the Centre, South, Aragon, and Catalonia, was distributed in a wide circle, of which the circumference touched the shores of the bay of Biscay and Mediterranean, the foot of the Pyrenean chain, and the rivers Ezla, Tormes, Alberche, Tagus, and Xucar. The first-named army was engaged in a harassing warfare with the guerrilla bands of Biscay and Navarre; the two last were opposed to the allied armies on the eastern coast of Spain; and the remaining three were distributed in a long belt of cantonments fronting towards

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* The present *Conde de España.*

† General State of the French Army on the 15th of March, 1813, extracted from the Official Returns: —

	Infantry.	Cavalry.
Army of the South (Gazan)	30,003	6602
Centre (Drouet)	14,261	1966
Portugal (Reille)	31,171	3654
North (Clauzel)	38,498	1978
Catalonia (Suchet)	26,214	1109
Aragon	32,463	3852
Reserve at Bayonne	5,822	55
Total present under arms	178,432	19,216
Absent on detachment	3,443	1,693
In hospital	30,395	
Total	212,270	20,909

Portugal and Andalusia, and extending from north to south upwards of seventy leagues. CHAP. XXIX.

Throughout the winter the enemy had manifested little inclination to disturb the cantonments of the Anglo-Portugueze troops; but early in February they pushed some parties across the Tormes, with the view of plundering the country situated between the outposts of the two armies. The flocks, however, had generally been driven off, and very little mischief was done. Towards the end of the same month a force under General Foy endeavoured to surprise the post of Bejar, covering the communication between the centre and right wing of the allied army by the pass of Baños. The 50th Regiment and 6th Portugueze Caçadores, to whom the defence of this post was entrusted, received the enemy with great spirit, and drove them back upon the Tormes with some loss. 1813. Feb. 20.

These movements caused Lord Wellington to bring up another division to the Agueda; and the prompt arrival of this reinforcement led the enemy to suppose that the allied army was ready to open the campaign; and also, from the apparent anxiety to preserve this advanced post, to conclude that it was the British general's intention to operate, as heretofore, by the great road on Salamanca, or by the valley of the Tagus,—an opinion that became afterwards strengthened by the assembling of guerrilla bands in the south, by the demonstrations of the army of del Parque on the side of the Sierra Morena, by the position of Hill's corps on the banks of the Alagon, and by various reports to that effect purposely circulated throughout the country. Napoleon, doubtless calculating the vast accession of strength that would be placed in

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Lord Wellington's hands by his being invested with the chief command of the Spanish armies, in whose movements some kind of concert might thenceforth be expected, and rightly judging that the British commander would take advantage of these increased means and of the state of the war in Germany, to make a great effort in the north of Spain, early in the year counselled Joseph to lay aside the sceptre and assume the truncheon; to consider himself rather as the general of the French armies, than the king of ten millions of refractory Spaniards; and strongly recommended him to leave his capital, holding it only as a military post, and fix his head-quarters — not his court — at Valladolid.

It had always, however, been the ambition of Joseph to be king of the Spaniards rather than the tyrant of Spain; and to the last he hoped to gain the affections of his subjects by relieving them, as far as he could, from the burthens of war; and, by enacting salutary laws for the better government of the kingdom, to draw out its resources without oppressing the people with increased demands. The violence, injustice, and rapacity of the French generals, who had not, like Joseph, any interest in the well-being of the country, thwarted all his Utopian plans. It was utterly impossible to govern Spain with the tables of Alfonso the Wise in one hand, and the sanguinary sword of Napoleon in the other. The endeavour to do so occasioned endless disputes; and the insubordination of his brother's ravenous lieutenants rose at length to such a pitch, that to insure obedience to his orders, it became necessary that Soult, the most contumacious and rapacious of these vultures, should be removed from the post of major-general of the

army. "Either the Duke of Dalmatia or myself must quit Spain," wrote the insulted monarch to his imperious brother. Had not Napoleon required the services of Soult, the reply to this spirited remonstrance would probably have been the recall of the puppet king himself; but, under existing circumstances, his demands were complied with. The emperor ordered his favourite general to France, and Marshal Jourdan was appointed his successor,—certes, an unpromising change to make at a time when Joseph stood more in need of the Ægis of Minerva than of the sword and scales of Astrea.

Joseph pleaded various political reasons for remaining at Madrid; but at length the necessity for re-opening the communication with France obliged him, reluctantly, to take the step recommended by his further-sighted brother, and on the 17th of March, accompanied by his guards and followed by his court, he bade a last farewell to his capital and repaired to Valladolid.

This change in the seat of government occasioned a general northerly movement of the French corps fronting the Anglo-Portugueze army, which, in the course of the following month, were distributed in cantonments as follows:—The army of the South, commanded by General Comte Gazan, occupied Madrid, Arevalo (head-quarters), Salamanca, Toro, and Zamora; that of the centre, under Drouet, Comte d'Erlon, took post in second line, at Segovia and Valladolid; and the army of Portugal, commanded by Comte Reille, covered the right flank of both the others, by occupying the country between the rivers Ezla and Carrion, on the north bank of the Douro. This

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1813. army had, however, been much reduced by detachments made from it to reinforce that of the north, which was still engaged in an active warfare with the guerrillas in Biscay and Navarre. These partisan corps had occasioned the enemy much annoyance during the whole winter; for, not confining their operations to the surprise of convoys and plunder of magazines, they had actually possessed themselves of almost all the seaports between Santander and the Bidasoa, which afforded them increased facilities for interrupting the communications with France; and it had therefore become necessary to put them down with a strong hand, ere the season for commencing hostilities of a more decisive nature

March. should arrive. Several divisions of the army of Portugal were sent to the army of the north for this purpose by the express order of Napoleon; and thus reinforced, Clauzel, who also by the emperor's command had superseded Cafarelli in the command of this army, speedily drove Mina out of Navarre; so completely dispersing that chieftain's band, that he fled accompanied by only twelve men. Meanwhile a division under Foy invested the seaport of Castro Urdiales, and by a vigorous attack captured that fortress in seven days.

May 11. Such was the state of affairs at the opening of the eventful campaign of 1813. The disposition of the French forces evinced a determination to maintain the line of the Douro; and the bridges across that river at Toro and Zamora afforded the army of Portugal the means of assuming the offensive by falling upon the left flank of the allied army, should it move forward on the great road by Salamanca towards Madrid or Valladolid; —a movement on which the enemy seemed fully to have calculated, from the forward position of the right wing

of the English army at Bejar, the determination with which that post had been held, and various other reasons that have been already mentioned.

The plan of the British general differed materially, however, from that which his adversaries had laid down for him, and had made their dispositions to counteract; and excites no less admiration from the skill manifested in its execution, than for the ability with which it was conceived and tact by which it was concealed. It was, by a rapid concentrical march of the different divisions of the Anglo-Portugueze army, to form a junction with the Spanish army of Galicia on the northern bank of the Douro, and, with the overpowering force thus collected, take in reverse the line of defensive posts established by the enemy on that river, and fall upon the right flank of their extended line of cantonments; whilst at the same time the 4th Spanish army and that of reserve of Andalusia, by advancing from the south, should occupy the attention of the enemy on that side.

Lord Wellington calculated, by the rapidity of his movements, to disconcert any attempt of the enemy to concentrate and fall upon his line of communication with Ciudad Rodrigo. Indeed, he trusted to be so expeditious as to compel them to fall back upon the Ebro without a battle; when, leaving a Spanish corps to invest Burgos, and pushing on with the entire Anglo-Portugueze army, he hoped to dislodge them from any defensive line they might take up on that river, and force them across the Pyrenees.

Such was the British general's plan — we will now follow his able movements in carrying it into execution.

CHAPTER XXX.

THE ALLIED ARMY TAKES THE FIELD. — SKILFUL MOVEMENTS OF LORD WELLINGTON. — ADVANCE OF THE RIGHT WING ON SALAMANCA. — CONCENTRATION OF THE WHOLE ARMY ON THE RIGHT BANK OF THE DOURO. — THE ARMY ADVANCES, AND CROSSES THE CARRION AND PISUERGA. — CONSTERNATION OF THE ENEMY. — THEY FALL BACK ON BURGOS, BUT DESTROY THE CASTLE AND RETIRE UPON THE EBRO. — LORD WELLINGTON TURNS THE LINE OF THE EBRO. — ADVANTAGE GAINED BY THIS MASTERLY MOVEMENT. — THE ENEMY RETREAT ON VITORIA. — BATTLE OF VITORIA. — OBSERVATIONS.

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EARLY in May, the allied army began to stir. The cavalry, of which the greater part had wintered in the neighbourhood of Coimbra, was brought up by various routes to the country north of the Douro, as if to facilitate its subsistence; the heavy pontoon train also commenced its march for that river, but the troops already on the frontier still remained quiet. In a few days, however, all were in movement; and by the middle of the month, six divisions of British * and two brigades of Portugueze infantry, five brigades of cavalry, and a proportionate quantity of artillery,—the whole under Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Graham,—had crossed to the right bank of the Douro, and by the 26th were collected on the salient portion of the Portugueze frontier, situated between that river and the sources of the Tuela and Sabores; the left being at Braganza, and the right on the Douro at Miranda. A rapid advance from this position, by roads which had hitherto

* Allied infantry would be more strictly correct, as in most of the divisions a small proportion of German and Portugueze regiments were incorporated.

been considered impracticable for wheel carriages, brought the left wing in four days to the Ezla; below the junction of which river with the Douro, namely, at the Barca * de Villalcampo, it was proposed to lay the pontoon bridge.

This concentration and forward movement of the major part of the allied army on the northern bank of the Douro, had been skilfully concealed by the advance of the troops composing the right wing, which broke up from their winter quarters on the 21st May, and moved concentrically upon Salamanca; the enemy, by this ruse, being confirmed in their belief that it was the British general's intention to operate on the left bank of the Douro.

Lord Wellington quitted Freneda on the 22d to direct in person the movements of this portion of his army. On crossing the stream which forms the boundary of the two Peninsular nations, with spirits elevated at the recollection of the victory gained on the plains spread out before him †, and with a buoyant feeling of confidence in the result of his present masterly plans, "he rose in his stirrups, and waving his hand, cried out 'Farewell, Portugal!' It was indeed for the last time that he looked upon the majestic mountains of Beira,—for the last time that, with uncovered heads, the grateful peasantry of Portugal greeted their liberator as he passed on his way *to France*, as *O graõ Lore!*" ‡

Napier, vol. v. 513.

The right wing of the allied army, with which the commander-in-chief now fixed his head-quarters,

* Boat-ferry.

† Fuentes de Honor.

‡ "The great Lord"—by which, and the yet more honourable title of the "just man," the British general is to this day known both in Spain and Portugal.

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was composed of the 2d and Light British, Morillo's Spanish, and Amarantes Portugueze divisions of infantry, and five brigades of cavalry (including the corps of Julian Sanchez); and moving in two columns upon Salamanca, — the light division and Portugueze from Ciudad Rodrigo, the 2d division and Spaniards from Bejar, — united in front of that place early on the morning of the 26th. General Villatte, who was posted there with a division of infantry and some cavalry and artillery, evacuated the town on the approach of the allies; but anxious, apparently, to ascertain the strength of the force before him, stood his ground in the vicinity rather longer than prudence warranted; and being hard pressed by the British cavalry and horse artillery, whose movements were directed by Lord Wellington in person, was obliged to abandon seven guns, besides suffering a considerable loss in men.

So completely was the French general deceived as to Lord Wellington's projects, that he retired precipitately towards Medina del Campo, as if to draw his adversary on, and expose him to attack from the bridges on the Douro at Zamora and Toro on his left flank. The other divisions of the army of the south, which were much scattered, were directed on the same point; and all was now hurry and confusion, throughout the French cantonments.

Lord Wellington remained at Salamanca until the 29th, when he proceeded to Miranda de Duero, to cross the river and join the left wing of his army, about whose movements he felt some anxiety. The ferry at this place had been removed by the enemy, and the only means of passing the rapid and rock-bound stream was by a hammock strung

by rings to a stout rope stretched from bank to bank across the river, —a method the Spaniards had learnt from the South American Indians. By this fragile suspension bridge his lordship was obliged to pass, dangling some hundred feet in the air above the foaming river. On the following day he reached Carvajales, and assumed the direction of the left wing.

The command of the right wing had in the meanwhile been intrusted to Sir R. Hill, with instructions to remain at Salamanca, to secure the communication of the army with Ciudad Rodrigo until another should be established by the right bank of the Douro. He was further directed to attack any troops the enemy might push forward towards the Tormes; but if not strong enough to maintain his position, to give up the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo for the moment, and collect his troops between Salamanca and Zamora, from whence he could fall back, if necessary, to the bridge about to be laid across the Douro at Villalcampo.

During these movements of the main allied army, the Spanish army of Galicia, under General Giron, advanced to Benavente, communicating by its right with Sir Thomas Graham's corps; and the Conde de la Bisbal, with the army of reserve of Andalusia, was in movement towards Almaraz, to gain the pass of Baños, on the British right. The 3d Spanish army, under the Duque del Parque, was also put in motion on the great road from Cordoba to Madrid.

On the 31st May, the greater part of the army operating on the north bank of the Douro crossed the Ezla without opposition; and the enemy having evacuated Zamora and fallen back upon Toro, Lord

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June 2. Wellington occupied the former place without loss of time, thereby securing a good point of passage across the Douro. On the 2d June, head-quarters were advanced to Toro, the enemy having abandoned that place also, and retired towards Valladolid. A sharp cavalry affair occurred near Morales in following up the French, in which the 10th Hussars particularly distinguished themselves, taking above 200 prisoners with very small loss. The communication between the two wings of the army was now secure, as at this season the Douro begins to be fordable at Toro.

Hitherto the troops which the enemy had occasionally shown were mostly cavalry; but the infantry of the army of Portugal had by this time come up in considerable force, and Comte Reille appeared to be disposed to maintain his ground between Torrelobaton and Tordesillas. The heads of the allied columns were accordingly halted on the 3d, to allow the different divisions to close up; and General Hill having been directed to move by his left to Toro, the right wing crossed the Douro on the afternoon of that day, and effected its junction with the main body of the army. At the same time Giron's corps arrived at Villalpando, where it was halted to form a support to the British left.

On the 4th, the whole army being thus compactly assembled on the northern bank of the Douro, Lord Wellington again moved forward; but the scattered corps of the French army had not yet been able to collect in sufficient force to dispute his advance, and evacuating Valladolid and Puente de Douro, they quitted the Lower Carrion, hoping by a concentrical retreat, combined with

"the army of the north and the troops under Foy in Biscay, to be able to unite and make a stand at Burgos. Suchet, at the same time, was ordered to march with the army of Catalonia upon Zaragoza. So precipitately had the enemy found it necessary to retire at all points, that large magazines of grain and ammunition were abandoned at Arevalo, Zamora, and Valladolid. June 6.

It must have caused Lord Wellington great vexation to find, at this most anxious and interesting period, that after all the trouble it had cost him to get the Spanish armies placed in an efficient state to take the field, he was likely to derive no assistance from them, owing to the gross negligence and misconduct of the intendants and other civil authorities of the country. For General Giron now complained that, from the neglect of these persons to provide sufficient means of transport, his corps was nearly destitute of ammunition; and his lordship learnt at the same moment that the army of reserve of Andalusia was detained on the Guadiana, in consequence of the Intendants of the province of Estremadura having neglected to collect provisions for its subsistence, although directed so to do by the captain-general, at Lord Wellington's desire, ten weeks before.

"Thus" (his lordship writes to Don Juan O'Donoju*) "this campaign will be fought without the aid of a single Gurwood. Despatches, &c. June 4.

* General O'Donoju had recently been appointed minister of war. A brave man, but restless intriguer, the closing scene of this minister's life affords a melancholy instance of the instability of fortune. Long the idol of the democratic party in Spain, O'Donoju was eventually driven to seek shelter from political persecution within the walls of Gibraltar, and, reduced to the utmost penury, died in the civil hospital of that place; regretting with his last breath that the advice of the Duke of Wellington — which he had ever disregarded — had not been followed in the formation of a government for his distracted country.

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Spanish corps, notwithstanding that it is supposed there are 160,000 Spanish troops in arms. It cannot be expected that troops will march without provisions, or will fight without ammunition; and it cannot be stated with truth either that provisions for the army of reserve could not have been collected in Estremadura upon ten weeks' notice, or that 200 or 300 mules could not have been procured in Galicia for the ammunition for the army of that province. Yet for want of these exertions the cause may be lost.

"I earnestly entreat the government to concert with the Cortes the means of establishing in the provinces some authority to which people will pay obedience, and which will insure their resources for the purposes of the war; otherwise, notwithstanding all our exertions, the cause of the country will be lost."

Continuing to advance rapidly, but extending itself to the left, the allied army crossed the Carrion on the 7th, when head-quarters were established at Amusco; and on the three following days the left wing was brought forward, and the entire army passed the Pisuerga; Lord Wellington taking up his quarters at Melgar on that river, whence he moved on the 11th to Castro Xeriz, about eighteen miles west from Burgos. The necessity of providing for the subsistence of the army in its further progress induced Lord Wellington to make short movements on that day, and on the next the left wing halted, whilst with four divisions of infantry, and the greater part of the cavalry of the right, his lordship advanced towards Burgos, to reconnoitre the enemy's position, "and force them to a decision whether to abandon the castle to its fate, or to protect it with all their force."

Despatches, &c. Villadiego, June 13.

Ibid.

The intelligence that the entire Anglo-Portugueze army had crossed the Douro and Ezla, and was in full march on Valladolid, came like a thunderbolt upon King Joseph. It was evident, con-

sidering the disjointed state of the several French armies, that his only chance of retaining a footing in Spain depended on their speedy concentration on the Ebro: he, however, thought differently, conceiving that it would not be necessary to retire beyond Burgos; on which point the armies of Portugal, the centre, and south had, as we have seen, been directed. CHAP. XXX. 1813.

On the 9th of June, the two last and the greater portion of the first named of these three armies were collected on the Hormaza; and Joseph felt confident, with the assistance of the troops from the north and east under Foy and Clauzel, to whom fresh orders were despatched, and the appui of the strong castle which had proved such a stumbling-block in the way of the allies in the preceding campaign, that he should not only be able to arrest the further advance of his adversary, but even to act offensively, and manœuvre so as to gain his communications; for imagining, from the impracticable nature of the roads between the Pisuerga and Upper Ebro, that Spanish troops only would be employed on that side, he had no idea that his own line of retreat was in any danger of being cut. Augoyat, p. 155.

Under this comfortable persuasion, the court, suite, and equipages of his flitting majesty, the numerous renegade Spanish families who adhered to his falling fortunes, and the various other *impedimenta* of the French army, which had been hastily despatched from Valladolid on the first alarm, were now halted at Vitoria; and Joseph still continued to press upon his brother his favourite scheme of quelling the insurrection of his Navarese and Biscayan subjects, by establishing a good civil government north of the Ebro, *after having driven*

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the English back into Portugal. The defensive position chosen by the enemy to arrest the allied army, until all their expected reinforcements were come up, extended along some strong ground behind the river Hormaza, its right being above the village of that name, the left towards the Arlanzon in front of Estepar. A demonstration made against the right of this position induced the enemy to abandon it and retire across the Arlanzon. This retrograde movement was effected in excellent order, but nevertheless it afforded the British cavalry an opportunity of capturing a gun and some prisoners. The enemy again showed a disposition to maintain themselves in front of Burgos, by taking post behind the Urbel and Arlanzon, which were much swollen by a recent fall of rain; but the threatening posture of Sir Thomas Graham's corps on their right flank, dispelled Joseph's dreams of security, and determined him to fall back upon the Ebro, to save his communication with France and expedite his junction with Clauzel and Foy. Accordingly, at 10 o'clock at night, the whole army marched off, retiring through Burgos.

Kincaid. Adventures, &c. p.205.

"At daybreak next morning an explosion shook the ground like an earthquake, and made every one jump on his legs." The cause was not ascertained until some hours after, when Lord Wellington — who with the rest had started up and mounted his horse — returned from a reconnoissance with the unlooked-for, gratifying intelligence that the castle of Burgos was blown up. So hurriedly, however, had the work of destruction been accomplished, that, though the city was rendered a pile of ruins, the walls of the castle, on the repairs of which vast sums and labour had recently been expended,

were not materially injured; and a magazine of live shells, to which a train had been laid — certainly for no other purpose than to destroy the city and its helpless inhabitants — exploded prematurely, killing several hundred men of a column of infantry defiling under the castle walls: this atrocious act thus hurling its own just punishment on the heads of the perpetrators.

On the 16th the enemy were once more in fancied security behind the Ebro. The central army took post on the left, at Haxo; that of Portugal on the right, at Espejo and Frias; the army of the south at Miranda, having left a garrison of 600 men in the castle of Pancorvo, to command the defile between that place and the bridge on the Ebro at Miranda; for King Joseph still cherished the idea of acting offensively. His delusion on this point was, however, but of short duration; for, on the following day, Reille sent in all haste to inform him that the bulk of the allied army was placed on his right flank: instant retreat became therefore necessary. Augoyat, p. 156.

Lord Wellington had lost no time in following up the retreating enemy. Directing Graham and Giron to move forward their respective corps on S^{n} Martin and Rocamunda, and cross the Ebro at those places, he marched with the remainder of the army to the northward, and crossed the river at the same points and at Puente de Arenas on the 15th; the left wing having effected the passage, as above directed, on the preceding day. The advance was continued towards Vitoria on the 16th and 17th; head-quarters being on the latter day at Quincoces, about twelve miles to the north of Frias, which was occupied by a division of Comte June 13.

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Reille's corps. By these bold and masterly movements a great advantage was gained, independent of the necessity they imposed on the enemy of either retiring or receiving battle on a weak flank; namely, that of opening a communication with Santander, whereby a new base of operations was obtained, which, from its proximity to the actual seat of war, would greatly tend to facilitate the further movements of the allied army. The situation of the French army was extremely critical. Reille proposed to abandon the great road to France, and march for Navarre by the right bank of the Ebro, thereby drawing near Suchet; but the King still reckoning on the junction of Clauzel to arrest the progress of the allies, decided on retiring upon Vitoria. Doubtless the hope of saving his valuable baggage had its influence on this unwise determination. Reille, however, was directed to move on Bilbao, with the view of anticipating the allies at that place, and rallying the troops of General Foy, whose division, though that of General Sarrut had now joined, still remained on the north side of the mountains of Biscay.

Augoyat, p. 156.

Belmas, vol. i. 254.

In pursuance of these orders, Reille marched with two divisions of his army towards Orduña early in the morning of the 18th, directing Maucune, with another division, to march from Frias to the same point. On reaching Osma, however, Reille fell in with the 1st and 5th British divisions under Graham, issuing from the mountain passes in his front, and already in possession of the road to Orduña, which induced him to retrace his steps as expeditiously as possible to Espejo. Maucune, meanwhile, in marching with his division from Frias across the mountains to join Reille, encountered

the light division at S^{n} Millans, and fell back in great disorder also upon Espejo, losing all his baggage and 500 men.

Reille now saw that no time was to be lost in gaining the high road to Bayonne; and collecting his three divisions, marched in the course of the night to Subijana de Morillas on the river Bayas, to hold that important point, whilst the two other armies (of the centre and south) passed the narrow gorge of Puebla de Arganzon, by which the river Zadorra and great road from France enter the valley of the Ebro from the basin of Vitoria. Augoyat, p. 157.

The French armies of the centre and south retreated also during the night of the 18th, and on the following morning gained the valley of the Zadorra under the protection thus afforded by the army of Portugal. Here they took post *à cheval* on the great road to Vitoria; the former occupying a range of heights in front of the village of Ariñez, its left at Tres Puentes on the Zadorra, and its right on a lofty mountain ridge which divides that stream from the river Ega; the latter taking a position in second line, in advance of the village of Gomecho. Comte Reille, having accomplished his delicate task, arrived the same evening, and occupied the heights of Zuazo with the army of Portugal, thus forming a third line, about two miles in advance of Vitoria; sending, however, the division of General Sarrut to Aranguiz on the road to Bilbao, to watch the enemy and cover Vitoria on that side. Ibid. Belmas, vol. i. 254.

"The nature of the country through which the allied army had passed since crossing the Ebro had necessarily extended its columns," and that lying in its front between the Bayas and Zadorra presented similar obstacles to the operations of an Gurwood. Despatches, &c. June 22.

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army; the approaches to the valley of the latter river being separated by mountains which scarcely admit of any communication being kept up between them. Lord Wellington halted the heads of columns, therefore, on the 20th, in order to close up the different divisions, and moved the left wing to Murguia on the eastern bank of the Bayas, for the purpose of turning the enemy's position by the Bilbao road. Giron's Spanish corps was at the same time directed towards Vitoria, from Orduña, so as to afford support to Sir Thomas Graham.

Lord Wellington fixed his head-quarters at Subijana de Morillas, and devoted the greater part of the day to a minute examination of the enemy's position, with a view to attack it on the following morning, should Joseph decide on holding his ground, which his lordship rather supposed he would; for, writing to the Conde de la Bisbal, who with the army of Andalusia was now within a few days' march of Burgos, he says, "I believe it will be necessary for you to keep at hand just now; for the enemy are very strong, and an armistice having been concluded in Germany (this was after the battle of Bautzen), it is to be expected they will be reinforced."

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. June 20.

Joseph, on his part, was determined to fight; but he would willingly have postponed the battle until Clauzel had arrived with the army of the north. Nevertheless, knowing that this general had marched from Pamplona some days previously to effect a junction, he still hoped he would arrive in the course of the 21st. Clauzel, however, having by his first orders been directed to unite on the Ebro, could not now accomplish the circuitous march this change occasioned, to be in time to take

part in the battle; and Joseph, with inconceivable folly — for confidence under existing circumstances was folly—though anxiously looking for his support, detached Maucune's division of the army of Portugal to escort some of his court followers on the road to France! A gleam of sense returning on the morning of the 21st, Reille, with what remained of his army and a Hispano-French division, was directed to move from the useless position he occupied at Zuazo, to support Sarrut's division on the extreme right, and cover Vitoria on the side of Bilbao.

On the evening of the 20th, the whole of the allied army, excepting the 6th division left at Medina del Pomar to cover the march of the magazines and stores, was assembled on the banks of the Bayas. On the right, the 2d and light divisions, Amarante's Portugueze and Morillo's Spanish corps, were in advance of that river, facing towards Puebla de Alarzon on the Zadorra. The right centre, consisting of the 4th division, the hussar brigade, and D'Urban's Portugueze cavalry, had also crossed to the left bank of the Bayas; but was separated from the former by a chain of mountains which stretched from that river to the Zadorra. The 3d and 7th divisions, forming the left centre, remained still on the right bank of the Bayas, about four miles above the preceding; and Sir Thomas Graham with the left wing was posted yet six miles higher up the stream, occupying Murguia on its left bank with the 1st and 5th British divisions, Pack's and Bradford's Portugueze brigades, Longa's Spanish corps, and a large body of cavalry. Giron with the army of Galicia was at the same time making a forced march from Orduña, to be at hand to take part in the expected battle.

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The armies of the adverse generals were nearly equal in point of force, the numerical superiority of the allies being counterbalanced by the superior quality—taken collectively—of the troops opposed to them; for the Spaniards whom Lord Wellington brought into the field were mostly fresh levies, and though in this day's operations they afforded a striking proof of the good effects of discipline, yet they could not be considered equal even to the conscripts in the enemy's ranks, who had the advantage of being well officered.

The French army consisted of the whole of the armies of the south and centre; two divisions of infantry and all the cavalry of that of Portugal; a portion of the army of the north, and the king's guards; and deducting for the losses it had experienced since the commencement of the campaign, and the garrison left at Pancorvo, cannot be computed at less than 72,000 men, including 11,000 cavalry. Lord Wellington had with him 35,000 British and Germans, 25,000 Portugueze, and 21,000 Spaniards; making a total of 81,000, of whom 10,000 cavalry.

By break of day on the 21st of June the allied army was in movement, marching by four distinct routes towards the Zadorra. The right column, led by Hill, was directed on the bridge across the river at La Puebla; the right centre on that of Nanclares; the left centre made a circuit to gain the bridges of Tres Puentes and Mendoza; and the left (Graham's corps) marched by the high road from Bilbao to Vitoria, which traverses the Zadorra by a bridge between Abechuco and Arriaga.

Lord Wellington accompanied the right centre

column, which was now reinforced by the light division, brought round, ere the sun rose, from the extreme right. On reaching the Zadorra (the left bank of which was occupied by the enemy's advanced posts) the troops were halted: the light division opposite the bridge of Villodas, the 4th in front of that of Nanclares, the cavalry in reserve; and in these positions awaited the junction of the 3d and 7th divisions on the left, to commence the attack.

In the early part of the morning a thick mist, amounting almost to a drizzling rain, hung about the valleys, and concealed the movements on both sides; but by the time the allies reached the Zadorra—that is, towards nine o'clock—the sun had gradually dispersed the vapours and given assurance of a glorious day.

During a tedious period of inaction, occasioned by the non-arrival of the 3d and 7th divisions, many an anxious eye followed the direction of Lord Wellington's telescope, which was pointed frequently, and with some slight symptoms of impatience, towards the mountain of La Puebla, on the right. At times, too, his lordship was observed to turn an attentive ear to catch any faint sounds proceeding from the left; but all remained still as death until about ten o'clock, when a distant cracking of musketry on the right, made every pulse throb quicker; and a line of white smoke was at the same time discovered rising along the dark summit of the Puebla mountain, announcing that Hill had commenced the battle.

The ridge whereon the work of destruction first began, though of vast importance to the enemy, from its possessing a complete command over the

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narrow defile by which the great road to France is conducted along the bank of the Zadorra into the valley of Vitoria, was not only slightly guarded, but occupied without judgment; and a brigade of Morillo's corps having climbed its southern side and fallen impetuously upon the troops posted on the summit, threw them into disorder. The enemy endeavoured to repair by courage the want of foresight in their general; but the Spaniards maintained the contest with equal spirit, and would not be repulsed. Gazan soon became aware of the error which had been committed, and despatched reinforcements from Subijana de Alava to recover the heights; but Hill, whose corps had by this time crossed the Zadorra, observing this, sent also some light battalions to succour the Spaniards, and these were in their turn supported by other troops, in proportion to the efforts made by the enemy to obtain the ascendency.

The contest was thus prolonged with great obstinacy, and both sides experienced a heavy loss. Morillo and the gallant commander of the British troops* were both wounded (the latter mortally), but neither would quit the field; and the allies maintained their ground on the summit of the ridge throughout the morning, despite the reiterated efforts of the enemy to dislodge them.

Whilst the possession of this important point was thus hotly disputed over-head, Sir Rowland Hill embraced the opportunity to file the rest of his corps without interruption through the narrow pass which remained unguarded below; and on

* Lieut.-Colonel the Honourable Henry Cadogan, of the 71st regiment.

gaining space for the deployment of his column, made immediate dispositions to attack the centre of the enemy's position.

Here, in first line, was posted the army of the south, commanded by Comte Gazan; its right resting on the Zadorra at Villodas, its left towards the village of Subijana de Alava, situated on the northern slope of the ridge of La Puebla. Sir Rowland determined to commence operations by seizing this post, which, in consequence of the numerous detachments made to support the troops engaged on the crest of the mountain, he suspected could not be very strongly guarded. It proved to be unoccupied; but the approach was swept by so formidable a fire of artillery, and of numerous light troops who lined the woods and ravines in its vicinity, that it was not altogether a bloodless conquest; and no sooner had the British possessed themselves of it, than the enemy bringing up strong reinforcements, it became a scene of fierce contention: their strenuous and oft-repeated endeavours to recover it were, however, unavailing.

When the first sounds of battle were heard on the right, a smart fusillade commenced between the skirmishers of the light division and the enemy's advanced posts on the left bank of the Zadorra, about Villodas; but the arrival of the 3d and 7th divisions, having, from unlooked-for difficulties on their march, been retarded far beyond the period calculated, and their co-operation being essential to act against the enemy with effect, no movement of importance was made on this side until about noon, when information having been obtained from a peasant that the French had neglected not only to destroy, but even to guard, the bridge of Tres

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Puentes (about a mile and half above that of Villodas), Kempt's brigade of the light division moved rapidly to the left, crossed the narrow structure at a run, followed by the 15th hussars in single files; and thus unperceived gained the enemy's bank of the river, actually in rear of their advanced posts occupying Villodas.

The divisions of Lord Dalhousie's column (3d and 7th) were shortly afterwards perceived winding down the hills on the left, directing their march towards the bridge of Mendoza, situated about half a mile higher up the stream than that of Tres Puentes. At this point the enemy, unconscious of the presence of Kempt's brigade on the left bank of the river, were prepared to offer a stout resistance; but Colonel Barnard*, heading his gallant riflemen, advanced at an accelerated pace along the edge of the stream, and coming suddenly upon their flank, threw them into irrecoverable disorder, and forced them to a precipitate retreat. The 3d and 7th divisions were thereby enabled to cross the river without loss.

The enemy posted along the lower part of the stream, observing that the left wing of their first line was giving way before Hill, and now hearing the firing in their own rear, hastily fell back upon the centre of their position; leaving, with extraordinary improvidence, the bridges of Nanclares and Villodas uninjured.

The 4th division immediately crossed by the former, and thus the four divisions of the British centre became massed in front of the weakest part of the enemy's line; which, dispositions were forth-

* Lieut.-General Sir A. F. Barnard, K.C.B.

with made to assail, whilst Hill, advancing from Sabijana, should attack their left. The distant rolling of artillery to the north at this time gave notice that Graham's corps was already warmly engaged.

Drouet perceiving where the danger was most to be apprehended, hastened with two divisions of the army of the centre to support the right of the first line, where King Joseph had already taken post to direct in person the operations. At this moment, however, when matters had already assumed an alarming appearance in his front, the King received notice from Comte Reille (commanding the army of Portugal on the enemy's extreme right) that he was attacked by a superior force. This rendered the danger imminent indeed; for should that general not be able to hold his ground, Vitoria would fall into Graham's hands, and the retreat of the left and centre of the French army be completely cut off. Augoyat, p. 159.

Drouet and Gazon were consequently ordered to fall back as expeditiously as possible to a range of heights in front of the village of Zuazo, about two miles in advance of Vitoria; where, under the protection of forty-five pieces of artillery placed in position by Joseph himself, it was hoped they might arrest the advance of the English right, and by thus drawing together the two wings of the French army enable them to afford each other support. Ibid.

This movement, though the ground was extremely favourable to a retreating army, being hilly, studded with woods and villages, and intersected with water-courses, was one of extreme difficulty under the circumstances of the moment, the battle being already hotly engaged along the

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whole line. The villages of Margarita and Hermandad, covering the enemy's flank on the Zadorra, were assailed by the 7th division and Colville's brigade of the 3d; whilst Lord Wellington, placing himself at the head of Kempt's brigade of the light division and the remainder of the 3d division, moved to the right along the front of their line, and by a vigorous assault carried the village of Ariñez, which the French had continued to hold with the view of giving time for their left to be withdrawn from the neighbourhood of Subijana. Their troops on that side being turned by this operation fled in the utmost confusion; but unfortunately the ground was such as not to admit of the employment of cavalry, and they escaped, *à la débandade*, without much loss.

Pellot Memoires, &c. p.6.

Augoyat, p. 159.

From this moment disorder and terror spread through the enemy's ranks from right to left. Their different corps became intermixed in their hurried flight, and all was confusion. The vivacity with which the British troops pushed on was such, that the prescribed position of Zuazo could not be occupied; nevertheless, the artillery placed there was drawn off, and under its fire the enemy attempted to re-form their discomfited columns behind the villages of Ali and Armentia, where the range of hills that bounds the plain of Vitoria to the S. W. offered a last position for covering the city.

The very disorder in which the enemy retired enabled them to outstrip their pursuers, and consequently gave them time to form up in some kind of order; and the sharpness of the cannonade now opened upon the 3d division (which having taken the lead in the pursuit, was the first at hand to close with the enemy) checked for a while

its advance. The 4th division, however, quickly came up; and pushing on resolutely against the enemy's left, they abandoned their position without a struggle, and, forced off the high road to Vitoria, fled, an unmanageable mob, across fields and ditches, where their artillery could not follow, towards Metanco, to gain Salvatierra; Joseph, on learning that the chaussée to Bayonne was already occupied by the left wing of the allies, having indicated that place (which lies on the road to Pamplona) as the rallying point of his defeated army.

Joseph now closed his regal and military career by getting into his carriage, and sending orders to Reille to cover the retreat as long as possible with the army of Portugal; — no very easy task to perform, considering that the British cavalry was already in his rear, and Graham's entire corps prepared to pass the Zadorra the moment he should abandon the bridges in his front.

The operations of the left wing of the allied army had not been crowned with the complete success which attended those of the right and centre. Sir Thomas Graham's corps quitted the banks of Bayas as the day broke, and advanced upon Vitoria by the road from Bilbao, supported by the army of Galicia, under General Giron. On approaching the Zadorra, the entire army of Portugal was discovered occupying the position to which it had been moved to support Sarrut's division. The village of Aranguiz had been abandoned; but the enemy were posted on a range of heights, which, stretching northward from that place along the right bank of the Zadorra, possesses a perfect command of the road from Bilbao to Vitoria, conducted along its southern foot. They also occupied in

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considerable force the village of Abechuco, situated on the road, and covering a bridge across the river; as well as Gomacho Mayor, higher up the stream, where there is likewise a bridge. The French cavalry was chiefly in reserve on the left bank of the Zadorra; and also the Hispano-French corps, which watched the great road to Bayonne.

General Oswald was immediately directed to dislodge the troops posted on the heights with Pack's Portugueze brigade and Longa's Spanish corps, supported by a brigade of light cavalry and his own division of infantry—the 5th. The enemy were driven from their position in very good style by the Portugueze and Spaniards; and Longa, pushing on over the heights, occupied the village of Gamarra Menor, situated in the valley of the Zadorra, on the north side of the range; whilst General Robinson's * brigade of the 5th division moved forward to attack Gamarra Mayor, standing about a mile lower down the valley, to the right.

The preservation of this village was of the utmost importance to the enemy, on account of the bridge which it covered; it was therefore strongly occupied. But in spite of the tremendous fire of musketry and artillery that greeted the assailants, it was carried at the point of the bayonet; and pressing forward they also gained possession of the bridge, and captured three guns; but reinforcements were quickly brought up, and after a desperate struggle the bridge remained in the hands of the enemy.

By the possession of the village, however, and of Gamarra Menor, the retreat of the enemy by the great road to France was interdicted; for,

* Lieut.-General Sir F. P. Robinson, K.C.B.

being conducted close along the left bank of the Zadorra, and hemmed in on the other side by a chain of rugged hills, this road was completely commanded within short musket range from the opposite bank of the river, of which the allies were now masters. But, to make matters sure, a detachment of Longa's troops had crossed the stream some miles higher up, and driven the enemy from Durana, on the high road itself; so that a great advantage had already been gained by Graham's operations. Not satisfied, however, with this measure of success, the gallant general determined if possible to force his way to Vitoria by the Bilbao road, and for this purpose advanced with the 1st division and Bradford's Portugueze brigade to attack the village of Abechuco, which covered the bridge of Arriaga. The village was carried by Col. Halkett's brigade of Germans, supported by the Portugueze and covered by a heavy cannonade. The light battalions pushed on to the bridge, where they captured three guns and a howitzer; but all their endeavours to force a passage were vain.

Whilst this attack was in progress, the enemy made strenuous efforts to recover Gamarra Mayor, but were gallantly repulsed by General Oswald's troops. They contented themselves, therefore, with the possession of the two bridges; upon both of which an overpowering fire of musketry and artillery was brought to converge, whilst strong reserves of cavalry were drawn up in the plain beyond: reinforcements were also sent to the troops on the right, which had been repulsed from Durana, to cover that flank from attack by the Bayonne road, and a reserve was likewise established on that side at Be-

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tonia. From the formidable nature of these preparations it was deemed unadvisable to make further attempts to force the passage of the river.

Such was the state of affairs in this quarter, when the left and centre of the French army having been driven past Vitoria, Reille, taken in flank and rear, was obliged to move off by his right to follow and protect the fugitives. His dispositions were ably made, and his retreat commenced with some order; but closely pressed on every side, and driven from position to position, with the loss of all his artillery, it soon became a rapid flight; and night alone saved his corps, as well as the rest of the French army, from entire destruction.

Thus ended the battle of Vitoria. The loss of the enemy in men bore no proportion to the extent of their defeat, for never was rout more thorough. They admit, however, to have had 6960 men killed, wounded, and taken; whilst other accounts, with greater appearance of truth, swell the amount to 10,000, including 800 prisoners.* One hundred and fifty-one pieces of cannon; countless stores of ammunition; the military chest, containing upwards of five millions of dollars; a stand of colours; the marshal's baton of the conqueror of Fleurus; the carriage of the crownless King of Spain, and all the baggage of his court and army — comprising the choicest plunder of the Peninsula, — fell into the victors' hands; and never, perhaps, were more extraordinary trophies left upon a battle-field: countesses and courtesans; state robes and court dresses; poodles, parrots, monkeys; champagne,

Augoyat, p. 160.

Col. Jones, vol. ii. 163.

* The loss of the allied army was 740 killed and 4174 wounded, of whom rather more than two thirds of each were British.

claret, and chambertin, — were alike abandoned to their fate: the hairdressers, comedians, paroquets and lavender-water, left by the Prince de Soubise in his precipitate flight from Gotha, fifty-six years before, furnish the nearest parallel in modern history.

No battle, perhaps, since John Sobieski drove the Mohammedan host from before the walls of Vienna, has exerted such influence over the destinies of Europe as that we have just described. It not only liberated Spain, but turned the scales at that moment held in equipoise by Austria's fears and inclinations, and thereby led to the formation of the formidable coalition which alone, probably, could have given the death-blow to Napoleon's schemes of universal empire.* The action itself was fought according to the truest principles of the art of strategy, the enemy's line of retreat having been gained without giving him a chance of acting upon that of the allies. The movements of concentration of the British general also furnish a lesson which will be studied by

* The battles of Lutzen and Bautzen (2d and 22d of May) had raised the ambitious hopes of Napoleon in the same proportion that they had lowered the pretensions of Russia; when Austria, stepping forward as a mediatrix, brought about an armistice, with the view of adjusting the terms of peace in a congress to be assembled at Prague. There is little reason to doubt the sincerity of Austria, in the first instance; but in the progress of the negotiations — or rather evasions — which followed, she saw that Napoleon was bent on continuing the war, and that she would no longer be allowed to remain a quiet spectator of the contest. Policy, and the sweet hopes of revenge, easily snapped the weak tie of relationship; but the recollection of Hohenlinden, Austerlitz, and Wagram still made the Emperor Francis hesitate on which side to range his formidable army. Intelligence of the battle of Vitoria reached him at Brandeis on the 8th of July, and the die was cast. The armistice, however, was prolonged to the 10th of August, but merely to gain time. Napoleon, meanwhile, became alarmed at the progress of Lord Wellington, and at last expressed his willingness to accept the terms offered by the allies, which, when originally proposed, he had disdainfully rejected. They chose to consider his acquiescence too late, and the contest was renewed and persevered in until his downfall was accomplished.

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all great commanders of future ages. But in a field ten miles in extent, even *his* eye could not be every where; and there can be but little doubt, if Giron's corps, or even a portion of it, had followed the movement of Longa's division, crossed the Zadorra above Gamarra Minor, and descended along the left bank of the stream by the great road from France, Reille could not have held the bridges of Gamarra Mayor and Abechuco, and would have been driven back on Vitoria before the French left and centre had reached that place;—in such a case the destruction of their entire army would have been inevitable.

This movement of Giron's corps would have been precisely similar to that seized with such happy quickness by Barnard after passing the bridge at Tres Puentes; or the Spanish general might have been directed to cross the Zadorra below Abechuco and turn Reille's left, which would have produced the same effect. As it was, his entire corps, 12,000 strong, was kept *en masse* in the rear, and did not fire a shot throughout the day. The enemy's generals, excepting Reille, showed little talent in the operations of this day. Joseph, it must be allowed, could not well avoid fighting, to save his baggage, stores, parks, and treasure so injudiciously halted at Vitoria, and to prevent the corps of Foy and Clauzel, marching on his flanks to form a junction, falling into his adversaries' hands: but his position was ill chosen; his troops were too much *en masse* in the centre, and not sufficiently strong on the left; and the height on which his right was posted on the 21st ought to have been occupied the day before, and intrenched. That this was the quarter wherein danger was most to be apprehended, a

knowledge of the principles of the art of war, as well as the character of his adversary's previous operations, ought clearly to have convinced him. But neither Joseph Buonaparte, nor his advisers, possessed that "first merit of a general," which consists in "correctly judging the talents and character of his opponent, —of penetrating his most secret views, and divining the object of his operations."

Jomini. Guerres de Frederic. vol. ii. 325.

CHAPTER XXXI.

RETREAT OF THE FRENCH ARMY. — THE LEFT WING OF THE ALLIES PROCEEDS AGAINST GENERAL FOY'S DIVISION, WHICH IS DRIVEN ACROSS THE BIDASOA. — LORD WELLINGTON MARCHES AGAINST CLAUZEL, WHO ESCAPES INTO FRANCE. — HIS LORDSHIP DECIDES ON BLOCKADING PAMPLONA. — CAPTURE OF PANCORVO. — THE ENEMY ARE DRIVEN FROM THE VALLEY OF BAZTAN. — PERVERSE CONDUCT OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT. — LORD WELLINGTON COMPLAINS OF THE WANT OF A SUFFICIENT NAVAL FORCE TO AID HIS OPERATIONS. — OPERATIONS OF THE ANGLO-SICILIAN ARMY. — OBSERVATIONS ON LORD WELLINGTON'S OPERATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO THE BATTLE OF VITORIA. — ARRIVAL OF SOULT TO COMMAND THE FRENCH ARMY. — PLANS OF LORD WELLINGTON, AND DIFFICULTIES THAT ATTENDED THEIR EXECUTION.

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MANY circumstances combined to save the French army from the utter annihilation threatened by so tremendous an overthrow. The day was already closing when the final blow was given; the victorious troops had been sixteen hours under arms, and had marched many miles before they came into action, and, famished and exhausted, were not proof against the temptation offered by the good cheer and rich spoils scattered for miles in all directions round Vitoria. They were the apples of Hippomenes, which enabled the fugitives to gain an advance that placed them beyond the reach of their pursuers. "It is an unrivalled army for fighting," writes its victorious commander, "if the soldiers can only be kept in their ranks during the battle; but it wants some of those qualities which are indispensable to enable a general to bring them into the field in the order in which an army ought to be to meet an enemy, or to take all the advan-

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. July 18.

tage to be derived from a victory." That the ranks of the allied army were much thinned by stragglers in search of plunder*, cannot be denied; though it is but justice to the brave troops to state, that the greater part of the immense booty captured on this occasion fell to the share of the non-combatants and followers of the army; who, it is said, divided amongst them nearly a million sterling in money. Unfortunately, however, in consequence of the dispersion of the muleteers and others in quest of plunder, the baggage, stores, and supplies of the army experienced a check at Vitoria, which, by an unavoidable reaction, influenced materially the advance of the troops, and prevented a very close pursuit of the enemy; whom also the weather befriended, for a heavy and incessant rain set in, which rendered the roads nearly impassable for artillery, or any kind of wheel-carriage.

The mass of the fugitive French host reached Pamplona on the 24th. Its last gun had been captured that morning by the British advanced guard, and a single howitzer was all it now possessed of the well-appointed parks of three large armies! Such was the state of disorganization and insubordination of the troops, that the governor of Pamplona closed the gates of the fortress against them.

The enemy, as usual, set fire to every house and village on the line of retreat, with the hope of checking the pursuit of the allies; but the heavy rain which fell saved them from the intended destruction. Reille had covered the retreat as far as Irurzun; but thence, crossing the mountains to San

Belmas, vol. i. 257.

* The diminution in the strength of the Anglo-Portugueze army from plunderers, on the 2d of July, was upwards of 4000 men! —*Despatches*, 2d July.

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Estevan, he proceeded to Irun to rally the division of General Foy, and secure the line of the Bidasoa. The remainder of the French army, after leaving a strong garrison in Pamplona, and provisioning that fortress to enable it to make a protracted defence, by forcibly seizing all the food and fuel in the neighbourhood, continued its retreat towards France on the morning of the 25th, taking the road by Roncesvalles to St. Jean-pied-de-Port. The light division was pushed on in pursuit that same day, and on the following morning Pamplona was invested.

Lord Wellington established his head-quarters at Irurzun on the 24th; and writing that day to his brother at Cadiz, says, "King Joseph and his army must quit Spain; indeed, they have already this night retired from Pamplona. I am trying to cut off some of the others, and I shall try to turn them all out of Spain before they can be reinforced." In execution of the intention thus expressed, Sir Thomas Graham, with the left wing of the army, had been directed to proceed from Salvatierra on the 23d, and, by a mountain track, gain Tolosa on the great road to France, and manœuvre to cut off Foy's division; whilst Giron's Spanish corps, which had previously been pushed on by the chaussée itself, endeavoured to come up with the convoy that had left Vitoria on the morning previous to the battle under the escort of Maucune's division. This latter general had, however, got too long a start to be overtaken; and Foy, on learning the result of the battle of the 21st, immediately made for Tolosa, and, abandoning some guns to Longa's Spaniards at Mondragon, reached Villa Franca (a few miles in advance of

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. June 24.

Tolosa, on the high road), just as the head of Graham's column was approaching that place on the side of Salvatierra. The enemy fell back, skirmishing, to a strong position in front of Tolosa, where they covered both the chaussée and road to Pamplona. Here they were vigorously attacked next morning, Giron's and Longa's troops, which had come up in the night, taking part in the action, and after an obstinate resistance were dislodged with some loss; when they drew off towards Irun.

The allied troops followed up their success with vigour, driving the enemy from all the strong positions they successively occupied to dispute their advance; and a brigade of the army of Galicia, led by Castaños, drove the French rear guard from its last position on the Spanish soil, and forced it across the Bidasoa by the bridge of Irun. June 29.

In consequence of these successful operations of the left wing, the garrison of Passages surrendered on the 30th, and on the following day the forts of Guetería and Castrò Urdiales were abandoned: their garrisons proceeding *by sea* to San Sebastian and Santoña respectively. Numerous ports were now, therefore, opened to the British shipping, whence easy access was gained to the interior of the country; an advantage which came to be sensibly felt in the course of the subsequent operations of the army.

Lord Wellington having thus freed himself from all apprehensions for his left, now turned his attention to Clauzel's corps on his rear and right, which, it will be remembered, King Joseph had sent repeated but perplexing orders to join him with all speed; first at Burgos, then on the Ebro, and lastly at Vitoria. Clauzel reached the Ebro

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at Logroño at the very time that Joseph, finding the allied army had turned his position on the upper part of that river, was commencing his retreat upon Vitoria. Ignorant, apparently, of all that was passing around him, Clauzel continued on the bank of the Ebro at San Vincente until the 20th; when learning, at length, the direction the king had taken with the main army, he pushed on with all possible expedition towards Vitoria to effect a junction. On the evening of the 21st, when within a few miles of that place, intelligence reached him of the disaster which, but an hour or two before, had befallen the French army, and that the city was occupied by the conquerors. He retraced his steps rapidly to Logroño; paused there for some days, as if irresolute what course to pursue, and then, descending the Ebro, reached Tudela on the 27th.

Belmas, vol. i. 258. Augoyat, p. 157.

Lord Wellington, however, understanding that Clauzel was still at Logroño late on the 25th, hoped, by moving rapidly towards the Lower Ebro, to be able to intercept his retreat. Leaving, therefore, Sir Rowland Hill to superintend the operations before Pamplona, his lordship marched on the 27th towards Tudela, with the 4th, 7th, and light divisions, and two brigades of cavalry; directing, at the same time, Lieut.-General H. Clinton, with the 5th and 6th divisions, the household brigade of cavalry, and Spanish horse of the army of Andalusia, to advance on Logroño by way of Salvatierra and Vitoria, to stop Clauzel's corps, if it should attempt to force a passage on that side.

His lordship had scarcely left Pamplona ere he learnt that the enemy had quitted Logroño, and taken the direction of Tudela. It was evident, there-

fore, that they would reach that place before him; and he immediately changed the direction of his march, and moved to Caseda, on the river Aragon, still hoping that Clauzel would give him an opportunity of falling upon him, by endeavouring to reach France by the road from Tudela to Jaca. The French general, however, had got notice of his adversary's movements, and continuing his retreat to the eastward reached Zaragoza on the 1st of July.

Lord Wellington desisted from further pursuit, considering it more advisable that Clauzel's corps, 14,000 strong, should be allowed to enter France, than that it should be compelled to join Suchet's army, — for their junction he could not now possibly prevent, — since of all things it was the least desirable that the enemy should be strengthened in Catalonia.

Clauzel availed himself of the *pont d'or* thus offered, and leaving all his artillery in the castle of Zaragoza to facilitate his movements, proceeded to Jaca, and crossed thence into France, directing his march by Oleron upon St. Jean-pied-de-Port. At this time Zaragoza was occupied by a detachment of 3000 men of the French army of Aragon (Suchet's), commanded by General Paris; who, finding the Spanish bands drawing round him on all sides, determined to sally forth before he should be completely hemmed in, and recover his communication with Suchet by Lerida; leaving only a garrison sufficient for the defence of the castle. Some of Mina's troops were, however, already in possession of the road by which he purposed retreating; and after a vain attempt to force a passage, he was obliged to turn northwards, and follow Clauzel's footsteps, gaining the gorges of the Pyrenees by

Augoyat, p. 160.

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Huesca and Jaca with the loss of all his artillery, the greater part of his baggage, and some of his men. The guerrilla chief Duran entered Zaragoza as soon as Paris had quitted the city, and immediately invested the castle; but he was superseded in the command of the besieging force a few days afterwards by Mina.

July 10.

The castle, and some other works which the enemy had thrown up to give greater security to the vast magazines collected there, held out until the 2d of August; and the loss of this place, with the stores and artillery it contained, proved a death-blow to a combined movement subsequently projected for the two great French armies against Lord Wellington.

Suchet's Mem. vol. ii. p. 474.

On the 1st of July Lord Wellington had again established his head-quarters in the vicinity of Pamplona. It had been his lordship's first intention to lay siege to this strong fortress, and, for want of an English battering train, he had contemplated using French guns and ammunition for the operation; but the absolute necessity that existed for besieging San Sebastian,—an undertaking which, besides of itself employing a considerable force, would require to be covered by a large corps posted on the French frontier, —and the further necessity which at this time arose for keeping a force at hand ready to move on the side of Aragon, in consequence of the failure of the Anglo-Sicilian corps before Tarragona, of which Lord Wellington received intelligence on 3d July, determined him to change his plans. Since so delicate an operation as that of a siege could only be entrusted to his best troops, for whom there already appeared to be ample employment, he resolved, therefore, to re-

duce the fortress by a strict blockade, and to employ the Spanish troops on this service. Accordingly, the different Anglo-Portugueze divisions relieved each other before Pamplona as they successively arrived from the movement against Clauzel, and finally were all pushed on towards the passes in the mountains in front, when the army of Andalusia came up, to which the blockade was then entrusted. July 15.

This army had experienced some short delay by having to invest the castle of Pancorvo, in which, as we have already noticed, the enemy had thrown a garrison of 700 men on abandoning the line of the Ebro. La Bisbal appeared before the place on the 27th June; carried the town and lower works of the castle on the following day; and on the 1st of July, having cut off its supply of water, compelled the fortress to surrender. In obedience to orders from Lord Wellington, the Conde then marched with his corps to Pamplona, and on the 15th relieved the troops from the duties of the blockade of that city.

Meanwhile, though the two wings of the enemy's army had been drawn back within the French territory, the centre seemed disposed to maintain itself in the valley of Baztan, on the Spanish side of the Pyrenean chain. This rich and secluded valley is encompassed on all sides by ranges of lofty mountains, amongst whose rocky ravines arise the numerous sources of the Bidasoa. Collecting in one body near San Estevan, at the western extremity of the Baztan, the stream from that point flows due north; overhung along its right bank by the cragged ridges of Echalar, Sta Barbara, Mandale, and Commissari, and along its left by the rugged ramifi-

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cations of the mountain of the Five Crowns, or of La Haya, and the heights of S^{n} Marcial. The bridge of Irun crosses it at the northern foot of these last-named heights, and thenceforth it flows through an open valley to the sea, a distance of several miles. During the latter part of its course, the Bidasoa forms the boundary line of France and Spain.

The extreme fertility of the Baztan alone rendered it worth preserving; but it besides furnished the enemy with a favourable advanced position for undertaking operations against either the force assembled on the Lower Bidasoa to cover the projected siege of San Sebastian, or against that employed in covering the blockade of Pamplona, the only good road from Bayonne to that city being conducted by the pass of Maya, along the eastern side of the valley.

Lord Wellington determined, therefore, to dislodge the enemy from this favourable position, whilst preparations were making for the siege of San Sebastian; and on the 4th of July Sir Rowland Hill, with two British and two Portugueze brigades, crossed from the valley of Lanz into that of Baztan, and commenced operations. The enemy were in greater force than had been expected, and the country abounded in strong positions; in consequence of which Lord Wellington (who arrived himself on the following day) ordered up the 7th division to the support of Hill's troops. The enemy, however, contested the ground but feebly, retiring from position to position when dispositions were made to attack them, and finally fell back upon the pass of Maya, whence they escaped into France on the night of the 7th.

San Sebastian had been blockaded since the lat-

ter end of June; and the battering train having been brought round from Bilbao to Passages, with a view to the siege of that fortress, Lord Wellington proceeded to the left, to superintend the operations in progress on that side, fixing his head-quarters at Hernani. Sir Thomas Graham was charged with the direction of the siege, with the 1st and 5th divisions and two Portugueze brigades; and General Mendizabel's Spanish corps being now relieved from the blockade it had hitherto maintained, was directed to invest Santoña, to prevent the escape of the garrison.

July 11.

Not to break the thread of the military operations which the British commander was directing with such consummate skill at this interesting period, we have abstained from noticing the various other matters which had at the same time occupied his attention. For, because we see him with such unwearied activity flying from post to post, wherever danger was to be apprehended, or his presence required, — now directing the movements against Clauzel on the right, now back again towards the centre, turning Gazan out of the valley of Baztan; then giving directions in person for the conduct of the siege of San Sebastian on the extreme left,— we must not lead our readers to suppose that these matters, all-important as they were, engaged his whole time, or that the Spanish government ceased to thwart and perplex him by their inexplicable conduct: on the contrary, as if considering this period — when the operations of the army were becoming every moment more complicated, and it was more than ever necessary the commander-in-chief should not be interfered with in his dispositions — as that best suited for making changes in

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the arrangements agreed upon for the command of the Spanish forces, they, without consulting Lord Wellington, and without paying the slightest attention to the representations of Sir Henry Wellesley, ordered General Castaños to repair to Cadiz, and superseded Giron in the command of the army of Galicia. Lord Wellington addressed a strong remonstrance to the minister of war on this subject; representing, in the first place, the injustice done to those officers, — one of whom "had served his country in close concert with himself for the last three years, and in the whole course of that time had never differed in opinion with him on any subject of importance;" whilst the other, since he had been under his command, "had conducted himself entirely to his satisfaction;" and complaining, secondly, of this fresh breach of the engagements entered into with himself, on the faith of which alone, he had been induced to accept the command of the Spanish army. His lordship, with excusable warmth, thus concludes his letter: —

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. July 2.

"Your excellency knows also that this is not the first time that the engagements solemnly entered into with me, after full and repeated discussions, have been broken; and nobody knows better than your excellency the inconvenience to the service which resulted. You are likewise aware of my disposition and desire still to serve the Spanish nation as far as in my power. There are limits, however, to forbearance and submission to injury; and I confess that I feel that I have been most unworthily treated in those transactions by the Spanish government, even as a gentleman.

"It is not my habit, nor do I feel inclined, to make a parade of my services to the Spanish nation; but I must say that I have never abused the powers with which the Government and the Cortes have intrusted me in any the most trifling instance, nor have ever used them for any purpose excepting to forward the public service."

Intrigue had, as usual, been at work to effect the removal of these two officers. A violent dispute had at this time arisen between the Cortes and the clergy; and the thoughts of the former were far more intent on bringing the church under subjection, and on punishing those whom they considered its supporters, than on completing the liberation of their country by maintaining their armies in an efficient state.

"I judge from the measures adopted," (writes Lord Wellington to Sir Henry Wellesley on this subject,) "that it is intended to carry on the war against the bishops in Galicia, for which I conclude that Castaños and Giron are not considered fit instruments. I wish that you would take the same opportunity of pointing out to these gentlemen" (Arguelles, Toreno, and others of the liberal party) "the danger and imprudence of such measures. It will now rest with the Archbishop of Santiago whether or not we shall have a civil war in our rear. If we have, we must take leave of all our communications and our supplies of all descriptions, and we shall soon feel the consequences. To be sure it will be droll enough if, having commenced the war in Spain, and continued it to this moment, with the clergy and people in our favor and against the French, they and we were to change sides, and after all our victories we should be compelled to withdraw by having the clergy and people against us."

But it was not of the perverse Spanish government only that Lord Wellington had to complain at this important juncture; for, notwithstanding the warning he had given so long beforehand, of the probability of his requiring the co-operation of a naval force on the north coast of Spain, no steps had yet been taken to collect there such a squadron as would be able to ensure the communication between Lisbon and the ports of Biscay.

The inconvenience resulting from this dilatoriness came now to be sensibly felt; for not only, as we have seen, had the French troops at Castro and

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Gueteria been able to evacuate those places, and proceed to reinforce the garrisons of other fortresses on the coast, but a constant communication continued to be kept up by sea between San Sebastian and Bayonne; and whilst ammunition in abundance was embarked in the Tagus, waiting only for a convoy to bring it round to Santander, yet so straitened was the army for ball cartridge that what had been captured from the enemy, though their muskets were of a smaller calibre than those of the allied troops, was obliged to be carried in reserve, lest there should be an absolute want in the day of battle. Money and stores of every description were also likely to be soon required. Well might his lordship, therefore, write to Earl Bathurst. —

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. July 10.

"I am certain that it will not be denied that since Great Britain has been a naval power, a British army has never been left in such a situation, and that, at a moment when it is most important to us to preserve, and to the enemy to interrupt, the communication by the coast. If they only take the ship with our shoes, we must halt for six weeks."

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. July 19.

Up to the 19th of July, however, only two or three small vessels had arrived on the coast to carry despatches; and to maintain the blockade, nothing but the Surveillante frigate.

Various other matters had likewise occupied Lord Wellington's attention during the progress of his active operations in the field since the opening of the campaign. Thus we find that it was in contemplation to withdraw the force employed in causing a diversion in favour of the main army on the eastern coast of Spain, and to send it back to Sicily; some alarm being felt for the safety of that island. Again also the project was revived of

sending the Anglo-Sicilian army to Italy to act in concert with Murat, whom the allies were now endeavouring to detach from his alliance with France. Lord Wellington's opinion in regard to the first of these measures, is given with characteristic brevity in the following dry official letter to Lord W. Bentinck: —

"My Lord,

"In answer to your Lordship's despatch of the 20th (No. 3.), I have to observe, that I conceive that the island of Sicily is at present in no danger whatever. Gurwood. Despatches, &c. July 1.

"I have the honor to be, &c."

The other matter his lordship considered more worthy of attention; and, in his correspondence on this subject, his foresight is very remarkably evinced.

"I entertain no doubt," (he writes to Lord William Bentinck,) "that the English and Murat, or the English and any other power that could put 30,000 or 40,000 men in the field, would create a revolution in Italy. Ibid.

"It is very difficult to form an opinion of Murat's sincerity; but I am quite certain he will do nothing unless the Emperor of Austria should take a line with the allies. In that case he will probably conclude with you. If he should conclude with you, I authorize you to embark from Spain all your Anglo-Sicilian corps, and take them where you please, in order to carry into execution your treaty with Murat."

At this period Lord Wellington was sounded as to his inclination to hold a command in Germany; to which flattering proposal he thus modestly alludes, in a letter to Earl Bathurst: —

"In regard to my going to Germany, I am the Prince Regent's servant, and will do whatever he and his government please. But I would beg them to recollect that the great advantages which I enjoy, here consist in the confidence that every body feels that I am doing what is right; which advantage I should not enjoy, for a time at least, in Germany. Many might be found to conduct matters as Ibid. July 12.

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well as I can, both here and in Germany; but nobody would enjoy the same advantage here, and I should be no better than another in Germany. If a British army should be left in the Peninsula, therefore, it is best that I should remain with it."

July 1. On Lord Wellington's return to his head-quarters at Huarte from directing the movements against Clauzel, he received despatches from Lieut.-General Sir John Murray, reporting the operations of the Anglo-Sicilian army under his command. Sir John, in pursuance of his lordship's instructions, had embarked his corps at Alicante on the 28th of May; and proceeding to Tarragona, invested that place on the 3d of June. A detachment under Lieut.-Colonel Provost had been sent on the previous day to attack Fort San Felipe, at the Col de Balaguer; which remarkably strong post surrendered on the 7th, and by its capture the only road whereby an army could advance with artillery from the westward was effectually barred. The siege of Tarragona meanwhile had been proceeding with activity, and on the 8th a breach was made in a detached work, whose capture, it was thought, would insure the fall of the place; but the necessary preparations for following up the attack not being yet completed, the assault of this outwork was deferred until the 11th: on which day intelligence was received that Suchet on one side, and General Maurice Mathieu on another, having between them 20,000 men, were advancing by forced marches to the relief of the place. Sir John Murray not having with him *more* than that number of troops (including Copon's 8000 men of the army of Catalonia), and but 4500 of that number being English and Germans, decided on re-embarking his army forthwith; and perhaps, considering the composition of his army, and comparing its state

of efficiency with that of his adversary, he was right in declining the contest. But, unfortunately, Sir John deemed it necessary for the safety of his army to embark in such haste that the battering guns in the advanced works were abandoned, though not a French soldier had yet appeared in sight! In his report, Sir John Murray candidly admitted that Admiral Hollowell had given it as his opinion that the guns might have been brought off by remaining another night. "This, however, was a risk he did not wish to run for so trifling an object;" and thus the Anglo-Sicilian army was, for a considerable time at least, deprived of the means of attacking any other maritime fortress and obtaining a secure base of operations; whilst, on the other hand, Suchet, relieved from all fear of losing any of these points, had it now in his power to operate with a large portion of his force against the right and rear of the main allied army.

Sir John Murray, in further justification of his decision not to risk an action, quoted the 13th article of Lord Wellington's "instructions for the conduct of the campaign on the eastern coast."*

This unfortunate affair gave Lord Wellington much annoyance; but as Lord William Bentinck had arrived on the 19th of June to assume the command of the Anglo-Sicilian army, and had returned with it to Alicante, he hoped "that things would go on better;" and in the meantime he declined giving any opinion as to the proceedings of Sir John Murray (as requested by that officer) until the details should be before him. For though Sir John's reports were of extraordinary length, they did not contain any account of his operations; nor

* Given at page 282.

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did they state any one *positive fact*, excepting that he had re-embarked his army, leaving his battering guns behind.

On receiving, however, a detailed account of Sir John Murray's ill-conducted operations, Lord Wellington did not conceal his dissatisfaction; for not only had the evident meaning of his lordship's instructions been perverted to screen the disgraceful precipitation with which the siege of Tarragona had been raised, — Sir John having applied to his own proceedings an article of the "instructions," which evidently referred only to the Spanish generals, — but the very article wherein the course to be pursued in the event of the necessity arising for abandoning the attempt on Tarragona was particularly pointed out, had been altogether disregarded: Sir John, instead of following his instructions by returning immediately to Valencia to secure what might have been gained by the Spaniards in that kingdom during the absence of Suchet, or by landing to the northward of the Xucar, placing himself in the rear of Harispe's corps left to make head against the Duque del Parque and Elio, had disembarked his troops again at the Col de Balaguer; and thus drawn the enemy once more to the south, and rendered the whole plan of non-effect.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. July 19.

His lordship, therefore, on a consideration of all the circumstances of the case, recommended that, in the event of Lord William Bentinck's return to Sicily being called for, Sir John Murray should not again be placed in the command of the army employed on the eastern coast of Spain.*

* Lieut.-General Sir J. Murray was subsequently arraigned before a court-martial for his conduct during these operations. He was pronounced to have committed an error of judgment in abandoning his artillery, but acquitted of misconduct in any other respect.

Lord William Bentinck brought the army back to Alicante; and shortly after his arrival at that place, receiving intelligence of the battle of Vitoria, moved forward with as little delay as possible in pursuit of Suchet; whom that important event, though the full extent of Joseph's disaster was concealed from him, had decided to fall back upon the Ebro.

Suchet's Memoirs.

The French marshal, informed that Clauzel had joined General Paris at Zaragoza with 14,000 men, pressed his march with the hope of being able to combine some operation with those generals against Lord Wellington; but learning subsequently that the former had retired to Jaca, and that the latter was shut up in Zaragoza, he continued his retreat along the coast, and took post behind the Lobregat.

The Anglo-Sicilian army, following Suchet's movements, reached Valencia on the 13th July; and leaving General Elio's Spanish corps to observe Murviedro, into which Suchet had thrown ample stores and a strong garrison, Lord William Bentinck pushed on with the remainder of his force by the coast road towards the Ebro, crossed that river by boat bridges at Amposta in the last days of July, and on the 1st of August invested Tarragona. But the French marshal, collecting all his disposable troops, once more advanced to the relief of the place, and his numerical superiority was too great to warrant Lord William's hazarding an action; the siege was accordingly raised on the night of the 15th, and the Anglo-Sicilian army fell back to Cambills. Suchet immediately blew up all the works, and destroyed the artillery and stores collected at Tarragona, and then again retired behind the Lobregat; and the British general, sending Del

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Parque's army to Zaragoza, and a division of his own to reinforce Elio's corps, now blockading Tolosa, took up a position with the remainder of his force at Villa Franca to observe the enemy, pushing his posts forward towards the Lobregat to communicate with Copon's army hanging on the enemy's right flank about Martorell.

We have carried our brief notice of the operations of the contending armies on the eastern coast of the Peninsula some way beyond the period to which our narrative of the more stirring events passing on the confines of France has been brought, that the account of those more important operations might not be uselessly interrupted. For the sole object of the Anglo-Sicilian corps on the eastern coast being to give employment to Marshal Suchet — a service which, as we have seen, it effectually performed, though its operations in other respects afforded little matter to be proud of — it was requisite, for the clear understanding of Lord Wellington's plans and movements, that our readers should know what were the relative positions of the belligerents in that quarter during the progress of his lordship's operations in the north.

We may here appropriately observe, that the operations of the British general subsequent to the battle of Vitoria have been most unjustly condemned by various French military writers. Having, these critics maintain, cut his adversary off from the great road to Bayonne, Lord Wellington ought to have pushed on rapidly by that route, and carried the war at once into the south of France. "The wish," in this case, was clearly "father to the thought;" since nothing, we should conceive, could possibly have given the French generals

greater pleasure than to have seen the allied army pushed forward, without magazines, into the narrow *coupe-gorge* that presents itself between the Bidasoa and Adour. Hemmed in on one side by the sea, by impassable mountains on the other; leaving in his rear two of the strongest fortresses in Spain still occupied by the enemy, and the army of Suchet on the Ebro; and having in his front Bayonne and St. Jean-pied-de-Port to bar the entrance into France; — even the situation of Melas at Alessandria, or of Mack at Ulm, would have been enviable compared with that in which the British general would have thus found himself placed.

We have seen that, on the 30th of June, that is in eight days after the battle of Vitoria, Lord Wellington received intelligence of the unfavourable result of the attempt on Tarragona, and of the return of the Anglo-Sicilian army to Alicante. Suchet's army had thus become available to act upon his rear, and at that same date Clauzel was still at Zaragoza with 14,000 men: — a force of itself quite sufficient to rout La Bisbal's corps, relieve Pamplona, and fall upon the rear of the allied army. Lord Wellington must, therefore, have left one half of the Anglo-Portuguèze army, at least, to watch Clauzel and Suchet, and blockade Pamplona and San Sebastian, whilst with the other half he advanced to the Adour; and the result of such an operation against a skilful adversary would, most assuredly, have been fatal to the allied army; since, leaving a corps to dispute the passage of the rivers Nivelle, Nive, and Adour — and Reille's corps was actually prepared to do so, — his opponent, advancing rapidly by the passes of Roncesvalles, would have gained the magazines and com-

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munications of the allied army; have fallen upon its detached corps in detail; and compelled the main body to return in all haste and fight a battle under every disadvantage, to recover its line of operations.

Let it not be supposed that these are mere visionary notions; for, as we shall see, Soult, who now arrived to command the French army, (even though his adversary was not to be drawn into the snare,) thought that the project to which we have alluded was still so feasible that he endeavoured to carry it into execution; and but for the foresight, skill, and activity of his opponent, his plan would to a certain extent have succeeded.

The news of the passage of the Ebro, which reached the Imperial head-quarters on the 4th of July, convinced Napoleon of the error he had committed in trusting the conduct of the Peninsular war to the hands of Marshal Jourdan; and, as the only chance of turning the tide of success, the Duke of Dalmatia, invested with uncontrolled power, and the title of "Lieutenant of the Emperor," was despatched from Dresden to take once more the command of the army opposed to Lord Wellington, thenceforth most improperly called the "army of Spain."

July 23. Soult arrived at Bayonne on the 12th July; and, in a proclamation replete with the bombast of the Buonaparte school, informed his troops that the reverses they had experienced were occasioned solely by the imbecility and pusillanimous conduct of his predecessor; that he partook of their grief, disappointment, and indignation; knew that the blame of their present situation rested altogether with others; and called upon them to have the

merit of repairing it, and second him in obeying their Emperor's order, "to dislodge the enemy from the lofty heights, whence they were enabled presumptuously to look down upon the fertile fields of France; and drive them across the Ebro."—"Let the account of our success be dated from Vitoria, and the birthday of our Emperor (15th August) be celebrated in that city."

But though the language of Soult was confident, he felt the necessity of preparing a salve for the wound he inwardly dreaded his reputation might receive if, after this programme, his performances should fall short of his threats; and accordingly we now, for the first time, find a French general openly admitting that Lord Wellington was a great commander.

"Let us not, however," (he says in this document,) "defraud the enemy of the praise to which he is entitled. The dispositions and arrangements of their general have been prompt, skilful, and consecutive. The valor and steadiness of his troops have been commendable. Yet do not forget that it is to the benefit of your example they owe their present military character; and that whenever the relative duties of a French general and his troops have been ably fulfilled, their enemies have usually had no other resource than flight."

A few days before this eulogy was penned by his adversary, Lord Wellington had received from his sovereign a yet more gratifying assurance of the estimation in which his abilities were held; His Royal Highness the Prince Regent having, in the most flattering terms, announced to him his promotion to the rank of Field Marshal.

The posture of affairs in Germany at this juncture furnished additional reasons — had any been wanting — for the prudent determination of Lord Wellington *not* to carry the war into France, until

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he had strengthened his position in the Pyrenees by the reduction of the fortresses in his rear. For the French emperor — doubtless with the view of sowing the seeds of discord between Great Britain and her allies in the north of Europe — had stipulated that deputies from the "King of Spain" (meaning his brother), and the "insurgent Spaniards," should be admitted to the congress about to assemble at Prague to arrange the terms of peace; and Lord Wellington scarcely anticipating the conquest the hopes of the Emperor of Austria would achieve over his fears, and feeling assured that England would never become a party to any treaty which should not guarantee the integrity of the Spanish monarchy, saw at once that this artful proposal might lead to the conclusion of a peace between France and the northern powers, to the exclusion of Great Britain, and that the whole force of the French empire might shortly, therefore, be directed against his army.

This latter consideration was of itself sufficiently weighty to deter Lord Wellington from carrying his army into France, there appearing to be but slight chance of his being able to obtain a firm footing in that country before overwhelming numbers might be marched against him; since Bayonne was likely to make a more protracted resistance than San Sebastian; and until it fell, his line of operations would have been long, and liable to interruption: and on the preservation of his communications with Spain the supply of his army with stores and ammunition would altogether have depended, if not also its subsistence; for at that period the whole population of the country would probably have risen against their invaders. Moreover, the neigh-

bourhood of Bayonne is by no means fertile; and to have blockaded that fortress, and advanced further into the interior, would have reduced the strength of his army to about 25,000 men! What, therefore, we may ask, would have been the situation of the allied army, had a peace been concluded between France and the northern powers of Europe to the exclusion of England, under such circumstances!

On the other hand, by reducing the fortresses of San Sebastian and Pamplona, he hoped, whatever turn affairs might take in Germany, that he should be able to hold his ground on the Spanish frontier, against almost any force that could be directed against him; as behind the strong barrier of the Pyrenees, the Spanish troops might be rendered more available than they had hitherto been.

Nevertheless the task which we may say Lord Wellington thus found himself compelled to undertake was by no means easy of accomplishment; the position of the two fortresses, — the nature of the ground in their front, — and the proximity of the enemy, occupying a strong defensive position, — being all peculiarly unfavourable to the extended operations the allied army would necessarily have to embrace; for not only is the actual distance between San Sebastian and Pamplona greater than that of either of those fortresses from the enemy's posts, but in point of fact they are separated by the main chain of the Pyrenees, which stretches southward into Spain, between the sources of the Bidasoa and Arga. Now it was evident that San Sebastian could not be attacked, unless at the same time Pamplona in its rear should be blockaded, and each of the various passes in the Pyrenees on its

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flank guarded by a force strong enough to dispute the enemy's advance until, by a general movement of concentration, a sufficient body of troops could be assembled in its rear to cover the point towards which the enemy's efforts might be directed, whether Pamplona or San Sebastian. The extreme asperity of the country, the want of lateral communications between the roads leading down from the mountains into Spain, and above all the number of passes to be guarded, tended to render this movement of concentration one of extreme difficulty; and if ill-directed, the different divisions would be exposed to be beaten in detail.

On the other hand, the investment of San Sebastian could not be deferred until the reduction of Pamplona had been effected, without abandoning the advantages of having isolated that fortress; of having dispossesed the enemy of some very strong ground which it might be difficult to recover; and without giving them the means of again advancing by the great road to Vitoria, and enabling them to cut the communication between the corps besieging Pamplona and Bilbao: at which port the base of operations of the allied army was now established.

Further, the immediate possession of San Sebastian was of vast importance on other grounds; for Lord Wellington foresaw that an immense saving of expense would be thereby effected, since he should then be able to sever the communication of the army with Portugal and the distant parts of the north of Spain, and have all its principal magazines and hospitals in England.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. July 25.

In resolving to undertake this peculiarly difficult double operation, our great commander did not for

a moment, however, entertain the dangerous illusion that a chain of mountains offers a secure line of defence if all the passes be guarded. On the contrary, he well knew that it is, of all defensive lines, perhaps the most dangerous, since it occasions a minute subdivision of the army, and renders the lateral movements of these detached bodies to each other's support extremely difficult; whilst, on the other hand, the operations of the enemy being masked, they are enabled to assemble in force in front of any one pass, overwhelm its defenders, and — if their retreat be not judiciously directed, and every favourable position obstinately disputed, to afford time for the arrival of support — push on to the important point, and beat in detail their adversaries' scattered divisions as they come successively up.

Indeed, experience has proved that all mountain passes may be turned. It was a saying of Lord Wellington's, that "where a man could pass a mule could pass, and where a mule could pass a gun could pass;" and Napoleon, on the same subject, declared that "an army could pass wherever a man could plant his foot:" an assertion of which his own passage of the St. Bernard, Suwarof's of the St. Gothard, and Soult's of the Sierra Morena, had already proved the truth.

Lord Wellington's hopes of offering a successful resistance were grounded on the confidence he felt that his troops would make so obstinate a stand at whatever points the enemy might present themselves to force a passage, that he should have time by a retrograde movement of concentration, on whichever of the two invested fortresses the enemy might direct their march, to effect the junction of a

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sufficient number of the unavoidably scattered divisions of his army to arrest their forward movement before any mischief could be done; and then, by directing other troops on the enemy's flanks, compel them to a disastrous retreat. On this subject, he thus writes confidently to Earl Bathurst,—

Despatches, &c. July 12.

"I think I can hold the Pyrenees as easily as I can Portugal."

CHAPTER XXXII.

POSITION OF THE ALLIED FORCES. — SIEGE OF SAN SEBASTIAN. — ADVANCE OF MARSHAL SOULT TO RAISE THE BLOCKADE OF PAMPLONA. — PROJECTS OF THE FRENCH COMMANDER. — ATTACK ON THE PASS OF RONCESVALLES. — RETREAT OF THE RIGHT WING OF THE ALLIED ARMY. — LORD WELLINGTON PROCEEDS TO THE POINT OF ATTACK. — BATTLE OF SORAUREN. — ATTACK ON THE PASS OF MAYA. — THE ALLIED CENTRE FALLS BACK TO UNITE WITH THE RIGHT WING. — LORD WELLINGTON ANTICIPATES SOULT'S ATTACK, AND DEFEATS THE FRENCH LEFT, WHILST SIR R. HILL HOLDS THEIR RIGHT IN CHECK. — ROUT OF THE FRENCH ARMY. — CRITICAL POSITION OF SOULT. — HE ESCAPES INTO FRANCE BY THE PASS OF ECHALAR. — THE ALLIED ARMY RESUMES ITS POSITIONS. — PROPOSAL OF THE DUC DE BERRI TO JOIN LORD WELLINGTON. — HIS LORDSHIP'S OPINION ON THAT SUBJECT.

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RETURNING to our narrative, it will be necessary for the clear understanding of the interesting movements now on the eve of execution, to point out the positions occupied by the various corps of the allied army, to effect the twofold object Lord Wellington had undertaken.

Sir Thomas Graham, with the 1st and 5th divisions and two Portugueze brigades of infantry, was charged with the direction of the siege of San Sebastian; to cover which, on the side of France, four divisions of the 4th Spanish army, under General Giron, were posted on the left bank of the Bidasoa, extending from the heights of San Marcial to the sea at Fuenterabia. Longa's division of this army kept up the communication between these troops — forming the left wing of the allied army — and the left centre, composed of the light and 7th divisions; which, having been pushed

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across the Bidasoa on the 15th, now occupied the pass of Echalar, Vera, and the heights of Sta Barbara. The 6th division was posted in reserve at San Estevan, ready to move either to the support of these troops, or of the right centre, composed of Amarante's Portugueze and two brigades of the 2d British division, which, under the command of Sir Rowland Hill, occupied the valley of Baztan. The principal passes at the head of this valley — Maya, Aretesque, &c. — were held by the British troops; those on its eastern flank by the Portugueze, of whom a brigade under Major-General Campbell was advanced within the French territory, occupying Los Alduides, and communicating by its right with Roncesvalles. The important pass of that name, by which the road from St. Jean-pied-de-Port to Pamplona traverses the mountains, and another on its right, were guarded by General Byng's brigade of the 2d division and Morillo's Spaniards, supported by the 4th division at Viscaret. The 3d division was at Olague in the valley of Lanz, ready to reinforce either the above-mentioned troops forming the right wing, or those composing the right centre of the army.

The Conde de la Bisbal, with the army of reserve of Andalusia, maintained the blockade of Pamplona (to facilitate which, and prevent the escape of the garrison, redoubts, intrenchments, abattis, and other impediments had been thrown up on all sides); and the allied cavalry, under Sir Stapleton Cotton, was distributed in cantonments in rear of that fortress, towards Tafalla, as well for the sake of subsistence, as to be at hand to take part in the operations on the only side where its services could be rendered available.

At the same time the guerrilla bands of Duran and Mina covered, as we have seen, the right flank and rear of the allied army, being engaged in besieging the castle of Zaragoza and watching the movements of Marshal Suchet; against whom Lord Wellington proposed marching with a portion of his army, should he decide on advancing into Aragon. Despatches &c. Lesaca, July 19.

These positions were as good as could have been taken, considering the double operation Lord Wellington had in hand; but nevertheless the roads connecting the several divisions laterally, were circuitous and bad, and offered the enemy great advantages for acting offensively, the transverse communications on the French side of the mountains being better, shorter, and more numerous.

"Nothing," (says a graphic writer, to whose pages we are already much indebted,)— "nothing can be imagined more bold and grand than the mountain region now occupied by the troops.... Mountains are crowded together in all variety of form: here, crested with grey and jagged rocks; there, rounded and green upon their summits, to which by long and toilsome paths a way is won. On all sides are found ravines and torrents, — wild, rugged, and filled with fragments of rock. The roads are narrow and stony; the fastnesses into which they wind are black and shadowy; and he that passes them in solitude hears but the dash of waters and the screams of eagles." Sherer. Memoirs, &c. vol. ii. p. 243.

Lord Wellington devoted much of his time to reconnoitring and studying the features of this wild region, directing repairs where necessary to the rude bridges that spanned the mountain torrents, and causing improvements to be made in the rough roads connecting the different posts of his extended line. On the 11th of July he proceeded to the neighbourhood of San Sebastian to consult with the commanding officers of artillery and engineers

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as to the best mode of attack to be adopted for the reduction of that fortress, the operation presenting greater difficulties than had been anticipated; and for a few days fixed his head-quarters at Hernani.

The town of San Sebastian stands on a low narrow isthmus, which connects a rocky promontory with the hilly country extending between the rivers Urumea and Orio. The rugged peninsula stretches seawards but little beyond the general run of the coast, nevertheless on either side a well-sheltered bay is formed; and into that on the eastern side of the town the first of the above-named rivers empties itself. A castle, or citadel, occupies the crest of the promontory, covering the town from attack towards the sea, and possessing a perfect command of the two harbours. The two sea walls of the town are ill constructed, being flanked only by projecting towers; but on the side of the isthmus, which is but 500 yards wide, a single front of fortification stretches from bay to bay, and is covered by a horn-work.

The main wall, or curtain, of this front could, however, be completely enfiladed from some sand-hills on the right bank of the Urumea, at the distance of 600 yards; whence also the eastern sea wall of the town could, at low water, be seen to its base. It was observed also, that when the tide was out a passable communication was left dry round the angle in which the sea wall meets the land front. To abridge, therefore, the labours of the siege, it was decided to batter the exposed wall from these sand-hills; and as soon as a practicable breach should be made, to storm it at the favourable moment of the tide, by pushing a column

rapidly along the land front, between the sea and the eastern branch of the horn-work;—trusting to celerity of movement, and means to be adopted to keep under the enemy's fire and call off their attention, to save it from any great loss during this daring operation.

Lord Wellington having thus decided on the plan to be followed, and expecting that an attempt would be made to raise the siege, moved his head-quarters on the 14th to San Estevan, and on the 16th to Lesaca, to be at hand to direct the necessary movements to repel the enemy.

The siege was now pushed with vigour; batteries were thrown up on the sand-hills, and also against a fortified convent and redoubt, situated about 500 yards in advance of the horn-work; of which it was requisite to obtain possession, before the place itself could be attacked as proposed. These advanced works were gallantly stormed and carried on the morning of the 17th; and on the 20th, the breaching batteries opened upon the sea wall.

Lord Wellington meanwhile became very urgent that the place should be stormed as soon as possible, having ascertained that the enemy's posts in front of Giron's corps had been considerably weakened, and learning also from various sources, that the French army was collecting in front of his right, at St. Jean-pied-de-Port; though boat bridges were preparing at Urogne, between the Nivelle and Bidasoa, opposite the extreme left of the allied army. His lordship supposed, therefore, that Marshal Soult's object was to draw his attention towards the pass of Roncesvalles, whilst he made an attempt to force the position of the left wing of the allied

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army on the Bidasoa, and raise the siege of San Sebastian.

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Despatches, &c. July 20.

La Bisbal at the same time wrote to acquaint his lordship that he was under apprehension of attack on the side of Aragon, and might be compelled to raise the blockade of Pamplona. Of this Lord Wellington was well assured there was no fear; but every thing made him anxious to obtain possession of San Sebastian without delay, as well for the security of the left flank of his defensive line, as to simplify his operations. His lordship had hoped that the assault would be made on the 24th, two breaches having been reported practicable on the previous afternoon. In consequence, however, of the houses immediately in their rear being on fire, it was deemed advisable to postpone the attack until the following morning; and in the mean time the guns were turned to make a third breach, to the left of those already effected, which also was considered practicable that evening.

On the morning of the 25th, before day-break, 2000 men issued from the trenches, and advanced rapidly to the assault. The foot of the sea wall was reached without much loss, a mine having been sprung under the glacis of the horn-work, which created great confusion amongst the enemy, and for the moment paralyzed their fire; but, on arriving at the breaches, the assailants were so warmly received that every bold attempt to mount the crumbling ruins was baffled. The space between the walls and the sea was too narrow to admit of any formation of the troops to keep down the musketry fire from the breaches themselves; and there was not yet sufficient light to enable the guns in the batteries to play upon the artillery of the place

Jones's Sieges, vol. ii. 42.

in aid of the assault, as had been proposed. On the other hand, the enemy's guns on the flanking towers of the sea wall not having been silenced, directed volleys of grape with murderous precision on the dense and disorderly crowd collected at the foot of the breaches; whilst from the castle hill on one side, and the eastern branch of the horn-work on the other, showers of grenades and shells were poured upon the assailants with equally destructive effect.

The officer of engineers * who led, and the officer who commanded † the advanced party of the column directed to storm the main breach, succeeded in effecting an entrance to the town, followed by a few of the troops; but their daring example was of little avail. The former of these gallant officers was severely wounded and taken prisoner, the latter was killed; and the troops retired with a diminution of upwards of 400 in their numbers.

The troops destined to storm the third breach — who ought to have led the column of attack, it being the most distant point to reach — had to file along the narrow space in rear of the party attempting the main breach, and in so doing got into confusion themselves, and occasioned also considerable disorder amongst that party; and as they only arrived at their destination after the other attacks had failed, they also retired. Jones's Sieges, vol. ii. 41.

Immediately on hearing of this unfortunate failure, Lord Wellington came over from Lesaca, to give directions for the further prosecution of the siege; but on examining into the state of the means at his command, found the supply of ammunition July 25. Jones's Sieges, vol. ii. 44.

* Lieut. (Major) Harry D. Jones, Royal Engineers.
† Major Frazer, Royal Scots.

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far too small to warrant any further immediate attack being made against the place. He decided, therefore, on suspending all proceedings until the arrival of additional ordnance and ammunition, daily looked for from England; and, with a view to render the besieging force more disposable, directed that the guns should be withdrawn from the batteries and carried to Passages, excepting a few to keep up a fire on the breaches and to repel any sortie the enemy might make to destroy the works.

His lordship was on his way back to Lesaca the same afternoon, when he received intelligence that there had been some fighting during the day at the pass of Maya; and on reaching his head-quarters, learnt that the enemy had also advanced in force by the road from St. Jean-pied-de-Port to Pamplona, and been warmly engaged with General Byng's advanced brigade in the pass of Roncesvalles, and with the 4th division on its left.

Though still thinking that the real attack was meditated on his left, Lord Wellington made instant dispositions to be prepared at all points; and despatched orders to La Bisbal to send half of the infantry of his corps to reinforce the troops defending the Roncesvalles road, continuing the blockade of Pamplona with the remainder, and directed Sir Stapleton Cotton to assemble the cavalry in

July 26. the neighbourhood of that fortress. His lordship also proceeded himself on the following day to the right, which further information now convinced him was the true point of attack.

The design of Marshal Soult was, by advancing with the major part of his army in two strong columns, to bear down all opposition which could be offered at the passes in front of his left; and

then, directing them concentrically upon Pamplona, to overwhelm the corps blockading that fortress ere the British general could bring up a sufficient force to succour it; at the same time distracting his adversary's attention by a demonstration upon the Lower Bidasoa against San Sebastian. Pamplona relieved, the French marshal's efforts would then be directed to gain the communication of the allied army; and he sanguinely hoped that if he did not succeed in enveloping its left wing, he should, at least, compel Lord Wellington to raise the siege of San Sebastian and retreat hastily to Bilbao.

The advantages promised by this project, if successful, were far greater than any which could possibly result from a direct attempt to raise the siege of San Sebastian; and to carry his ably conceived plan into effect, Soult drew the right wing of his army to St. Jean-pied-de-Port, where, uniting it with his left, a division of the centre, and a large body of cavalry already collected there, he formed a body of 40,000 men *, which he conducted in person to the attack of the passes of Roncesvalles; whilst at the same moment D'Erlon, with a column of 15,000 men, broke up from the neighbourhood of Espelette, and advanced towards the passes of Maya. The troops were supplied with four days' provisions,

* The following was the new organization given by Marshal Soult to "*the army of Spain:*" —

Right wing — Comte Reille	16,000
Left ditto — Clauzel	17,000
Centre — D'Erlon	20,000
Reserve — General Villatte	10,000
Garrisons	9,000
Cavalry	6,000
Total	78,000

(*Augoyat, Précis, &c.* p. 165.)

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which it was supposed would last them until they reached the magazines of the allied army. Villatte, who commanded the reserve, 10,000 strong, occupied the intrenched camp of Urogne, in advance of St. Jean de Luz, and was instructed to act according to circumstances; but if the opportunity offered, to advance on Hernani and raise the siege of San Sebastian.

Angoyat, p. 168.

Intrenched camps had been formed round Bayonne and St. Jean-pied-de-Port, to rally the army in the event of disaster.

The attack upon the allied right, directed by Soult in person, was made with his customary resolution. One strong column, under Clauzel, advanced directly against the pass of Roncesvalles; whilst another, led by Reille, followed a mountain path that leads up the Val Carlos, climbed the steep sides of Mount Arola to turn that pass, and was then directed to move along the summit of the ridge to take in reverse those to the right, and cut off the Portugueze brigade posted at Los Alduides.

At break of day the advanced pickets of the 4th division, placed close under the crest of the ridge of Arola, received most unexpected notice that the enemy were close upon them, — a Spanish post in their front having been made prisoners without firing a shot; and a few minutes after, the enemy's troops, crowning the summit of the mountain, opened a galling fire upon the 20th regiment, which General Ross was hastily forming to meet the threatened attack. A company of that regiment was instantly ordered to the front, and, advancing in close order and at double quick, drove back the enemy's skirmishers without difficulty; but on gaining the spine of the narrow ridge came sud-

U.S. Journ. Nov. 1839, p. 398.

denly, face to face, upon the head of the enemy's column, which had just gained the summit on the opposite side. The French officers called out to their opponents to lay down their arms; — the officer commanding * the gallant little band cried, in return, "Bayonet away, bayonet away." And never was that formidable weapon used with better effect; for, rushing headlong upon the enemy, they were fairly driven down the hill without firing a shot: though the killed and wounded on both sides showed that it is not the sight of a bayonet alone, that renders a British charge so formidable an affair.

Being far distant from support, instant retreat became necessary; but this gallant exploit (which has been justly called "one of the most brilliant feats of the war") afforded time for the brigade to form, and the engagement became most severe. The enemy continued to gain ground until the reserves of the 4th division were brought up, when they were held in check at all points, notwithstanding their immense superiority.

Meanwhile the attack of Clauzel on the right had been met with equal resolution. Major-Gen. Byng † had taken post with his brigade in advance of the principal pass of Roncesvalles, to cover another gorge (more to the right) by which a road leads to Orbaizete, where Morillo's Spaniards were placed. Byng resolutely maintained this forward position, until its security became shaken by the progress of Reille's column along the summit of Mount Arola on his left, when he drew back,

* Captain (Lieut.-Colonel) George Tovey.
† Lieut.-General Lord Strafford, G.C.B.

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fighting, towards the summit of the pass in his rear, thereby uncovering the road to Orbaizete. Here, however, he obstinately maintained his ground, the flank march of the enemy having been arrested by the 4th division; but Sir Lowry Cole conceiving that the loss of the pass on the extreme right rendered his position no longer tenable, drew off the whole of the troops during the night to Lincoin, in advance of Zubiri, where they were joined by the Portugueze brigade from Los Alduides. The position of this brigade had been rendered somewhat critical by Reille's movement; but Campbell * with great judgment decided on marching to the support of Cole, rather than retiring into the valley of Baztan and joining the division to which his brigade belonged, justly considering that where the danger was most pressing his assistance would be most wanting.

Robinson. Memoirs of Picton, vol. ii. 217.

Sir Thomas Picton also, on being informed of what had occurred on his right, and that Cole expected to be attacked by Soult's whole force on the following morning, immediately marched the 3d division from Olague to his support, and crossing the difficult ridge that separates the valley of Lanz from that of the Arga, arrived early in the morning of the 26th at Zubiri, whence he pushed on towards Lincoin, and effected his junction with the rest of the right wing; of which, as senior officer, he now assumed the command.

But though all the troops which, for some time at least, could be collected in this quarter were now opposed to Soult, yet the enemy's overwhelming superiority rendered further retreat necessary. Their endeavours to hurry the English general's

* Lieut.-General Sir Archibald Campbell, Bart., G.C.B.

movements, and throw the retiring columns into confusion, were, however, unavailing. As a wounded boar, when closely pressed, wheels round and shows his tusks at his pursuers; so Picton retired before the enemy, facing about when they approached too near, to warn them of the danger of an unsupported attack. On the afternoon of the 26th he drew up his force on some strong ground in front of Zubiri, and held the enemy at bay till nightfall, when the retreat was resumed, and continued leisurely and in the most perfect order during the following morning: men and officers — their general included — in no very enviable temper at the prospect of having to abandon Pamplona, whose spires were now seen but a few miles in their rear.

Lord Wellington meanwhile was proceeding with all possible speed to the point of danger; — giving orders as he rode rapidly along for the movements of the different divisions of his army towards the threatened flank. On approaching Sorauren, on the road from Elizondo to Pamplona, and but six or seven miles distant from the latter place, he perceived the enemy's columns crowning the heights above and moving upon the village, of which it was evident they would be in possession in the course of ten minutes, and that the march of Hill's corps by this road would consequently be interrupted. He galloped instantly into the village, alighted for a few seconds whilst he scribbled a pencilled memorandum directing the march of that general on Lizasso, and, remounting his horse, rode out at one end of the place at the very moment that an aide-de-camp, bearing his instructions, quitted it at the other, and that the enemy's light

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troops, pouring down the heights, entered it in the centre!

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By this time Picton had reached Huarte, only five miles from Pamplona, where he had already determined to make a stand, when an order — borne by one whose panting horse showed that its rider was conscious of the importance of the communication with which he was charged — directed him to halt; announcing, at the same time, that La Bisbal's corps was marching to his support. The troops obeyed the order with alacrity; and shortly after they had taken up their ground, the words "Here he comes," passed from rank to rank, announced the presence of Wellington himself. Loud cheers greeted him as he galloped down the line: all desponding thoughts were from that moment banished, and every one looked confidently forward to a glorious celebration of the anniversary of Talavera.*

July 27.

Lord Wellington made no alteration in Picton's dispositions to receive the enemy. On the left the 4th division, Campbell's Portugueze and Byng's British brigades were drawn up on a range of heights (Sierre de Oricain) that stretches laterally between the roads directed on Pamplona from Lanz (Bayonne) and Roncesvalles (St. Jean-pied-de-Port); a chapel situated on a detached knoll in rear of the village of Sorauren, on the former road, being held by the 7th Caçadores; and a steep hill, also standing a little apart from the rest of the ridge at its opposite extremity, and commanding the latter road, being occupied by a Portugueze battalion and the Spanish regiment of Pra-

* It is not a little remarkable that, of twenty British infantry regiments engaged on this day, twelve had been in the battle of Talavera.

via, belonging to La Bisbal's army. The 3d division was on the right, extending from Huarte to some high ground at Olaz, on the left side of the valley of the Arga; thus covering more directly the Roncesvalles road, which descends along the course of that river and traverses Huarte.

Morillo's Spanish division, and that portion of the army of Andalusia which had been withdrawn from the blockade of Pamplona, were in reserve, rather towards the left; and the allied cavalry, under Sir Stapleton Cotton, was assembled in rear of the right, in the vicinity of Huarte, where alone the ground was favourable for its employment, and on which side the enemy's horse was also collected.

The enemy drew up on a ridge parallel to that occupied by the allies,—a deep and rugged ravine alone separating the two armies. Soult commenced the battle by attacking the hill which commanded the Roncesvalles road, having, as we have already stated, previously seized on the village of Sorauren on the road to Bayonne, which he intended to make the pivot of his operations. This first attack was bravely repulsed by the Spanish and Portugueze battalions occupying the hill; but seeing the importance of the post, and that the enemy were making dispositions for a fresh assault, Lord Wellington ordered the 40th English and the Spanish regiment of El Principe to their support; and these troops gallantly repelled all the efforts made by the enemy to dislodge them during that and the following day.

The only advantage gained by the enemy in this day's operations, (though in number they more than doubled the amount of the allies,) was the posses-

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sion of Sorauren and Ostiz on the Bayonne road, by which the direct communication between the right and centre of the allied army was cut; but Lord Wellington's timely arrival had saved that directed on Pamplona from San Estevan and Echalar, by way of Lizasso, which joins into the former at Arre, in rear of the left of the position he occupied. This fortunately allowed the 6th division (which Lord Wellington had ordered to follow him from San Estevan) to effect its junction on the morning of the 28th; and it was instantly placed in position on the right bank of the river Ulzama *, fronting the enemy at Sorauren, and covering the left flank of the 4th division.

Despatches, &c. July 28. ½ p. 10 A.M.

Thus reinforced, and judging from the issue of the preceding day's conflict, Lord Wellington did not think that Soult would repeat the attack; and his lordship was actually penning a letter to Sir Thomas Graham stating this opinion, when a tremendous rolling of musketry on the left cut short his epistle.

The French marshal, finding that support was coming up to the allies, saw that no further time was to be lost in dislodging them, if dislodged they could be, from their formidable position; and before the 6th division had well reached its assigned ground, he pushed a strong force against it from Sorauren. But so destructive a fire was brought to converge upon this ill-fated column during the flank march this attack occasioned—the 4th division plying it on the right, and Campbell's Portugueze in rear, whilst the 6th division received it in front—that after several endeavours to make way

* Erroneously called the "Lanz," in the Despatches.

it was thrown into the greatest disorder, and retired with immense loss.

Soult now endeavoured to remedy the posture of affairs on this side by assailing the extremity of the ridge occupied by the left of the 4th division, where the 7th Caçadores were posted. This attack at first had some success, and the Portugueze were driven from the chapel on the road to Pamplona; but the brigade of General Ross * rallied the Caçadores and recovered the lost ground, inflicting a heavy loss upon the enemy. A general attack along the whole range of heights followed these failures, and was kept up during several hours with great fury; but with only a temporary advantage on one point, where a Portugueze regiment of Campbell's brigade, overpowered by numbers, gave way on the right of General Ross's brigade; obliging it likewise to fall back. Lord Wellington immediately directed the 27th and 48th regiments to charge with the bayonet; and Ross having re-formed his brigade with the same object, whilst Campbell rallied the broken Portugueze regiment, the whole fell upon the enemy, and drove them down the hill with a terrific slaughter.

The 6th division having at this juncture been moved forward in the valley of the Ulzama, threatening the enemy's right flank, their offensive movements on this part of the field ceased entirely; and the battle was continued but faintly on the right. Soult's repeated failures to gain the hill commanding the Roncesvalles road having thoroughly disheartened his troops.

* The late gallant Sir Robert Ross, K.C.B., who fell at Baltimore the following year.

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Throughout this trying day, Lord Wellington's post was on that part of the heights where the battle raged fiercest — at a point from whence alone he could command a perfect view of the whole field; "and there he sat upon the ground, exposed within close musket range, during the whole of the hottest affairs." Several officers of his personal staff were wounded; and a ball which, striking the plate of the Marquis of Worcester's * sword-belt, threw him from his horse, glanced off and grazed Lord Wellington. "But here, as at Vitoria, where in the heat of the battle he rode through the fire of eighty guns, passing along the front of the tremendous battery in the French centre — here, as there, God covered his head in battle: not a hair of it was scathed, and he was preserved to his grateful and admiring country."

Sherer. Mil. Mem. vol. ii. 257.

The 29th passed off without any firing; each party, however, waiting only for the reinforcements hourly looked for to resume the combat.

Whilst this bold attempt to reach Pamplona was making on the French left, D'Erlon, in the centre, had proceeded to carry into execution his part in the prescribed operations against the allied positions. Leaving their bivouacs in the neighbourhood of Ainhoüe before daybreak on the 25th, the enemy's columns pushed on by several roads towards the passes of Maya, at the head of the valley of Baztan, making demonstrations principally to force those on the right, which were guarded by the Portugueze troops of the Conde de Amarante's division; the principal passes, which were those on the left, being held by detachments from

* His Grace the Duke of Beaufort.

Pringle's and Walker's brigades of the 2d division, commanded by Lieut.-General Hon. W. Stewart.

The whole of the allied troops guarding the mountain barrier in this quarter were distributed in weak posts along its summit, as if with the view of disputing every goat path, and the supports of those on the left were far too distant; for General Stewart unfortunately fell into the snare laid for him, and fancied that the right was the real point of attack.

D'Erlon, under cover of his feigned attack upon the Portugueze, having brought up the greater part of his force by a mountain track from Espelette, and skilfully concealed his troops behind an eminence close to the pass of Arétesque (against which no attack appeared to be meditated), suddenly rushed forward and overthrew its defenders. The gallant officer who commanded the advanced pickets * was prepared for this attack, and offered a spirited resistance; but unfortunately it was a complete surprise to his superiors, and for a considerable time he remained without any other support than the light companies of the 2d brigade of the 2d division, which were ordered up just as the attack commenced; and now regiment after regiment was hurriedly brought into action. But these dribbled reinforcements could not check D'Erlon's formidable mass. The 34th and 50th regiments, charging with the bayonet, drove back the first assailants; but were on the point of being overpowered by numbers, when the 92d came up to the rescue, and was nearly annihilated in its turn. All behaved with the most determined bravery: the

Annals of Peninsular Campaign, vol. iii. 386.

* Captain (Major) Moyle Sherer, 34th regiment.

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French admit a loss of 1500 men on this point alone. But numbers eventually prevailed: the British troops were obliged to give ground, and four guns and 140 prisoners remained in the enemy's hands.

Pellot. Précis, &c. 27.

Meanwhile other columns of French troops ascended to gain the passes on the right, which the loss of that of Arétesque rendered no longer tenable, and the whole fell back towards Elizondo. Sir Rowland Hill, who had been to visit the post of Los Alduides across the mountains on his right, now arrived on the ground, and rallied the troops in a strong position in advance of Elizondo, where they were reinforced by a brigade of the 7th division from the pass of Echalar, which had been turned by the successful operations of the enemy in the valley of Baztan. The allies now in their turn became the aggressors, forced the enemy back to the passes, and before nightfall recovered the post which was the key of their original position. But apprized that Sir Lowry Cole had fallen back from Roncesvalles, Sir Rowland Hill found it necessary to make a corresponding retrograde movement to keep up his communication with the right wing; and accordingly the troops were withdrawn from their advanced position at the head of the valley, and fell back during the night to Berueta.

July 26.

D'Erlon was intimidated by the vigour of Hill's attack, and did not advance during the following day beyond the passes of Maya. Sir Rowland also maintained his ground on that day behind Elizondo; but, in conformity with an order from Lord Wellington, retired altogether from the valley of Baztan on the morning of the 27th, directing his march on Pamplona by the pass of Belate. Apprized, however, that this, the direct road, was occupied in his rear

by the right of Soult's army in front of Pamplona, at Ostiz and Sorauren, he quitted it at Lanz, and marched for Lizasso; and there, on the 28th, gained the road to Pamplona from San Estevan.

On that day the 7th division also reached Lizasso from Sumbilla; but continuing its march to Marcalain, took post midway between Hill's corps and Lord Wellington's position, covering Pamplona.

D'Erlon's corps followed Hill's movement cautiously as far as Lanz, whence on the 29th it continued its march to Ostiz, and thus effected its junction with Marshal Soult's army.

Soult had now succeeded in concentrating the whole of his army in front of rather more than half of that of his adversary; and he resolved by a vigorous effort to endeavour to seize the connecting link of the two widely separated wings of the allied army, and thereby force Lord Wellington back on Pamplona, and Graham to retreat into the Asturias. Two good lines of retreat having been opened to him by the withdrawal of the allied troops from the passes of Maya and Echalar, the French marshal conceived that he incurred little risk of being cut off from France during his meditated operations, even though he should lose his communication with St. Jean-pied-de-Port by Roncesvalles. He proceeded, therefore, to carry his project into execution forthwith, by despatching a division to reinforce D'Erlon, destined to manœuvre round the left wing of the allied army; and during the succeeding night, effected a general movement of the rest of his troops to the right. A division of Clauzel's corps d'armée marched to Olague to serve as a reserve to either wing; Maucune's division descended from

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the heights between the roads from Lanz and Roncesvalles to replace these troops at Sorauren; the remaining divisions of Reille's corps successively relieved each other along the summit of the ridge, and General Foy, withdrawing from Picton's front in the valley of the Arga, took post at its southern extremity; which thus became the left of the enemy's new position. Their cavalry was obliged to make a wide circuit by Zubiri and Egue to gain the valley of the Ulzama from that of the Arga; but the state of the roads rendering it difficult for artillery to follow this movement, all the guns of Reille's and Clauzel's corps had been sent back to France by the pass of Roncesvalles on the night of the 28th, when Soult perceived that he should be obliged to change his line of operations.

The extraordinary strength of the position thus occupied by the left of the French army, (which Soult purposed should act altogether on the defensive,) relieved its commander from all apprehension of losing his communication with France by the pass of Maya, during the extended movement of his right wing to turn the left of the allies at Lizasso; but Lord Wellington perceived the French marshal's object the moment his columns were in motion, and as quickly decided on taking the initiative in the attack. Lord Dalhousie with the 7th division was directed, therefore, to dislodge the enemy from a mountain in his front on the western side of the valley of Ulzama, which, occupied by part of Maucune's division, covered the right of their position; and Sir Thomas Picton with the 3d division was ordered to cross the heights from which the enemy's left had been withdrawn, and turn that flank by the road to Roncesvalles.

The 4th and 6th divisions stood ready to assail the enemy in front as soon as the effect of these movements on their flanks should begin to appear. These skilful dispositions were crowned with the most perfect success; the enemy were forced from a position which Lord Wellington described in his despatch as "one of the strongest and most difficult of access he had ever yet seen occupied by troops;" and their divisions isolated, and consequently, from the nature of the country, forced to retreat eccentrically, could find safety only by recrossing the mountains as rapidly as possible. Never was dispersion more complete: Reille with the "débris" of Maucune's division and a brigade of Lamartinière's, fled towards Lanz; another body of fugitives escaped to the pass of Maya by Urtagaiz; Foy, who considered that route too hazardous, "wandered about the mountains" for three days, and at last escaped with his division to St. Etienne; other troops on the French left retired by the Roncesvalles road! Thus was Soult's left wing completely routed before his right had even exchanged a shot with Hill's corps. The loss of the enemy in men was immense; artillery and baggage they had none to lose.

Augoyat, p. 174.

In proportion as Lord Wellington had observed the success of his own operations, he had detached troops towards Lizasso to the support of his able lieutenant; but now pushing on himself after the beaten enemy, he, by sunset, reached Olague, immediately in rear of Soult's attack upon Sir Rowland Hill.

It was late in the morning before the action had commenced in this quarter, the enemy having a considerable distance to march. Their attacks on the front of Sir Rowland's position were repulsed

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by the bayonet, but the great numerical superiority of the French enabling them to manœuvre on his flanks, the English general after an obstinate resistance was obliged to cede ground. His troops fell back in admirable order to a second and stronger position, where, with the assistance of the reinforcements despatched by Lord Wellington, they succeeded in arresting Soult's further advance.

July 30.

Towards the close of the day, the French marshal heard of the rout of his left wing. From that moment all his fond hopes of celebrating Napoleon's birthday at Vitoria vanished—indeed there seemed to be a greater probability of his keeping it on board a British man-of-war;—and the less pleasing duty of withdrawing his army, henceforth, occupied all his thoughts, its position being most critical: for, cut off from the pass of Maya by Lord Wellington at Olague, the road to Bayonne, by San Estevan and the pass of Echalar, now alone remained open for it to retreat by; and on this it might be intercepted, either by troops directed on its rear from the valley of Lanz, or by the light division; which having been hitherto stationed at Lucuberri, to cover the communication between San Sebastian and Pamplona, was now moving again towards the Bidasoa, and actually nearer San Estevan than Soult himself was. Fortune, however, befriended him. When night came, he fell back with all possible celerity towards the pass of Arraiz.* Sir Rowland followed briskly on the following morning, and, at the foot of the pass, was sufficiently near the tail of the enemy's column to be able to inflict some loss with two pieces of artillery, as it hastily climbed the steep ascent. Here

* Called Doña Maria in the Despatches.

also the 7th division came up on the right, having been pushed on by Lord Wellington, in the hope of intercepting the enemy at this point;. which, could it have arrived an hour sooner, it would have done.

Sir Rowland Hill made immediate dispositions to force the enemy from the strong position they had taken up on the crest of the mountain. The 2d division, gallantly led by Lieut.-General Stewart, advanced by the road ascending directly to the pass; the 7th division, under Lord Dalhousie, by another more difficult of access on the right. The former, which first reached the summit, experienced a check, and its general was severely wounded; but the attack was renewed when the other column was sufficiently forward to take part in the action, and the enemy were compelled to retire after suffering a very severe loss. The 7th division followed on the track of the enemy; but Sir Rowland Hill's column moved to the right to Almandoz, and reached Elizondo on the following day —1st August.

As it happened, it was unfortunate that the enemy were pressed on this point, since it hastened their retreat on San Estevan, and thereby saved them from falling into the hands of the 4th and light divisions, marching on that point to intercept them. For Lord Wellington, pushing on from Lanz across the pass of Belate with the former and Byng's brigade, was marching by Irurita to gain the bridges on the Bidasoa in their rear, and had directed Count Alten with the light division, to endeavour to "cut in upon their column of march" on the opposite flank, by advancing rapidly from Zurbieta to Doña Maria, San Estevan, or Sumbilla, according to circumstances.

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This division had, on the 26th, been withdrawn from the right bank of the Bidasoa, and was collected in the neighbourhood of Lesaca; from whence it marched on the 28th to Lucuberri, to protect the communication between San Sebastian and Pamplona: — a concentrical point, from which it might conveniently move on either of those places. After the successful issue of the action on the 30th, Lord Wellington sent orders for it to move forward on Zurbieta; and on the following day, finding that Soult was falling back, to gain the pass of Echalar by Doña Maria and San Estevan, closely pressed by the 2d and 7th divisions, his lordship, desirous of placing the enemy between two fires, had, as before stated, directed Count Alten to endeavour to head the enemy's column at those points, or, if that were impracticable, at Sumbilla.

Despatches, &c. July 31.

The retreat of Soult was too rapid to admit of Lord Wellington (whose movement was unavoidably very circuitous) reaching San Estevan before him; and the light division only succeeded in gaining the flank of the retreating enemy near the bridge of Yanci, after it had passed the Bidasoa, at sunset on the 31st. A sharp fire was kept up across the river, along the right bank of which the enemy's column had to file, which inflicted a heavy loss upon them. Had General Barcenas moved with his whole brigade of the army of Galicia upon this point, instead of merely sending a battalion of Cazadores, Soult would have been lost; for as it was, this weak battalion held the enemy in check at the bridge during several hours.

Kincaid. Adv. in the Rifle Brig.

Despatches, &c. Aug. 16.

The French marshal having thus escaped both Scylla and Charybdis, gained the pass of Echalar without loss of time; and there, on the 1st of Au-

gust, once more took up a strong defensive position, its right resting on the lofty mountain of La Rhune. Lord Wellington collected the 4th, 7th, and light divisions in front of this formidable post on the following day, and moved forward to the attack. The 7th division, advancing on the side of Sumbilla, was the first to reach the ground; and General Barnes's * brigade was instantly formed for the attack. Advancing "with a regularity and gallantry" which Lord Wellington states in his official despatch "he had seldom seen equalled," this single brigade actually drove two French divisions from their strong position.

This gallant exploit closed the brilliant nine days' operations of the allied army, and left not an enemy remaining within this part of the Spanish frontier. The loss of the French, as admitted by themselves, amounted to "13,148 men, including 2700 prisoners;" but as upwards of 6000 prisoners had to be shipped for England, we must take it for granted that this is but a *rough guess* on the part of the French writers. The loss of the Anglo-Portugueze army scarcely amounted to 6000 men†; not quite two thirds of whom were British. The Spanish loss amounted to between 200 and 300. A considerable convoy proceeding to Pamplona was captured on the 31st of July, between Berueta and Elizondo.

Augoyat, p. 176.

Despatches, &c. Aug. 24.

The allied army had now resumed nearly the same positions which it occupied at the commencement of these operations; and the same reasons continuing to exist against carrying the war into

* The late Lieut.-General Sir Edward Barnes, G.C.B.

† This includes 400 returned as "missing;" but not the loss sustained at the attack on San Sebastian.

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France *, Lord Wellington judged—and the event proved that he judged rightly—that Soult, notwithstanding his heavy loss, would renew his efforts to relieve the beleaguered fortresses. He determined, therefore, to persevere in his plan of establishing himself firmly on the Spanish frontier by the reduction of San Sebastian and Pamplona; and accordingly on the 5th of August gave orders for the ordnance and stores to be relanded at Passages to resume the siege of the former fortress, whilst the blockade of the other was committed to the charge of Don Carlos de España, whose corps had relieved the army of the Conde de la Bisbal, and by whose spirited exertions every attempt of the blockaded garrison to break through his line of investment during the late operations, had been gallantly frustrated.

At this time Lord Wellington received a proposal from H. R. H. the Duc de Berri, that he should place himself at the head of 20,000 men, (whom, his royal highness represented to be ready, organized, and even armed, in the south of France,) and join the allied army.

His lordship referred the Duke for an answer to this proposal to the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs; stating at the same time his own ideas on this delicate subject to Earl Bathurst.

Despatches, &c. Lesaca, Aug. 8.

It was Lord Wellington's opinion "that the interests of the house of Bourbon and of all Europe were the same—viz. in some manner or other to get the better and rid of Buonaparte." "The dominion of Napoleon," his lordship considered, "rested internally upon the most extensive and expensive system of corruption that was ever

* The congress at Prague still continued.

established in any country; and externally upon his military power, which was supported almost exclusively by foreign contributions. If he could be confined to the limits of France by any means, his system must fall."

The character of Napoleon forbad, however, the supposition that he would tamely submit to see his throne undermined by the slow process of growing unpopularity. The French ruler knew that a declaration of war would at all times allay the disaffection of a people so greedy of military glory as those he governed; and the nations of Europe saw before them another long prospective of desolating wars, if the favourable moment now offered were not seized to crush the tottering fabric of Napoleon's power. Their own preservation was the consideration before which all others should give way. The repose of 100 millions of people was not to be risked for the chance of Buonaparte having learnt moderation in the school of adversity; and if civil war would tend to shorten the struggle, they could have no scruple in fomenting it, since France had never hesitated to inflict that curse upon other countries whenever it could promote her views of aggrandizement. Lord Wellington was therefore of opinion, that "though it might be a question with the house of Bourbon whether they would involve their partizans in France upon anything short of a declaration from the European powers leagued against Buonaparte not to lay down their arms until he should be dethroned, yet there could be none with the allies whether they would receive the assistance offered." *

* Monsieur Augoyat (*Précis*, &c. p.188.), apparently a great admirer of Napoleon, calls the conduct of Lord Wellington, in his transactions with the Bourbon princes, "odious;" forgetting the revolutions effected

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With reference to his own plans for the prosecution of the war, Lord Wellington writes to Earl Bathurst a few days subsequently, —

Despatches, &c. Lesaca, Aug. 14.

"For my part, I repeat what I told you before,—I shall enter France or not (unless I should be ordered) according to what I think best for my own operations, as I have no reliance whatever in what is doing in the North."

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by Buonaparte in Piedmont, Lombardy, the Venetian states, Naples, the Papal territories, &c. &c.; those attempted in Spain, Portugal, and Poland; and the improvements he kindly proposed making in the government of England, had he succeeded in crossing the Channel. We, on the contrary, cannot but consider the conduct of Lord Wellington highly honourable and humane.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

SIEGE OF SAN SEBASTIAN RESUMED. — THE FORTRESS IS CARRIED BY STORM. — ADVANCE OF SOULT TO ITS RELIEF. — HE IS REPULSED AT ALL POINTS. — ATTACK AND CAPTURE OF THE CASTLE OF SAN SEBASTIAN. — OPERATIONS OF THE ANGLO-SICILIAN ARMY ON THE EASTERN COAST. — AFFAIR OF ORDAL. — RETREAT OF LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK TO TARRAGONA. — INTRIGUES OF THE SPANISH GENERALS AND MINISTER OF WAR. — LORD WELLINGTON REQUIRES THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT TO FULFIL ITS ENGAGEMENTS, OR ACCEPT HIS RESIGNATION OF THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. — HE DECIDES ON ENTERING FRANCE. — PASSAGE OF THE BIDASOA. — LORD WELLINGTON REPLIES TO THE CHARGES BROUGHT AGAINST THE ANGLO-PORTUGUEZE TROOPS FOR THEIR CONDUCT AT SAN SEBASTIAN. — SURRENDER OF PAMPLONA. — CAUSES WHICH DETER LORD WELLINGTON FROM MOVING FORWARD. — FORMIDABLE INTRENCHED POSITION OF THE FRENCH ARMY. — PASSAGE OF THE NIVELLE FORCED, AND RETREAT OF MARSHAL SOULT TO BAYONNE.

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On the 19th August the arrival of the long-looked-for fleet of transports from England, with the requisite battering train ordnance, ammunition, &c. enabled Lord Wellington to resume his operations against San Sebastian; and they were prosecuted with such activity that, at 9 A. M. on the 26th, the batteries again opened upon the fortress. Their fire was directed to widen the breaches which had been made in the previous attack, and to batter the left extremity of the high curtain of the land front, in rear of the breach in the face of the south-east demi-bastion; but Lord Wellington, desirous of averting the ruin of the town, would not consent to the proposal of a bombardment.

In the following night the boats of the Surveillante frigate landed a detachment of 200 men of the 9th regiment on the rocky island of S. Clara,

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capturing a French post left for its defence. This island is situated at the mouth of the western harbour, distant about 800 yards from the castle, the defences of which it sees in reverse; it was decided, therefore, to construct a battery upon it to silence, if possible, the guns which, from that commanding point, bore upon and defended the breaches.

On the night of the 29th a false attack was made, to induce the enemy to explode the mines they were supposed to have prepared under the glacis of the hornwork, but without producing the desired effect. On the following day Lord Wellington, who constantly rode over from his head-quarters at Lesaca to watch the progress of the siege, inspected the breaches, which appearing to be good and practicable, the assault was ordered to take place at 11 o'clock next day.

The immediate command of the troops destined for this service was confided to Lieut.-General Sir J. Leith. The force placed under his orders consisted of 750 volunteers from the army generally, the brigades of Generals Robinson, Hay, and Spry of the 5th division, and the 5th Caçadores. The columns filed out of the trenches at the hour appointed, having, as in the former attack, to advance a distance of 180 yards along the narrow space between the eastern branch of the hornwork and the sea, exposed to a most galling fire. Immediately on issuing from the trenches two mines were sprung by the enemy, which blew down a considerable extent of the retaining wall forming the ditch of the hornwork towards the sea; but happily these explosions were prematurely effected, and occasioned but little loss to the assailants, who

were not yet closely formed. The troops, undismayed, rushed forward, and reached their destination in the best possible order, and mounted the breaches with the greatest gallantry; but such was the storm of fire poured upon them, — musketry from retrenchments thrown up parallel to the breaches, as well as from every point of the walls whence they could be seen, and grape and shells from the more distant batteries in the castle, — that the brave fellows were swept away as fast as they showed themselves on the crest of the wide gaps. It was ascertained also that the rampart was retained internally by a wall from 15 to 25 feet deep, at the foot of which all sorts of impediments had been accumulated; and that to the right and left of the breached portions of the wall traverses had been erected, so as to isolate them from the rest of the works. Attempts were then made to form a lodgment on the face of the breaches; but this was found to be impossible, the loose rubbish of the walls not affording materials for throwing up cover, and no artificial means for so doing having been provided.

Sir Thomas Graham, who, from an advanced battery on the right bank of the Urumea, watched the whole proceedings, sent detachment after detachment to feed the different attacks; but every effort to carry the breaches was rendered unavailing by the overpowering fire of the garrison. For nearly two hours was this furious contest persevered in at an enormous sacrifice of life; and the flowing tide, now creeping stealthily upon the rear of the assailants, gave warning that no time must be lost, if further succour was to be afforded them. Accordingly a column of Portugueze, led by Major

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Snodgrass*, was directed to cross the Urumea, whilst it yet continued fordable, and attack the left, or most northerly breach, which, it will be recollected, had not been attempted at the former assault. This movement was executed in admirable order, under a heavy fire of grape and musketry; and another detachment, under Lieut.-Colonel M'Lean, followed, and reinforced the troops on the main breach: but these efforts had no effect beyond making good the casualties which had already occurred, and the result seemed more than doubtful.

In this most desperate state of affairs, Sir Thomas Graham asked Lieut.-Col. Dickson, who commanded the artillery, if he could suggest any measure to give an impulse to the attack. This able officer immediately proposed that the whole of the guns in the breaching batteries of the right attack should, as far as possible, be brought to bear on the high curtain above the breach in the face of the demi-bastion; and, in a few minutes, the fire of 47 pieces of artillery was directed with such powerful effect upon the enemy's interior defences, that they were compelled to abandon the principal traverse, which protected the main breach, and seek more distant cover.

Jones's Sieges, vol. ii. 78.

The troops at the main breach paused in their vain endeavours to win an entrance during the continuance of this tremendous cannonade, watching with astonishment and admiration the effect produced in this unprecedented manner by the fire of the artillery: of which such was the wonderful precision that, though the shot passed but a few feet over their heads, sweeping the enemy from their

* Colonel Snodgrass, C.B.

retrenchments, not a casualty occurred amongst themselves.

Shortly after this mode of clearing a way for the assailants had been adopted, the whole of the numerous fire barrels, live shells, hand grenades, &c., which the garrison had collected along the ramparts for the close defence of their traverses and interior works, ignited, causing a succession of explosions along the whole extent of the high curtain; killing and wounding many of its defenders, and throwing the remainder into the greatest confusion. The assailants took instant advantage of this favourable moment to renew their efforts, and a vigorous rush made them masters of the first traverse. The garrison, on this, rather hastily abandoned the ravelin and eastern branch of the hornwork; fresh troops mounted the breach in rapid succession; the Portugueze, at the same moment, forced an entrance to the right; and the town was carried, during a most awful storm of thunder, lightning, and rain, rendered yet more terrific by the shouts of the infuriated captors: 700 prisoners were made; the rest of the garrison took refuge in the castle, whence they kept up a constant fire on all who showed themselves in the streets; so that little or no success resulted from the exertions of the assailants to subdue the flames spread throughout the town by the explosion of the grenades and shells along the ramparts, as above mentioned.

The loss sustained by the allied army in this most sanguinary assault amounted to upwards of 2000 killed and wounded: amongst the former was the commanding engineer, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Richard Fletcher, an officer of great merit; and

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amongst the wounded were Generals Sir James Leith, Oswald, and Robinson. Nothing could exceed the admirable conduct of all the troops engaged in this most desperate assault; but it was found to be utterly impossible to save the town from being plundered, owing to the difficulty of bringing in fresh troops to relieve those who had been engaged.

Whilst this protracted and sanguinary struggle continued, Lord Wellington was called upon to make head against a desperate attempt of Soult to save the tottering fortress. The French marshal, having once more got together the scattered divisions of his army, took post behind the formidable works he had caused to be thrown up in advance of St. Jean de Luz, covering the great road to Bayonne; and, suddenly quitting his camp on the night of the 30th, marched with the purpose of assailing the force covering the siege of San Sebastian by daybreak on the following morning. Comte Reille, with two divisions and a strong reserve, was directed to cross the Lower Bidasoa and carry the heights of San Marcial, on the left bank, occupied by the Spanish army of Galicia, under General Freyre *; whilst Clauzel, with four divisions, should pass the river at Vera, and push on to turn the Haya † mountain, covering the right of the position of San Marcial, and gain the road by Oyarzun to San Sebastian; an operation which had been successfully executed on several occasions in preceding wars.

Lord Wellington, on the first intimation of the

* General Freyre had superseded General Giron in the command of this army.

† Or *Montagne des Cinq Couronnes.*

general movement of the French army to concentrate in front of his left, moved up the 1st division to the rear of Irun to support the left of the Spaniards occupying the San Marcial heights; and now, rightly judging on what points the enemy's efforts would be directed to break through his defensive line, reinforced these troops with Lord Aylmer's unattached British brigade, and moved two brigades of the 4th division towards the Haya mountain to support Longa's Spaniards on the right of the San Marcial position. At the same time, a Portugueze brigade was directed to take post between the convent of Vera and Lesaca; and General Inglis's brigade of the 7th division was ordered to close to the left, and occupy the bridge on the Bidasoa below Lesaca; while, to occupy the attention of the enemy on their own left, the allied troops occupying the passes of Echalar, Zugarramurdi, and Maya, were directed to attack the weakened posts in their immediate front.

When day broke on the 31st, one of the enemy's columns was discovered already on the left bank of the Bidasoa, at the foot of the San Marcial height; another was in the act of fording the stream; and a third was throwing a bridge across it higher up, about midway between the destroyed bridge of Irun and the village of Biriatu. A heavy fire of artillery opened on both sides; and as soon as the enemy's troops were formed, they pushed forward their right to attack the Spaniards, anticipating an easy victory. Their confidence was fatal to them; for the steepness of the ascent having broken their formation, the Spaniards, seizing the advantage offered by the loose order of their advance, fell upon and drove them not only down the hill, but

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fairly into the river, in which many were drowned. A similar attack on the right of the Spaniards met with the same fate; and the enemy desisted from any further serious attempts to dislodge them, until their bridge was completed, and a greater force had been brought across the river.

In the afternoon the battle was resumed with increased vigour, the whole of Comte Reille's corps being pushed across the Bidasoa at different points, and moving simultaneously forward to the attack of the heights. At the moment of their advance Lord Wellington rode along the front of the Spanish line, and, in brief terms, complimented the troops on their gallant bearing; vociferous "*vivas*" greeted him as he passed; and, animated by his presence as well as emboldened by their previous success, the Spaniards received the enemy with the greatest intrepidity, and again, and finally, drove them down the side of the mountain and across the river. The pontoon bridge breaking down from the press of fugitives, caused the French a heavy loss.

The endeavours of Clauzel to force the heights covering the right of the Spaniards, promised, at first, to be more successful. The enemy, advancing in two strong columns, forded the Bidasoa below Salin, and pushed on to attack the Portugueze brigade posted near the Lesaca. General Inglis instantly moved his brigade to its support; but finding it impossible to maintain the heights between that place and the river against the overpowering force of the enemy, retired to the more defensible ground in front of the convent of San Antonio, situated at the eastern foot of the Haya mountain. This difficult change of position before so superior

a force was effected in admirable order, covered in the most gallant style by the 51st and 68th light infantry regiments, under Colonel Mitchell and Lieut.-Colonel Hawkins; and the further progress of the enemy was checked.

Lord Wellington, on observing the direction of the enemy's attack, had sent orders for the Light division and the remainder of the 7th, to move instantly to the support of General Inglis; and those troops now coming up, Clauzel found his position becoming extremely critical. He therefore fell back during the night; but on reaching the Bidasoa at dawn, found it so swollen by the heavy rains which had fallen since he crossed it on the preceding day, as to be no longer fordable, and was in consequence obliged to ascend the stream and file over the bridge of Vera, exposed to the fire of part of Major-Gen. Skerret's brigade of the Light division. An opportune attack made on the allies by some troops Soult directed along the right bank of the river, on being apprized of Clauzel's perilous situation, saved his corps from almost certain destruction. As it was, it suffered very severely.

The loss of the enemy in these different operations amounted to 3600 *hors de combat:* that of the allies to 417 English, 527 Portugueze, and 1679 Spaniards; total 2623. The moral effect produced by the failure of the attack on the heights of San Marcial was sensibly felt both by the French and Spaniards during the rest of the war; rendering the former far less daring when brought in contact with adversaries whom they had hitherto despised, and inspiring the latter with a degree of confidence which they had never before shown.

Augoyat, p. 179.

CHAP. XXXIII. 1813. Having this object in view, Lord Wellington did not comply with the wish for support expressed by General Freyre on the eve of the last attack made on his position; his lordship being determined that the Spaniards should have all the credit of the victory, — and, for once, bear likewise the brunt of the battle.

Sept. 1. The day after the enemy were thus repulsed at all points, Lord Wellington visited San Sebastian, and gave his sanction to the mode of attack on the castle proposed by the commanding officer of engineers. This, in addition to a powerful bombardment to induce an immediate capitulation, consisted in erecting batteries on the works of the town, to breach most of the main points of the castle defences. A fire of mortars was accordingly opened forthwith, and kept up with little intermission during the six subsequent days; but without producing the desired effect. Meanwhile the progress made in the works had been much retarded by the numerous fires which burst forth in the town immediately after the assault; but on the morning of the 8th the breaching batteries were at length ready, and 59 pieces of ordnance (including mortars) plied the castle with so rapid and well-directed a fire that, at the expiration of two hours, the governor beat the *chamade*, and, after a brief negotiation, agreed to surrender the garrison prisoners of war: — 1301 officers and men marched out on the following morning, and laid down their arms on the glacis; 535 sick and wounded remaining in the hospitals.

Jones's Sieges, vol. ii. 82.

The loss of the allied army in the different operations against San Sebastian amounted to 951 officers and men killed, and 2490 wounded: total

3441; a number which fell but little short of the strength of the garrison at the commencement of the siege.

General Rey's defence was highly creditable to him: not so his treatment of the prisoners taken in the first attack; who, during the bombardment of the castle, were confined in a small open space, and not permitted to throw up any kind of cover for their protection.

After the defeat of the enemy before Pamplona Lord Wellington, conceiving it probable that Marshal Soult would call Suchet to his assistance, and make another effort to relieve that fortress, had instructed Lord William Bentinck, if the latter should either march himself to the northward, or make any large detachment from his army in that direction, to send the 3d Spanish army along the Ebro to follow this movement. Lord William, on a false report of the march of General Decaen with a force of from 10,000 to 15,000 men into France, was induced to despatch the Duque del Parque's army to reinforce Lord Wellington; and he himself at the same time, with the Anglo-Sicilian army, drew nearer to the enemy in his front, advancing to Villa Franca, midway between Tarragona and Barcelona. Despatches, &c. Sep. 10.

Marshal Suchet took instant advantage of his adversary's ill-advised movements; and collecting the divisions of his own army, and drawing towards him a portion of that of Catalonia, fell suddenly upon the Anglo-Sicilian army; the advanced-guard of which, composed of the 27th regiment, three Spanish battalions, and a corps of Calabrese, the whole commanded by Colonel Adam, was posted at the pass of Ordal, on the high road from Villa Franca to Barce-

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lona. The ground in the immediate neighbourhood of this pass is steep and rugged, giving it an appearance of great strength; but in reality it offered a very bad position, being much too far in advance of the rest of the army, considering that it might be turned on either flank. Some fields works had been thrown up to cover the direct approach, and four mountain guns were placed in battery on the road.

The attack of the enemy was altogether unexpected; in fact, the rencontre appears to have been a surprise to both parties. At midnight on the 12th September, the pickets of the allies were rapidly driven in, and a most vigorous attack soon after commenced upon their works. The 27th regiment defended the first redoubt with great obstinacy, and twice succeeded in driving the enemy back; but the French cavalry having meanwhile got upon the road in rear, the other intrenchments were abandoned; and this gallant corps, overpowered by numbers, was compelled to give way. Colonel Adam was severely wounded, and a loss of 150 men was sustained by the 27th regiment alone. The Spaniards lost double that amount; and the guns remained in the enemy's hands, after having been fought to the last moment.

Suchet's Memoirs, vol. ii. 342.

Lord Wm. Bentinck rallied his discomfited advanced guard, and fell back without loss of time to Vendrell, closely pursued at first by the enemy's cavalry; but a gallant charge of the allied horse, under Colonel Lord F. Bentinck, checked their ardour, and the retreat was continued without further molestation; and on the evening of the 14th of September the army, with feelings of bitter mortification, once more found itself under the dismantled walls of Tarragona. On the 23d September

Lord W. Bentinck returned to Sicily, leaving the army under the command of Lieut.-Gen. W. Clinton.

Suchet, however, had been completely foiled in his object: which was, to bring the Anglo-Sicilian army to a general action; hoping so to cripple it as to be able, without risk, to undertake an operation, combined with Marshal Soult, against Lord Wellington. Suchet's Memoirs, vol. ii. 346.

The project entertained by Soult—which, as we have seen by Lord Wellington's instructions to Lord W. Bentinck, the British commander had early divined — was for Suchet to menace the right flank of the main allied army, whilst he should attack it in front; drawing to him the corps of General Paris, which still held the defile of Jaca. Soult, however, had no authority over Suchet; and consequently this proposal, made through the French minister of war at Paris, on the 13th August, had to be submitted to Suchet ere it could be carried into effect; and in the meantime the latter received the news of the loss of the castle of Zaragoza, containing a large park of field artillery and abundant stores, which had been calculated upon by Soult, for carrying into effect their meditated attack. The plan, therefore, was deemed no longer practicable, and had to be modified to suit the altered circumstances. Ibid. 347.

Marshal Soult, on the fall of San Sebastian, submitted another plan for a combined operation, viz., for Suchet to cross the eastern Pyrenees, leaving garrisons in the principal fortresses of Catalonia, and join him at Tarbes; and with their united forces to re-cross the mountains by Oleron and Jaca, and enter Navarre: a project so wild, as almost to cast a doubt on Soult's capacity for planning military operations on a great scale. Such was the view Suchet Ibid. 359.

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took of it; and in return the latter proposed a more feasible plan (dated Villa Franca, 16th September), viz., that his army, reinforced from France, so as to enable him to march with 30,000 men and 100 pieces of artillery, should advance between the Ebro and Pyrenees on Jaca, to join Soult; whilst that marshal, with the whole of his army, but without guns, should cross the Pyrenean chain by the mountain roads to the northward of that place; and thus, with a combined force of between 80,000 and 90,000 men, fall upon Lord Wellington's right flank.

Suchet's Memoirs, vol. ii. 347.

Marshal Soult acceded to this proposal; and, on the 29th September, wrote to acquaint Suchet that he was about to make the necessary preparations for carrying his part of the concerted plan into execution. But Lord Wellington having, by the surrender of the castle of San Sebastian, secured a base of operations which rendered the possession of Pamplona a matter of far less importance to him than heretofore, had now decided on assuming the offensive; and his advance gave the death-blow to the plans of the French marshal, — proving the absurdity of any attempt to concert an operation between two generals holding independent commands, and acting on points at the distance of a fortnight's march from each other.

Previous to the last attempt made by Marshal Soult to relieve San Sebastian, several changes had taken place amongst the general officers commanding the different Spanish armies. The government persisted in appointing Don Manuel Freyre to the command of the army of Galicia, to the prejudice of General Giron; and the Conde de la Bisbal, ambitious of being at the head of a force removed from

Lord Wellington's immediate control, and thinking he could effect his purpose by intrigue at Cadiz, had resigned the command of the army of reserve of Andalusia, on the plea of the necessity of visiting the baths of Alhama for the cure of his wounds. Lord Wellington, who, on further acquaintance, had found that, though an able officer, the Conde was "one of the most difficult he had yet had to deal with," made no objection; and in the most flattering terms offered the vacant command to General Giron.

The health of Sir Thomas Graham had also become so impaired by the climate, as to render his return to England necessary; he continued, however, to perform the duties of second in command of the army, until Lieut.-General Sir John Hope, appointed to succeed him, should arrive from England.

The contemptible government of Spain still continued to thwart in every way the measures adopted by Lord Wellington for rendering the native armies efficient. The ability with which his lordship had conducted the war was on all hands freely admitted; but vanity is the besetting sin of the nation, and many Spanish generals, besides Ballasteros, thought that they could have conducted it with equal, if not greater success; though none, like him, had the hardihood to express such an opinion. Intrigue was therefore resorted to, to excite a feeling against the British commander; the venal press of Cadiz was engaged to sound a fresh blast on the trumpet of alarm, as well as to assail his character in every possible way, with the hope of inducing him to throw up the command of the Spanish armies; and the prime mover of these despicable intrigues, there is

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too much reason to believe, was the minister of war himself.

The new Regency — for another had recently been appointed — did not choose to consider the agreement entered into by the preceding government for the command of the army binding, and seemed disposed, by quibbling about the meaning of a word, to annul altogether the compact entered into with Lord Wellington. His lordship, in an admirable letter to the minister of war, pulled to pieces the special pleading of that wretched intriguer, and, in manly terms, required that the existing Regency would be pleased to ratify the agreement made by their predecessors, in such terms as that he could not be mistaken, as he had been before, regarding the meaning intended to be conveyed by the letter of the former minister of war, when he originally accepted of the command of the Spanish armies.

Despatches, &c. Aug. 30.

"It is really necessary," (his lordship's letter continues), "for many reasons connected with the public service, that the government should come to an early and final decision upon this subject, and should have an opportunity of making a new arrangement for the command of their armies, if they should think that they ought not to comply with what I have now had the honor of submitting to your Excellency.

"Therefore, in case the Regency should not think it proper to comply with my request, I beg leave hereby to resign the command of the Spanish armies, with which the Cortes and Regency of Spain have honored me."

* * * * *

Adverting, next, to the evils which had resulted from the non-fulfilment of the engagements entered into for the supply of the Spanish armies in the field, Lord Wellington observes —

"More than half of Spain has been cleared of the enemy above a year; and the whole of Spain, excepting Catalonia and a small part of Aragon, since the months of May and June last. The most abundant harvest has been reaped in

all parts of the country; millions of money spent by the contending armies in the Peninsula are circulating everywhere; and yet your armies, however weak in numbers, are literally starving. The allied British and Portugueze army under my command has been subsisted, particularly latterly, almost exclusively upon the magazines imported by sea; and I am concerned to inform your Excellency, that besides money for the pay of all the armies which has been given from the military chest of the British army, and has been received from no other quarter, the British magazines have supplied quantities of provisions to all the Spanish armies, in order to enable them to remain in the field at all."

The minister of war, in reply to this letter, informed Lord Wellington that he had received the direction of the Regency to forward, to be laid before the Cortes, his lordship's resignation of the command of the Spanish armies; adding, that further instructions on the subject would be despatched upon the meeting of the new Cortes. The British general now, therefore, merely held the command until a successor should be appointed.

In a letter written by Lord Wellington at this period to Earl Bathurst, after describing the wretched state of subjection in which the Government was held by the Cortes, and the Cortes by the mob of Cadiz, — thereby rendering any influence England might possess over the majority of the members of the Cortes quite inoperative, on whichever side that influence might be directed, — his lordship, with prophetic spirit, points out the evils that would eventually result from the working of this democratic leaven in the government of the country. Despatches, &c. Dec. 5.

"It is quite impossible," (his lordship writes,) "that such a system can last. What I regret is, that I am the person that maintains it. If I was out of the way, there are plenty of generals who would overturn it. Ballasteros

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positively intended it; and I am much mistaken if O'Donnel*, and even Castaños, and probably others, are not equally ready. If the king should return, *he also will overturn the whole fabric*, if he has any spirit. But things have gone so far, and the gentlemen at Cadiz are so completely masters of their trade of managing that assembly, that I am afraid there must be another convulsion; and I earnestly recommend to the British government to keep themselves clear of the democracy, and to interfere in nothing while the government is in their hands, excepting in carrying on the war, and keeping out the foreign enemy."

It was Lord Wellington's intention to have moved the left wing of the allied army across the Bidasoa immediately after the fall of San Sebastian, it being very desirable to dislodge the enemy from the mountains on the right bank of the river, whence a perfect view was obtained of all his positions and of the movements of his various corps; but an unfortunate delay which occurred in bringing up the pontoon train obliged his lordship, for a time, to suspend his meditated offensive operations. Under existing circumstances, the British general, however, still questioned the prudence of crossing the frontier with his whole army, and carrying the war into the south of France, seeming rather to think that it would be more advisable, after securing the frontiers of Navarre, to turn his attention towards Catalonia, and first clear Spain of her invaders. For though he was now aware that Austria had joined the league against Napoleon, yet the miserable failure of the first combined operation of the allies against Dresden, rendered it doubtful whether the French emperor would not recover the ascendency; and in that case the Anglo-Portugueze army might be speedily driven out of France, since the numerical

* Conde de la Bisbal.

superiority Lord Wellington at the present moment could calculate upon carrying into that country, to use his own words, "consisted in about 25,000 Spaniards, neither paid nor fed, who must plunder, and would set the whole country against us." Despatches, &c. Sept. 19.

Affairs on the eastern coast, at this time, also, made his lordship question the propriety of entering France until Pamplona had fallen; for, though Lord William Bentinck had sent Del Parque's army to join him, yet he entertained great doubts whether Suchet had made any considerable detachment from his army, as Lord William Bentinck had supposed; and he conceived, therefore, that the French Marshal might attempt — as we have already seen he did — to strike such a blow at the Anglo-Sicilian army as would cripple it for the rest of the campaign, and enable him, then, to march upon the rear of the main allied army. Ibid.

Lord Wellington maintained his army, however, in a menacing position, ready to advance the moment circumstances might appear favourable; and, at the same time, Pamplona (which his lordship hoped would be compelled to surrender early in October) continued to be strictly blockaded by Carlos de España.

The more satisfactory accounts, which shortly afterwards reached Lord Wellington, as well of the progress of the war in Germany, as of the failure of Suchet to effect anything against the Anglo-Sicilian army, induced him, early in October, to carry into effect his plan of crossing the French frontier with the left wing of the allied army. Accordingly, Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Graham, having under his command the 1st and 5th divisions, Lord Aylmer's British, and Generals Wilson

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and Spry's Portugueze brigades, was directed to cross the Bidasoa on the morning of the 7th of October, in five columns: three, between the mouth of the river and Irun; the others, immediately above and below the site of the destroyed bridge on the royal road to Bayonne. These troops were to dislodge the enemy from Andaye and other posts covering their right, whilst Don Manuel Freyre with the army of Galicia, descending from the position of San Marcial, should pass the river in three columns by fords at the foot of those heights, and attack the enemy in front. Simultaneously with those operations, the Light division, supported by Longa's Spaniards, was directed to assail the enemy's intrenchments at the Puerto de Vera; and General Giron, with the army of Andalusia, was ordered to attack the works on the mountain of La Rhune, covering the extreme left of the French position.

From the foot of the San Marcial heights to the sea, the Bidasoa flows through a wide, flat-bottomed valley, over which, at high tide, the water spreads to a considerable extent; but, as the sea recedes, the stream, returning to its tortuous channel, leaves broad sand banks on either side. For several hours, during low water, this channel is fordable in various places; but the points of passage are liable to change, as well from the effects of spring tides as from the pouring down of mountain torrents after heavy rains; and even when the fords are known, it is necessary to take advantage of them without loss of time,—a rise of sixteen feet in the tide soon rendering them impassable.

The attack, from these circumstances, could only be made at low water; and, to ascertain the exact

position of the fords, Spanish fishermen were employed for several days, who, whilst apparently following their customary occupation, waded about the stream in all directions, until they ascertained where it was passable. By this means, three fords were discovered between the mouth of the river and the destroyed bridge, which General Freyre pointed out to the English officers selected to lead the columns across; who had been also set to watch the proceedings of the fishermen.

The troops destined to force the passage of the river in this quarter, were marched to their assigned positions some hours before daybreak on the morning of the 7th of October, with strict orders to remain completely concealed, until, at the favourable moment of the tide, a signal rocket should be fired from the church steeple of Fuenterabia, when the three columns on the extreme left were to advance to the attack. One brigade of the 5th division was accordingly posted in the ditch on the western side of the town of Fuenterabia; the other brigade of this division, with Lord Aylmer's British, and General Spry's Portugueze brigade, were concealed behind embankments which secured the meadows bordering the river from inundation, between that town and Irun; and the 1st division, with Wilson's Portugueze brigade, were drawn up under shelter of some eminences between Irun and the foot of the heights of San Marcial.

A violent storm, which had passed over the allied camp the preceding evening, still hung about the amphitheatre of mountains that girts in the hilly country over which the enemy had spread their comfortable hutted towns; and, amidst the groaning of the thunder, the noise occasioned by the move-

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ment of the artillery and pontoon train along the paved road did not excite the enemy's attention; fortunately, too, though vivid flashes of lightning gleamed occasionally, the march of the troops to their appointed stations was equally unobserved; and the tents of the whole of these troops were left standing, that at dawn the enemy's suspicions might not be awakened by observing that a movement had been effected during the night.

The troops sheltered under the embankment bordering the Bidasoa were so close to the French advanced posts, that the conversation of their pickets on the opposite bank of the river could be distinctly heard as they were engaged in cooking their breakfasts, little anticipating the coming visiters to partake of their pot-luck. On the side of the allies, not a whisper was heard; and, as dawn appeared, all eyes were impatiently directed towards the church steeple of Fuenterabia, fearful that every moment's delay would lead to the discovery of their close vicinity to the enemy. At length, after several hours of most exciting suspense, the whistling sound of the long-looked-for rocket was heard; and in a moment the entire edge of the Bidasoa, from Irun to Fuenterabia, was lined with troops, who, breaking into three columns, advanced to the fords pointed out for them respectively to cross by.

The river makes a considerable bend inwards below the destroyed bridge; which, in order that the enemy's line might be attacked at all points at the same moment, made it necessary that the three columns on the left should cross first. This they effected in admirable order, though a slight delay occurred in the passage of the brigade on the right,

which, owing to a blunder of General Freyre, might have been productive of great loss. The ford that was pointed out by the Spanish general proved impassable, and the head of the column had, consequently, to retrace its steps — unavoidably, under such circumstances, in a little confusion. Captain Mann*, of the Royal Staff Corps, who led this column, had, it fortunately happened, been himself employed to reconnoitre the fords, and, leaving his horse sticking in the mud, descended the stream for about a quarter of a mile, to a ford he had discovered, and previously recommended to be used; and, wading breast high through the stream, followed by the cheering troops, quickly gained the French bank of the river. The enemy were so paralyzed by the suddenness of the attack, that advantage was not taken of this untoward circumstance, which thus, for a short time, obliged the column to lend its right flank to their fire; and the column was nearly half-way across the river before the French, recovering from their surprise, commenced firing upon them.

The enemy were driven from Andaye after a short resistance, which became the signal for the 1st division to cross the river by the fords immediately above and below the destroyed bridge, and for the Spanish army of Galicia to descend from the position of San Marcial to the fords of Beriatu, at its base. The passage of the river at all these points was effected with equal celerity, under cover of a heavy fire of artillery. A pontoon bridge was immediately laid for the passage of the guns, as well as to secure the communication of the army with San Sebastian.

* Lieut.-Colonel F. W. Mann.

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Lord Wellington, from the summit of the San Marcial height, watched the progress of the different columns of his army. The smile of satisfaction which usually lit up his countenance when he thought "he had" the enemy, was never more perceptible; and at length, with the exclamation of "They 're off, by ——," he pushed his horse rapidly down the steep side of the mountain, and proceeded to the left, to direct in person the further movements of that wing of his army; on which, it was evident, the measure of the success of his operations depended.

The enemy had thrown up a line of works on the summit of the hills, extending from Mount Mandale on their left, beyond the chaussée on their right; upon which they now hastily drew back on all sides: but the passage of the Bidasoa below Fuenterabia never having been contemplated, little preparation had been made to meet an attack on that side; and the brigade which crossed at that point, by advancing along the sea coast, came unexpectedly upon the right flank and rear of the enemy's new position, spreading consternation in their ranks, and forcing them to a precipitate retreat. Abandoning all their advanced works on the right bank of the Bidasoa, they retired in disorder to their strongly intrenched camp in front of Urugne, leaving three guns in the hands of the allies.

This success against the enemy's right rendered the task of the 1st division and Freyre's Spanish army comparatively easy; the apprehension of being cut off, causing the French troops in the centre to defend but feebly the formidable works they had thrown up on the Montagne Verte and heights of

Mandale. The light division, directed against the enemy's left, encountered more opposition, but were equally successful. General Kempt's brigade, supported by Longa's Spanish division, advanced against the pass of Vera, whilst Colonel Colborne's * brigade attacked the enemy posted on Mount Commissari. The only approach to the enemy's intrenched camp on the summit of this mountain was by a zig-zag path, defended by a series of field-works disposed in steps, as it were, up the steep side of the rocky ridge; but Colborne, placing himself at the head of his brigade, consisting of the 52d light infantry, the 2d battalion of the 95th rifle corps, and a battalion of Portugueze caçadores, advanced resolutely to the attack, and, at the point of the bayonet, drove the enemy from their works one after another, and finally dislodged them from their formidable intrenched camp at the summit.

Meanwhile Giron, with the army of Andalusia, attacked, in two columns, the equally inaccessible mountain of La Rhune, which covered the right and rear of the enemy's position, and carried all their intrenchments in very gallant style, till they arrived at the foot of a lofty isolated crag, or tor, which, rising on the summit of the ridge, presented a scarped face, 50 or 60 feet in height, towards the assailants, and even in rear could be climbed only with extreme difficulty. At the summit of this peak stood a hermitage, which, having been loop-holed and otherwise rendered defensible, made it a post of great strength; and all the efforts of the Spaniards to possess themselves of it, and of another similarly isolated rock, also situated on the

* Lieut.-General Lord Seaton, G.C.B.

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crest of the ridge more to the right, proved unavailing. Excepting on these two points, the enemy were driven from every part of their strong position before the day closed.

Sir Thomas Graham, after having successfully placed the left wing of the allied army on the French territory, gave up the command to Lieut.-General Sir John Hope *, who had joined the army on the previous evening, and embarked for England; whence he shortly afterwards departed to take the command of the forces employed in co-operation with a Prussian corps in the Low Countries.

Lord Wellington proceeded to Giron's corps on the morning of the 8th, to direct in person the attack on the rocky posts still held by the enemy on the summit of La Rhune, which a thick fog had deterred the Spaniards from resuming. His lordship, observing that the mountain was more accessible by its right, and that the attack of these points might be advantageously combined with that on the enemy's works in front of their camp at Sarre, made dispositions accordingly; forming the Spanish corps on the right. During this operation, Giron directed a battalion to attack the enemy's post on the rock, which was gallantly carried; and, pushing on, the Spaniards with equal bravery stormed an intrenched work on a hill that protected the right of the camp at Sarre; to which the enemy immediately retired, abandoning all their other advanced works. These were then taken possession of by detachments of the 7th division, which had been pushed through the pass of Echalar to co-operate in this attack. The post at the hermit-

* The late General Lord Niddry, G.C.B.

age still remained in the enemy's hands, but the day was too far spent to allow of its being attacked; and the garrison, finding themselves turned on both flanks, and likely to be cut off, abandoned it in the course of the following night.

The French army had now been dislodged from all its works in advance of the intrenched camps at Urugne and Sarre, excepting those on the summit of La Petite Rhune, — a ridge about two miles in rear of the Great Rhune, and nearly of equal altitude, and of as difficult access. They had further sustained a loss of between 2000 and 3000 men, and 11 guns. The allies had 1550 killed and wounded, of whom nearly half were Spaniards. In his official despatch, Lord Wellington speaks in high terms of the behaviour of the Spanish troops, and bestows great praise on General Giron and the officers of his staff, for their conduct throughout these operations.

On the following day (9th Oct.), after Lord Wellington had returned to his head-quarters, some troops of the 7th division, having imprudently pushed forward into Sarre, were attacked by a superior force, and suffered severely; a few Spanish regiments, however, coming up, the French were checked, and the British were enabled to maintain their position in front of the town; but, on the night of the 12th, the enemy took advantage of the vicinity of Sarre, to surprise an advanced party of Spaniards, occupying a redoubt in their abandoned camp. This post, being too far in advance of the general line of the allied position to admit of its receiving timely support, was henceforth allowed to remain in the enemy's hands; and they then attempted to recover the works from which they had

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been driven on the 8th, in front of their camp at Sarre, but were repulsed at all points by the army of Andalusia.

Some excesses having been committed by the troops on entering the French territory on the 7th, Lord Wellington, on the following day, again promulgated a general order, issued some months previously, forbidding, in the strongest terms, any ill usage towards the inhabitants, or pillage of their habitations; and his lordship accompanied this order with some very severe animadversions on the neglect of it, which had been manifested on the present occasion.

General orders, July 9.

To deprive the troops of any excuse for plundering, Lord Wellington had, some time before, adopted the plan of making a daily issue of pay to the soldiers; but this system could not be applied to the Spanish troops, who, as well as the Portugueze, looked forward to the plunder of France, as a just measure of retaliation for all the misery inflicted on their own countries by their merciless invaders. His lordship foresaw, therefore, that though he might perhaps be able to control the Portugueze, so as to make them co-operate with advantage in an invasion of France, yet, that to carry forward a large, ill-disciplined body of Spaniards, would rather mar than advance his operations; since their depredations would not only exasperate the inhabitants, but must occasion a wanton destruction of the resources of the country, which would prove more detrimental to the allies than to their adversaries.

At this very time, a most infamous libel, as well on his Lordship, as on the Anglo-Portugueze troops serving under him, was published in the Cadiz newspapers, (grounded, as it appeared, on an official

complaint made to the government by the Political Chief of the province of Guipuzcoa,) with reference to the conduct of the soldiery at the storming of San Sebastian. The complaint of the *Xefe Politico* set forth, that, not confining themselves to the plunder of the captured fortress, the troops endeavoured to burn the city after it had been sacked; and that it actually was set on fire by the besiegers, both during the attack, and subsequently to its capture; — the reason assigned for this conduct being, that the former trade of the place had been exclusively with the French nation, and, consequently, to the disadvantage of Great Britain.

Lord Wellington, in a letter to the British minister at Cadiz, clears the character of the allied troops, in the most convincing manner, from this infamous charge; which, however, as his lordship justly remarks, could apply only to the principal officers of the allied army, — himself and Sir Thomas Graham; since the common soldiers could not be supposed to possess such a knowledge of our commercial policy, as should induce them to act as they were stated to have done, without orders from their superiors. Despatches, &c. Oct. 9.

So far, however, from entertaining the wish to destroy the town, Lord Wellington had done every thing that was in his power to save it; and had refused his consent to the proposals repeatedly made to him, to bombard it, as being the most certain mode of forcing the enemy to surrender, for the same reasons that he had not allowed that mode of attack to be pursued, either at Ciudad Rodrigo or Badajos; though, had he desired to destroy the place from motives of commercial revenge, no more certain method of effecting that purpose could have

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been adopted, than by a bombardment; and certainly the laws of war furnished him with a good pretext for reducing it by such means.

It was equally untrue, as his lordship fully proved, that the town had been at any time set on fire by the allied troops. The burning of the town, on the contrary, was part of the enemy's system of defence, and proved one of the greatest obstacles the besiegers had encountered. It necessitated the postponement of the assault on the 24th of July, and in a great measure occasioned the repulse on the following day; and after the town had fallen, owing to the danger and difficulty of communicating, through the fire, with the advanced posts of the attack upon the citadel, it had at one time nearly become necessary to withdraw those posts altogether. It was, furthermore, a notorious fact, that both officers and men exerted themselves to the utmost to stop the progress of the flames; and equally well known, that many lives had been lost in the attempt to do so, owing to the musketry fire kept up on the troops, by the inhabitants themselves, from the roofs and windows of their houses, and by the enemy from the citadel.

Despatches, &c. Oct. 9.

"In regard to the plunder of the town by the soldiers, (his lordship proceeds to state) I am the last man who will deny it, because I know that it is true. It has fallen to my lot to take many towns by storm; and I am concerned to add, that I never saw or heard of one so taken, by any troops, that it was not plundered. It is one of the evil consequences attending the necessity of storming a town, which every officer laments, not only on account of the evil thereby inflicted on the unfortunate inhabitants, but on account of the injury it does to discipline, and the risk which is incurred of the loss of all the advantages of victory, at the very moment they are gained.

"It is hard that I and my general officers are to be so treated as we have been by the *Xefe Politico* and unre-

strained libellers, because an unavoidable evil has occurred in the accomplishment of a great service, and in the acquirement of a great advantage. The fault does not lie with us; it is with those who lost the fort, and obliged us, at great risk and loss, to regain it for the Spanish nation by storm."

We may judge of the indignant feeling these infamous accusations aroused in the breast of the British commander, by the following extract from a private letter to his brother: —

"I do not know how long my temper will last; but I was never so much disgusted with any thing as with this libel; and I do not know whether the conduct of the soldiers in plundering San Sebastian, or the libels of the *Xefe Politico* and *Duende* *, made me most angry." Despatches, &c. Oct. 11.

Lord Wellington now waited only for the fall of Pamplona, to make an attack, he had for some time been meditating, on Marshal Soult's formidable intrenched camps, and carry the war altogether into the enemy's country. Still, however, the garrison of that fortress obstinately held out; and having shown symptoms of a disposition to destroy the place,—a proceeding which Lord Wellington justly considered contrary to the usages of civilized warfare, and intended solely to inflict a serious injury on the Spanish nation,—his lordship instructed Don Carlos de España, in the event of any injury being done to the city, to grant no capitulation to the French garrison; and authorized him, without waiting for further orders, to put to the sword the governor, officers, and non-commissioned officers, and to decimate the troops. The blockading force was at the same time augmented; and Sir Stapleton Cotton received directions to show the allied cavalry in the neighbourhood of the invested city, to warn Ibid. Oct. 20.

* The Fairy — a newspaper of the day, published at Cadiz.

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the governor of the danger of attempting to follow the example of Brenier at Almeida.

An intimation of the foregoing instructions, and of his determination to carry them rigidly into execution, being made by Don Carlos de España to the French governor, produced the desired effect, as far as regarded the contemplated destruction of the city; but the hope of being succoured, induced the enemy to hold out (though reduced to a scanty allowance of flour and horseflesh) until the 31st of October, when the place was surrendered, and a garrison, 4000 strong, marched out prisoners of war.

The conduct of the Spanish general called forth well-merited eulogium from Lord Wellington. The French garrison, during a four months' blockade, had not once been able to communicate with Marshal Soult; and their repeated sorties had invariably been repulsed with great gallantry. In repelling one of their sallies, Don Carlos de España was severely wounded, but requested to be allowed to continue to direct the operations.

The extreme severity of the weather prevented Lord Wellington taking immediate advantage of the fall of Pamplona, as he had intended.

Despatches, &c. Nov. 1.

"Hill being up to his knees in snow," he writes to Sir John Hope, announcing the capture of that fortress, "it is absolutely necessary to defer our movement for a day or two;" adding, (as the surrender of Pamplona, if known to Soult, would naturally have led him to expect an attack,) "and I beg that every precaution may be taken to prevent communication with the enemy."

Lord Wellington, having determined to carry the war into the South of France, now issued the following brief proclamation: —

"*To the French People.*

"On entering your country, I make known to you, that I have given the strictest orders, of which a translation is subjoined, to avert the misfortunes which are generally the consequence of the invasion of an enemy's army (an invasion which, you are aware, has resulted from that made by your government on Spain), and of the success of the allied armies acting under my orders.

"You may rest assured that I will carry those orders into effect; and I request of you to arrest and conduct to my head quarters all those who, in disobedience of them, may do you any injury. But it is necessary that you should remain in your houses, and should not take any part in the operations of the war of which your country is about to become the theatre."

Despatches, &c. July 18.

The promulgation of the orders to which this proclamation referred (and of which a translation was appended), his lordship thought, with reason, would produce a better effect than a thousand promises made in the proclamation itself; since by this means the French people "might see what was *positively ordered.*"

Lord Wellington now again urged upon the English government, the necessity of having a sufficient naval force on the coast, as well to secure the supplies of his army, as to interrupt the *cabotage* * between Bordeaux and Bayonne; by which means the enemy's army was drawing its supplies from the interior of the country far more conveniently than they would otherwise have done by land carriage, through the sterile and thinly populated department of *Les Landes.* Besides which, it was very desirable to compel the enemy to employ the horses and other means of conveyance possessed by the country, to bring up all their supplies and also to find occupation for the peasantry;

* Coasting trade carried on in small vessels.

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since such a fatiguing service could not but prove very onerous to the inhabitants, and would deprive the French army of the means of recruiting its cavalry as well as infantry.

Despatches, &c. Nov. 1.

"I beg leave once more," (his lordship writes to Earl Bathurst on this subject,) "to impress upon your Lordship the absolute necessity that we should have the maritime communication constant and secure, notwithstanding the inconvenience, the difficulty, and the danger, if it is intended by his Majesty's government that I should maintain a large army upon this frontier; and it is obvious, from what I have above stated, that stinted naval means will not answer."

Ibid. Nov. 3.

Such were the wants of the Spanish army at this moment (when people in England were beginning to complain of Lord Wellington's dilatoriness), that General Freyre actually proposed that part of his troops should be sent to the rear, to endeavour to procure subsistence; and to insure the co-operation of the Spanish troops at this most important juncture, — when the forward movement of the army was delayed only by the state of the weather, which prevented the right wing from advancing, — Lord Wellington was obliged to order an issue of provisions to be made to them from the stores of the British army.

His lordship, in remonstrating with the Spanish government on this subject, through the minister of war, and adverting to the military exactions to which it unavoidably led, sarcastically observes, —

Ibid. Nov. 8.

"I doubt not that the *Xefe Politicos* have taken care to inform the government of the misery inflicted on the people by this military system; and I advert to one part of the letter from the chief of the staff,—that in which he states that 40,000 rations would last the army for two days, — just to show the extent of the abuses which prevail; abuses which it is impossible to remedy till the regular means shall be provided for the maintenance of the army.

"This army, which it appears by the letter from the chief of the staff consumes 20,000 rations daily, and by another which I have from General Freyre consumes 22,000 rations daily, consists of two divisions and one brigade of the 4th army, and will not produce 10,000 men in the field. Thus every soldier in the field costs more than two in his provisions, the most expensive article of his maintenance.

* * * * *

"Then there are whole armies that for want of means are quite useless."

During the month which had elapsed since the French army was driven from the Bidasoa, — an operation which, as we have noticed, defeated Suchet's project of combining a movement with Soult against the allied army, — the latter marshal had been strengthening his defensive position in front of St. Jean de Luz, with the determination of resisting to the uttermost any further advance of the allies upon the "sacred soil" of France.

The right of the enemy's line rested on the sea, having Fort Socoa (on the coast) as a support, some little distance in the rear. From thence a vast intrenched camp, occupied by three divisions, stretched inland along the summit of a series of detached heights towards the foot of the Petite La Rhune, covering the village of Urugne, and the great road to Bayonne, on which that village is situated; — being thus in advance of the river Nivelle. To the left of this camp, but somewhat thrown back, was another, at Ascain and Serres, on the two banks of the river: — this was occupied by a division, and protected by field works like the preceding, besides being sheltered by the Petite La Rhune. Three divisions, under Clauzel, occupied the heights behind Sarre, covering the road from

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Vera to Bayonne by Echalar. This camp was also strongly defended by redoubts, intrenchments, and abattis, and was covered on the right by the Petite La Rhune, — held by a brigade. Five miles to the left of Sarre, but altogether on the right bank of the Nivelle, a fourth camp, behind Ainhoüe, was occupied by two divisions, under D'Erlon, to cover the roads directed on Bayonne from the pass of Maya. The division of General Foy was at Bidarray on the Nive, watching the road from Pamplona by St. Etienne; and that of General Paris in the neighbourhood of St. Jean-pied-de-Port.

The positions of the enemy's different corps, though separately strong, as well by the nature of the ground each occupied as by the number of works which had been thrown up to protect them, yet, taken collectively, presented a by-no-means formidable line of defence. In fact, the loss of the Great La Rhune had completely shaken the position which Marshal Soult had taken so much pains to fortify, and he ought to have abandoned his camp at Urugne, and drawn back the right wing of his army behind the Nivelle, the moment that strong advanced post was wrested from him; for it was evident that its occupation by the allies, would not only enable them to screen their movements of concentration against whichever part of his line they might choose to make their attack, but would render any movement from his right to support his centre, or vice versâ, a flank march of extreme danger and difficulty. The Petite La Rhune, on the other hand, was too completely in his line of defence to give it any strength, *unless occupied in force*; and if it were not, it only became an additional obstacle in the way of the lateral march of

the different corps of the French army to each other's support.

Lord Wellington was not slow to perceive the defects of his adversary's position, and only feared that if his attack were much longer deferred, the news of the fate of Pamplona would reach Soult, and cause him to take steps to remedy them. His lordship's meditated attack had, as we have seen, been delayed since the capture of Pamplona by heavy falls of rain and snow, which rendered the roads on the right of the army quite impracticable for artillery; but on the 5th of November the weather appeared more settled, and orders were issued for the march of the different divisions to close upon the left, with the intention of attacking the enemy on the 8th. These movements of concentration were effected during the 6th and 7th; but a return of rainy weather again made it necessary to postpone the attack for a few days.

By the movements which had taken place, the whole of the right wing, under Sir Rowland Hill, and now consisting of the 2d and 6th British, General Hamilton's Portugueze, and Morillo's Spanish divisions, and a brigade of cavalry, were collected in the valley of Baztan; the posts of Orbazaite, Roncesvalles, &c., on the extreme right, which had hitherto been held by Sir Rowland's troops, being now given over to those of General Mina. The right centre, of which Marshal Beresford took the command, was composed of the 3d, 4th, and 7th divisions, Giron's corps, and a brigade of cavalry, and was assembled about the passes of Echalar and Zugarramurdi; and the left centre, consisting of the light division and Longa's Spanish division, occupied the mountain of La

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Rhune. The army of Galicia was posted on the heights of Mandale, connecting these troops with the 1st and 5th divisions, Lord Aylmer's British, and two Portugueze brigades, forming the left wing of the army; which occupied a strong defensive position on the range of heights from which the enemy had been dislodged after the allies had forced the passage of the Bidasoa on the 7th of October.

The major part of the allied army — nine divisions, exclusive of Giron's corps — was thus massed in front of the French left and left centre, through which it was Lord Wellington's intention to break, thereby placing himself in rear of their right, whilst Sir John Hope should hold the enemy in check, on that side, by making a formidable demonstration against the camp at Urugne; in which Captain Sir Geo. Collier of the R. N. was requested to co-operate by appearing off St. Jean de Luz with his squadron, as well as by throwing shells into the rear of the enemy's camp.

Lord Wellington slept on the Spanish territory for the last time during the war on the 9th of November. The event, foreseen by our Great Captain through a long vista of years, had at length come to pass. The unswerving adherence to, and unshaken perseverance in, the plans he had laid down for the conduct of the Peninsular war, — plans which had been persisted in, despite an accumulation of difficulties such as few commanders have ever before had to contend against, had obtained the desired result; and the liberator of Portugal and Spain, now leading his victorious legions across the Pyrenees, gave a blow which shook to the very foundation the Imperial fabric raised on the ruins of the throne of the Bourbons.

Lord Wellington was on horseback some hours before dawn on the 10th of November; and taking the rude mountain track that leads from Vera to Sarre, proceeded to join the right centre of his army, which he reached before daybreak. The moon shone brightly, but there was not yet sufficient light to commence operations requiring to be skilfully combined. The troops, however, were all under arms, and formed within a few hundred yards of the enemy's advanced works. As day broke, the battle commenced. The troops were formed in columns of attack, pointing towards Sarre; but were kept under shelter, whilst a brisk cannonade from eighteen guns was opened upon a strong redoubt that commanded the approach to the village on its right. About 7 o'clock, an impression having been made on this work, the troops moved forward to the assault; the 4th and 7th divisions advancing straight upon the redoubt covering the approach to Sarre, whilst Giron's Spaniards moved along the slopes of the Petite La Rhune on the left, and the 3d division pressed forward to turn the enemy's works on the right. The cheers which rent the air as Lord Wellington now rode to the front foretold success. The advanced redoubt on the right was gallantly carried by the 4th division; and a similar work which protected the village of Sarre, in front of its left, was abandoned on the approach of the 7th division.. Sir Lowry Cole immediately moved forward the 4th division to attack the village itself, already turned on both sides by the flanking columns; and it, also, was carried after a feeble resistance.

The enemy then fell back to their main position behind Sarre, to assail which dispositions were in-

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stantly made; and the Light division having meanwhile dislodged the enemy from the mountain of La Petite Rhune, now inclining to the right, poured down the north side of the steep ridge to assist in this attack, directing its march towards the intrenchments covering the right of the camp of Sarre, which was slightly thrown back towards Ascain. The enemy's position was of great strength, as well from the nature of the ground as from the numerous formidable stockaded works disposed to flank each other along the summit of the range of hills occupied by the camp. But their efforts to defend it against the overpowering force brought up to the attack were unavailing. The allied troops overcame every obstacle; captured all the enemy's artillery; and made prisoners of an entire battalion of the 88th regiment, which could not effect its escape from the principal redoubt.

During the progress of these operations in the centre, the right wing of the allied army descended from Urdax towards Ainhoüe, to attack the enemy's camp at that place; Morillo's Spaniards moving along the slopes of the lofty ridge of Mondarin, which overhangs the right bank of the Nivelle, in order to cover the march of the 2d, 6th, and Hamilton's Portugueze divisions, whilst advancing in parallel columns on the opposite side of the river.

The enemy's pickets on the bank of the stream, and in front of Ainhoüe, were driven in by General Pringle's brigade of the 2d division; whilst the 6th division, fording the Nivelle below the village, followed by the Portugueze division of Hamilton, proceeded to attack the right of the enemy's principal position; in which their troops were now all collected, excepting a division that had been

brought up from Bidarray to occupy the Mondarin mountain on the left, and now remained isolated.

The enemy's camp was about a mile in rear of Ainhoüe, extending along the crest of a steep ridge that shoots out from the Mondarin mountain on the left, and terminates abruptly on the Nivelle; thus completely closing the valley. The whole front of this position was covered by a formidable abattis, and five strong redoubts crowned its summit. The 6th division advanced without firing; overcame every obstacle; and drove the enemy's troops drawn up in front of their works from the position. The whole of the redoubts were then carried with but slight resistance; and General Byng's brigade of the 2d division, crossing over the ridge at its furthest extremity, carried a redoubt situated on a parallel range of heights in rear of the left of the enemy's position. This was the last of their works; and they were now in full retreat from all points, directing their march towards Cambo, to gain the bridge over the Nive at that place. The French division on the Mondarin ridge attempted to recover its communication by way of Espelette; but a brisk forward movement of Lieut.-General Stewart, with part of his division, forced it into the mountains towards Baygorry.

Lord Wellington himself witnessed the success gained by the gallant troops of the right wing of his army; and finding that he had obtained possession of the heights on both banks of the Nivelle, directed the march of his centre and right upon St. Pé; the 3d and 7th divisions of the former descending from Sarre along the left bank of the river, the 6th division of the latter along the right bank from Ainhoüe; the 4th and Light divisions

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and Giron's corps taking up a position in front of Ascain to cover this operation on the left; whilst Sir Rowland Hill, with the 2d division and Morillo's Spaniards, protected it on the right.

This decisive movement was effected as rapidly as the state of the roads would admit. The 3d and 7th divisions crossed the river at St. Pé on the arrival of the 6th division to cover the operation on the right bank, and the whole then moved forward to attack the enemy posted on the heights in rear of the village, who, after some resistance, were dislodged with considerable loss.

By the occupation of St. Pé the centre of the allied army was much nearer Bayonne than the French right at Urugne, whose safety thus became seriously compromised. But the day was too far spent, and the troops were too much fatigued, to enable Lord Wellington to undertake any further movement; and Soult was therefore enabled to escape.

Sir John Hope's demonstration against the front of the enemy's camp at Urugne, seconded by the advance of Freyre's corps from the heights of Mandale to threaten Ascain, had been perfectly successful. A strong detached work, occupying the summit of a knoll to the right of Urugne, was attacked and carried in gallant style by the 1st regiment of Guards; upon which the 85th light infantry of Lord Aylmer's brigade, making a rush down the valley on the right (in which the village is situated), drove the enemy out with the bayonet. A sharp skirmish was then kept up along the whole front of the enemy's works, into which their troops were withdrawn, and a brisk cannonade played upon their principal redoubts: but nothing further

was attempted; Sir John Hope, acquainted with Lord Wellington's designs, knowing that to engage in a serious attack on this side would only occasion a useless sacrifice of life, and even if successful, could not produce such results as were promised by the advance of the allied centre to isolate this wing of their army.

Late in the day Soult penetrated Lord Wellington's design, and detached troops to his left. But it was then too late; and perceiving the danger of his position, he fell back as soon as the darkness of the night enabled him to conceal his retreat from the allied troops in his front, to a position at Bidart, destroying, on his way, all the bridges on the Lower Nivelle. The enemy's division at Ascain had previously withdrawn from that place, which was immediately occupied by Longa's troops. Sir John Hope followed up the enemy next day, as soon as the bridges on the Nivelle could be repaired; Marshal Beresford also, with a part of the centre, advanced from St. Pé towards Bidart, as far as the state of the roads (rendered yet more impracticable than before, by a heavy fall of rain) would permit; but the French marshal had no confidence in an open position after the formidable line which it cost him four months' labour to fortify had been carried, and he withdrew during the night of the 11th to the intrenched camp in front of Bayonne.

Batty. Campaign in Pyrennees, p. 53.

Thus, a second time, was Marshal Soult within an ace of being captured by an adversary whom he was pleased to accuse of dilatoriness; for we may assert, without any fear of the charge of prejudice, that, had the season been less unfavourable, the right wing of the French army would have been compelled to surrender.

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Soult accused Clauzel's troops of want of resolution; but the truth is, they were overpowered by numbers, in consequence of Lord Wellington's admirable strategical movement of concentration on the decisive point. The enemy lost 1400 prisoners, and probably more than double that amount in killed and wounded: 51 pieces of cannon were also captured. The loss of the allies was 3000 killed and wounded, including 300 or 400 Spaniards.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE ALLIED ARMY ADVANCES TOWARDS BAYONNE. — THE SPANISH TROOPS ARE SENT BACK INTO SPAIN. — CONTINUED NEGLECT OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT IN SUPPLYING THEIR ARMIES. — POSITION OF THE ALLIES. — FEELING OF THE FRENCH TOWARDS LORD WELLINGTON. — ADDRESS PRESENTED TO HIM BY THE NOTABLES OF SAN JEAN DE LUZ, AND CONTRAST OFFERED BY THE CONDUCT OF THE SPANISH AUTHORITIES. — STATE OF THE WAR IN GERMANY. — LORD WELLINGTON DECIDES ON PENETRATING INTO THE SOUTH OF FRANCE. — ADVANTAGEOUS POSITION OCCUPIED BY MARSHAL SOULT. — THE ALLIES CROSS THE NIVE. — ACTIONS FOUGHT IN FRONT OF BAYONNE. — SOULT WITHDRAWS FROM THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF THAT FORTRESS, AND LORD WELLINGTON DETERMINES TO EFFECT THE PASSAGE OF THE ADOUR BELOW THE TOWN. — VEXATIOUS CONDUCT OF THE SPANISH AUTHORITIES. — TREATY CONCLUDED BETWEEN NAPOLEON AND FERDINAND. — SUBTILTY OF THE FRENCH EMPEROR. — THE SPANISH REGENCY REFUSES TO RATIFY THE TREATY. — THE DUC D'ANGOULEME ARRIVES AT LORD WELLINGTON'S HEAD-QUARTERS. — PROCEEDINGS IN CATALONIA.

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On the 11th of November the Anglo-Portugueze army followed the retreat of the enemy towards Bayonne, but halted about twelve miles from that fortress, in a strong position with its left at Guethary, and the right thrown back slightly towards St. Pé. The orders forbidding plunder had been so totally disregarded by the Spanish troops during the preceding operations, that Lord Wellington found himself reduced to the unpleasant alternative of having the resources of the country consumed and its inhabitants in arms against him, or of diminishing his army by sending the Spanish troops back to plunder their own country. He thought the latter step would least impair the efficiency of his army, and accordingly orders were forthwith issued for the retrograde march of all

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the Spanish corps. Longa's troops, who had conducted themselves like perfect brigands, were ordered into the interior of Spain, to Medina del Pomar; those of Mina, who had manifested considerable insubordination, recrossed the mountains to Roncesvalles. The armies of Freyre and Giron were marched back, and cantoned within the frontier; the former in advance of San Sebastian, the latter in the valley of Baztan.

The disgraceful neglect of the Spanish government in not supplying the wants of its troops occasioned, and in some degree excused, the excesses they committed; but the deduction of so large a portion of his force paralyzed Lord Wellington's movements at an important juncture: Morillo's division, about 3000 strong, being the only body of Spanish troops that assisted actively during the rest of this arduous winter campaign. *

The British and Portugueze had conducted themselves remarkably well, and the inhabitants already began to place confidence in the assurances of their general, by returning to their houses and agricultural pursuits. The want of a supply of money to pay the English troops began, however, to be felt, as also of great-coats and other articles of equipment; all of which had been shipped many weeks, but remained at Oporto and other ports waiting for convoy! Unless these wants were speedily supplied, Lord Wellington felt that, however desirable it might be that he should continue in the field, and however favourable the circumstances of the moment and of the season, it would be quite impossible for him to do any thing.

Despatches, &c. Nov. 21. and Dec. 5.

* Part of General Freyre's army was again brought forward in the spring of 1814.

The success of any future operations he might undertake, Lord Wellington felt convinced, would depend upon the good conduct and discipline of his troops, no less than on his own moderation, firmness, and justice. Of deriving any further assistance from the Spanish armies he therefore despaired, unless he could have at his command the means of feeding and paying them.

Despatches, &c. Nov. 21.

"If I could now bring forward 20,000 good Spaniards, fed and clothed," (his lordship writes to Earl Bathurst on the 21st November,) "I should have Bayonne. If I could bring forward 40,000, I do not know where I should stop. Now I have both 20,000 and 40,000 at my command upon this frontier, but I cannot venture to bring forward any for want of means of paying and supporting them. Without food and pay, they must plunder; and if they plunder, they will ruin us all."

A continuance of heavy rains, from the 11th to the 20th, rendered the roads and country quite impracticable for a general movement of the army. Sir Rowland Hill, however, on the 16th, having threatened an attack on the enemy's post at Cambo (where they had a tête de pont), they were induced to destroy the bridge at that place, which enabled Lord Wellington to take a more advanced position on the following day. The left wing was then brought forward to a range of heights between Bidart and Biaritz; crossing the chaussée to Bayonne, in front of the Chateau de Barouillet. About two miles to the right, the light division occupied the plateau and village of Arcanges; and, beyond it, the 6th division took post at Arrauntz, resting its right on the Nive. The other divisions of the army were disposed, *en potence*, along the left bank of the river, occupying Ustaritz and Cambo.

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Lord Wellington's head-quarters were on the 17th removed from St. Pé to St. Jean de Luz. When that town was first occupied by the allied troops, such of the inhabitants as had not followed Marshal Soult's advice, and fled, remained shut up in their houses, peeping occasionally through the closed windows to see if their turn had arrived to be plundered; but in the course of a few days, their fears subsiding, they once more ventured abroad; and finding that the strictest discipline was maintained, that every thing was scrupulously paid for by the allied troops, and that they were much more likely to be the pillagers than the pillaged, their shops were re-opened, the *émigrés* returned, supplies of all sorts were brought in from the country, and the petty trading town presented a scene of far greater bustle than had ever before been witnessed in its streets.

It was not without astonishment, too, that the inhabitants beheld the Generalissimo of the armies of Great Britain, Portugal, and Spain, habited in a plain blue frock coat, without a single decoration, take his daily, and sometimes solitary walk, on the esplanade overlooking the sea; saluting affably, and often entering into conversation with those who approached him. Could this, they thought, be the Great Captain who had defeated generals glittering in gold embroidery, covered with orders, and who never stirred out without the attendance of a numerous train of aides-de-camp and orderlies?

The authorities of St. Jean de Luz soon appreciated at its just value the noble character of the British general, and a few days after his lordship had fixed his head-quarters in their town presented to him the following address:—

"My Lord,

"The notables of the communes of St. Jean de Luz and Siboure present themselves to your Lordship, to express the gratitude of all the inhabitants for the favour which they enjoy in having you amongst them.

"France, secretly groaning under the evils of a dreadful war, has no other desire, no other want, than peace. We know, my Lord, that all your endeavours are directed to attain this object. May you succeed in so noble a design! You will have earned the gratitude of the universe; and we shall not cease to address our prayers to Heaven for the preservation of a hero as great as he is wise.

"(Signed, &c.)"

Whilst the plan pursued towards the French thus seemed likely to be crowned with success, fresh and numerous causes of annoyance were daily given to Lord Wellington by the Spanish government; and now also by the provincial authorities, emboldened by the protection afforded them by the government. Libellous pamphlets were published without any attempt to bring the writers to punishment; and in them the Spanish people were called upon to *revenge the conduct of the British army*, now accused of having committed all sorts of atrocities from the period of Sir John Moore's retreat up to the storming of San Sebastian.

The impunity with which these infamous attacks were permitted to have circulation — indeed, the well-grounded belief that they were actually published with the sanction of the minister of war — led Lord Wellington to think that the British government should take some decisive steps to avert the mischief thus threatened by the conduct of the knot of intriguing democrats, who had usurped the direction of the affairs of Spain; between whom and his lordship the breach was likely to be yet further widened, in consequence of the

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measures he had found it necessary to adopt in regard to the Spanish troops.

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Despatches, &c. Nov. 27.

His lordship, therefore, advised the British government to complain seriously, through their minister at Cadiz, of the conduct of the government of Spain and their servants; and to demand that a garrison of English troops should be admitted into San Sebastian, to secure a point of embarkation for the Anglo-Portugueze army, in the event of its being deemed expedient to withdraw it from Spain — which his lordship recommended should be done, if the representations of the British government were not attended to.

Ibid.

"The truth is," (his lordship concludes,) "that a crisis is approaching in our connexion with Spain; and if you do not bring the government and nation to their senses before they go too far, you will inevitably lose all the advantages which you might expect from the services rendered to them."

The appearance of an inclination on the part of the Cortes to get rid of the existing government being shortly after manifested, Lord Wellington wrote to Earl Bathurst to suspend taking the steps he had suggested; recommending, however, that power should be left with the ambassador to make the demands or not, according as he might judge at the moment most advisable. No further steps having been taken in the matter, we should not have alluded to it, but that some French writers, from what passed on the occasion, have drawn the conclusion that the Spanish nation regarded their allies with distrust and hatred; whereas those feelings were confined entirely to the soi-disant "liberals" in the government and cortes, who dreaded the influence which the British general had obtained over the mass of the nation.

The news received at this period from the seat of war in Germany — the defection of the Saxon troops from Napoleon's ranks in the fatal field of Leipsic, followed immediately by the declaration of war by Bavaria, whose army made a timid attempt to arrest the French emperor's retreat at Hanau — convinced Lord Wellington that it would be more advantageous to the common cause that his army should advance into the south of France, rather than engage in a war of fortresses in Catalonia; which, whilst employing all his own best troops, would enable Napoleon to withdraw the greater part of both Soult's and Suchet's armies to make head against the allies on the eastern frontier of his empire. And who can deny that the campaign of 1814 in France would have taken a very different turn, had Napoleon been able to bring 50,000 more troops into the field at Brienne, or Champaubert?

Despatches, &c. Nov. 22.

Still, however, Lord Wellington did not conceive that peace was out of the question. In fact, the events alluded to above gave Napoleon a fair excuse for coming to terms with the allies, if ambition alone had not actuated him; since the confederated states of the Rhine having of themselves withdrawn from his *protection*, there remained nothing to fight for but the integrity of France, which, at that time, was threatened only in the event of Napoleon's persisting in retaining the provinces he had conquered from the other powers of Europe and added to his empire. But, even in this case, the presence of the Anglo-Portugueze army in the south of France would naturally be attended with advantage pending the negotiations for peace; and this consideration decided Lord Wellington to prosecute the war with as much vigour as the means

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at his command and the unfavourable period of the year would allow. The return of bad weather, however, obliged his lordship to suspend his meditated movements; for not only were the roads become perfectly impracticable for any kind of carriage, but the Nive was so swollen by the rains as to be passable only by laying down bridges; and since the enemy continued to hold the right bank of the river in force, such an operation was one of some difficulty. In the meantime, several sharp affairs of outposts occurred at the left wing of the army; against which Marshal Soult pushed forward a strong reconnoissance on the morning after the change in its position on the 17th. The enemy, gallantly held in check by General Wilson's Portugueze brigade, were unable to effect their object; and on the 19th were equally unsuccessful in an attempt to drive in the outposts of the left centre, in front of Arcanges. On the 23d, the allies in their turn pushed forward; the advanced posts of the Light division being ordered to occupy a plateau near the French camp, which offered a more favourable position for observing what was passing; but the allied troops having imprudently followed too far in pursuit of the enemy's retiring pickets, became engaged with their supports, and were driven back with the loss of nearly 100 men.

At the commencement of December the weather became more favourable for Lord Wellington's projected operations, and he determined to avail himself of the improved condition of the roads and of the fall of the Nive, (which, from its vicinity to the mountains, rises and falls with equal suddenness,) to place the right wing of his army between that river and the Adour, so as to intercept the direct

communication between the enemy's camp at Bayonne, and the left of their army at St. Jean-pied-de-Port; deprive them of an extensive tract of country, whence they drew considerable supplies; and obtain for the allies more convenient cantonments in the event of a return of bad weather rendering it impossible to proceed with their offensive movements.

Before proceeding with our narrative of the operations of this trying winter campaign, it will be well, however, to give a brief description of the enemy's defensive position, and to point out the peculiar advantages which the possession of Bayonne afforded Marshal Soult for frustrating any projects his adversary might entertain of penetrating further into France.

The fortress of Bayonne is situated about four miles from the sea, at the confluence of the Nive with the Adour. The town stands astride the former river, but altogether on the left bank of the latter; a citadel, however, occupies the crest of a commanding hill on the opposite or northern bank of the Adour, covering the approach on that side. The Adour is a wide and rapid river, and nowhere fordable below its junction with the Bidouze, which falls into it, on its southern bank. The Nive, as we have already mentioned, can only be passed at certain points during fine weather, and becomes so rapid after heavy rains, as to render the communication by the common pontoons, such as were at that time in use in our army, very precarious. All the permanent bridges, excepting those at Bayonne, had been destroyed. In advance of the walls of Bayonne an intrenched camp, capable of sheltering a large army, had been formed on ground peculiarly well adapted

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to the purpose; nearly the whole of its front, from the left bank of the Nive to the Adour, being covered by a wide morass that could be inundated at pleasure, and towards which the ground on both sides fell in easy slopes, exposing the approach, for the distance of nearly a mile, to the full effect of the artillery with which the camp was armed. Breastworks for infantry connected these batteries; and palisades, ditches, trous de loup, and other obstacles gave additional strength to this formidable camp, which, besides, was completely exposed to the fire of the guns of the fortress itself. Between the right bank of the Nive and the Adour the nature of the ground was not altogether so favourable, but greater pains had been bestowed on the construction of the works.

Within this formidable camp Marshal Soult had withdrawn his army; reduced by his late losses to 50,000 men, but now again receiving daily reinforcements of conscripts from the interior of France. An attack upon an army so posted presented but slight chance of success. The enemy might perhaps, at a great sacrifice of life, have been driven from their field works; but the fortress would have afforded them a sure refuge, and could scarcely have been attacked whilst sheltering so large an army as that Marshal Soult had at his disposal wherewith to interrupt the besiegers' operations. As, however, Bayonne cut the road leading from St. Jean de Luz to the country north of the Adour,—which road is the only one at all suited to the movements of an invading army, particularly in the winter season,—it became necessary to endeavour, by some means, to compel Soult to abandon his advantageous position, and leave the fortress to its own resources; when it might

be invested, and a communication established round it under the protection of the besieging army.

This object could only be effected by manœuvring round Bayonne, to gain the communications of the French army — an operation attended with considerable difficulty and danger; first, from the nature of the country, and, secondly, from its rendering a division of the allied army necessary: for, during the progress of this flank movement, the communication with San Sebastian — the preservation of which was of the utmost consequence — would require to be protected by such a force as should ensure its safety; and the Spanish armies being no longer available, the numerical superiority of the Anglo-Portugueze army over that of the enemy was so very slight as to render this double operation one of some hazard. But, besides the disadvantage of having thus to act in two distinct bodies against a force massed on a central point, the wings of the allied army, whilst thus acting independently, would be separated by a river; thereby, even under the most favourable circumstances of weather, &c., increasing the difficulties of affording each other support; and, at the present season, considering the treacherous character of the stream, subjecting them to be altogether deprived of the means of communication. The roads, also, by which their intercourse would have to be kept up, were bad and circuitous; whereas Soult, having the command of excellent bridges over the Nive at Bayonne, could rapidly collect all his force on either bank of the river, to fall upon whichever wing of the allied army he chose; and in so doing, whether his attack were made between the Adour and the Nive, or between the Nive and the sea, he would

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have an excellent road to advance by. The division of General Paris, at the same time, held St. Jean-pied-de-Port, commanding the issues from the mountains at the sources of the Nive; and the right bank of that river was guarded by a strong line of posts, supported by a considerable force, cantoned at Villefranque, Mouguerre, and the adjacent villages between the Nive and Adour.

Hazardous as was the undertaking, Lord Wellington saw that Soult must be dislodged from Bayonne, ere the allied army could advance into France; and, trusting to the superiority of his troops, waited now but for a favourable change in the weather to carry his plans into effect.

The French marshal meanwhile flattered himself that he had brought his wily adversary to a standstill. Nevertheless, though, like most other French generals, and also his celebrated master, Soult openly affected to consider Lord Wellington's method of conducting military operations "*slow and methodical*," yet the experience purchased at Oporto had inwardly taught him to entertain a very different opinion of his opponent's system of making war; and he felt well assured that some attempt would be made to dislodge him by manœuvring round his flank: and aware of the great advantages his position afforded for acting offensively against his adversary during such an operation, he lay in wait, ready to spring upon him the instant a favourable moment for doing so should present itself.

On the 9th of December the allied army was put in movement. Sir Rowland Hill, with the right wing, effected the passage of the Nive at Cambo, protected by the 6th division, under Marshal Beresford, which crossed the river at Ustaritz:

General Pringle's brigade keeping up the communication between them, and forcing a passage across by a ford at Halsou. The operation was perfectly successful. The enemy fell back towards Bayonne by the chaussée from St. Jean-pied-de-Port; their troops at Cambo only escaping from the 6th division, which had crossed the Nive at Ustaritz and cut them off from that road, by making a wide circuit to gain Petit Mouguerre. Their right attempted to make a stand on some strong ground near Villefranque, but was dislodged by a Portugueze brigade, aided by the light companies of the 6th division.

During the night the French troops withdrew altogether into their intrenched camp; and Sir Rowland Hill then, bringing forward his right and placing it on the Adour, shut the enemy in between that river and the Nive; his operations of the previous day having severed their communication with St. Jean-pied-de-Port. Marshal Beresford, finding that Hill had effected his purpose, re-crossed the Nive immediately with the 6th division, to be at hand to support the troops remaining on the left bank of that river; a boat-bridge having been laid down below Ustaritz the evening before, to shorten the communication between the two wings of the army.

Whilst these operations were in progress, Lord Wellington had ordered Sir John Hope, with the left wing, and Count Alten, with the left centre, to reconnoitre the enemy's intrenched camp, and the course of the Adour below Bayonne — offensive demonstrations in that quarter being calculated to deter the enemy from sending reinforcements to their left. In conformity with these orders the 1st,

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5th, and Light divisions moved forward in columns of battalions early on the morning of the 9th, sweeping the whole country between the sea and the left bank of the Nive, and driving the enemy's advanced pickets into their camp; when the light infantry of the 5th division penetrated to the margin of the Adour below Bayonne. The objects of this reconnoissance having thus been accomplished, the troops were withdrawn at dusk to their former positions, which the 1st division did not reach until the night was far spent; the roads, from the previous passage of so many troops, having been rendered nearly impassable.

Soult saw that the moment had arrived for resuming the offensive, and with admirable celerity seized the opportunity to attack his adversary's divided forces; for, before dawn on the 10th, 35,000 men had left his intrenched camp, and were marching to overwhelm, as he hoped, the troops left to protect the great road to San Sebastian.

The 5th division and Bradford's Portugueze brigade covered this road in a strong position on the plateau de Barouillet, protected by abattis and other defensive works, and having Campbell's Portugueze brigade in advance; but the 1st division, composed principally of the guards, had, somewhat imprudently, been marched back to its cantonments at St. Jean de Luz — nine miles in the rear. The Light division, on the right, occupied another strong plateau at Arcangues, and that village was intrenched; but a valley, upwards of a mile in width, separated this division from the 5th, and was left altogether unprotected, under the impression that the enemy would not attempt to penetrate between two bodies of troops so strongly posted.

The French advanced in two dense columns

against these positions; one moving along the chaussée, towards the Chateau de Barouillet; the other by the road leading to St. Pé, which passes through Arcangues. The former commenced its attack soon after daybreak, and quickly drove back the outposts of the 5th division upon their supports. The other column, on reaching the plateau of Bassussury, in front of Arcangues, sent forward a cloud of skirmishers to amuse the Light division, whilst it moved by its right to penetrate by the valley between the position occupied by that division and the troops posted on the plateau of Barouillet. The situation of the allies was extremely critical. Campbell's brigade had been forced back on the high road, and an overwhelming force was at the same time pressing forward against the right of the 5th division. Soult seemed indeed to be on the point of snatching a most decisive victory, when suddenly a Portugueze battalion, boldly advancing again by the chaussée, wheeled round a wood that bounded the road on the right, and made a desperate charge on the rear of the French column, at that time moving against the 5th division; the 9th regiment, headed by its gallant colonel *, simultaneously rushing upon the same column from the right of the Barouillet position. The enemy's forward movement was instantly checked, and they were compelled to retire with a severe loss to the plateau of Bassussury, where their whole force was collected towards the close of the day; — their attempts to dislodge the Light division from Arcangues having been equally unsuccessful.

Lord Wellington was present during the latter part only of the action, which terminated about

* The late Lieut.-General Sir John Cameron, K.C.B.

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3 o'clock, — at which hour the 1st division reached the field from St. Jean de Luz. In the afternoon, two battalions of Nassau troops and one of Frankfort came over to the allied army, having learnt that their country had been freed from the yoke of Napoleon.

Whilst this hard-fought action was going forward on the left, the 4th division occupied the ground between the Light division and the 6th, (the latter posted on the left bank of the Nive below Ustaritz,) and the 7th division was placed in reserve between Arcangues and St. Pé. A boat bridge had been laid down across the river at Villefranque, to afford a more direct communication with Sir Rowland Hill's corps; and thus every measure which prudence could suggest was taken to afford timely support to either wing, wherever danger might be most menacing.

Lord Wellington thought that the enemy would not renew their attack on the left, being aware of the arrival of strong reinforcements to that wing; but Soult, rather rashly, persisted in his endeavour to gain St. Jean de Luz: a victory on this point promising greater results than one obtained over the allied right. Nevertheless, as if to throw his adversary off his guard, the French marshal suffered his pickets to be driven in early in the morning of the 11th, and the allied advanced posts were again established as on the preceding day. Soon after 2 o'clock, however, the enemy made a furious attack along the chaussée, driving in the pickets and their supports, and assailing the 5th division on the plateau of Barouillet with a vastly superior force. The attack, though so little expected that the troops had been sent to cut wood, was most

gallantly met. The 5th division and Portugueze troops, formed in front line with a part of Lord Aylmer's brigade, again bore the brunt of the action, the remainder of that brigade and the 1st division being held in reserve.

The attack was obstinately persevered in as long as daylight continued, but with so little advantage to the enemy that no part of the second line of the allies was brought forward; and both armies, throughout the night, occupied the same positions as before the action. The 5th division having, however, sustained a heavy loss during these two days' fighting, was relieved by the guards as soon as night arrived to conceal the movement, and took their post in second line.

At daybreak on the 12th, the enemy seemed inclined to try the pluck of their new opponents; but after a warm skirmish drew back, seeing no reason to hope for better success against them than they had obtained over their former adversaries; and the rest of the day passed off with a brisk fire between the pickets.

Soult now hoped that, alarmed by the pertinacity of these attacks on his left wing, Lord Wellington would have so closed up his reserved divisions to its support that they would not be able to cross the Nive and march to succour Hill's corps, ere he, by effecting a rapid passage of the river at Bayonne, should be able to overwhelm it with the bulk of his army. Accordingly, he drew off all his troops from Hope's front during the night of the 12th, crossed the Nive by the bridges covered by his camp, and early on the following morning fell upon the allied right wing with a force of between 30,000 and 40,000 men. But the moment the day broke, Lord Wel-

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lington, perceiving but a weak cordon of troops in his front, penetrated Soult's design, and forthwith ordered the 6th and 4th divisions, and part of the 3d, to cross the Nive and march to Sir Rowland Hill's support. These reinforcements would have arrived in good time to force back the enemy, had Soult's attack against Hill been attended with any success; but so far from that being the case, Sir Rowland had repulsed the enemy without requiring assistance, though the force brought against him trebled in number that which he commanded.

The corps under Sir R. Hill consisted of three Portugueze and three British brigades of infantry, Lieut.-Colonel Ross's * troop of horse artillery, and a brigade of Portugueze artillery commanded by Lieut.-Col. Tulloh; in all scarcely 12,000 men. His position stretched from the village of Villefranque, situated on the summit of a narrow ridge running parallel to the course of the Nive, to Vieux Mouguerre, perched on the top of a similar range of hills extending along the left bank of the Adour; the distance from right to left being about three miles. The village of St. Pierre, situated midway between the two former, occupied the summit of a third ridge; but from this point two horns projected towards Bayonne, forming a wide crescent, up the centre of which the great road from Bayonne to St. Jean-Pied-de-Port ascended straight to St. Pierre. This intermediate range of hills was separated from the others by deep and narrow valleys, wherein several mill-dams had been formed, rendering the passage across them difficult.

The centre of this position was occupied by

* Colonel Sir Hew D. Ross, K.C.B.

General Barnes's British, and General Ashworth's Portugueze brigade. Villefranque, on the left, was held by General Pringle's brigade, and Vieux Mouguerre, on the right, by General Byng's. Le Cor's Portugueze division remained in reserve, in rear of the left.

The enemy's attack commenced soon after 8 o'clock. Three strong columns, issuing from the faubourg St. Pierre, preceded by a cloud of skirmishers, quickly drove back the outposts on the Bayonne road, and, opening out as they advanced, moved at a rapid pace towards the allied position; the centre column (which was the most considerable) marching by the great road upon St. Pierre; those on the flanks towards the points of the crescent, so as to advance along the two horns, and close upon the centre. Sir Rowland, perceiving that no serious attack was meditated against his right, drew General Byng's brigade towards the threatened point, leaving only one regiment and the light companies of the others to guard Vieux Mouguerre. Ross's troop of horse artillery was also brought to the front, and taking up a position to sweep the great road with its guns, instantly opened its fire with tremendous effect upon the enemy's advancing columns; whilst Tulloh's guns, distributed along the left of the line, plied them with an oblique fire as they closed upon the centre of the allied position.

Still, however, the French continued to advance, forming columns of attack along the whole front; and, pushing on, attempted to break through the thin line of troops by which they were opposed. One column succeeded in establishing itself on a tongue that projected from the ridge occupied by the allies, a little to the left of the high road and

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immediately in front of the left of Barnes's brigade; and at this point the enemy maintained a close and desperate contest for a considerable time, but were finally dislodged by a gallant charge of the 92d regiment. Ashworth's Portugueze brigade, occupying the left centre of the position, sustained likewise a very formidable attack: one strong French column, which had advanced along the southern horn of the crescent, assailing it in front; whilst another, penetrating by the valley which separates that ridge from the one occupied by Pringle's brigade on the left, threatened to take it in flank. The Portugueze troops resisted very bravely, but overpowered by numbers were getting into disorder, when the 71st regiment and left wing of the 92d threw in an oblique fire, which checked the enemy's direct attack, and General Le Cor's division moved up to their support; De Costa's brigade forming upon Ashworth's left, and General Buchan's in rear. The enemy were then driven back with the bayonet.

A column had been directed against General Pringle's brigade, whilst this attack was going forward, to deter it from detaching to the support of the troops engaged in the centre, and a hot fire was kept up across the mill-dams in the valley separating the heights of Villefranque (where Pringle was posted) from the rest of the allied position; but nothing serious was attempted on that side. On the right, the portion of Byng's brigade which had been left at Mouguerre, being menaced by a French column, evacuated that village; but finding afterwards that the enemy were not in force, recovered it, making some prisoners.

The enemy had now been repulsed at all points;

but they still occupied in force the extremity of the northern horn of the crescent, in front of the right of the allied position, being separated by a deep valley from the ridge of Vieux Mouguerre; and from this point they continued to keep up a hot cannonade on the centre, whilst dispositions seemed to be making for a fresh attack. General Byng was consequently directed to collect his brigade and drive the enemy from this position; which he effected in the most gallant manner, supported by General Buchan's Portugueze brigade. The French made a vain attempt to recover their ground; but were driven back into the faubourg St. Pierre, and eventually withdrew to the shelter of their intrenched camp.

Thus terminated one of the most sanguinary actions fought during the war: two guns and some prisoners remained in the victors' hands, — trophies they might well be proud of, considering the vast disparity in numbers of the contending forces; and Lord Wellington, who was present during the latter part of the action, declared that for a long time he had not seen so many dead upon a field of battle. The 6th division came up at the close of the day, but not in time to take any part in the combat.

Despatches, &c. Dec. 13.

Lord Wellington expressed in warm terms his admiration of the conduct of Sir Rowland Hill, to whom he gave all the credit of this brilliant victory, and expressed himself equally satisfied with the other general officers and the whole of the troops engaged.

So greatly did the result of this action increase Marshal Soult's respect for his opponents, that thenceforth, ceasing to play the part of Napoleon, he took the prudent Fabius for his model, and

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acted entirely on the defensive. In fact, this was the last offensive operation he ever directed. The loss of the enemy during the five days' fighting, from the 9th to the 13th, amounted, according to their returns, to 5914 men; but one of their own historians of this campaign estimates it at 15,000 — stating that on the 13th alone Soult's army sustained a loss of nearly 5000 men. The allied army lost 5061, in killed, wounded, and missing, of whom 282 were officers. Generals Robinson, Barnes, Le Cor, and Ashworth were wounded. Sir John Hope, who was ever present in the thickest of the fight, received three bullets in his clothes, but fortunately escaped with but a slight contusion.

De Beauchamp, vol. ii. p. 26.

Immediately after the battle of the 13th, Lord Wellington despatched orders to the Conde de la Bisbal (who had returned to the command of the army of Andalusia) to send two brigades of his troops to occupy Itsassu, to cover the rear of the army on the side of St. Jean-pied-de-Port; and also to General Freyre, to move forward two divisions of the army of Galicia from Irun to Ascain, to serve as a support to the left wing. At the same time the 3d, 4th, and 7th divisions (excepting one brigade of the first-named and another of the last) were directed to cross to the right bank of the Nive.

To prevent a recurrence of the outrages committed by the Spanish troops on entering France after the passage of the Nivelle, Lord Wellington directed that those now brought forward should be furnished with provisions from the magazines of the English army; and he called upon the Spanish generals to enforce the most rigid discipline, and to give orders that no demands for

supplies of any kind should be made upon the country.

The weather now again became so inclement, that it was once more necessary to suspend the movements of the allied army; and from a variety of causes, its further advance was at each step attended with increasing difficulties: for, until a bridge should be thrown across the Adour below Bayonne, its operations could only be conducted up the left bank of that river — that is to say, between it and the foot of the Pyrenees, over an arid, rugged country, traversed by but few roads, and those of the worst description, and intersected by numberless streams, usually, at this period of the year, swollen into impassable torrents. To carry the supplies of a large army across such a country at such a season, was out of the question; and as Lord Wellington perceived that the command he now possessed of the course of the Adour was beginning to have the effect on which he had calculated — viz. that of compelling Soult to draw off his army from Bayonne towards the country whence it had hitherto received its supplies by means of the navigation of the river — he looked confidently forward, to find the force in his front so diminished by the necessity thus imposed on the enemy of seeking subsistence elsewhere, that he should experience little difficulty in throwing a bridge across the Adour below the fortress; and by its means be enabled to establish his communication by the great road along the right bank of the river. During the unavoidable inaction of the army, preparations were therefore secretly making to effect this purpose whenever the weather should admit of his putting the troops in motion.

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The long sojourn of Soult's large army in this corner of France had completely exhausted the resources of the country in the immediate neighbourhood of Bayonne; and for a considerable distance to the north of that place, a tract of sterile country (Les Landes) stretches towards the Garonne, from which no supplies whatever could be drawn. It was by means, therefore, of the navigation of the Adour, and the *cabotage* carried on between Bordeaux and Bayonne, that Soult had hitherto been enabled to keep his force massed to make head against the allies; but now deprived altogether of one of these lines of supply, and seeing the probability of the other being also cut off, he had been compelled to withdraw his arm gradually, to a considerable distance, which rendered Lord Wellington's project of crossing the Adour comparatively easy of accomplishment.

At the same time, the difficulties against which his Lordship found he had himself to be prepared on the score of supplies, and the absolute necessity that existed for gaining the good will of the inhabitants of the country, rendered it quite requisite that he should be abundantly furnished with *money*. But whilst, on the one hand, we find the British government urging forward their general, unconscious apparently of even the geographical difficulties which lay in his way, on the other we learn that his movements were constantly cramped by the niggardly supply he was able to obtain from them, both of pecuniary means and naval assistance.

In reply to the importunities of the British ministry, Lord Wellington dryly observes in a letter to Earl Bathurst,—.

Despatches, &c. Dec. 21.

"In military operations there are some things which cannot be done: one of these is to move troops in this

country during or immediately after a violent fall of rain. I believe I shall lose many more men than I shall ever replace by putting any troops in camp in this bad weather; but I should be guilty of an useless waste of men, if I were to attempt an operation during the violent falls of rain which we have had."

Of the penurious system pursued by the British government at this momentous period, and of the inconveniences which resulted therefrom, we may form some idea by the following extracts from Lord Wellington's correspondence: —

"The money for the Spanish army is still at Coruña, as well as 150,000 dollars from Lisbon. We are short 18,000*l.* for the last month's pay to the troops, and there is not a shilling in any of the military chests. We are just as bad as the Spaniards. I yesterday wanted to send off a courier to General W. Clinton in Catalonia, and the money for his expenses was borrowed from those who happened to have a little to lend." Despatches, &c. Jan. 27. 1814.

Again, in a letter to Colonel Bunbury, his lordship says, adverting to Earl Bathurst's disapprobation of some means he had adopted to raise money, —

"I am very much afraid that the government are not aware of, and do not feel, the difficulties in which we are at all times for want of money; and that when they consider any measure that has been adopted, they do so without adverting to the necessity that has occasioned it; and that this is the reason of the frequent disapprobation of what we do. You will be able to inform Lord Bathurst of the state in which you found us, and in which we were to the last moment of your being here; and he will, I hope, believe that measures of this description are not adopted unnecessarily." Despatches, &c. Feb. 4.

The Spanish government and authorities, meanwhile, as usual, threw all sorts of impediments in the way of Lord Wellington's operations. As an instance, we may mention that the authorities of

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Santander, affecting great alarm lest, by the establishment of the principal hospital of the British army at that port, the yellow fever might be introduced into the country, placed the hospitals in quarantine; and the *Xefe Politico* of Guipuzcoa gladly seized the opportunity thus afforded to annoy Lord Wellington, by directing that all vessels proceeding from that port to others on the coast of that province, should be subjected to the same uncalled-for sanitory restrictions.

This was, in point of fact, placing the supplies of the British army in quarantine; for Santander was the only port on the Guipuzcoan coast which afforded a secure shelter to the ships bringing from England and other parts of the world the stores of the army, — indeed it was the only one sufficiently capacious to serve as a general rendezvous for those vessels; and consequently all had to proceed there in the first instance, to wait for orders; and they were only brought round from thence as room could be made for them in the other small harbours more in the vicinity of the army — where, however, their cargoes could not be landed, until they had performed quarantine for having touched at Santander!

Lord Wellington at this period saw, however, some cause for apprehending that his operations would be altogether suspended by the withdrawal of Spain from the contest; for Napoleon, perceiving that his most redoubtable foe had forced the least vulnerable frontier of his empire, and would probably, in a few weeks, lead his victorious army into the heart of France, now resorted to the tortuous policy by which he was wont to effect his ends when open force could not accomplish them. With this view the captive Ferdinand was again brought

forward to play a part in the last act of Napoleon's Spanish tragedy.

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This weak prince, during the five years which had elapsed since his forcible detention at Bayonne, had been residing at the Chateau de Valançey, scarcely regretting the loss of his liberty and crown, since it affected not his means of indulging those sensual gratifications for which alone he ever seemed to think he had been born a prince. The overtures of Napoleon were at first, therefore, very coolly received by Ferdinand; but those Spaniards who were about him, being either more desirous of enjoying their freedom, or more ambitious than their captive king, eventually persuaded him to conclude a treaty with the French emperor, by which he was acknowledged as the legitimate sovereign of Spain: and, in return, Ferdinand engaged to pay annually a sum of 30,000,000 of reales to the ex-king, his father; to effect an immediate exchange of French prisoners in Spain and in *England* for an equal number of Spaniards imprisoned in France; to restore the properties, revenues, employments, pensions, &c. of all such Spaniards as had adhered to Joseph Buonaparte; and, finally, to cause the British troops to evacuate Spain.

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Napoleon probably doubted both Ferdinand's power and inclination to fulfil the terms of this treaty; for he knew him to be a man of little capacity, and could scarcely expect that one whom he had so grossly duped would consider himself bound to keep faith with his deceiver; more especially knowing, as he did, that Ferdinand, like all weak men, had in every action of his public life shown himself to be a double-dealer, uninfluenced in the slightest degree by a sense of

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honour. The French ruler, however, was well informed of the internal state of Spain, and consequently aware of the hostile feeling entertained by the clergy, the grandees, and indeed by the mass of the Spanish nation towards the Cortes and the constitution it had promulgated; and hoped, by letting Ferdinand loose upon the country at this juncture, to throw a brand upon the smouldering embers of insurrection that would at once set them in a blaze. He knew his victim too well to think that he would willingly surrender one iota of his hereditary rights and prerogative; for adversity had not taught Ferdinand wisdom, neither had despotism lost its charms in his eyes from having of late been seen in its most hideous form. He was the same ignorant, worthless, priest-ridden despot, as when he was artfully inveigled across the frontier of his kingdom; and whilst under Napoleon's tutelage had gained only lessons in duplicity.

The chances, therefore, seemed all in favour of the French emperor's designs. If Ferdinand was able and willing to carry into effect the treaty he had ratified, the alliance between Spain and Great Britain would at once be snapt asunder; and if he were neither able nor willing to cause the treaty to be acknowledged in Spain, still there was every chance of his restoration to the throne causing a rebellion, which would much cripple the means of acting of the Anglo-Portugueze army in the south of France. In any other case, Napoleon could not be the loser; since the government of Spain would only have passed from the hands of an incompetent Regency into those of a weak prince, governed by a coterie of intriguing priests and worthless favourites. Had Napoleon taken the

existing government of Spain by surprise, and sent Ferdinand at once to Lord Wellington's head-quarters, he would, beyond a doubt, have done much mischief; but, fortunately, he wished, before releasing the king, to obtain from the Regency a confirmation of the treaty to which his captive had put his signature.

This was a delicate undertaking to accomplish, as it was necessary to keep the British minister at Cadiz and Lord Wellington in the dark respecting the treaty as long as possible, — in fact, if practicable, until every thing was arranged.

The Duke of San Carlos was the person selected to conduct this underhand proceeding; but charged, at the same time, with private instructions from Ferdinand how to act, according to the state in which he might find matters in Spain. The king's liberation was the great object to be kept in view, and was to be brought about, whatever might be the sacrifice. If, as Ferdinand feared, the Cortes were not to be persuaded to ratify the treaty without reserve, then they were to be secretly informed by San Carlos that his majesty was quite prepared to continue the war after he should have obtained his release (his royal word being at the very time pledged that he would *not* do so!), on the plea that he had acted under restraint. The existing government would, therefore, merely have to suspend hostilities for a time, and to persuade England to acquiesce in the measure: points upon which Ferdinand seemed to anticipate little difficulty.

San Carlos, under a feigned name, repaired to Catalonia; presented himself to General Copons; and persuaded that officer to keep his presence a secret, and to forward him on to Madrid; — to

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which place the government was at that time removing from Cadiz.

The Regency, though not a little surprised when the treaty was laid before them, acted with considerable tact. They expressed great joy at hearing of their beloved sovereign's good health, and at seeing his royal sign manual; but stated that it was their duty to acquaint his majesty, that a decree of the Cortes had declared any deed or convention signed by him whilst under restraint or in captivity, to be of non-effect.

Meanwhile, the removal of the Regency having caused some little delay in the execution of San Carlos's mission, the now impatient Ferdinand hurried off another of his minions — Don José Palafox — with a letter to the Regency, for the purpose of expediting matters. The Regency, however, remained firm; informing the king, in reply, that a plenipotentiary had been nominated, on his majesty's part, to a congress of the great powers of Europe about to assemble to arrange the terms of a general peace; and that the liberation of his majesty would then be effected, when they should have the happiness of delivering into his hands the authority they had received only in trust — "a charge of such weight that it could rest only upon the robust shoulders of a monarch who, by the re-establishment of the Cortes, had restored an enslaved nation to freedom, and driven the savage monster despotism from the throne of Spain."

By this piece of bombast the "liberals" intended the king to understand what would be expected of him, ere the reins of government should be placed in his hands. Ferdinand foresaw, therefore, the struggle that awaited him to recover the

despotism which he had no intention to resign, and whose weight he considered his shoulders were quite as well able to bear, as those of his ancestors who had borne it before him. Napoleon, too, perceived that a violent convulsion would inevitably follow the release of the king; but still hesitated to take a step which he thought would lower him in the eyes of the world, and the advantages which he certainly might have derived by so doing, from the distracted state of affairs in Spain, were lost by the delay.

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Lord Wellington had watched the progress of these intrigues of Ferdinand and Napoleon with some anxiety; foreseeing what would be the result of the liberation of the king of Spain in the actual condition of that country.

On this subject he thus writes to Earl Bathurst: —

"I have long suspected that Buonaparte would adopt this expedient; and if he had less pride, and more common sense, and could have carried his measure into execution as he ought to have done, it would have succeeded. I am not certain that it will not succeed now; that is to say, so much of the misery felt in Spain is justly attributed to the vices and constitution of the government, that I think there must be many who would desire to put an end to them, even by the sanction of this treaty of peace. If Buonaparte had at once withdrawn his garrisons from Catalonia and Valencia (which in all probability he must lose at all events), and had sent Ferdinand to the frontier, or into Spain (and he must be as useless a personage in France as he would probably be in Spain), I think it can scarcely be doubted that the peace would have been made, or, at all events, the prosecution of the war would have been so difficult as to render it almost impracticable, and great success hopeless.

Despatches, &c. Jan. 10.

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"From this treaty, your Lordship will see that Buonaparte is of the same opinion with me regarding the importance of our operations here," . . . .

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That the Spanish *army* was not to be depended upon to support the existing government and continue the war contrary to the wishes of the king, Lord Wellington had every reason to be satisfied, as we find by the following passages, alluding to this subject, and to the conduct of General Copons, in one of his lordship's letters to Sir Henry Wellesley:—

Despatches, &c. Jan. 13.

"He (General Copons) has not reported to me the arrival of the Duke (San Carlos); and, what is still more extraordinary, for which I shall call him to account, he has not sent me a letter in cipher, recently intercepted, he knowing that we possess the means of deciphering them all.

"I suspect that the same opinion about the peace prevails among the Spanish military here. They have all some notion of what has occurred, but not a word has any one of them said to any of us; and I have repeated intelligence and warning from the French, of some act of treachery meditated by the Spaniards."

Despatches, &c. Jan. 27.

Anticipating the course Napoleon would adopt, on finding his first effort fail to withdraw Spain from the alliance of Great Britain, Lord Wellington now gave orders to the Spanish generals of Catalonia, Aragon, and Valencia, not to make any capitulation with the French garrisons in those provinces without his consent, unless such garrisons should surrender prisoners of war; a necessary precaution to take, where such duplicity had been manifested by the Spanish generals, and such eagerness by Buonaparte to obtain the release of his captured soldiers.

With the conduct of the Regency and Cortes, in their first proceedings on this trying occasion, Lord Wellington was perfectly satisfied; but he neither admired the policy nor the delicacy of the mode in which it was proposed to receive the king, in the event of his being sent back to Spain; for, by a de-

Despatches, &c. Feb. 5.

cree of the Cortes, passed on the 2d February, it had been declared that the king was not to be considered free until he had sworn to the constitution; that on entering Spain he should not be accompanied by an armed force, nor by any of the Spaniards who had served under Joseph; that the road he was to travel should be fixed by the Regency; and that on arriving at Madrid he should alight at the hall of the Cortes, and again swear to observe the constitution, — a constitution in the framing of which he had never been consulted, and of the details of which, for all the Cortes and Regency knew, he had never, until the moment of his reaching the Spanish frontier, had the opportunity of making himself acquainted.

Lord Wellington foresaw that such humiliating proceedings as it was thus proposed to adopt towards the king, could not but excite an angry feeling in the breast of one educated, as he had been, in the most rigid precepts of despotism; and in a letter to Sir Henry Wellesley his lordship observes,

"I do not know what is to be done if he will not swear to the constitution on the frontier. Is he then to be sent back?" Despatches, &c. Feb. 5.

Whilst Napoleon, by his artful conduct, was thus sapping the very foundation of social order in Spain, a mine was about to explode in France that rendered his own downfall certain.

Early in February, the Duc d'Angoulême arrived at the head-quarters of the British general at St. Jean de Luz, proposing to place himself at the head of the Royalists of the South of France, who, he was assured through various channels, only waited the presence of a prince of the house of Bourbon Feb. 3.

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openly to declare themselves in favour of the exiled family.

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Lord Wellington not having received any instructions from the British government as to the course he should pursue in so delicate, and, to the Prince, so hazardous a matter (for the conclusion of a peace with Napoleon was at this period very probable), persuaded his royal highness, for the present, to remain with the allied army under the assumed title of Le Comte de Pradel, and wait to see what turn the diplomatic conference at Chatillon would take, ere he took a step that might seriously compromise the adherents of his house; and it is a remarkable fact, that on the very day on which his lordship gave this prudent advice to H.R.H., the Emperor of Russia, unwillingly acceding to the wishes for peace expressed by the rest of the allied powers, issued his commands to his plenipotentiary at the congress of Chatillon, to sign the peace on the conditions which had been offered to the cabinet of the Tuilleries at the opening of the conference; and peace would unquestionably have been concluded on the basis then proposed, but for the victory obtained by Napoleon over Blucher's army at Champaubert, which, once more raising his hopes, led him to hold out in his exorbitant demands.

Mikhilofsky Danilefsky, Camp. in France, p. 92.

Jan. 29.

The Royalists of Bordeaux, Toulouse, and other cities of the south of France, soon, however, became informed of the presence of the Duc d'Angoulême with the army of Lord Wellington, and looked eagerly forward to the advance of the allied army to enable them to express their uncontrolled feelings, by openly raising the Bourbon standard. The white cockade had already been mounted in the seat of war in Champagne, though without creating much

sensation; but Napoleon's anxious question to an aide-de-camp of Prince Schwartzenburg, — "Is it true that the allies aim at pulling me from my throne to make way for the Bourbons?" — showed the dread he felt at the prospect of the threatened internal convulsion. His own efforts to organize a guerrilla warfare in rear of Lord Wellington's army had completely failed; though at first, in consequence of the misconduct of Mina's troops, there seemed to be a probability of their being successful. General Harispe, himself a Basque, had been sent expressly to foment the insurrection amongst his countrymen; and Mina's troops, stationed at Bidarray and St. Etienne to watch the enemy's movements at St. Jean-pied-de-Port, had been surprised by a force consisting principally of the inhabitants of those villages and others in the neighbourhood, and driven with loss into the valley of Los Alduides. But a proclamation addressed to the Basques, informing them that they would not be permitted to act alternately the parts of peaceable peasants and soldiers in arms against an enemy, and that they must consequently choose between remaining quietly in their villages or joining the ranks of the French army, — in the latter case subjecting themselves to be treated as prisoners of war, — soon had the effect of putting a stop to their insurrectionary movement.

Ibid. p. 166.

Jan. 12.

During the remainder of the month of January the weather continued bad, and no movements of any interest took place in this part of the seat of war. A few affairs of outposts occurred on the Upper Nive, Joyeuse, and Arran, but without materially affecting the positions of either party. Meanwhile Marshal Soult had been gradually with-

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drawing troops from Bayonne towards the centre of his army, now established on the Adour at Peyrehorade; and on the 21st of January all the enemy's outposts were withdrawn from their intrenched camp of Bayonne, announcing the intention of abandoning that fortress to its own resources. Lord Wellington accordingly made dispositions to move forward whenever the weather would admit of his so doing; but the continued ill conduct of the Spanish troops confirmed his lordship in the opinion he had already formed, that he should derive no assistance from them, — in fact, that their co-operation would prove an obstacle in his projected invasion.

Despatches, &c. Feb. 7.

"Their conduct," (he writes to Marshal Beresford,) "is terrible. I have done everything in my power, by severity and fair means, hitherto without success; and every question is taken up as one of national honour. The truth is, the officers will not discipline their troops, and the generals will not give themselves any trouble about the matter, and rather encourage indiscipline."

On the eastern coast of Spain, hostilities had been temporarily suspended from the same causes which had existed to arrest the operations of Lord Wellington. Lieut.-General W. Clinton, in concert with General Copons, had, about the middle of January, made an attempt to surprise the enemy's posts on the Lobrogat; but the badness of the roads retarded the movements of the allies, and the enemy, apprised of their intention, retired in good time. Towards the end of the month 10,000 men of Suchet's army were withdrawn to reinforce the army engaged in defending the eastern frontier of France, on which the French marshal withdrew for protection under the guns of Gerona, and the allies immediately proceeded to invest Barcelona and Hostalrich.

CHAPTER XXXV.

ADVANTAGES OFFERED BY THE NATURE OF THE COUNTRY FOR INTERDICTING THE FURTHER ADVANCE OF THE ALLIES. — FAVOURABLE POSITION OF THE FRENCH ARMY. — DIFFICULTIES TO BE ENCOUNTERED BY LORD WELLINGTON. — HE DETERMINES TO FORCE BACK THE FRENCH LEFT. — ACTION OF GARRIS. — THE ENEMY RETIRE BEHIND THE GAVE D'OLERON. — LORD WELLINGTON PROCEEDS TO THE LEFT OF HIS ARMY TO DIRECT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BRIDGE ACROSS THE ADOUR BELOW BAYONNE; BUT THE OPERATION BEING UNAVOIDABLY POSTPONED ON ACCOUNT OF THE WEATHER, HE RETURNS TO THE RIGHT, AND FORCES THE FRENCH TO RETIRE BEHIND THE GAVE DE PAU. — SOULT CONCENTRATES HIS ARMY AT ORTHEZ, IS DEFEATED, AND RETIRES BEHIND THE ADOUR. — ACTION AT AIRE. — OPERATIONS OF THE LEFT WING OF THE ALLIED ARMY. — A BOAT BRIDGE IS THROWN ACROSS THE ADOUR BELOW BAYONNE, AND THE CITADEL OF THAT PLACE IS INVESTED. — SOULT CHANGES HIS LINE OF RETREAT, AND MAKES A FLANK MOVEMENT ON TARBES. — OPINION OF LORD WELLINGTON RESPECTING THE RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS. — HE DETACHES A CORPS UNDER MARSHAL BERESFORD TO BORDEAUX. — ENTHUSIASTIC RECEPTION OF THE DUC D'ANGOULÊME IN THAT CITY.

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NOTWITHSTANDING that Lord Wellington's masterly movements had compelled the enemy to quit the Lower Adour, and abandon Bayonne to its own means of resistance, yet Marshal Soult seized every advantage offered by the country to interdict the further advance of the allies into the interior of France, and by his able dispositions again obliged his adversary to undertake a twofold operation.

Trusting to the fortress of Bayonne and the impassable nature of the Adour to protect his right, and clinging to the Pyrenees on his left, where the fortress of St. Jean-pied-de-Port closed all the outlets from the mountains directed on that flank, and the extreme asperity of the country seemed to present insuperable obstacles to a front attack,

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the French marshal directed all his attention to the defences of the intervening country occupied by the centre of his army; where also great facilities presented themselves for checking the advance of the allies, the ground being strongly marked, intersected by numerous mountain streams, all at this season swollen to such an extent as to be passable but at a few points, and those even very uncertain, and each offering an excellent line of defence. The roads too across this country afforded but slight facilities for the movements of an army, being all, with the exception of that communicating between Bayonne and St. Jean-pied-de-Port, of the very worst description, and having, from the continual passage of troops and the prevalence of rainy weather, become almost impracticable.

To strengthen the natural defences which the country thus offered, the principal passages over the Bidouze (which river presented itself in first line) at Guiche, Bidache, and Came, were covered by têtes-de-pont; the fortress of Navarreins, on the Gave d'Oleron, some miles in rear, was placed in a state to stand a siege; Hastingues and Oeyregave on the Gave de Pau, yet further retired, were intrenched; and Peyrehorade was protected by a strong tête-de-pont. Dax, in the rear of these three lines, and now made a general depôt for the French army, was likewise protected by intrenchments.

Towards the centre of this strong defensive position, namely, behind the Adour and Gave de Pau, at Port de Lannes and Peyrehorade, Marshal Soult collected the major part of his army; keeping up his communication with Bayonne

merely by a cordon of posts along the right bank of the Adour (which, however, was lined with strong redoubts armed with heavy artillery), but, on his left flank, still maintaining the divisions of Generals Harispe and Paris in advance of the Bidouze; the latter occupying St. Palais, the former pushed forward towards the sources of the Joyeuse.

Whilst thus, by the advanced position of the two wings of his army, Marshal Soult was enabled to keep a close watch on his adversary's movements, by occupying with the bulk of his force a centrical position commanding bridges over the Adour and Gave de Pau, he possessed the means of moving with celerity on any point of his line that Lord Wellington might attempt to force; and at the same time the forward position of his left wing, and the têtes de pont guarding the bridges over the Adour in its rear, gave him facilities for becoming the aggressor, should his antagonist, by crossing the Lower Adour, afford him an opportunity of falling upon his communication with Spain.

The French marshal, misjudging the system of his adversary, calculated that he would rest satisfied with the opportunity thus offered him to lay siege to Bayonne in order to secure a new base of operations, ere he ventured farther into the interior of France; and he trusted that if a favourable opportunity did not arise in the progress of that operation to attack the allied army, sufficient time would, at all events, be gained to allow Suchet's army to arrive to his assistance, and enable him once more to resume offensive operations with such a numerical superiority as would give him a fair chance of success. But if, on the other hand, Lord Wellington determined to continue to

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act offensively, Soult judged that the necessity he would be under of maintaining at the same time the blockade of Bayonne, would so reduce the strength of the allied army as to enable him to oppose an effectual resistance, even without receiving reinforcements.

The position of Lord Wellington was one of considerable difficulty; for had he even remained satisfied with the opportunity thus afforded him to besiege Bayonne, it is obvious he would have had to divide his army to cover its right flank and rear; which, so long as the enemy retained possession of St. Jean-pied-de-Port, and the command of the great roads from thence to Bayonne and Pamplona, they would be enabled to menace. He at once perceived, however, that only one mode of proceeding was open to him; and keeping his army grouped round the camp in front of Bayonne to allay the enemy's suspicions, he impatiently awaited the return of fine weather to dash at his adversary, and by one of those well-concerted, vigorous movements, which had so often before disconcerted his opponents' projects, again overwhelm him by bringing a superiority of force into action on the decisive point. For this brusque attack we may also say — *as usual* — Soult was not by any means duly prepared.

It is evident, from Bayonne being so far in advance of the right wing of the enemy's army (which it may be said now occupied a line perpendicular to the course of the Adour), and from the circumstance of the only road suited to the operations of an army whose object was to penetrate into the heart of France being, as we have before noticed, conducted along the right bank of the Adour, Lord

Wellington could not venture to cross that river either immediately above or below Bayonne, and gain this road in order to turn the flank of his adversary's several defensive lines, without incurring great risk for his own communication between Bayonne and St. Jean de Luz, which would be exposed to attack from the enemy's left during his circuitous movement round Bayonne to act against their right. Besides which, it was not by any means certain that Soult might not yet contemplate a combined movement with Suchet, and by recrossing the Pyrenees, and marching upon Jaca (which still held out), force Lord Wellington to retrace his steps to save Pamplona.

These considerations determined Lord Wellington to force back the French left from the roots of the Pyrenees, ere he carried the left of his own army across the Adour; but it was not until the middle of February that the weather permitted him to carry this project into effect. On the 10th of that month, however, the rain ceased; and on the 12th the roads and torrents having become passable, the divisions forming the right and right centre of the allied army were put in motion towards Hasparren; and on the 14th Lord Wellington, quitting his head-quarters at St. Jean de Luz, proceeded to the right, to direct in person the movements against the enemy, desiring Lieut.-General Sir J. Hope, who was left in command of the rest of the army, to maintain a strict blockade of Bayonne, and to throw a boat-bridge across the Adour below that city, the moment circumstances would admit of his undertaking such an operation. In conformity with these instructions, Sir John

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Hope moved up the 1st and 5th divisions to invest more closely the enemy's camp between the sea and the Nive, and the 4th division to complete the blockade between the right bank of that river and the Adour; and every other necessary step was taken to prevent the garrison obtaining information of the movements and designs of the allies.

Meanwhile Sir Rowland Hill, with the right wing, having driven in the French posts on the Joyeuse, Lord Wellington, on the 14th, directed a movement to turn the enemy's left at Hellette; whereupon General Harispe, who commanded their troops assembled at this point, hastily withdrew from his position, and fell back towards St. Palais, thereby abandoning his communication with St. Jean-pied-de-Port, wherein he had placed a garrison of 1500 men; and Mina, now emerging from the gorges of the Pyrenees, forthwith formed the blockade of that fortress.

Harispe having retired upon the division of General Paris, halted in a strong position in front of Garris, a village situated a few miles in advance of St. Palais, where he resolved to dispute Hill's further advance. Sir Rowland, with the 2d British and Morillo's division of the army of Galicia, arrived
Feb. 15. in front of this position on the following afternoon; and the Spaniards having driven in the enemy's outposts, were directed by Lord Wellington round the French left upon St. Palais, to cut off their retreat upon that place, which alone offered them a passage across the Bidouze; and shortly before the close of day, his lordship ordered forward the 2d division to attack the enemy's position in front, being anxious to dislodge them from the strong

ground they occupied before they could receive further support.

The French troops defended themselves most obstinately, and maintained the contest until after dark, returning twice to the charge after they had been driven from their formidable position. The 39th regiment, commanded by Colonel O'Callaghan*, greatly distinguished itself on this occasion, and had the honour of finally driving the enemy from the field at the point of the bayonet. The French had several hundred men placed *hors de combat*, exclusive of 200 hundred prisoners left in the hands of the victors. Morillo was unable to advance with sufficient celerity to intercept the enemy at St. Palais; and during the night they crossed the Bidouze at that place, and destroyed the bridge. Following the enemy's retreat, Sir R. Hill crossed the river at St. Palais on the 16th, and next day drove them across the Gave de Mauleon; when they retired behind the Gave d'Oleron, and took up a strong position in the vicinity of Sauveterre.

On the first intelligence of these movements against his left, Marshal Soult, throwing the division of General Abbé into Bayonne, and leaving a force to hold the tête de pont at Peyrehorade, marched in all haste with the rest of his army on Sauveterre. The right centre of the allied army having meanwhile made a corresponding forward movement with Hill's corps towards the Bidouze, the advanced posts of both were, on the 18th, established on the left bank of the Gave d'Oleron, extending from above Sauveterre to the confluence of that river with the Gave de Pau, and waited only

* Lieut.-General the Honourable Sir R. W. O'Callaghan, G.C.B.

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the arrival of the pontoon train to undertake the passage of the latter stream.

Lord Wellington having thus placed his line of communication with St. Jean de Luz in security, repaired on the 19th to the camp in front of Bayonne, hoping that the bridge might now be thrown across the Adour, and the left wing of the army passed over; but finding that, from the boisterous state of the weather, it was impossible for the boats intended for the bridge to put to sea, his lordship resolved to turn the delay to account by forcing the enemy's left yet further back; and on the 21st returned to the right to direct the operations in person, desiring Sir J. Hope to cross the Adour whenever the weather would permit. The news of the surrender of Jaca arrived very opportunely at this moment, as it secured the allied army another line of retreat in the event of any disaster, and closed another door against the return of Soult into Spain.

On the 23d, Marshal Beresford, with the 4th and 7th divisions, composing the left centre, attacked the fortified posts at Hastingues and Oeyregave, on the left bank of the Gave de Pau, and obliged the enemy to retire into their tête de pont at Peyrehoradè; and on the following day the right centre and right crossed the Gave d'Oleron at different points, between Sauveterre and Navarreins, whilst Morillo's Spanish division drove in the enemy's posts near the latter place, and formed its blockade.

During the execution of these movements Picton, with the 3d division, threatened an attack on the enemy's position at Sauveterre, which induced them to destroy the bridge; but they held firm until the night, when, finding they were likely to be antici-

pated at Orthez, they fell rapidly back to that place, destroying all the bridges on the Gave de Pau; which river, it is necessary to explain, unites with the Gave d'Oleron a little above Peyrehorade.

At Orthez Soult had collected the whole of his disposable force, with the determination of making a stout stand, as well for the preservation of his magazines, which a further retreat would oblige him to sacrifice, as from being driven to the alternative of either abandoning the road to Bordeaux, or of quitting his hold of the Pyrenees. The position he occupied was exceedingly strong, and seemed well calculated to answer his purpose. The left of his army, commanded by Clauzel, occupied Orthez, which is situated on the side of an eminence that completely commands the passage of the gave. The centre, under D'Erlon, was thrown back along the crest of a range of heights that overlook the road to Dax; and the right, where Reille commanded, was posted on a steep eminence that protrudes from this ridge towards the village of St. Boës, situated on the before-mentioned road, which was strongly occupied. A reserve, composed of Harispe's and Villatte's divisions and some Basque troops, was posted on an elevated plateau in rear of the centre, astride the roads to Pau and St. Sever.

Every part of this position was strong; the left, indeed, was almost inattackable, from its proximity to the river and the strength imparted to it by the occupation of Orthez; and the centre was scarcely less difficult of approach, in consequence of its receding in form of a crescent. The right, though advanced beyond the centre, was refused with reference to the position generally; and whilst it could not be turned without causing an extended

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movement that might have been dangerous in face of an army of nearly equal force, it was, in respect to actual strength of ground, by far the most formidable part of the enemy's line. On the summit of the hills the hedges had been levelled and ditches filled up, that no obstacles might impede the evolutions of the troops; and all the bridges over the Gave de Pau had been destroyed.

The force assembled for the defence of this formidable position amounted to about 40,000 men; and against it the seven divisions, composing the right wing and centre of the allied army, were concentrically directed on the 26th. On the morning of that day Marshal Beresford, with the 4th and 7th divisions, crossing the Gave de Pau below its confluence with the Gave d'Oleron, advanced along its right bank by the road from Peyrehorade to Orthez. The cavalry and 3d division crossed the river below the ruined bridge of Berenx, as the troops under Marshal Beresford approached to cover the operation; and Lord Wellington directed the 6th and light divisions to move upon the same point, to be ready to cross at dawn on the following morning; and Sir R. Hill to occupy some heights on the left bank of the gave, opposite Orthez, covering the road to Sauveterre.

At daybreak on the 27th the 6th and Light divisions crossed the gave; and shortly afterwards the five divisions thus assembled on its right bank were moving in parallel columns to attack the enemy's line. The battle commenced about 9 o'clock by a vigorous assault made by the 4th * division, supported by the 7th and Colonel Vivian's brigade

* The 4th division had been withdrawn from the blockade of Bayonne.

of cavalry, on the village of St. Boës, in advance of the French right; during which the 3d division, moving along the road from Peyrehorade, and supported by the 6th division and Lord Edward Somerset's brigade of cavalry, advanced to attack the heights occupied by the French left and centre. The light division remained in reserve, between these two attacks; and Sir R. Hill, in conformity with Lord Wellington's directions, made dispositions to force the passage of the river above Orthez, so as to turn the left, and place himself in rear of the French army.

The village of St. Boës was carried by the 4th division after an obstinate resistance; but from the extreme difficulty of approach to the heights beyond (the sides of which were furrowed by deep ravines that rendered deployment impossible), the advancing columns were exposed to so destructive a fire both of artillery and musketry, brought to bear upon them from all points, that their endeavours to gain a footing on this part of the enemy's position proved unavailing.

The 7th division was moved up to support the troops engaged; and the struggle was persevered in with undaunted bravery, the allies, from their exposed situation, sustaining an immense loss. But the Portugueze brigade of Vasconcellos at length gave way; and a brigade of the Light division, which was moved forward to its support, had great difficulty to cover its retreat. Excepting, therefore, that the village of St. Boës remained in the hands of the allies, no impression had hitherto been made on the enemy's position.

Lord Wellington had repaired to the left wing of his army on observing the little progress it was

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making, and rode into the thickest of the fight, galloping from point to point wherever his presence was most needed, and addressing a few words of encouragement to each regiment as he passed along. But he now saw that a partial change in his plan of attack was necessary, and immediately ordered the 3d and 6th divisions and Colonel Barnard's brigade of the Light division to co-operate in the attack of this part of the enemy's line; directing these troops to move against the left flank of the height occupied by the French right, and thus endeavour to break through their line at the angle formed by the meeting of the right wing and centre of their army, whilst the 4th and 7th divisions renewed the combat, moving round more to their left. These commands were promptly executed. The 52d regiment, led by Colonel Colborne, showed the way up the hill, closely followed and supported on either flank by the other troops. The overwhelming force by this means brought to bear upon the key of the enemy's position was decisive of the day. The French began to give ground; and the British artillery, overcoming every obstacle, formed on the summit of a knoll that commanded their entire position, and carried destruction into their ranks. Soult, seeing that the battle was lost, ordered the retreat by the road to Sault de Navailles; the only one left open to him.

In the mean time Sir Rowland Hill, eluding the vigilance of Clauzel, had effected the passage of the gave above Orthez, and placed himself in rear of the enemy's left; and now, observing the state of the battle, pushed forward with the 2d division and Fane's brigade of cavalry, to gain the great

road to St. Sever; hoping, by so doing, to be able to intercept the retreat of the enemy at Sault de Navailles, where it crosses the Luy de Bearn.

Up to this time the retreat of the enemy had been conducted with admirable order, the whole moving off steadily from the right in echellon of divisions; but Soult, perceiving the danger he incurred from Hill's parallel movement on his right flank, pressed the march of his troops to gain Sault de Navailles. Hill did the same, and eventually it became a race which should first reach that place. Every effort was made to head the enemy; but throwing away arms, knapsacks, and havresacks, the Frenchmen gained a decided advantage over our troops carrying weight, and shot ahead fast, the broken nature of the country favouring their retreat, by preventing the cavalry from taking advantage of their disorder. An opportunity for attacking their rear column presented itself, however, on drawing near Sault de Navailles, which was promptly seized by Lord Edward Somerset, who charged it with his brigade and made a great many prisoners.

The pursuit of the allies closed with the day at Sault de Navailles; a severe contusion, received by Lord Wellington during the attack of the enemy's right wing, preventing his moving about with sufficient celerity to direct in person the last movements of the army. But the rout of the enemy could not well have been rendered more disastrous: 6 guns and between 4000 and 5000 men, killed and wounded, were left upon the field of battle; several thousand prisoners were made in the pursuit, and the French ranks suffered a nearly equal

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diminution by desertion. The allies had 2270 killed and wounded.

The French army, after crossing the Luy de Bearn at Sault de Navailles, continued its retreat to Hagetmau, whence the main body retired by the road to St. Sever; but a considerable corps was directed on Aire, to cover the evacuation of large magazines which had been collected there. The allied army resumed the pursuit of the defeated enemy on the morning of the 28th; the centre pressing forward in three columns, with the hope of enveloping the main body of the French army ere it could get clear of St. Sever, which is situated on the left bank of the Adour. But the badness of the roads, by retarding the march of the two flank columns, frustrated Lord Wellington's design; and Marshal Soult having collected his army behind the Adour, drawn off the garrison of Dax, and been reinforced by some battalions of conscripts, continued his retreat on the 1st of March, taking the direction of Agen.

The left and centre of the allied army crossed the Adour a few hours after the enemy had retired; and finding that by the easterly direction taken by Soult the direct road to Bordeaux was uncovered, Lord Wellington ordered Marshal Beresford to push on immediately with the Light division and Vivian's brigade of cavalry to Mont de Marsan, where a large magazine of provisions was captured without firing a shot. The advanced posts of the centre were at the same time moved on to Cazeres; but Sir Rowland Hill, with the right wing, still remained on the left bank of the Adour, having been sent in pursuit of the French corps which had retired upon Aire. On the morning of

the 2d Sir Rowland came up with the enemy, who had taken post on a strong ridge of hills about two miles in advance of the town, with their right resting on the river. The 2d division was immediately ordered to advance against the right of the French position, and Da Costa's Portugueze brigade to attack the centre. The former succeeded in dislodging their opponents without much difficulty; but the Portugueze troops, after gaining the crest of the ridge occupied by the enemy's centre, were attacked with great vivacity, and fell back in the utmost disorder. This repulse might have been followed by serious consequences, but for the timely arrival of General Barnes's brigade of the 2d division, detached by General Stewart to Da Costa's succour; which, charging the enemy in the most gallant style, instantly checked their forward movement, and, following up its success, drove them back in confusion. The French, nevertheless, made several attempts to recover their ground; but the arrival of another brigade of the 2d division put an end to the contest; and the enemy were subsequently driven from the town of Aire, which was occupied by Sir Rowland Hill. March 2.

On the evening of the 1st of March the Adour and other rivers in rear of the allied army became so swollen and rapid, in consequence of a heavy fall of rain, that all the pontoon bridges were swept away, thereby intercepting the communications of the army and checking the arrival of its supplies. It therefore became necessary to halt for some days to remedy the evil; and Soult thus obtained a respite which enabled him to collect and re-organize his army, and to effect a skilful change in his line of retreat.

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We will take advantage of this pause in the operations of the principal armies of the belligerents to return to the left; where, during the progress of the events we have just narrated, Sir J. Hope had been engaged in effecting the passage of the Adour below Bayonne, and investing the citadel of that fortress, on the right bank of the river.

To perform these services Sir John Hope had under his orders the 1st and 5th divisions, Lord Aylmer's British and Bradford's and Wilson's Portugueze brigades of infantry, and General Vandeleur's brigade of cavalry. The 4th division, as we have seen, had been called upon to take part in the operations directed against Marshal Soult; and the ground it had occupied in the line of investment — viz. between the right bank of the Nive and the Adour — was now taken up by the 5th division. To replace this latter on the left bank of the Nive the army of General Freyre had again been ordered across the frontier, and took post at Bidart, ready to move to the ground occupied by the 1st division, when it should have crossed to the right bank of the Adour.

The vessels taken up for the formation of the projected bridge, and the whole of the bridging materials, had been for some time past collected at Socoa and other ports to the westward, and waited now but a favourable opportunity to make for the Adour: but a continuance of boisterous weather had, has we have already noticed, prevented their sailing; for the mouth of that river is closed by a sandy bar, on which so heavy a sea breaks whenever the wind blows strong on shore as to render it perfectly impassable.

On the 22d, the weather having moderated, it

was hoped that the difficulty attendant on entering the river might be overcome; and on the evening of that day the flotilla put to sea, under convoy of the Porcupine frigate (Rear-Admiral Penrose's flag-ship), the Lyra brig of war, and five gun-boats. At midnight the troops destined to cover the operation of laying the bridge, consisting of the 1st division, a troop of horse artillery, a brigade of 18-pounder guns and another of rockets, were put in motion; and quitting the chaussée leading to Bayonne on approaching Anglet, proceeded along the front of the enemy's outposts, towards the coast; which they reached before daybreak, after a march rendered particularly fatiguing and difficult from the badness of the roads, without having given the enemy the alarm, and took post under shelter of some sand-hills between Bidart and the mouth of the Adour. When daylight appeared, the enemy's pickets were briskly dislodged from the wood covering the right of their intrenched camp; and two brigades of infantry (guards and German legion), the horse artillery, and a pontoon train, moved towards the mouth of the Adour, whilst the 3d brigade of the 1st division (guards) and the brigade of 18-pounders traversed the wood, and gained the bank of the river at a signal staff planted on a high sand-hill, called *La Balise Orientale,* nearly opposite Boucaut. The guns were instantly placed in battery, pointing towards the flank of the enemy's camp; and the troops were drawn up under shelter of some sand-hills bordering the marsh which protected its front.

The enemy's pickets in advance of the rest of their camp had been simultaneously attacked and driven in by the Spaniards, and Lord Aylmer's and

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Wilson's brigades, between Anglet and the Nive, and by the 5th division between the Nive and Adour; so that Bayonne was now closely invested on the right bank of the latter river.

The flotilla meanwhile appeared in the offing; but the wind having blown very fresh during the night, the swell on the bar continued to be too heavy to allow the vessels to enter the river. The enemy, however, trusting to the width and rapidity of the stream, having neglected to establish any posts along the right bank below Bayonne, Sir J. Hope determined to take advantage of their culpable negligence to establish a footing on that side, without waiting for the co-operation of the gun-boats, which were to have covered the passage of the first troops.

As a preparatory step, the rockets and 18-pounders were brought to bear upon some gun-boats and a corvette, which the enemy had stationed at a bend in the river, to sweep with a flanking fire the approach to the right of their camp. The gun-boats were quickly forced to proceed higher up the river; and the corvette also, after receiving a few rounds of red-hot shot, sought shelter under the guns of the citadel. To call off the enemy's attention from the projected operation, a brisk fire was likewise kept up along their whole front; and some pontoon rafts having been prepared, detachments of troops were passed over to the right bank as expeditiously as the rapidity of the current would admit: this daring operation being screened from the enemy's observation by the before-noticed bend in the river, and by the pine wood, which, stretching along the front of their camp, extended nearly to the water's edge.

The passage of the troops was, however, so extremely slow, that but four companies of the 3d Guards, and two of the 60th Regiment (Rifle Battn), in all scarcely exceeding 500 men, had been carried across before evening; and the enemy at length apprized of their presence, and awakened to a sense of the importance of dislodging them before they could receive further reinforcements and establish a firm footing, directed a column of 1300 men against them from the citadel.

Major-Gen. Stopford, who commanded the little band, made instant preparations to receive the enemy's attack, drawing up his troops across a narrow sandy tongue that forms the northern lip of the mouth of the Adour; his right flank protected by river, and his left by the sea. A few rockets arriving very opportunely, were placed behind some sand hills in advance of the right; and two guns of the troop of horse artillery were also brought to bear upon the enemy from the left bank of the river.

The French were allowed to advance within close musket range; when so well-sustained a fire opened upon their front, whilst volleys of rockets were showered upon them on their left, that panic-struck by the appalling noise and terrific appearance of these novel projectiles, they faced about and fled precipitately, not considering themselves in security until they had regained the shelter of the citadel; and no further interruption was offered to the establishment of the bridge.

The whole of the 24th was occupied in passing over more troops; and on the afternoon of that day, the swell on the bar having somewhat subsided, the vessels intended for the bridge stood in for the river. The passage of the bar was still, however,

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attended with great danger, the land marks for the channel having been removed; but by the exertions of Captain Riley of the Royal Navy (whose boat was upset in effecting a landing on the coast with a pilot) others were erected, and the vessels then undertook the hazardous passage. Several of the *chasse-marées* and a gun-boat were lost, and twelve of the former were forced to return to St. Jean de Luz; but thirty-four got safely into the river, as also four of the five gun-boats, and two transports conveying a flexible boom which had been prepared to lay across the stream above the bridge, to protect it from any fire-ships or hulks which the enemy might drift down for the purpose of destroying it.

The operation of laying the boom and bridge commenced immediately, under the direction of Major Tod of the Royal Staff Corps *, assisted by

* The plan of the bridge over the Adour was proposed to Lord Wellington by Lieut.-Colonel Sturgeon of the Royal Staff Corps. The *chasse-marées*, taken up for this service in the different Spanish ports, were the vessels in which the coasting trade is carried on. They are two-masted, decked vessels, of from 20 to 40 tons burthen. Twenty-five of these vessels were anchored stem and stern, to resist the ebb and flow of the tide, at intervals of 30 feet; and five 13-inch cables were stretched across the river, resting on sleepers placed fore and aft and well secured to the decks of the vessels. The ends of the cables were secured on the left bank by capstans and gun tackles, fixed to a frame of timber prepared for the purpose, and on the right bank by attaching heavy iron guns to them, which were thrown over the retaining wall that pens in the river. Notches were cut in the wooden sleepers to receive the cables and keep them equidistant, and they were further secured by lashings. Stout oak planking being then laid down on the cables, a bridge, 12 feet wide, and from its pliant nature admirably calculated to adapt itself to the rise and fall of the tide, was thus completed.

The boom laid down for its protection was formed of two rows of ships' masts, linked together with iron chains at intervals of 20 feet: the two rows being secured laterally by similar means. Each mast was anchored by its centre; those in the first row, up the stream, those in the second, down, to meet the flood tide. The chain parts of the booms were allowed to hang loosely, so as to be about 12 feet under water. This was calculated to give the elasticity necessary to resist the violence of a first shock of any vessels which might be drifted down upon it. Two cables were also stretched across the river in front of the boom to break the blow; and four gun-boats were placed in advance to afford

officers of the Royal Navy and Royal Engineers; but owing to the loss and non-arrival of so many of the vessels laden with part of the bridging materials, and the difficulty experienced in mooring the vessels, which could only be done at slack tide, the bridge was not completed until the evening of the 26th March.

The whole of the 1st division, and part of Wilson's Portugueze brigade, had been passed over to the right bank before nightfall on the 24th; and on the following morning these troops moved towards the citadel, resting their right upon the river, and extending their left so as to command the great road to Bordeaux. The communication of the garrison with the country north of the Adour was thus interrupted; and on the 27th a French post was dislodged from the village of St. Etienne, when the investment of both the citadel and fortress was completed.

The bridge below the town, now opened an uninterrupted communication between the sea ports forming the base of operations of the allied army, and the great roads leading into the interior of France by the right bank of the Adour; and the river below the bridge afforded a secure harbour for such vessels bringing supplies as could pass over the bar.

The navigation of the river, though partially interrupted by Bayonne, was free above the town, and the supplies of the allied army were therefore carried by land around the citadel to a quay formed

it protection. Batteries were likewise thrown up on both banks of the river; and light boats were constantly kept in readiness, with fire grapplings, to haul off and anchor any vessels that might be directed against the boom during the night.

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on the right bank, whence they were again consigned to boats, and conveyed to Port de Lanne, Peyrehorade, and other places in rear of the force acting against the French army.

The British government now also, at the earnest recommendation of Lord Wellington, opened this river, and the various French ports to the southward of it, to vessels of all nations not at war with any of the allied powers. The immediate consequence of this judicious step was, that the ports were filled with vessels pouring in supplies of all sorts, thereby greatly diminishing the expense of maintaining the army, as well as rendering that army more efficient. The result of Lord Wellington's masterly movements, during the fortnight's operations we have just described, will be best summed up in his Lordship's own words,—viz. "Bayonne, St. Jean-pied-de-Port, and Navarreins are invested; and the army, having passed the Adour, are in possession of all the great communications across that river, after having beaten the enemy and taken their magazines."

Despatches, &c. Mar. 1.

Reverting now to the operations of the main armies of the contending parties, it is necessary to recall to our readers' recollection that, on retreating from St. Sever, the chief part of the French army had, in the first instance, taken the road to Agen (a town situated on the right bank of the Garonne, midway between Bordeaux and Toulouse), seemingly as if Marshal Soult was still undecided whether to abandon the former city, or to give up the support afforded by the Pyrenees, and the chance of effecting a junction with Suchet. The delay experienced by the allied army in consequence of the destruction of the bridges in its rear

probably influenced the determination of the French marshal to profit by the opportunity thereby afforded him to throw his army once more upon the intersected country at the foot of the Pyrenees; justly concluding that such a step, considering the state of his army, would be much more likely to save Bordeaux, than either a direct movement to cover that city, or the half measure of retiring on Agen, which he had at first contemplated. Doubling back, therefore, to the south, and pressing his march to avoid being cut off by Hill's corps at Aire, he withdrew from Lord Wellington's front along the right bank of the Adour towards Tarbes; calculating that this step would either deter the British general from detaching a corps to Bordeaux, or else so reduce the strength of the allied army as to enable him to resume offensive operations with some probability of success.

Even, however, if it occasioned but a short check in his adversary's operations, Soult hoped to derive advantage from this movement, as it would tend to expedite the junction of Suchet, now marching in all haste from Catalonia to the defence of "the sacred soil of France."

Lord Wellington had long foreseen that, whatever might be the general feeling of the inhabitants of the south of France towards the existing government, the necessity would arise for his making large detachments from the army acting against the enemy in his immediate front, in proportion as it should advance into the interior of the country; for such detachments would be equally needed to afford the inhabitants an opportunity of freely expressing their desire to rid themselves of the bur-

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thensome yoke of Napoleon—should such really (as he fully believed) be their wish—as to secure the flanks of the allied army, if, on the other hand, the French people seemed disposed to hug the chains that bound them to their despot ruler's throne.

The moment, therefore, his Lordship learnt that the bridge was securely established at the mouth of the Adour, and that the citadel of Bayonne was invested, he gave orders for two divisions of the Spanish army of Galicia (8000 strong), commanded by Don Manuel Freyre, to cross the river, and march by the great road conducted along its right bank to Port de Lanne, where a pontoon bridge was in the mean time laid down, to enable them to recross to the left bank of the Adour and continue their march to St. Sever. A brigade of Portugueze artillery was directed to accompany the Spanish troops; and orders were given for a brigade of British heavy cavalry and one of 18-pounder guns to follow by the same route.

We have already noticed that Marshal Beresford, with a division of infantry and some cavalry, had been sent to occupy Mont de Marsan, on the direct

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road to Bordeaux, immediately after the allied army had crossed the Adour at St. Sever. It was not, however, at that time the intention of Lord Wellington to push a corps further towards the Garonne, unless Soult's movements rendered it expedient to do so; but from the communications his lordship now received from Bordeaux, he had good grounds to believe that a strong Bourbon party existed in that city, and that whether or not the Royalists should consider themselves sufficiently strong to declare their sentiments, if a

British force were directed towards the city its possession would not be disputed.

Lord Wellington determined, therefore, to afford the French people the opportunity of declaring their unbiassed sentiments with regard to the Bourbon family; and the Spanish corps of Freyre being now well advanced on its march towards St. Sever, his Lordship was enabled to detach a corps for this purpose without very materially diminishing the efficiency of the army opposed to Marshal Soult. Accordingly, on the 8th of March Marshal Beresford, with the 4th and 7th divisions and a brigade of cavalry, was directed to advance as rapidly as possible from Mont de Marsan on Bordeaux.

The position in which Lord Wellington now found himself placed, with reference to the political affairs of France, was one of peculiar difficulty; for it required the nicest judgment to shape a course through the rocks and quicksands of excited passions and political intrigues which on every side surrounded the delicate question — Is France to be revolutionized or not?

Every thing tended to convince the British commander that "the people" had become thoroughly weary of the military system of Napoleon, now that the exaction of heavy contributions to supply, and the adoption of compulsory measures to recruit their armies, and various other arbitrary and despotic acts, had convinced them of the reality of the evils attendant on a system of government based solely on military power, — a foundation of all others the least stable.

The almost general feeling of dislike now manifested to the rule of Napoleon, following so imme-

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diately the first calls made upon the people to submit to unusual sacrifices for its maintenance, fully proved the soundness of the opinion which, as we have seen, Lord Wellington had, at a very early period, formed of the basis on which Napoleon's power rested; namely,—externally by the plunder of those countries wherein his aggrandizing policy led him to carry the scourge of war; internally, by the most flagrant system of bribery and corruption.

Despatches, &c. Aug. 8. 1813.

But though the French people scrupled not, whenever the presence of the allied army permitted them freely to express their sentiments, openly to avow their earnest desire for the deposition of Napoleon (being fully convinced there would be no peace for France so long as he occupied the throne); yet hitherto they had not expressed any desire for the restoration of their legitimate princes; and indeed so many years had elapsed since the princes of the House of Bourbon had quitted France, that they were less known, and perhaps less thought of, by the generality of its inhabitants, when contemplating the event of having to select a successor to Napoleon, than those of any other European dynasty. That many firm adherents to the exiled royal house were still to be found amongst the leading families, particularly of La Vendée and the south of France, was well known; yet hitherto neither the success of the allied arms, nor the proclamations of the Duc d'Angoulême announcing his presence on the soil of France, had encouraged them to give an impulse and direction to the pervading feeling of dislike to Napoleon by raising the standard of the Bourbons; and H. R. H., deeming his project hopeless, was de-

terred only from returning to England by the arrival at St. Jean de Luz of the Marquis de la Rochejaquelein; who, with the devoted loyalty and chivalric contempt of danger that characterized his noble house, had traversed the whole of France, and eluded the vigilance of the Imperial police, to bear to H. R. H. the assurance of the existence of a vast Royalist confederation throughout the kingdom, and that the important city of Bordeaux waited only his presence to unfurl the standard of his house.

1814. Feb. 18.

De Beauchamp, vol. ii. p. 60.

This information occasioned, however, no change in the opinion of Lord Wellington as to the course the Duc d'Angoulême ought to pursue. Negotiations were still going foward with Napoleon; and his Lordship had no authority from the British government to support or excite any movement to favour the restoration of the Bourbons.

"I am still convinced," he writes to the Duc d'Angoulême, "that it is for the interests of your Royal Highness's family neither to anticipate public opinion, nor to press it." In other words, consider well before you take a step of which, under the circumstances of the moment, the prudence seems very doubtful, and from which you cannot possibly recede without causing the ruin of your devoted friends, and diminishing your chance of success at a future period.

Despatches, &c. Feb. 25.

The frank, straight-forward, and humane conduct of our great commander, in all his transactions connected with this subject, cannot but be highly appreciated by those who are capable of understanding the peculiar delicacy of the position in which he was placed, however much it may be condemned by the crooked diplomatists of the Machiavellian

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school. Indeed, whilst on the one hand Lord Wellington was accused of *timidity*, on the other he was charged with *perfidy*;—Marshal Soult, in a scurrilous proclamation, wherein he gave vent to the impotent rage his recent defeat at Orthez had generated, charging him with "speaking words of peace with the brand of discord in his hand."

Proclamation, March 8.

We have seen, however, that Lord Wellington had freely declared his opinion to the British ministry, that, in order to ensure the peace of Europe, "Buonaparte must be got rid of:" he had expressed himself equally well persuaded that, from the growing unpopularity of the French emperor, this desirable object might be readily accomplished; he was perfectly aware that a strong Bourbon party existed in the country, which by a single stroke of the pen he could call to arms; and was fully sensible how materially an insurrection of the kind would tend to favour his own military operations; and, lastly, it cannot be doubted that the loyalty and fidelity so deeply rooted in his own breast must have led him to wish success to the Bourbon cause, and to desire to assist himself in restoring the legitimate sovereign of France to the throne of his ancestors. Whilst thus, we may say, prompted by various personal as well as political considerations to hold out encouragement to the friends of the exiled family to declare themselves, his Lordship, influenced by the most honourable feelings, continued to warn the Duc d'Angoulême and his adherents of the danger they would incur by taking such a step whilst negotiations for peace were still pending. At the same time, in all his communications with the British government on this subject, his Lordship advocates the policy of encouraging a

Royalist insurrection and breaking off all negotiations with Buonaparte, whose downfall, in that case, he considered inevitable.

Despatches, &c. Mar. 4.

"In proportion as we advance," (his Lordship writes to the Earl of Liverpool,) "I find the sentiment in the country still more strong against the Buonaparte dynasty, and in favour of the Bourbons; but I am quite certain there will be no declaration on the part of the people, if the allies do not in some manner declare themselves; or, at all events, as long as they are negotiating with Buonaparte.

"Any declaration from us would, I am convinced, raise such a flame in the country as would spread from one end of it to the other, and would infallibly overturn him.

"I cannot discover the policy of not hitting one's enemy as hard as one can, and in the most vulnerable place."

The proceedings of the Allied Sovereigns and their ministers indicated a more timid line of policy. Fear and hesitation marked every act of their diplomacy, as well as every step made by their unwieldy armies towards the capital of France. The opinion of the Emperor Alexander alone was in unison with that of Lord Wellington, with regard to "getting rid of Buonaparte;" and he only authorized his plenipotentiary at Chatillon to continue the negotiations for peace with the French Emperor, for the sake of preserving unanimity in the councils of the confederates. The same feelings seem also to have guided him with respect to encouraging the adherents of the House of Bourbon to declare themselves; for the Comte d'Artois was not received at the Imperial head-quarters.

The step now taken by Lord Wellington, of marching a corps of the allied army upon Bordeaux, was calculated, however, to ascertain the real feeling of the people of France towards their exiled princes; as the presence of an English

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force in that important city, by placing the inhabitants beyond the range of intimidation, would afford them an opportunity of declaring their unbiassed sentiments, both with regard to Buonaparte and their legitimate princes.

Despatches, &c. Mar. 7.

Marshal Beresford, to whom the command of the corps destined to occupy Bordeaux was entrusted, received directions, therefore, to afford the inhabitants full scope to make known their sentiments, without giving them any encouragement to declare in favour of the Bourbons; but, on the other hand, not to interfere to prevent the Royalist party proclaiming Louis the Eighteenth, provided the public peace was preserved.

Lord Wellington's instructions further directed Marshal Beresford to state to the Royalist party, that the object of the Allies in carrying the war into France was *peace*, and that they were still engaged in negotiations with Buonaparte to attain that object. That, consequently, however well disposed he might be to support any insurrectionary movement against Buonaparte while he continued at war, he could give it no further aid when peace should be concluded; and the inhabitants were to be requested "to weigh this matter well, before they raised a standard against the government of Buonaparte and involved themselves in hostilities."

Marshal Beresford, with the 4th and 7th divisions, and Vivian's brigade of cavalry, marched from Mont de Marsan to execute the delicate operation with which he was entrusted on the 8th of March, and reached Bordeaux on the 12th; a small force of the enemy, under General l'Huillier, retiring across the Garonne on his approach. A short dis-

tance in advance of the city, he was met by the mayor, Comte Lynch, attended by the civil authorities, who, after reading an address expressive of the satisfaction and joy of the inhabitants at the arrival of the allies, stripped himself of the tricoloured scarf of office, and replaced it with that of the Bourbons. The white cockade was instantly mounted by all classes of the inhabitants; and the enthusiastic burst of loyalty that greeted H. R. H. the Duc d'Angoulême as, following close upon the allied advanced guard, he entered the capital of the south of France, announced clearly the triumph of the cause of legitimacy.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

LORD WELLINGTON ORDERS THE SPANISH CORPS OF GENERAL FREYRE, AND PART OF THAT OF MARSHAL BERESFORD, TO JOIN HIM ON THE ADOUR. — PROJECTED ATTACK OF MARSHAL SOULT. — ADVANCE OF THE ALLIES. — ACTIONS AT VIC BIGORRE AND TARBES. — THE FRENCH ARMY RETREATS TO TOULOUSE. — OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES. — BATTLE OF TOULOUSE. — MEASURES TAKEN BY LORD WELLINGTON TO INCLOSE THE FRENCH ARMY, WHICH SOULT SAVES BY A TIMELY RETREAT. — OBSERVATIONS ON THE CLAIM OF VICTORY PUT FORTH BY THE FRENCH. — INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED OF THE CAPTURE OF PARIS AND ABDICATION OF NAPOLEON. — CONVENTION FOR THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. — SORTIE FROM BAYONNE. — LORD WELLINGTON IS APPOINTED AMBASSADOR AT THE COURT OF FRANCE. — HE PROCEEDS TO PARIS. — IS CREATED A DUKE. — PROCEEDINGS OF THE KING OF SPAIN SUBSEQUENT TO HIS RELEASE. — LORD WELLINGTON REPAIRS TO MADRID. — RETURNS TO HIS ARMY, AND EMBARKS FOR ENGLAND. — IS RECEIVED AT PORTSMOUTH BY THE PRINCE REGENT. — TAKES HIS SEAT IN THE HOUSE OF PEERS, AND RETURNS THANKS IN PERSON FOR THE CONGRATULATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

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THE communications of the army over the Adour and other rivers in its rear having been re-established, Lord Wellington awaited but the arrival of Freyre's Spanish corps and the British heavy cavalry and artillery to resume his operations against Marshal Soult; though, from the complaints received from all quarters of the misconduct of the Spanish troops during their march to join him, he doubted much whether their presence would not rather be detrimental than otherwise. The object of Marshal Beresford's diversion having therefore, as we have seen, been so successfully and expeditiously attained, that officer was directed to rejoin

March 14. the army on the Adour with the 4th division and Vivian's cavalry, leaving Lord Dalhousie, with the 7th division and a few squadrons of horse, to watch

Bordeaux and reduce the forts commanding the navigation of the Garonne, so as to enable the British squadron to enter the river.

Instructions had previously been sent to Lieut.-General Sir John Hope, to prosecute the siege of Bayonne with the left wing of the allied army, now reinforced by Carlos de España's corps; and to Lieut.-General W. Clinton, to break up the army on the eastern coast of Spain as soon as he should hear of the removal of Suchet from Catalonia; proceeding with the principal part of the British and German troops to join Lord Wellington's army by way of Zaragoza, Pamplona, and St. Jean de Luz; sending the Italians, Sicilians, and Calabrese back to Sicily, and placing Whittingham's and Sarsfield's divisions (in English pay) under the command of the general commanding the 1st Spanish army, to effect the reduction of Barcelona and such other fortresses of Catalonia as yet remained in the enemy's hands. Those of Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon had already been recovered by a stratagem of Baron de Eroles, who, having obtained possession of Suchet's cipher, sent the commandants of those places an order, purporting to be from that Marshal, to evacuate them, and proceed to join him with their respective garrisons; which, however, were waylaid and made prisoners. March 6. March 4.

Marshal Soult meanwhile having received reinforcements, and conceiving that by detaching Beresford's corps upon Bordeaux Lord Wellington must have so diminished the allied army in his front as to afford him a favourable opportunity of falling upon its right flank and rear, crossed the Adour with his whole force on the 12th of March, and on the following day advanced towards Aire by Lam-

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bega and Conchez. This forward movement of the enemy led Lord Wellington to direct a general concentration of the troops he had immediately at hand between Aire and Garlin; where a strong position was taken up (its right resting on the latter place) to keep the enemy at bay until, by the arrival of the troops ordered up from Bayonne and recalled from Bordeaux, the allied army should be in a condition to punish Soult for his temerity.

Augoyat, p. 196.

The French marshal's resolution, however, failed him at the pinch. He pushed forward only on the 15th; the left and centre of his army advancing to the plateau of Castel Pugnon, in front of Hill's right at Garlin; but deeming that point too strong to be attacked in front, he decided on turning it by its right, and on the morning of the 16th commenced his operation. His movements, however, were far too slow, considering the exigency of the case; for, on the following day, finding that Lord Wellington's reinforcements were hourly arriving, he fell back in all haste to Lambège. His hurried retreat disappointed Lord Wellington, who would gladly have drawn the French army more round to the right, and forced it to receive battle with its back to the Pyrenees. On the 18th, however, the allied army was pushed forward in three columns by Plaisance, Castelnau, and Conchez, with the hope of yet bringing the enemy to action before they could recross the Adour. The right column drove in their outposts upon Lambège; but Soult retired in the night to Vic Bigorre, leaving a rear guard, composed of two divisions under D'Erlon, strongly posted in the vineyards in front of that town, to cover the march of the rest of his army upon Gers sur Lande to gain the road from Pau to Tarbes.

D'Erlon's corps being attacked next morning in a very spirited manner by the 3d division and Bock's brigade of German cavalry, after some sharp fighting*, was dislodged and driven through the town. The allied army was then collected at that place and at Rabastens.

Soult, continuing his retrograde movement, drew off during the night to Tarbes, where again crossing the Adour, he took up a position on some very strong ground on the right bank of the river: its left immediately in rear of Tarbes, which was occupied; its right near the windmill of Oleac, in the direction of Rabastens. The allied army marched in two columns to attack this position on the morning of the 20th; one column, led by Lieut.-General Sir H. Clinton, advanced from Rabastens to turn the enemy's right; whilst the other, under Sir Rowland Hill, moved forward by the high road from Vic Bigorre to Tarbes, to attack their left. These movements, executed with rare precision, were completely successful: turned on one flank by the 6th division under Sir H. Clinton; threatened on the other by Sir R. Hill, who had pushed on through the town of Tarbes; and attacked in front by the Light division, Soult drew off with some loss to a second range of heights covering the road to St. Gaudens. This ground was yet stronger than the former. Lord Wellington decided, therefore, to keep the advantage already obtained by the

* Lieut.-Colonel Sturgeon of the Royal Staff Corps (whose name has been mentioned several times in these pages) was killed in this affair. "*He was an officer of very superior merit,*" remarks, in a note, the gallant compiler of his Grace the Duke of Wellington's Despatches; to which we may justly add, that he was one of the most gallant and zealous of soldiers. He commenced his military career in the Royal Artillery.

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forward posture of the two wings of his army, to continue his movement against his adversary's flanks.

The French army was thereby placed in a situation of extreme peril; as, should the allies succeed in cutting its line of retreat by Tournay on St. Gaudens and Toulouse, it would then be forced back upon the Pyrenees and compelled to disperse or surrender. But so much time was required to communicate the orders for the simultaneous advance of the different corps, that the day closed before this decisive movement could be effected, and Soult profited by the night to draw off without further loss towards St. Gaudens. Continuing its retreat rapidly, disembarrassing itself of every thing calculated to impede its march, the French army reached Toulouse on the 24th.

The allied army pursued in three columns; Beresford, with the left wing, taking the great road by Auch; Hill, with the right, that of St. Gaudens; the centre, which Lord Wellington directed in person, moving by Gallan, l'Isle du Dodon, and St. Lys. But the destruction of the bridges effected by the enemy, and the consequent necessity imposed on their pursuers to bring forward a cumbersome pontoon train, and also the wretched state of the roads, occasioned by the passage of so many troops during a period of heavy rain, retarded the march of the allied army, and saved the enemy from sustaining any great loss. General Fane's brigade of cavalry, attached to Sir R. Hill's column, succeeded, however, in coming up with their rear guard at St. Gaudens on the 22d, and made some prisoners; but their further retreat was unmolested, and it was only by great exertion that the allied army was con-

centrated on the left bank of the Garonne, opposite Toulouse, by the 27th.

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Soult profited by the three days' advance he had gained on the allies to place the city in a state of defence, and to occupy and strengthen by every possible means a boldly outlined range of heights that commands it within cannon-range, to the eastward; and in this formidable position he determined to dispute, *à outrance*, the further advance of the allies.

The interesting city of Toulouse, the capital of Languedoc, and formerly of the Visigothic kingdom established in the south of France, stands on the right or eastern bank of the Garonne; with which the canal of Languedoc, sweeping round, and sometimes approaching within musket-range of the old walls, connects itself about a mile and a half below the town. Immediately beyond the canal (eastward from the city) rises the before-mentioned range of heights, called Mount Calvinet; and in a marshy valley at its foot, on the reverse side, runs the river Ers, — a deep and muddy stream, which at this season could be passed only by bridges.

Marshal Soult took post on these heights with four divisions of his army, destroying all the bridges on his front but that of Croix d'Orade, on the Alby road, and covering with têtes-de-pont those across the canal of Languedoc between the left of this position and the Garonne. The summit of the ridge was crowned with redoubts connected by intrenchments, which mutually flanked each other, and swept with their fire the entire front of the position as far as the river Ers; those on the left (at a part of the heights called *La Pujade*) serving at the same time to flank the têtes-de-pont covering

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the bridges by which the roads from Alby and Montauban crossed the canal on the north side of the city. Here an uninterrupted plain extends along the right bank of the Garonne all the way to the Ers; and the canal from the N. W. foot of Mount Calvinet to its junction with the first-named river became, therefore, the left of the French line; forming nearly a right angle with the rest of their position. Besides the two têtes-de-pont above mentioned, a third covered the Pont du Jumeau, situated near the termination of the canal; and all three were strongly guarded, and armed with heavy artillery.

The enemy's position on the heights of Calvinet covered the roads directed on Toulouse from Alby, Lavaur, Caraman, and Montaudran; the first being conducted along the western foot of the ridge, the last round the base of the opposite extremity, and the two others directly across it. The route from Carcassonne approaches the city from the south, between the canal of Languedoc and the right bank of the Garonne; and the roads from Auch, Lombey, and Muret are directed on the faubourg St. Cyprien, situated on the left bank of the river, directly opposite, and connected with Toulouse by a stone bridge, and standing in a deep re-entering angle of the Garonne. This latter circumstance tended greatly to favour its defence; and besides being protected, like the city itself, by an old wall flanked with towers, it was now covered also by a formidable advanced line of intrenchments.

The allied army arrived in front of the works protecting this suburb on the 27th. But Lord Wellington, seeing at a glance that nothing decisive could result from an attack on this side of the river, lost no time in making the necessary reconnoissances

to ascertain the most favourable points for passing the army to the opposite bank. His lordship was at first desirous to throw a bridge across the river for this purpose below the city; but the heavy rains which had lately fallen, as well as the melting of the snow on the Pyrenees, had so swollen the river, and rendered its current so rapid, that every endeavour to accomplish this service was frustrated; and he then determined to pass Sir Rowland Hill's corps across the Garonne above the town, higher up than its junction with the Arriège, and direct it upon Cintegabelle, where there was a bridge over the latter river. By this plan not only would the road from Carcassonne be gained, and the communication between Soult and Suchet cut, but an attack on the former would be directed against the least defensible part of his position; namely, between the canal of Languedoc and the Garonne.

Accordingly, Sir R. Hill's corps crossed the Garonne by a pontoon bridge on the 31st March, and, advancing to the Arriège, reached Cintegabelle. But the roads on the right bank of that river were found to be so broken up as effectually to impede the movements of an army; and as there was no chance of their becoming passable for many weeks, the troops were withdrawn next day, and Sir Rowland took post opposite the faubourg St. Cyprien.

There was now no course left to adopt but that of waiting until the floods should subside, so as to allow a bridge to be laid across the river below the town, and then to take the bull by the horns, by attacking Soult's strong position on the right bank of the river. Every day's delay was, however, of the utmost consequence, for Soult, profiting by the respite thus, unavoidably, afforded him, was hourly

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improving and multiplying his defences, and Suchet was supposed to be advancing rapidly to his colleague's succour. Lord Wellington determined, therefore, to take advantage of a favourable change in the weather on the 2d, to throw a pontoon bridge across the river. This operation was successfully effected on the morning of the 4th, about half a league above Grenade; and though the rain had again set in during the preceding night, a strong corps under Marshal Beresford, composed of the 3d, 4th, and 6th infantry divisions, and three brigades of cavalry, was immediately passed over: — Marshal Soult offering no opposition, though the whole of his army was within a short march. Thus, a third time, did Lord Wellington successfully effect one of the most difficult operations in the art of war, before a general who had the reputation of being the ablest tactician of Napoleon's army.

The Light division and Freyre's Spaniards were about to follow Marshal Beresford's corps, when the river again rose to such a degree as to render it necessary to dismantle the bridge; and on the following day the stream became so impetuous as to make it prudent to take it up altogether. The army was thus cut in two, without the possibility of re-uniting until the floods should subside; but Marshal Soult was determined not to be tempted to depart from his strictly defensive system, and allowed the favourable opportunity to escape of attacking either wing of the allied army with a vastly superior force.

In this state the allied army continued until the 8th of April — a period of great anxiety to Lord Wellington, who had also much reason to be uneasy on other accounts; for, anticipating that the

Spanish government would be prevailed upon to allow the garrisons of the fortresses still held by the enemy in Catalonia to return to France*, and that Soult would therefore be very soon reinforced by those troops (calculated at about 20,000 men), as well as by the 14,000 with whom Suchet was marching to his succour, and whose junction his lordship saw little probability of being able to prevent, he apprehended that the British force under his command (now reduced to *one third* of its original number by the necessity for carrying on unconnected operations in various quarters) would not be able to make head against the very superior numbers which might be brought against it. For the British portion of the allied army on the eastern coast of Spain, which he had directed to join him (being the only part of it he considered likely to be of assistance), amounted to but 4000 or 5000 men, and could not be expected to effect its junction with him so quickly as the enemy's force, which (assisted by the Spanish armies of Catalonia and Aragon) it had hitherto kept in check, could join Soult.

Under these circumstances, his lordship writes to Earl Bathurst,—

"I beg leave again to draw your Lordship's attention to the state of this army, particularly to that of that most important branch of it, the British infantry. Your Lordship has been informed, by my despatch of the 20th ultimo, what troops are employed at Bayonne, and what at Bordeaux; and you will see what remains to be opposed to the

Despatches, &c. April 7.

* The French emperor, at this time, held out a threat to the Spanish government to detain the King of Spain until the garrisons of the fortresses of Catalonia were given up. Lord Wellington, foreseeing the vast advantage it would afford the enemy if these troops were allowed to return to France, had strongly advised that they should be granted no terms but those of remaining prisoners of war; but it now became a delicate matter to press this upon the Spanish government, if the release of their king depended upon it.

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united armies of Marshals Soult and Suchet, if the garrisons" (alluding to those of Catalonia) "should be set free.

"Adverting to the state in which the army took the field in May last, to the number of actions in which it has been engaged, and to the small reinforcements it has received, it is a matter of astonishment that it should now be so strong. But there are limits to the numbers with which it can contend; and I am convinced your Lordship would not wish to see the safety and honour of this handful of brave men depend upon the doubtful exertions and discipline of an undue proportion of Spanish troops."

The continued fall of rain from the 3d to the 7th prevented the re-establishment of the pontoon bridge until the morning of the 8th; when Lord Wellington crossed over to the right bank of the Garonne, and joined Marshal Beresford with the Spanish corps of General Freyre and the Portugueze artillery, leaving Sir Rowland Hill with the right wing to repel any sortie from the faubourg St. Cyprien, and to make a false attack on that side to favour the meditated assault on the French intrenched position on Mount Calvinet.

Lord Wellington, on reaching the right bank of the river, immediately commenced operations, by directing a general movement of the army towards the Ers; when the 18th hussars, led by Colonel Vivian*, made a most gallant attack on a superior body of the enemy's cavalry, commanded by General Pierre Soult, driving it across the river, and through the village of Croix d'Orade, and making a hundred prisoners. A passage over the Ers was thus secured (greatly to the discredit of Marshal Soult), which tended materially to facilitate his lordship's meditated operation against the enemy's position on Mount Calvinet. But the necessity for removing

* Lieut.-General the Right Honourable Sir R. Hussey Vivian, Bart. G.C.B.

the pontoon bridge higher up the Garonne, in order to shorten the communication with Sir R. Hill's corps, compelled Lord Wellington to defer the attack on the enemy until the morning of the 10th; for though the operation of taking up the bridge commenced immediately after the Spanish army had crossed by it to the right bank of the river, yet not until a late hour on the 9th could it be re-established at the site fixed on, higher up the stream. At daybreak on the 10th, the Light division also crossed to the right bank of the river, leaving only the 2d British and General Le Cor's Portugueze divisions, and a brigade of cavalry under under Sir R. Hill, in front of the enemy's works, covering the faubourg of St. Cyprien.

The allied army, in all, amounted to 45,000 men, of whom 5000 were Portugueze, and 8000 Spaniards; a number exceeding but very little that of the French army under Marshal Soult, which, though it had been much reduced by the heavy losses sustained in the late actions, had recently been augmented again by the garrison of Toulouse (4000 strong) and various detachments drawn from other places, and now amounted to about 40,000 men, exclusive of the national guards of Toulouse.*

But, deducting the 10,000 men left under Sir R. Hill opposite the faubourg of St. Cyprien, the force which Lord Wellington had at his disposal to attack

* The French authorities, *of course*, differ widely from us, in estimating the comparative strength of the hostile armies at Toulouse; but according to a recent publication ("*Considérations sur la Bataille de Toulouse, &c., par T. Choumara, ancien Capitaine du Génie*"), we find the French "official returns" give the amount of Marshal Soult's army at 34,871, exclusive of the garrison of Toulouse.

Another French author (General Vaudoncourt) represents the force of the allies to have been as follows: —

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Soult's intrenched position cannot be calculated at more than 35,000 men.

The distribution of the French army was as follows: — One division (General Arricau's) defended the têtes-de-pont, covering the three bridges over the canal, between its junction with the Garonne below Toulouse and the road to Alby; the convent of Les Minimes, on the Montauban road, in advance of the centre bridge, being held by a regiment of light infantry. Beyond the road to Alby three divisions (those of Clauzel, Harispe, and Villette) occupied the summit of the Calvinet ridge; their left resting on two strong redoubts and various other works thrown up on the knoll of La Pujade; their centre covered by two others to the left of the road to Lavaur; and their right prolonged to where the range turning slightly southward, takes the name of La Sypière, at which point another formidable redoubt occupied a very commanding situation on the Caraman road. The whole extent of this ridge was

English and Germans	-	32,500
Portugueze	-	5,000
Spaniards	-	29,900!
		67,400
Adding a Spanish reserve (meaning the army of the Conde de la Bisbal, which never crossed the frontier in 1814) that he states the Duke of Wellington "must have had somewhere"	-	18,900
Total	-	86,100

The returns of the British and Portugueze troops were submitted to too many checks, and exposed to too many eyes, to admit of any deception being practised, if such a disposition on the part of the British commander had existed. And we have his Grace's authority, contained in a *private* letter to Earl Bathurst, for giving the amount of the Spaniards, viz. "8000 men;" (*Despatches*, &c. 7th March); that is, the 3d and 4th divisions of the army of Galicia. Morillo's division had been left in the rear, after the army crossed the Gave d'Oleron on the 4th of February, to blockade the fortress of Navarreins, which held out until the abdication of Napoleon was known. — (*Despatches*, 1st March and 18th April.)

nearly three miles, and the different redoubts were connected laterally by intrenchments. Two divisions (Armagnac's and Taupin's) were in reserve, under shelter of the heights; one in rear of the left, the other behind the centre, in advance of the faubourg St. Etienne. Some battalions of raw conscripts were posted along the canal in rear of this part of the enemy's line, and held the Pont des Demoiselles, on which the roads from Lavaur and Caraman were directed on the town. The national guards of Toulouse lined the city walls; and the defence of the faubourg St. Cyprien, on the left bank of the Garonne, was entrusted to Comte Reille, with two divisions.

A body of cavalry, under General Vial, was posted in front of the French left, opposite Croix d'Orade; another, commanded by General Berton, covered their right on the road to Bordes; and a third, under General Soult, remained in reserve.

It is evident, on viewing attentively the peculiar features of the position chosen by Marshal Soult, that his adversary had no other course to pursue than that of directing his attack on the intrenched heights of Calvinet. By assailing the faubourg St. Cyprien, on the left bank of the Garonne, he could not have obtained any great results, and would infallibly have occasioned the ruin of that populous suburb. This would have been followed by the destruction of the bridge connecting it with the city, and eventually by that of the city itself, if the passage of the river were forced. On every account, therefore, it was advisable to make the attack on the right bank of the Garonne. Nevertheless, as the communications of the allied army were all on the left bank, it was imperatively necessary, with a

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view to their preservation, to keep a large body of troops opposite the works covering the faubourg St. Cyprien, and this occasioned a considerable diminution in the amount of force disposable for carrying on operations on the right bank of the river. Here, the canal, from the Garonne to the foot of Mount Calvinet, presented an almost inattackable front; and the walls of the city rose advantageously in second line, sweeping with their fire the entire space from their base to the canal, should the first line of defence be forced. An attack on this side would therefore have occasioned a great loss of life, and probably the ruin of the town.

On the other hand, to have turned Mount Calvinet altogether, and crossed to the western side of the canal above the city, directing the attack thence on the faubourg St. Michael, which was unprotected by works, would have rendered so wide a movement necessary, that Soult might readily have taken advantage of it to overwhelm the troops left to guard the pontoon bridge keeping up the communication with Hill's corps, and then, crossing to the left bank of the river with his whole force (abandoning Toulouse, and destroying both the permanent and pontoon bridges in his rear, if necessary), have fallen upon the allied right wing blockading St. Cyprien; to whose assistance Lord Wellington could not possibly have returned for the want of a bridge.* The British general, therefore, though he might have gained Toulouse, would probably have lost a corps of 10,000 men, and his communications.

An attack on Mount Calvinet itself avoided this

* A similar operation was skilfully executed by Clairfait at Mayence, in 1795.

risk; and if successful, from the command this height possessed over Toulouse, the eventual fall of the city was certain, without the necessity for any further sacrifice of life on the part of the allies, if they chose to fire upon it.

An opinion has often been expressed,—founded on the fact of the battle of Toulouse having been fought ten days after the allied armies of Austria, Russia, and Prussia had occupied the French capital,—that a battle in this part of the seat of war was altogether uncalled for; that the generals of both armies were aware of the surrender of Paris, but, with the hope of ending the war with an action of eclat, they kept this circumstance concealed, and were consequently guilty of the unpardonable crime of sacrificing the lives of their brave soldiers to gratify their personal ambition. As regards Lord Wellington, nothing can be more groundless than such an accusation; for it is clearly proved by his lordship's despatches that, up to the 12th of April, he believed the allies were still negotiating with Buonaparte at Chatillon.

Despatches, &c. Apr. 12.

Had Lord Wellington even been aware, however, of the capture of Paris, he could not have known what had become of Napoleon, and of the French army with which he had been so long baffling the plans of the allied sovereigns; and as but a few weeks previously they had withdrawn from Troyes on the sudden appearance of the French emperor at the head of a handful of overmarched troops, it would not have been unreasonable to conclude that they might be equally frightened out of Paris, if their dreaded adversary appeared with his veteran band on the plain of Grenelle.

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It was equally of importance, therefore, for Lord Wellington to strike a blow at Soult's army before it could be reinforced by that of Suchet, whether he knew or did not know that the French capital was occupied by the allies; since in the former hypothetical case, it would have been of the utmost consequence to prevent the concentration of such a force in the south of France as would have served as a *noyau* for fomenting a civil war in the country.

The truth is, however, as we have stated, that Lord Wellington thought Buonaparte was yet at the head of a powerful army, and that negotiations for peace were still pending at Chatillon; and having decided on attacking Marshal Soult's formidable intrenched position on Mount Calvinet, he issued his orders accordingly.

Orders. Head Qrs. St. Jory, April 9.

Sir Rowland Hill with the right wing, composed of the 2d British and Le Cor's Portugueze divisions, was directed "to threaten" the suburb of St. Cyprien on the left bank of the Garonne, "to draw a part of the attention and force of the enemy to that side."

The 3d and Light divisions were ordered to make demonstrations against the front of the enemy's line extending between the Garonne and foot of Mount Calvinet, threatening principally the têtes-de-pont.

Freyre's Spanish corps, on the left of the Light division, was to advance from Croix d'Orade, and form in two lines on a hill to the left of the Alby road, nearly opposite the northern extremity of the heights of Calvinet; where it was directed to remain until the corps of Marshal Beresford was perceived moving up to attack the enemy's right. A brigade of British cavalry was in reserve at Croix

d'Orade, and another on the left of the Spaniards, keeping up the communication between them and Beresford's corps.

The 4th and 6th divisions, and a brigade of cavalry (composing Beresford's corps), were ordered to cross the Ers by the bridge at Croix d'Orade, and march to their left, between that river and the enemy's position, until they arrived opposite the French right, when they were to move up to the attack of the heights.

At an early hour on the 10th April the whole of the troops were in motion, each division marching silently and steadily towards its assigned station. Soult, from the summit of Mount Calvinet, eagerly watched every movement of the busy throng below, and, confiding in the strength of his position, trusted that the opportunity had at length arrived to efface the humiliating recollection of his repeated defeats.

The action commenced by the attack of the 4th division (leading Beresford's corps) on a body of French troops occupying the village of Montblanc. The enemy were quickly dislodged, when the Marshal continued his flank movement to gain the right of the French position, by marching along the left bank of the Ers, in a direction parallel to the front of the enemy's line, exposed during his march to the fire of their artillery from the Calvinet heights.

The roads were so very bad, and the ground was so saturated by the recent rains, that the movement of this corps was extremely tedious; and that its march might not be unnecessarily retarded, it was deemed advisable to leave its artillery behind at Montblanc, to cannonade the enemy's

CHAP. XXXVI. works on the left of their position at La Pujade, in aid of the operations of the Spaniards.

1814. It was intended by Lord Wellington that the several attacks and feints should be made simultaneously, commencing when Marshal Beresford's corps reached its assigned ground opposite the enemy's right; but by some mistake the Spanish corps of General Freyre was brought into action before the appointed time, which led to the feints against the têtes-de-pont on the canal on his right, being also prematurely made.

The Spanish general formed his troops in two lines in front of La Croix d'Orade, posting a reserve and the Portugueze artillery attached to his corps on a hill opposite the left of the enemy's position on the heights of Calvinet; under shelter of which a brigade of British cavalry also took post to support the Spaniards.

As soon as their formation was completed, the Spaniards moved forward to the attack. The leading line, headed by Freyre in person, advanced with great spirit, and at first in excellent order, driving before it a French advanced brigade; but becoming exposed to a heavy fire of musketry and grape as they drew near the enemy's intrenchments, the Spaniards pressed on rapidly to bring their opponents to close quarters, and their line on reaching the heights was consequently much disordered. In this state it partly succeeded in lodging itself under shelter of a hollow road, about 50 yards in front of the enemy's works, where it attempted to re-form and wait for the support of the second line, whose movements had not been by any means so rapid. The French, however, did not allow their assailants time either to regain any

kind of order, or to receive support; but, issuing from their lines, fell upon them with great impetuosity; turned their flank by pushing forward a brigade round the western extremity of the heights, and after a severe struggle drove them down the hill with considerable loss. But so obstinate was the contest, that one Spanish regiment (Tiradores de Cantabria) maintained its ground under the enemy's intrenchments, until ordered to retire by Lord Wellington.

The efforts of the Spanish general and staff officers to restore the combat were vain; and the enemy would have seized the bridge over the Ers, behind Croix d'Orade, and thereby isolated Beresford's corps, but for the opportune arrival of the reserve of the Light division to the support of the Spaniards, which, forming in line on the French left, checked their further advance, and compelled them to retire again behind their intrenchments.

General Picton, on the extreme right of the allied line, observing the forward movement of the enemy on the Montauban road in pursuit of the Spaniards, and conceiving that it afforded him a favourable opportunity for making a dash at their works covering the Pont Jumeau on the canal in his front, or hoping that a serious attack on them would, at all events, check the enemy's forward movement by occasioning fears that he might in the meantime force his way into the town, converted the feint prescribed by his instructions into a real attack. The enemy's advanced posts were quickly driven in; but on arriving at the tête-de-pont, the works were found to be of so formidable a description that it was impossible to storm them;

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and the troops being without shelter of any description, and exposed to a most destructive fire, suffered severely, and by a rapid retreat alone escaped annihilation.

Sir Rowland Hill's proceedings on the left bank of the Garonne were attended with better success. The enemy were driven from the first line of works covering the faubourg St. Cyprien; but the old walls that embraced the suburb more nearly, afforded them a second line, which could not be carried by a *coup-de-main*; and by contracting the circle of their line of defence, Comte Reille was enabled to send one of his divisions to the assistance of Marshal Soult, to whom the movement of Beresford's corps to turn his right gave serious cause for alarm.

The French marshal, meanwhile, had allowed a most favourable opportunity to escape him of attacking Beresford's corps during its flank march; though it is possible he imagined that by forcing back the Spaniards, whom he saw preparing to assail his left, and vigorously following up the advantage gained on that side, he should more effectually destroy the British corps thus boldly pushed along his front to turn the right of his position, than by attacking it during its movement, and before it had advanced beyond the reach of support.

Marshal Beresford having therefore overreached the right of the French, wheeled his columns into line, and advanced against their position; the 6th division, under Sir H. Clinton, moving by the Caraman road against the redoubt covering their right; the 4th division, commanded by Sir Lowry Cole, diverging rather to the left, in order to gain the heights of Sypière, beyond the right of the French

intrenchments, and so threaten the rear of their position.

The face of the hill fronting the 6th division was extremely steep and rugged, and the troops during their difficult advance were exposed to a most destructive fire of artillery; nevertheless, they pressed onward in admirable order, and repulsing a charge of cavalry made on their left flank, reached the crest of the ridge; and after a short, but desperate struggle, carried the principal redoubt at the point of the bayonet.

The 4th division had a less difficult, though a by-no-means easy task to perform, and accomplished it in good style, driving the enemy from the ridge on the right of their position beyond their intrenchments, and establishing itself in line with, but some little distance from, the 6th division, extending obliquely across the enemy's ground. A force of 9000 men was thus firmly lodged on the enemy's right flank, having carried the redoubt which was the key of their line of defence.

A pause now occurred in the battle. The consequences of the failure of the attack of the Spaniards was not yet known on the left; and Marshal Beresford found it necessary to order up his artillery left behind in the village of Montblanc. The Spaniards meanwhile were rallied in a new position; and Freyre made dispositions to renew the attack. Soult, on his part, availed himself of this respite to bring up the reinforcements sent from the faubourg St. Cyprien, and directing all his reserves to the right, prepared to become the assailant.

About one o'clock (the artillery of Beresford's corps having been brought up) the battle was resumed; the movement to take the enemy's line in

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reverse being continued by the advance of the 6th and 4th divisions against the redoubts covering the enemy's centre.

This movement being made from the right, placed the two divisions *en echelon*, and occasioned a considerable opening between them. Soult, with much presence of mind, took advantage of this to direct a formidable attack upon the front and left flank of the leading division (6th), hoping to be able to crush it, before that in rear could arrive to its support. General Taupin was accordingly ordered to lead his division, *au pas de charge*, against the front of the nearest division; whilst General Soult's cavalry and an infantry brigade of General d'Armagnac's division attacked it in flank.

Belmas, vol. i. 284.

Taupin's leading brigade advanced intrepidly to the combat, but, as usual, formed *en colonnes serrées;* and being received by a most galling fire, could neither move forward nor deploy, and became perfectly unmanageable. A bayonet charge decided its fate. It turned and fled, carrying disorder into the 2d brigade of the division advancing in support. This in its turn communicated the panic to the reserve, and the whole went off in inextricable confusion. Taupin was killed; and the victors, pushing on rapidly, entered the two redoubts of the French centre, the defenders of which, catching the alarm, fled like the rest. The principal part of Taupin's division rallied only on reaching the works thrown up in advance of the faubourg St. Etienne.

A desperate attempt was made from thence to recover these redoubts; but all the enemy's efforts, though persevered in with the greatest bravery, were defeated by the cool courage of their adversaries.

Soult then endeavoured to re-establish the battle, by taking up a new and more contracted line between the redoubts of La Pujade and the works covering the Pont des Demoiselles; and from his right he again pushed forward a column to attempt to recover the redoubt in the centre of the Calvinet position. It was repulsed, however, with great loss; and the 6th division, now continuing its movement along the ridge to take in flank the works of La Pujade,—in the attack of which Freyre was preparing to co-operate by ascending the hill in their front,—they were abandoned without a struggle; and by 5 o'clock the whole of Soult's formidable works on Mount Calvinet were in the hands of his irresistible opponent, and the city they were thrown up to defend lay completely at the mercy of his artillery.

Soult continued to occupy the rising ground in advance of the faubourg St. Etienne until dark; but retired during the night behind the canal.

The loss of the allied army in this long and hard-fought battle was very severe; greater, probably, than that of the French. It amounted to 595 killed, 4046 wounded, and 18 missing; total 4659; of whom 2124 were British, 1928 Spaniards, and 607 Portugueze.

But few prisoners were made, and only one gun was captured; but the formidable works left in the victors' hands were more decisive trophies than any others that could have been won upon a battle field. On the side of the allies, Generals Mendizabel, Espeleta, Brisbane, and Pack were wounded; on that of the enemy, two generals were killed and five wounded.

By the capture of the heights of Calvinet the

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allied army had closed in Toulouse on three sides; the narrow space between the Garonne and canal of Languedoc, south of the city, alone remaining open to the enemy; and the chaussée to Carcassonne, which leaves Toulouse on that side, was the only road that now offered them the means of escape. Lord Wellington immediately despatched the light cavalry to cut off the communication by this road, until arrangements could be made to establish a body of troops there to complete the investment of the city; the great expenditure of ammunition which had occurred in the action rendering it impossible to undertake this operation at once. It was, moreover, an operation that called for the utmost caution, considering the amount of the enemy's army that was to be penned up, and the disadvantages under which the allied army would labour from being divided into three parts by the Garonne and canal of Languedoc. Lines of works were now commenced across all the communications leading from the enemy's lines; the troops were closed up and placed in nearer and more advantageous positions; and the fate of Numantia seemed to hang over the devoted city, Marshal Soult having expressed his determination "to bury himself and army under its ruins."

Beauchamp, vol. ii. 459.

But though such was the language of the French marshal, he entertained a far different intention; for, on the very night of the battle, he wrote to inform Suchet that he "did not think he should be able to remain long at Toulouse, and that it was probable he would have to fight himself a passage out of the city."

The same causes which occasioned Lord Wellington's delay in occupying the Carcassonne road

in force — viz. the necessity for making the divers new arrangements consequent to a great battle, and an issue of supplies of various kinds to enable the troops to undertake further active operations — obliged Soult to remain in Toulouse during the 11th; but when night arrived he issued forth, leaving behind three general officers, and 1600 wounded men, a number of guns, and large magazines containing stores of every description.

By a rapid march the French army reached Villefranche (24 miles) on the morning of the 12th, pursued by, and suffering some loss from the allied cavalry; and continuing its retreat on the following day, reached Castelnaudry. At this place Soult had signified to Suchet his intention to halt, *if he could;* but otherwise to make for Carcassonne, and take up a position on the Aude. He recommended his colleague, therefore, to fall back from Perpignan on Quillan, in order to accelerate the junction of their armies, with a view to re-establish the war on the Upper Garonne, basing it on the Pyrenees; — a movement by which he hoped to deter Lord Wellington from penetrating into the heart of France.

Suchet, however, justly turned this project into ridicule; asking, what communications they themselves could keep up with the interior of France, and where they were to obtain provisions and ammunition in the Pyrenees? Besides, the road by which Soult proposed he should march was "barely practicable for a mule." Suchet, therefore, acquainted Soult that it was his intention to fall back to Narbonne on the 13th, and proceed thence to Beziers; and advised his brother marshal to draw towards him by way of St. Pons, where they might concert measures for their future operations.

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Beauchamp, vol. ii. 468.

Lord Wellington entered Toulouse, amidst the acclamations of its inhabitants, on the morning of the 12th of April. He was absolutely borne in triumph to the *capitol*, greeted with cries of "*Vive notre Libérateur;*" and it will not in this place be inopportune to advert briefly to a claim* for the palm of victory which has been put forth in behalf of Marshal Soult,—a claim so utterly preposterous, that, with a smile of pity, it had been leniently considered as the offspring of the marshal's own wounded vanity, until held up to general derision by the recent grant of a sum of money by the French government "*in aid of the monument to be raised in honour of the battle of the 10th of April*, 1814!!"

The grounds on which the French government (we presume we must say), and divers recent French writers, claim the victory for Marshal Soult are, that Lord Wellington's attacks were not successful on all points of the French position; that Picton was beat back, the Light division was beat back, and that Hill did not carry the faubourg St. Cyprien; in fine, that the allied army fought to obtain possession of Toulouse, but gained only its third line of defence; and was unable to force its way into the city, either the night after the battle, or on the following day, &c. &c.

We cannot but think that, even on the admission of the French writers themselves, the battle must be considered as lost by Soult, since they allow he was driven from *a part* of his first defensive line after a protracted and sanguinary conflict. But, in

* This claim is by no means new. In a Chronological Atlas, published in the United States of America some fifteen years back, the battle of Toulouse is stated to have been won by Marshal Soult.

point of fact, he was driven from *all* his works that Lord Wellington intended should be seriously attacked, as is clearly proved by the orders his lordship issued previous to the battle. So far, then, victory certainly remained with the British general. Now, after the capture of their intrenched position on Mount Calvinet, no further attack was made on the enemy, either the night after the battle, or the subsequent day; and therefore (as has been pithily observed in reference to this subject), "where there has been no battle there can be no victory." In fact, to have proceeded to carry by assault a place yet covered by two lines of works, when the possession of the heights whence the enemy had been driven, enabled the allied army to destroy that city and the army which had taken refuge behind its walls, would have been a most unpardonable waste of human blood.

Quarterly Review, June, 1838.

We may further say, in regard to the extravagant pretensions of these French writers, that we never yet heard of any claim having been preferred by General Mack for a victory at Ulm, because he sought shelter within that walled city and held out there for a week, after having been driven from the position in which he endeavoured to cover it at Elchingen; and if Soult had tarried as long at Toulouse after having been dislodged from Mount Calvinet, even his former brilliant military reputation would not have saved him from enjoying the same *Erostratic* celebrity as the Austrian general; — for he, too, would have been compelled to surrender.

Lord Wellington, loath to destroy so populous a city as Toulouse, deferred adopting a course which would have forced Soult either to attempt

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to cut his way through the allied army, or to remain "to be buried under its ruins," until all other means of accomplishing his purpose had failed. Indeed, it was desirable that Soult's army should be left in quiet possession of Toulouse until the investment of the city was completed. Of this *Le Vieux Renard** was perfectly conscious, and he wisely withdrew whilst yet a door of escape remained open. France ought therefore to be thankful, indeed, to our Great Captain for sparing one of the most interesting of her cities; and a monument may well be raised by that country to *his* honour on the heights of Calvinet, whence, as he looked triumphantly down on the crouching city, that a word from him would have rendered a pile of ruins, he issued his orders to cease the work of destruction. Such is the view posterity will doubtless take of "the monument to be erected in honour of the battle of the 10th of April," and as such we sincerely hope that it may be completed; though we confess we should like to see it erected on a scale which will do more honour to the French nation than the *munificent* grant of 41*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.* from its government, at present promises.

The entrance of the allied army into Toulouse became the signal for the most extravagant display of Royalist feeling, notwithstanding that Lord Wellington, in a letter addressed to the municipal council before entering the city, and afterwards verbally, in an audience given to that body in the hall of the capitol, cautioned the inhabitants against giving expression to sentiments, which, how-

* The *sobriquet* by which Soult was distinguished in the French army.

ever commendable, might expose them to future persecution; since he felt bound to acquaint them, that the allied powers (as he then fully believed) were yet negotiating with Buonaparte at Chatillon, and that a peace with him was therefore by no means improbable.

His lordship's proceedings with regard to the restoration of the exiled royal family of France had, from the moment the Duc d'Angoulême appeared at his head-quarters, been "bound by instructions, and cramped by the total ignorance in which he was of the state of the negotiations at Chatillon;" but the moment had now arrived when (as he had foretold) a declaration of the allied powers in favour of the House of Bourbon, called forth the long-repressed feelings of the *peaceable* inhabitants of the south of France in favour of their ancient race of princes; and Louis XVIII. was proclaimed in almost every town where public opinion was not controlled by the presence of French troops.

Despatches, &c. Apr. 16.

The important news of the capture of Paris, and abdication of Napoleon, reached Toulouse on the afternoon of the day Lord Wellington entered the city. An English officer (Colonel Cooke), despatched from the French capital by Sir Charles Stewart*, was the bearer of this gratifying intelligence, and was accompanied by a French officer, charged by the Provisional Government established at Paris, to communicate the same to Marshals Soult and Suchet, and to call upon them to suspend hostilities. These officers were im-

* The Marquis of Londonderry, at that time H. M. minister at the court of Prussia.

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mediately sent forward to Marshal Soult, with whom they came up at Castelnaudry on the following day. The marshal, however, declined to acknowledge the Provisional Government; but proposed to Lord Wellington a suspension of hostilities, in order to afford him time to gain more authentic information as to the events stated to have occurred at Paris. This proposal was declined by Lord Wellington, who, considering the conduct of Marshal Soult as indicative of a desire to promote a civil war in the country, decided on following up the wreck of the French army; and accordingly the allied troops were moved forward on the 16th and 17th towards Castelnaudry.

Marshal Suchet, however, having unhesitatingly acknowledged the existing government of France, Soult, finding that he was standing out alone, hastened to avoid another collision with Lord Wellington, by sending Comte Gazan to conclude a convention for the cessation of hostilities, which was effected on the 18th.

It was with poignant feelings of regret that, in the course of these negotiations, Lord Wellington received Major-General Colville's report of a sanguinary action which had occurred in front of Bayonne. A sortie having been made from the citadel of that fortress, before daybreak on the morning of the 14th of April, the enemy succeeded in breaking through the allied line of investment, and carrying the village of St. Etienne; but the advanced pickets being promptly supported, the besiegers recovered all their positions, inflicting a severe loss upon their assailants, who had upwards of 900 men placed *hors de combat.* The allied army sustained a loss of 600 officers and

men killed and wounded, and 236 prisoners; and had moreover to deplore the capture of its gallant commander, Lieut.-General Sir John Hope, who, whilst bringing up reinforcements early in the affair, had his horse killed under him, and being unfortunately wounded himself at the same moment, could not be extricated in time to save him from falling into the enemy's hands. The French commandant had little cause to congratulate himself on the result of his sortie, having sustained a greater loss than the besiegers, and been frustrated in his design of destroying their works and magazines.

Notice of the convention entered into between Lord Wellington and Marshal Soult was received by the governor of Bayonne on the 20th. He hesitated to acknowledge the Provisional Government for some days; but on the white flag being displayed from the walls of the fortress, the operations of the siege were immediately suspended. The last blood shed during this unprincipled war of six years' duration, — a war which alone had cost France upwards of half a million of men, — was thus spilt on the spot where Napoleon's infamous project to subvert a kingdom in strict alliance with France had been matured.

Immediately on the termination of hostilities throughout Europe, Lord Castlereagh repaired to Paris, as the representative of Great Britain in the assembly of sovereigns and ministers convened for the purpose of settling European affairs on the dissolution of Buonaparte's colossal power. One of the first acts of that eminent statesman was to recommend the Prince Regent to appoint the Marquis of Wellington his ambassador at the

Lord Londonderry's War in Germany and France, p. 328.

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court of France; and on the 21st of April Sir Charles Stewart arrived at Toulouse, from Paris, to offer that post to his lordship. Ever desirous to serve his country in any situation in which it might be thought he could render himself useful, Lord Wellington accepted the office; and although he could not at once quit his army to assume the duties of the embassy, he set out as early as possible for the French capital, in order to afford Lord Castlereagh the benefit of his able assistance at a moment when political matters of vast importance were under consideration.

Despatches, &c. Apr. 21.

Leaving Toulouse on the night of the 30th of April, Lord Wellington arrived at Paris on the 4th of May; where he was greeted by the allied sovereigns, their generals and ministers, with the consideration due to his pre-eminent talents and distinguished services. He at the same time received intelligence of his elevation to an English dukedom; and, having already been decorated with the grand cross of the principal European orders of knighthood, he now stood at the summit of earthly fame and dignity. The duke's stay at Paris was, however, of short duration, owing to a pressing necessity for his presence at Madrid; where the incapable and ill-advised Ferdinand, unmindful of his engagements, and untaught by experience, had, with reckless perversity, adopted a course destined eventually to convulse unhappy Spain with all the horrors of civil war, anarchy, and revolution.

The release of Ferdinand and the Infantes of Spain had been reluctantly granted by Buonaparte, with the hope of obtaining the liberation of the French garrisons cooped up in the fortresses

of Catalonia. The king, accompanied by the royal family, commenced his journey from Valançey on the 13th March; General Zayas having been despatched to Madrid, some days previously, with a letter to the Regency, expressing the great satisfaction their communications had afforded his Majesty, and signifying his approval of the re-establishment of the Cortes, and of every other measure adopted by them for the good of the realm, — being all in accordance with his own royal intentions.

At Perpignan the king was received by Marshal Suchet, to whom he gave his word that he would expedite as much as possible the return of the French garrisons remaining in Spain. The instructions of the French marshal prescribed that he should take Ferdinand to Barcelona, and obtain securities for the deliverance of those garrisons before he set him free. But these orders were set aside*; the Infante Don Carlos remaining at Perpignan as a hostage. The king, still escorted by Suchet, entered Spain on the 22d, and after a short delay at Figueras proceeded to the Fluvia, where he was delivered over to General Copons, who received him with all due honour. The oath to the constitution, which the government had directed he should be called upon to take, *was not taken;* and a letter and other documents which Copons was charged by the Regency to deliver to his Majesty, he thrust into his pocket.

* Lieut.-General H. Clinton having suspended the execution of Lord Wellington's order for the dislocation of the Anglo-Sicilian army (a course his lordship highly approved), Suchet probably thought, as that army was blockading Barcelona, he might not be allowed to enter that fortress with his prisoners; or if allowed to enter, might not not be permitted to depart from it.

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On reaching Gerona, that same day, he wrote to the Regency, announcing his arrival, and acknowledging the receipt of this letter; saying he should make himself acquainted with its contents, and expressing the comfort it was to him to be in the midst of a nation and an *army*, to whom he was indebted for a fidelity as constant as it was generous.

This hint alarmed the Cortes—or rather the "*liberal*" party, which, by means of the press and mob of Madrid, dictated all the measures of that assembly; and it was now thought advisable to collect troops to support the authority of the Regency, and to enforce the humiliating acts to which they had ordained the king was to submit. But they soon found that, excepting a few of the guerrilla bands, the troops were little disposed to uphold a government which, *constitutionally*, was not a whit less despotic than that of an absolute monarch, and of whose neglectful treatment they had such good grounds to complain.

The government still, however, madly persisted in fancying that the *nation* was with them;—a nation of which every class had been offended, either in its rights, privileges, habits, or prejudices—a nation governed by priests, and that considered the Inquisition a blessing!

Amongst other absurdities into which the Cortes were led by this erroneous estimate of their power, was that of specifying the route by which the king was to reach his capital; directing him to proceed by way of Barcelona, Tortosa, and Valencia. Ferdinand, however, having taken time to ascertain the pulse of the troops by remaining some days at Gerona, and discovering also the real state of

the feelings of the country towards him, and burning with indignation at the treatment of the Regency, regulated his conduct and line of march accordingly, and proceeded to Zaragoza. He was received there with every possible demonstration of attachment, and after remaining some time proceeded to Valencia. The day before entering that city he was met by General Elio, who assured him of the devotion of the army he commanded; and the inhabitants of Valencia greeted him with shouts of "Long live the absolute king!"

Ferdinand remained three weeks at Valencia, to the great vexation of the Regency, to whose solicitations that he would repair to Madrid he paid no attention. The Cortes, nevertheless, continued so besotted as to proceed to regulate the establishment of the king's household.

At Valencia the news of Napoleon's abdication reached Ferdinand, which removed any scruples he might have felt regarding the treaty of Valençay; and his plans being now ripe for execution, on the 4th of May he issued a manifesto, charging the Cortes with having violated the ancient laws and institutions of the country, and adopted revolutionary principles totally subversive of the royal prerogative. He admitted that many abuses had crept into the various departments of the government, which, however, with the assistance of a cortes *legitimately* convened, he purposed correcting, taking measures at the same time to secure the rights of the crown, the liberty of the subject, and the public tranquillity; and concluded by dissolving the existing Cortes, and annulling the constitution they had promulgated.

Had Ferdinand adhered to the promises thus

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voluntarily made, his name, instead of being inscribed on the page of history as his country's curse, would have been handed down as her regenerator; but he set out for Madrid the day after publishing this manifesto, without entertaining the slightest intention of fulfilling any one of the promises it contained, and bent only on wreaking vengeance on those who had been foremost to oppose his resumption of a despotic throne.

The Cortes bowed submissively to this imperious mandate: the *Serviles* with open joy; the *Moderados* with scarcely less satisfaction, relying on the King's promises; and the *Liberales*, because they had discovered, at the eleventh hour, that they possessed no real influence in the country. But neither this timely submission of the Cortes, nor the enthusiastic expression of public feeling manifested in his favour on reaching Madrid, diverted the vindictive Ferdinand from his purpose. The members of the Regency were immediately banished, various deputies of the Cortes were arrested, and yet heavier punishments hung over the heads of others who had rendered themselves obnoxious to the royal displeasure.

It was with the hope of averting the mischief that the perseverance in such a course would be sure to occasion, that the Duke of Wellington now hastened to the Spanish capital.

Quitting Paris on the 10th of May, his Grace reached Toulouse on the 13th, where he was detained four days by business connected with his army. He arrived at Madrid on the 24th, and immediately sought by his commanding influence "to prevail on all parties to be more moderate, and to adopt a constitution more likely to be practicable,

Despatches, &c. May 9.

and contribute to the peace and happiness of the nation."

The Duke continued at Madrid until the 5th of June, seeking by every means in his power to promote the objects which had led him thither: and well would it have been for the Spanish nation, had its rulers listened with greater attention to the voice of the man who, as best knowing the condition and capabilities of the country, and as being at the same time the most disinterested of advisers, so far as related to its internal affairs, was, more than any Spaniard, able to counsel wisely in matters tending to promote its regeneration. Previous to his departure, however, he submitted to Ferdinand a luminous exposition of his opinions upon the foreign policy of Spain, in the form of a memorandum, which clearly pointed out the advantages she would derive from strengthening the ties that already bound her to Great Britain.

Despatches, &c. Madrid, June 1.

The Duke rejoined his army at Bordeaux on the 10th of June; and peace having in the meantime been signed at Paris, he issued instructions for the breaking up of an army, which, owing to his unceasing attention to its organization and discipline, had (so far as the British and Portugueze troops were concerned) become one of the most efficient armies that ever existed. "I always thought I could have gone any where and accomplished any thing with that army," was his Grace's observation at a later period; and there was not a man in that army who did not reciprocate this confidence.

Without employing any of those methods which even the greatest commanders have not disdained to use, in order to secure the good-will of their troops, the Duke of Wellington was eminently popular with

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his army. Perhaps the demeanour of his Grace was more suited to the habits and feelings of British soldiers, than would have been a more familiar carriage — such as Buonaparte often condescended to adopt. His manners, at once dignified and simple, his affability, together with the manliness of his deportment and cool valour, caused him to be honoured and admired by all ranks. Another source of the good feeling manifested towards him by his officers, resulted from the ready attention paid to all their reasonable requests and representations, and the great facility with which the business of the army was transacted at head-quarters; advantages that were on all sides attributed to the excellent arrangements and courtesy of Lord Fitz-Roy Somerset, who so long fulfilled the important duties of military secretary, to the entire satisfaction of the army at large. The service of the Adjutant-general's department under Major-Gen. Sir E. Pakenham, and that of the Quarter-master-general directed by Major-Gen. Sir George Murray, were performed with equal zeal and ability*; and the difficult duty of the Commissariat was also most ably conducted by Sir Robert Kennedy. In a word, the whole machine with which the Duke of Wellington worked so efficaciously, was brought, by the commanding talents of his Grace, to perhaps the utmost degree of perfection of which an army is susceptible.

* An army, like most complex machines, besides such parts as can be at once seen and judged of, contains certain springs and levers, which, though less apparent, exercise, nevertheless, vast influence over its working powers; and thus, whilst in narrating the events of a campaign the services of officers commanding divisions, brigades, and regiments are brought under frequent notice, yet the historian is afforded but few opportunities of recording the less visible though equally meritorious services of the officers of the staff.

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Taking leave of his companions in arms by a general order remarkable for its simplicity, the Duke departed for England by way of Paris; landed at Dover on the 23d of June; and finding that the Prince Regent was at Portsmouth with his illustrious guests the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, hastened thither, and was received with every mark of honour and regard.

On the 28th of June the Duke of Wellington took his seat in the House of Lords; and not having been in England since he was raised to the peerage, his patents of creation as baron, earl, marquis, and duke, had all to be read on that day. On the 1st of July his Grace attended the House of Commons to return thanks verbally for the distinguished honour which had been conferred upon him by that House, in sending a deputation to convey a vote of thanks for his distinguished services, and of congratulation on his return to England. Having made his acknowledgments in a short emphatic speech, his Grace's eminent services in conducting the Peninsular war were summed up by the Speaker in the following eloquent address: —

"My Lord, since last I had the honour of addressing you from this place, a series of eventful years has elapsed; but none without some mark and note of your rising glory. Hansard's Parl. Deb. vol. 28. p. 490.

"The military triumphs which your valour has achieved upon the banks of the Douro and the Tagus, of the Ebro and the Garonne, have called forth the spontaneous shouts of admiring nations. Those triumphs it is needless on this day to recount. Their names have been written by your conquering sword in the annals of Europe, and we shall hand them down with exultation to our children's children.

"It is not, however, the grandeur of your military services which has alone fixed our admiration or commanded our applause,—it has been as well, that generous and lofty spirit which inspired your troops with unbounded confidence, and

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taught them to know that the day of battle was always a day of victory; that moral courage and enduring fortitude, which, in perilous times, when gloom and doubt had bent ordinary minds, stood nevertheless unshaken; and that ascendency of character, which, uniting the energies of jealous and rival nations, enabled you to wield at will the fate and fortunes of mighty empires.

"For the repeated thanks and grants bestowed upon you by this House, in gratitude for your many and eminent services, you have thought fit this day to offer us your acknowledgments; but this nation well knows that it is still largely your debtor: it owes to you the proud satisfaction, that amidst the constellation of great and illustrious warriors who have recently visited our country, we could present to them a leader of our own, to whom all, by common acclamation, conceded the pre-eminence; and when the will of Heaven, and the common destinies of our nature, shall have swept away the present generation, you will have left your great name and example as an imperishable monument, exciting others to like deeds of glory, and serving at once to adorn, defend, and perpetuate the existence of this country among the ruling nations of the earth.

"It now remains only to congratulate your Grace upon the high and important mission on which you are about to proceed; and we doubt not that the same splendid talents, so conspicuous in war, will maintain with equal authority, firmness, and temper, our national honour and interests in peace."

CHAPTER XXXVII.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON PROCEEDS TO BELGIUM, AND THENCE TO HIS EMBASSY AT PARIS. — REMARKS ON THE STATE OF FRANCE. — HIS GRACE JOINS THE CONGRESS AT VIENNA. — BUONAPARTE QUITS ELBA, AND LANDS IN FRANCE. — DETERMINATION OF THE ALLIES TO SUPPORT LOUIS XVIII. — ARMIES TO BE ASSEMBLED FOR THAT PURPOSE. — DECLARATION OF THE CONGRESS. — NAPOLEON PREPARES FOR WAR. — PRECAUTIONS TAKEN AGAINST HIM IN BELGIUM. — THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON PROCEEDS THITHER. — HIS MEASURES. — STATE OF HIS ARMY. — SITUATION OF THE ARMIES OF THE COALITION IN MAY. — PLAN OF OPERATIONS PROPOSED BY THE DUKE. — MURAT ATTACKS THE AUSTRIANS IN ITALY, AND IS DRIVEN FROM HIS THRONE. — STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF THE PRUSSIAN, ANGLO-ALLIED, AND FRENCH ARMIES, EARLY IN JUNE. — HOSTILITIES COMMENCE. — PLAN OF NAPOLEON. — BATTLES OF QUATRE BRAS AND LIGNY. — OBSERVATIONS.

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FIVE years previously the Duke had left England almost trembling for her own safety: now, she saw herself infinitely more powerful than ever she had been, after a long and fearful struggle so gloriously maintained; wherein British valour shone conspicuously, indicating to Europe the only means of delivering itself from the thraldom under which it had so long groaned. His Grace, being anxious to assume the duties of his embassy, would only permit himself to remain for a few weeks in England; and leaving London on the 8th of August, he repaired, in the first instance, to the Netherlands, where a British force under Lord Lynedoch was then stationed, for the purpose of inspecting the frontier of Belgium on the side of France, and judging of its means of defence; upon which subject government was desirous to have his opinion. After making a rapid survey of this frontier, in the course of which some of its ruined fortresses were examined with a view to their restoration, the Duke

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proceeded to Paris, where he arrived on the 22d of August. He shortly afterwards furnished the British ministry with a "Memorandum on the defence of the frontier of Belgium;" and it is worthy of notice, that the position on which, in the following year, he gained his greatest victory, is therein pointed out as affording "military advantages."

It was to be supposed that France — a decidedly military nation — which twenty years before had so rapidly passed from its revolutionary delirium into an intoxication of warlike renown, should repine at a condition of peace and of Bourbon dominion, especially when so distasteful a change had been brought about by the instrumentality of foreign bayonets. Still the drain occasioned by the conscription had been so severely felt by every family in the kingdom, that the people generally seemed now disposed to submit quietly to the new order of things. But the discontent of the army, and of many thousand individuals who had held public employments in different parts of Europe and were reduced to a state of starvation, was not to be removed. Aware of the dissatisfaction existing amongst the troops, and dreading evil consequences from Buonaparte's dangerous proximity at Elba, some "adherents of the French government," at this time, felt an earnest desire that the ex-emperor should be transferred to a greater distance from the disaffected. And truly the selection of that island — almost within sight of the shores of France — for the residence of Napoleon as a sovereign prince, was an extraordinary instance of want of foresight on the part of the allies.*

Despatches, &c. Paris, Aug. 28.

* The offer of the island of Elba to Napoleon was the sole act of the Emperor of Russia. — (See *Lord Londonderry's War in Germany and France*, p. 311, 312.)

It is not our purpose to dwell on the diplomatic services rendered by the Duke of Wellington at this period; we may, however, observe, that the despatches written in the course of his mission at the French capital show how actively he entered upon and followed up the important question of the slave-trade emancipation, for the suppression of which the voice of England had of late been loudly raised: they also bear evidence of his extraordinary diligence and great acuteness in public affairs, and of his constant attention to the rights and interests of his countrymen; while all the measures he pursued were characterized by that good sense, moderation, and knowledge of human nature, which had been of such vast service to him when at the head of armies. And further, they afford much insight into the political state of France, at a time when Louis was seated on a volcano, perfectly unconscious of the eruption which was about to destroy his throne and shake Europe from the northern ocean to the Pillars of Hercules.

Meanwhile a congress of sovereigns and ministers of the leading powers had been sitting at Vienna; and Lord Castlereagh being obliged to attend the opening of parliament, his place in the congress was to be supplied by the Duke of Wellington, who reached the Austrian capital in the beginning of February. Little more than a month, however, elapsed from the time of his joining that august assemblage, ere its proceedings were interrupted by the astounding intelligence that Buonaparte had quitted Elba, with all his civil and military officers, and about 1200 troops, on the 26th of February, and was gone no one knew

Despatch from Lord Burghersh, March 1.

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whither. By subsequent information received from Genoa, it appeared that Napoleon having landed at Cannes in France on the 1st of March, immediately attempted to gain possession of Antibes; but failing in this object, had moved towards Grasse.

The political affairs of the congress, in which there had been some symptoms of dissonance, at once gave place to the contemplation of such military measures as were likely soon to become necessary against the common enemy. All was now harmony; and it was unanimously agreed upon to support the King of France with the combined forces of the great powers of Europe, which remained still on a war establishment; the intention being —provided Buonaparte should succeed in making head against Louis — to assemble three large armies; namely, one, consisting of 150,000 Austrians, in Italy, where Murat, King of Naples, had assumed a menacing attitude; a second on the Upper Rhine, to be composed of Austrian, Bavarian, and other German troops, to the amount of 200,000 men; the third, on the the Lower Rhine, to be formed of Kleist's Prussian corps (then cantoned between the Rhine and Meuse), the British and Hanoverians in Flanders, and some other troops collected on the Moselle. A grand reserve of 200,000 Russians was, at the same time, to be directed upon Wurtzburg.

In a despatch to Lord Castlereagh, after mentioning the intended composition of the army to be formed on the Lower Rhine, the Duke says, "Of this corps they wish me to take the command." He then observes, —

"The Emperor of Russia seems reconciled to

the notion of the old system of managing the great concern in a council, consisting of himself, the King of Prussia, and Schwartzenberg. He expressed a wish that I should be with him, but not a very strong one; and as I should have neither character nor occupation in such a situation, I should prefer to carry a musket."

Despatches, &c. Vienna, March 12.

While such a proposal manifests the high opinion entertained of the Duke by Alexander, the reader must smile at the emperor's proposal of having Wellington as an attaché to his staff!

The exposed situation of the new kingdom of the Netherlands, in whose preservation Great Britain was most immediately interested, caused the Duke of Wellington some anxiety; he therefore strongly urged upon his own government the necessity of pouring a large body of British troops into that country with all possible expedition; while he was at the same time enabled to exercise a salutary influence over the measures of the other parties in the coalition, owing to their inability to put their several armies in motion without that powerful lever, — English gold.

Meanwhile Napoleon prosecuted his march towards Grenoble under feelings of much doubt and anxiety; for there was no flocking to his standard, nor any display of enthusiasm among the people of the districts through which his march lay; but as he approached that place the aspect of affairs became wholly changed by the unanimous defection of Labédoyère's regiment from the royal cause. Marshal Ney, who had volunteered his services, promising Louis to "seize the intruder and carry him in a cage to Paris," no sooner came

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near his old master than he declared in his favour. Thenceforth "*l'aigle impérial vola de clocher en clocher jusqu'aux tours de Notre-Dame;*" and on the 20th of March Napoleon entered Paris in triumph at the moment that Louis quitted the city on its opposite side, and fled to Lille.

The emperor's exultation at the surprising success which had thus crowned his daring enterprise was, however, speedily moderated by the arrival in Paris of the declaration of the Congress of Vienna; in which document it was set forth, that Napoleon Buonaparte having broken the convention by which he had been placed at the island of Elba, had thereby annulled his only legal title to a political existence, and had consequently placed himself without the pale of civil and social relations; and, as the enemy and disturber of the world, had exposed himself to public vengeance. The several powers declared, therefore, that they were resolved to maintain entire the treaty of Paris of the 30th May, 1814; and that they would employ all their means, and combine all their efforts, that the general peace, the object of the wishes of Europe and the constant purpose of their labours, might not be again disturbed.

Undismayed by this expression of European feeling and determination (which he endeavoured to conceal from the French nation, by not permitting any mention to be made in the public prints of the acts of the congress), the great outlaw resolutely began to organize his army; and by unwearied diligence, seconded by the zealous exertions of most of his old generals and officers, who hoped every thing from the genius of their emperor, he speedily saw such a formidable force gathering

around his eagles* as would, he trusted, enable him to march and strike a blow against his nearest enemies, ere their assembled forces should be too powerful for his attacks. And with the purpose of conciliating the French nation, which evidently trembled at the prospect of again seeing France overrun by foreign armies, he convoked a legislative body, composed of men of all parties, and gave the country a constitution, which was to be declared and sworn to at a grand and solemn assembly of the people in the Champ de Mars, when a magnificent spectacle would be exhibited to the Parisians under the title of the *Champ de Mai.*

This charlatanical but imposing ceremony took place on the 31st May, when Napoleon promised to have half a million of men under arms in a few weeks, exclusive of the national guards; at the same time pledging himself, that if the allies should bring 600,000 men against him, he would oppose them with two millions.

At this momentous period an Anglo-Hanoverian army, of 28,000 men, was stationed in the Low Countries. About 15,000 of these were British, or of the German Legion; the remainder consisted of raw Hanoverian troops. Prepared to act with the above there was a Dutch force 20,000 strong, together with some regiments of Belgians, on whom little reliance could be placed when opposed to the French. "This army," writes Sir Henry Hardinge, "is not unlike Lord Rancliff's description of the French pack of hounds, — pointers, poodles, turn-

Letter to Lord Stewart, Mar. 27.

* An immense number of veteran French soldiers had recently returned to France from the several prisons of Europe.

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spits, all mixed up together, and running in sad confusion." There were, however, some staunch bull-dogs in the pack, of whom Sir Henry omitted to make mention.*

Buonaparte long deluded himself with the hope that his protestations of desiring nothing but to maintain France at peace, would serve to mollify the allied powers, and induce them to treat with him. Clinging to this idea, he does not seem to have seriously thought of marching into Belgium before the troops in that country could be reinforced. However, in all probability, but for the presence there of a British force, he would have despatched an army at once to Brussels, and annexed Belgium to his empire, if he did not even succeed in forcing Count Kleist, whose army contained a body of discontented Saxons, to pass the Rhine.

Every requisite measure of precaution had been in the mean time taken to protect the Belgic frontier. Mons, Tournay, and Ypres were by great exertions speedily put in a condition to resist a coup-de-main; the army (then commanded by the hereditary Prince of Orange, who held the rank of general in the British service) was concentrated near Ath and Nivelles; and the Quarter-master-general†, an officer distinguished for zeal and ability, as well as ex-

* In the same letter Sir Henry observes, "The Prince of Orange is very attentive and popular: his plans are, however, uncertain. The Dutch have the greatest confidence in his military talents; and his Royal Highness is said not to be pleased with the idea of the Duke's being likely to supersede him in the command. Sir Hudson Lowe and Barnes are very anxious for the Duke's arrival. Colborne* seems somewhat sick of his situation, and dreads any crisis of affairs under the present state of things."

† Lieut.-General Sir Hudson Lowe, K.C.B.

* Lieut.-General Lord Seaton was then military secretary to the Prince.

perience, and the firmest advocate for making a stand in front of Brussels, repaired to Aix-la-Chapelle to concert a plan of operations with Count Kleist, by which he consented to advance and support the Anglo-allied army, should Belgium—which had been already pronounced by the Prussian general, Gneisenau, "a formidable bastion flanking efficaciously any invasion meditated by France against Germany, and serving at the same time as a tête-de-pont to England"—be assailed. 1815.

General Gnisenau to Sir H. Lowe, Nov. 23. 1814.

Meanwhile the allied powers were not slow to follow up their celebrated declaration, by taking active steps for the speedy efficiency of their respective armies. The Duke of Wellington arrived at Brussels from Vienna on the 4th April, and assumed the command of the troops in Belgium. His Grace entirely approved of the views adopted prior to his arrival, and expressed a fixed determination to hold his ground on the frontier if possible; being sensible that any retrograde movement by the allied force would greatly conduce to the advantage of Buonaparte, as such a step would drive Louis XVIII. from Ghent, where with his family and military household he had taken refuge, and give the French possession of the resources of a country in which they had many friends;—there were, besides, other considerations, which will be found noticed further on.

The Duke of Wellington, with his characteristic frankness, immediately acquainted Count Kleist with the precise amount of his force; and gave as his opinion that, under the circumstances of the moment, the most desirable step for that general to take was for him to cross the Meuse, and canton his army between Charleroi and Huy, in which situation he would be in close communication with the allied

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army posted at Ath, Nivelles, and Braine-le-Comte. By such a disposition of the Prussian and his own forces, his Grace hoped effectually to cover Brussels in the event of being pressed, instead of falling back on Tirlemont and St. Tron, as had been suggested by Kleist.

It may be remarked that, in conformity with his invariable practice, the Duke strove to establish with his Prussian coadjutor* those reciprocal feelings of cordiality, without which it is impossible for independent commanders to co-operate beneficially: indeed his frankness, straightforward conduct, and urbanity rarely failed to obtain for him the good will of all with whom public affairs brought him in contact; thereby opening the way for an exercise of his commanding talents, which was never more advantageously felt than at the period now under consideration, when the whole of Europe in arms stood in need of a directing head. Hence we find the noble Duke at one moment furnishing a memorandum for the operations of the armies intended to take the field; at another, imbuing Prince Schwartzenberg, the generalissimo of the Austrian forces, with just principles for the simultaneous action of three great armies. Then again it was necessary to stir up the British government, by forcibly urging the employment in the Netherlands of the "whole strength of the empire." In short, it is plainly to be seen from the correspondence of his Grace that he was the soul of the grand coalition.†

Despatches, &c. Apr. 12.

Ibid. May 9.

* The plan of placing the Prussian army of Kleist under the command of the Duke of Wellington had been altered: it was now intended that a large Prussian army, under Prince Blücher, should co-operate with the *Anglo-allied* force commanded by his Grace.

† "Les idées de Milord Wellington sont entièrement les miennes; et je crois pouvoir répondre que le Prince de Schwartzenberg les par-

Much tact was, however, requisite; for while seeking to keep the allied powers to their engagement with respect to furnishing troops, the Duke of Wellington had to resist their exorbitant demands for subsidies, without at the same time fixing these so low as should impair the efficiency of their armies, and thereby endanger the cause in which they were embarked. But, with his usual ability, he managed to overcome all difficulties, and had the satisfaction to see that every thing concurred to insure the speedy overthrow of the great disturber of European tranquillity.

With regard to the army under his immediate command, the Duke had little reason to be satisfied. The British portion of it was composed chiefly of weak second battalions; which, with a body of the Guards, and two regiments of German hussars, had been hastily thrown into Holland at the close of the year 1813 under Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Graham*, for the purpose of rallying the Dutch. This corps had, soon after the cessation of hostilities, been reinforced by about 5000 men of the gallant German Legion; and the troops thus collected, united with a small Hanoverian force, had since protected Belgium.

Two days after his arrival at Brussels we find the Duke of Wellington writing thus to Earl Bathurst: —

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tagera également. Il propose un grand mouvement concentrique; et il veut que pour que ce mouvement ne soit pas risquant, on attende que l'ensemble des forces soit à la disposition des généraux. Voila également ce que nous voulons. Il veut que les armées se placent à telle hauteur qu'elles puissent se prêter la main en cas de revers. Il ne propose, en un mot, rien d'eccentrique; et je l'aime autant en fait de questions militaires, qu'en toutes autres."— (*Letter from Prince Metternich to Lord Stewart, May* 17.)

* General Lord Lynedoch, G.C.B.

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"If you could let me have 40,000 good British infantry* besides those you insist upon having in garrison, the proportion settled by treaty that you are to furnish of cavalry—that is to say, the eighth of 150,000 men—including in both the old German Legion, and 150 pieces of British field artillery fully horsed, I should be satisfied, and take my chance for the rest, and engage that we would play our part in the game. But, as it is, we are in a bad way."

Despatches, &c. Brussels, Apr. 6.

The Duke was very desirous to have with him some of the old "Spanish infantry;" but many of the best regiments having been sent to America at the termination of operations in the south of France, had not yet returned to Europe, although several of them were shortly expected. As one of the four great contracting powers, England was bound to furnish 150,000 men, or to defray the expense of any number she might be short of that amount in the field; and the Duke of Wellington, conscious that his wished-for strength in British troops could not be with him in time for the commencement of hostilities, would willingly have been joined by a proportion of Portugueze in English pay; but the government of Portugal refused to sanction the measure as proposed in a letter from his Grace to the Prince Regent of that country.

Despatches, &c. Apr. 16.

Ibid. Apr. 12

The Duke was anxious that the allies should act early, and with vigour, in order to afford Buonaparte as little time as possible to collect and organize an army; it being his opinion, that by throwing into France such a force as would suffice either to defeat the French army — which alone was the foundation upon which his power rested—or to keep it in check, opportunities would be afforded for those parties

* This seems to have been a favourite number with his Grace. The day before the battle of Salamanca, upon some question relative to the strength of a particular position, he declared that, in his opinion, 40,000 British troops formed a good position any where.

to act who were inimical to the resumption of power by the usurper. His Grace argued that the allies having no views of conquest, there was no territory which required in particular to be covered during the course of their operations: their object was to defeat the army and destroy the power of one individual; and the only military points to be considered were, — to enter France at the earliest possible period, and with the largest force that could be assembled; to provide for its being supported by other armies; and to secure a retreat upon them in case of a misfortune. It was his wish, therefore, that 200,000 men — composing the Austrian, Prussian, and Anglo-allied armies — should commence operations between the Meuse and Oise upon Paris, and be supported by 300,000 more as speedily as possible. Having transmitted his views of the advantages likely to be obtained from an early commencement of hostilities, — naming the 1st of May for opening the campaign, — together with a plan of operations for the several armies of the coalition, to the Earl of Clancarty, the English minister at Vienna, in two despatches dated the 10th and 12th of April, the measures proposed by his Grace were discussed and approved of by the great council there assembled on the 19th of the same month.

Before the end of April, however, it became evident that Napoleon would be able to have a much larger army in the field than his opponents had calculated upon; and the Duke of Wellington saw the necessity of delaying offensive operations on the part of the allies until, by the approach of the Russian forces, the Prussian army — of which Prince Blücher had recently taken command — and his own, might cross the French frontier as the

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vanguard of an overwhelming torrent, such as Buonaparte could have no hope of resisting. * In this view the two allied commanders disposed their forces so as to cover their respective communications, assuming for the present a strictly defensive attitude.

It was important on several accounts, both political and military, that Brussels should be covered; but to the British general it was of the utmost consequence to preserve an uninterrupted communication with Ostend, where all his reinforcements and supplies from England were landed; since, if once established in the heart of Belgium, the enemy would not only cut off his intercourse with that port, but, by erecting batteries on the left bank of the Scheld, might also interdict the navigation of that river, and compel British vessels to have recourse to Williamstadt or some more northern Dutch port; thereby occasioning great loss of time, when the speedy arrival of succours from England was of vital importance to the success of the cause. The Prussian commander did not feel equally anxious respecting the defence of Belgium, nor was he indeed altogether easy in his cantonments on the Meuse and Sambre; nevertheless he deferred to the desire of his great colleague.

The chief part of the French army at this time posted on the frontier was cantoned between Lille and Avesnes, and therefore immediately in front of the Anglo-allied force. The three armies now

* The principal Austrian army, under General Baron Frimont, stated at 140,000 men, was directed against Murat, King of Naples, who had declared in favour of Buonaparte. A second force, however, commanded by Prince Schwartzenberg, intended to be 80,000 strong, was assembling on the Neckar, with which the Bavarian army was to be united.

preparing for the invasion of France stood in echellon; that of the Duke of Wellington, forming the right, being the most advanced, and the Austro-Bavarian, on the Upper Rhine, the most retired. As the greatest force of the French and the chief military difficulties were opposed to the right of this echellon, the Duke considered that neither Blücher nor himself could stir until relieved of a part of the enemy's army in their front by a forward movement from the left. His Grace drew up a magnificent plan for the projected invasion, suited to the alteration of circumstances since his former one was despatched to Lord Clancarty on the 12th of April, which he forwarded to Lord Stewart, who was on a mission at Vienna. After laying down with admirable clearness and precision a vast scheme for the operations of the several armies, he proposes to commence hostilities when they should be able to do so with 450,000 men; namely, 150,000 on the right under Blücher and himself; the same number on the left; and as many, if possible, for the centre, and in reserve. His views were based upon a calculation that before the Austrians on the left, who were first to move, could reach Langres, the Russians would have passed the Rhine, and the entire Prussian army would be in line. The Duke thus terminates his observations upon the momentous subject he had been considering: —

"God knows whether this can be acted upon, or whether the allies will allow their forces to be divided as I suppose; and particularly whether the Prussians will act in two corps, one under Blücher here, and another from Luxembourg with the centre; or whether the other allies will like to commence till the whole Russian army is *en mesure*. But I am convinced that what I have proposed is so clearly the plan of operations, that I do not doubt it will be adopted with but little variation." Despatches, &c. Brussels, May 8.

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It would be deviating from the plan of our work to furnish more than an outline of the operations at this period in Italy; but as Murat was driven from his kingdom, and a large Austrian army became thereby free to act against France, we conceive it requisite to mention, that the King of Naples — who, notwithstanding his declaration against Buonaparte, had in 1814 given the allied powers reason to distrust his sincerity — having cause to suspect that the Vienna congress, influenced by the Bourbons, would not recognize him as a sovereign, had strengthened his army, and opened a correspondence with Napoleon at Elba. On receiving intelligence of the usurper's landing at Cannes, he marched towards the north of Italy at the head of a considerable force, and sought in the name of Liberty to rouse the Italians against the yoke of Austria, hoping to create a powerful diversion in favour of Buonaparte. He traversed the Pontifical states; invaded Tuscany; and one of his generals having driven an Austrian corps from a position it had taken up to cover Modena, nearly the whole of Italy south of the Po was in his power; while the Milanese and Piedmontese, seduced by a manifesto calling upon all Italians to assert their right to freedom, were almost in open insurrection.

April 4.

Despatches, &c. Brussels, Apr. 5.

"If we do not destroy Murat, and that immediately, he will save Buonaparte." So writes the Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh. The King of Naples was, however, unequal to the task he had undertaken; instead of following up his first success by a bold march upon Milan, where from 30,000 to 40,000 Italians who had served in the French armies were prepared to join his standard, he moved upon Ferrara, hoping to be able to cross the Po,

and establish himself on the communications of the Austrian army. This false movement gave the Austrians time to secure the line of that river; and being speedily reinforced, Murat was attacked and compelled to retire hastily towards his own states by the route of Faenza and Cesena, closely pursued by the main body of the Austrian army under Baron Frimont; while a corps was detached under General Bianchi by the great road of Florence, which succeeded in intercepting his retreat near Tolentino and in defeating his army. Murat re- May 3. gained his capital as a fugitive on the 19th May, and on the following day fled to seek refuge in France. Thus was Napoleon's only ally destroyed. The Austro-Italian army forthwith retraced its steps towards the north, and assembled in Lombardy, ready to penetrate into the south of France.

In the mean time, the ability and energy with which Napoleon put down the Royalists in the south and in La Vendée, arranged his government, organized his army, and took measures for the defence of France, call for our unbounded admiration; never, indeed, did the gigantic powers of that extraordinary man create more astonishment than during this period. He found the military force of the state reduced to a very low condition, the magazines deficient, the arsenals empty; but by the end of May, every branch of the service had been re-established, and a fine army was reproduced, equipped, and ready to take the field. Paris and Lyons being considered as the grand central points of resistance, immense depôts of ammunition and stores were collected in these cities. The heights of Montmartre, which overlook the capital, were fortified; and an extensive system of intrenchments

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embraced St. Denis and the ground between that town and the Seine, to cover Paris from the north and east. Works were likewise projected for the other sides of the city, but time was not allowed for their formation. The approaches to Lyons were also carefully fortified.

In the beginning of June the French army, divided into seven corps, was distributed as follows: — The 1st (D'Erlon) was at Lille; the 2d (Reille) at Valenciennes; the 3d (Vandamme) at Mezieres; the 4th (Gérard) at Metz; the 6th (Comte Lobau) at Laon. These five corps, with the Imperial guards, which were at Paris, and the reserve cavalry, under Generals Pajol, Excelmans, Milhaut, and Kellermann, which was cantoned between the Aisne, the Meuse, and the Sambre, constituted the "army of Flanders." The 5th corps, under Rapp, was in Alsace; and the 7th, commanded by Suchet, at Chambery. Besides the above corps d'armée, smaller bodies were employed as corps of observation; one of which was in the Var; another at Béfort, watching Basle and Huningue, and to protect the Jura; a third was at Bordeaux; a fourth at Toulouse; and a fifth in La Vendée.

By the 12th of June the Duke of Wellington had collected an army of 75,000 men, independent of troops in garrison. It consisted of British 30,000; German Legion 6000; Hanoverians 13,000; Brunswick troops 7000; Belgic, Dutch, and Nassau 19,000. Of these the British and German Legion *

* It may be requisite to mention, for the information of the general reader, that the German Legion, which so greatly distinguished itself in British warfare, consisted of Hanoverian troops that were taken into English pay in 1803. They were excellent soldiers, and as such possessed the confidence and esteem of the British army. They became eventually the guards of Hanover.

were the only troops in whom implicit confidence could be placed. The Hanoverians and Brunswickers were fresh levies, — brave, and animated by the best spirit, but wanting experience in war. Many in the ranks of the Dutch and Belgic regiments had served in the French army, and it was only natural that some distrust should be felt of troops who were about to be opposed to their old companions in arms. The Anglo-allied army was divided into two corps of five divisions each. The first was commanded by the hereditary Prince of Orange as a British general, and the second by Lord Hill. The Earl of Uxbridge * commanded the cavalry, the head-quarters of which were at Ninove. Those of the 1st corps were at Braine-le-Comte, and of the 2d at Grammont.

The cantonments of the Duke of Wellington's army had been judiciously chosen, with the two-fold object of covering Brussels and protecting western Flanders. Their front extended from Nivelles by Soignies and Ath to Oudenarde; Ghent, which still contained the court and military suite of Louis XVIII., was occupied; and a reserve remained in and near Brussels. Respecting this distribution of his army, the Duke thus wrote to the Prince of Orange in May: —

"In the situation in which we are placed at present, neither at war nor at peace, unable on that account to patrol up to the enemy and ascertain his position by view, or to act offensively upon any part of his line, it is difficult, if not impossible, to combine an operation; because there are no data on which to found any combination. All we can

Despatches, &c. Brussels, May 11.

* General the Marquis of Anglesey, G.C.B.

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do is to put our troops in such a situation as, in case of a sudden attack, to render it easy to assemble, and to provide against the chance of any being cut off from the rest."

Marshal Blücher's army at the commencement of hostilities was cantoned as follows:—The 1st corps, under General Ziethen, forming its right, occupied Fontaine l'Evesque, Fleurus, and Charleroi, and was in communication with the Anglo-allied army. The 2d corps, commanded by General Pirch, was at Namur (head-quarters). General Thielmann's corps, the 3d, was on the Meuse, near Dinant, having Ciney for its point of concentration. The 5th corps, under General Bülow, was at Hannut, far in the rear.

Having resolved to attack the allies, Napoleon directed the movements of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 6th corps, and the cavalry, so as for the whole to reach the vicinity of Beaumont on the 14th of June. The Imperial guards left the capital on the 8th, and proceeding by forced marches, gained the frontier, and took their place in the general concentration of the "army of Flanders," near the Sambre. Napoleon himself quitted Paris on the 12th, purposing to open the campaign by entering Belgium at Charleroi, where the advanced posts of the Prussian and Anglo-allied armies joined, hoping to defeat Blücher, whose army was nearest to that point, before he could receive support, and afterwards fall on Wellington.

The strength of the armies about to engage in hostilities may be estimated at, Prussians 110,000, Anglo-allied army 75,000, and French 130,000 men.

By the masterly arrangements of Napoleon his army was assembled, with surprising secrecy, on

the evening of the 14th of June, and bivouacked in three columns between Beaumont and the Sambre. At 3 o'clock on the following morning the whole were put in motion; the left column marching upon Thuin and Marchiennes, the centre on Charlèroi, the right upon Châtelet. The advanced posts of the allied armies entertained no suspicion whatever of the French movements, until those of the Prussians were attacked on the morning of the 15th and driven across the Sambre, when the bridges at the above-named places were seized by the enemy. Buonaparte entered Charleroi with his guards at 11 o'clock, having been preceded by a body of light cavalry; but although the distance which each column had to march was inconsiderable, it was late in the day ere all the French had passed the Sambre; delays having been caused by the nature of the cross roads. In the afternoon Marshal Ney arrived at head-quarters, and was directed by Napoleon to take command of the left column, consisting of about 45,000 men, and advance to Quatre Bras *, in order to sever the communication between Blücher and Wellington.

General Ziethen endeavoured by checking the advance of the enemy to allow time for Marshal Blücher to assemble his army; but too weak to oppose any effectual resistance to the enemy, he was compelled to fall back on Fleurus, having suffered some loss from the attacks of the French cavalry. Ney's corps, meanwhile, moved forward on the Brussels causeway; and about 5 o'clock his advanced guard encountered a brigade of the

* A point on the road to Brussels, where two chaussées intersect.

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Netherlands' army posted at Frasnes under Prince Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, whose troops fell back upon Quatre Bras. The main body of Ney's troops halted for the night at Gosselies, having its advanced guard at Frasnes. The centre column of the enemy's army was the same night near Fleurus; the right in front of Châtelet; the Imperial guards were between Fleurus and Charleroi; and the 6th corps lay in front of the latter place.

It was 6 o'clock in the evening of the 15th ere the Duke of Wellington received notice at Brussels that the Prussian outposts on the Sambre had been attacked by the enemy in force; he instantly despatched orders for his generals to hold their troops prepared to move when the enemy's object should be clearly developed. Receiving no report of any movement in front of his own advanced posts, he became convinced that Charleroi was the real point of attack; and therefore, by subsequent orders, issued the same evening, his whole force, excepting a body of troops left to cover Hal, was directed on Quatre Bras.

Before noon on the 16th Marshal Blücher had assembled the 1st, 2d, and 3d corps of his army; amounting to about 85,000 men, in position at Ligny; determined to make a stand there, although deprived of his 4th corps, which could not be up till the following morning.

The Duke of Wellington left Brussels very early on the 16th; and after looking at the ground about Waterloo, proceeded to his advanced posts. He found the Prince of Orange in possession of Quatre Bras, thereby keeping open the road leading thence to the Prussian position at Ligny.

All being quiet in front, the Duke spurred on, to hold a conference with his illustrious colleague, whom he met about half-past one o'clock, at the windmill of Bry; when it appearing that the whole French army was likely to attack the Prussians, his Grace assured Blücher that he would support him to the utmost of his power. The chiefs then separated, and the Duke hastened back to Quatre Bras, on which point it soon became evident that it was part of the enemy's plan to make a serious attack.

Napoleon's purpose was to fall upon the Prussians with the main body of his army; while Ney, after driving the allied troops from Quatre Bras, should move a portion of his force upon Bry. In this view, an order was sent to that marshal at 2 o'clock on the 16th, which, after announcing that the Prussian army would be attacked at half-past 2, directed him to fall on whatever force might be in his front, and after routing it to detach a body of troops by the Namur chaussée, and envelop the Prussian right wing.

It was, however, half-past 3 before the attack on the Prussians began; previously to which time Ney, having left D'Erlon's corps in reserve behind Frasnes, had moved to attack a division of the Netherlands troops under General Perponcher, which was posted between that village and Quatre Bras. The Netherlanders gave ground at once before the overwhelming numbers displayed against them; and the enemy expected to attain their object — the possession of the important point of Quatre Bras — without a struggle. Perponcher's troops were unsupported, and matters wore a most unpromising aspect; when suddenly the elevated

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ground at Quatre Bras was seen to bristle with bayonets: the 5th division, a Hanoverian brigade, and the Brunswick troops, composing the reserve from Brussels, led by Sir Thomas Picton, and accompanied by Major Rogers' battery of British artillery, with eight guns belonging to the Brunswickers, arrived thus opportunely at the scene of action. These troops, numbering upwards of 12,000, men, were scarcely posted in position, ere the enemy moved forward two divisions of infantry, supported by cavalry and a brisk cannonade, with the intention of penetrating the centre of the allied force; but meeting with a determined resistance, their infantry were compelled to fall back rapidly. Observing this failure, some heavy cavalry, whose motions were unseen by several of the British regiments, owing to the great height of the standing corn (chiefly rye), dashed forward, and were upon our infantry before all the battalions could complete the formation of squares to receive them; and considerable loss thereby ensued.

Shortly after this attack, the allies were reinforced by the 3d division, under Count Alten, which arrived by the Nivelles road, composed of British, German Legion, and Hanoverian troops, with Captain Cleeve's brigade of German artillery; it came up in time to repel a strenuous effort of the enemy to obtain possession of the wood of Bossu, that covered the right of the position, as well as of some houses in front of Quatre Bras. Major Lloyd's battery soon after joined the 3d. division. The action now became very furious; and the allied troops — particularly the British battalions, from being most forward — were fiercely assailed by the enemy's cuirassiers, who rode at

ng: the 2d battalion overthrown, and lost unfortunate mistake and the 2d battalion the wood of Bossu, the enemy's infantry. Others of their troops having at the same instant pushed forward by the open ground, they seemed on the point of establishing themselves upon the Nivelles chaussée, when about half-past 6 o'clock the division of Guards commanded by General Cooke, accompanied by Major Kuhlmann's and Captain Sandham's brigades of artillery, reached the field by the above-named road. Now was the most critical moment of the battle. General Maitland †, commanding the leading brigade, instantly formed line, and impetuously rushing into the wood, swept it clear of the French in a very short time. Continuing their headlong course, the Guards "broke cover" on the opposite side, where a well-formed line of infantry stood ready to receive them. Without waiting to re-form

Batty's Campaign, p. 50.

* As we do not recollect any other instance of a British colour being captured on the field during the war, we shall explain under what circumstances this battalion was surprised. It formed part of General Halkett's brigade of the 3d, but had been detached to support General Pack's brigade of the 5th division. Perceiving that the cuirassiers were about to charge, Pack ordered the 69th to form square; but the manœuvre was scarcely completed when the Prince of Orange rode up, and directed the battalion to re-form line: before this could be effected, the cuirassiers were amongst its moving divisions, and in a few minutes cut down near 200 men; the rest of the regiment found refuge in the squares of the 42d and 92d Highlanders. The intrepidity shown on this occasion by a volunteer, named Clark, merits notice: this young soldier, although bleeding from many wounds, was seen contending successfully against several of the French troopers after the rout of his battalion. His heroic conduct was rewarded with a commission in the 42d regiment. One of his wounds — of which he had *twenty-three*, as was certified by Dr. James Bartlet, who dressed them — cost him the use of an arm.

† Lieut.-General Sir P. Maitland, K.C.B.

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after issuing from the wood, Maitland's troops unhesitatingly moved forward, when the enemy directly gave ground. Some French cavalry, however, observing that the Guards were unsupported, prepared to charge them while thus in confusion; which being perceived by General Maitland, who also saw that any attempt to form squares would be vain, a retreat to the wood was ordered. This was speedily effected; and the skirts of the cover being immediately lined, a fire was opened on the cavalry, which drove it off with some loss. The Duke of Wellington then sent forward a column of Brunswickers from Quatre Bras, which taking post on the left of the Guards, so formidable a force was collected in front of the wood, that no fears were afterwards entertained for the right of the allied position.

The Duke of Wellington having now 25,000 troops and 38 guns in position, his force equalled that of Ney, which had been diminished by the withdrawal of D'Erlon's corps to support the attack at Ligny; but never had a call been made for greater personal exertion on the part of his Grace than during this hard-fought contest, which darkness at length terminated. Having the support of no cavalry save a regiment of Brunswickers and one of Belgians, who were of little service, the defence of their position by the infantry and a small force of artillery merited the highest encomium. The loss was necessarily severe. The Duke of Brunswick, an hereditary soldier, whose father received his death-wound at Jena, fell while bravely animating his troops, and the gallant Colonel Cameron of the 92d regiment was also killed. The total amount hors de combat exceeded 4000 men;

the principal loss falling, as usual, on the British.

By this effectual repulse of the enemy at Quatre Bras, the communication between Blücher and Wellington by the Namur chaussée was preserved; and Napoleon's scheme for enveloping the right of the Prussian army with a portion of Ney's troops was completely foiled.

During the continuance of this severe action at Quatre Bras, a furious battle raged between the Prussians and French, at Ligny, only seven miles distant. It has already been noticed that, by midday, Blücher's army (exclusive of the 4th corps) was assembled in position. It stood on the heights between Bry and Sombref, occupying in force the villages of St. Amand and Ligny in their front, both lying at the bottom of a considerable ravine, through which runs a shallow rivulet called the Ligne. The latter of these places protected the centre, and the former the right of the position.

By one o'clock the bulk of Napoleon's army was collected in advance of Fleurus, forming a line oblique to that presented by the Prussians — the French right being thrown back. Having examined the ground, Buonaparte ordered a change of front by pivoting on the left, until the right of his army was carried forward so as to place his line nearly parallel to that of Blücher. This movement brought Vandamme's corps opposite St. Amand; Gérard's in front of Ligny; and Grouchy's cavalry, composed of the corps of Pajol and Excelmans, before Sombref. A division under General Girard*, which had been detached from

* The names of Gérard and Girard must not be confounded. General Girard's division belonged to the 2d corps, which was under Ney.

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Reille's corps, formed the left of the whole. The Imperial guards and cuirassiers, composing the reserve, formed a second line, somewhat in front of Fleurus. The 6th corps was not yet up from Charleroi, but orders were despatched to hasten its march towards the reserve. These changes occupied much time, and delayed the battle till after three o'clock.

It commenced with an attack on St. Amand by Vandamme; Girard's division making, at the same time, a flank movement to turn that village. Ligny was shortly afterwards assailed by Gérard, and the guns of both armies kept up a heavy cannonade; from which the Prussians suffered most, being posted on a long slope, up which the enemy's shot bounded *en ricochet*, reaching even to their adversaries' reserves on the heights near Bry. After a sharp conflict, the French succeeded in obtaining possession of St. Amand, and in establishing themselves on the Prussian bank of the rivulet. General Girard then boldly advanced against the troops occupying the slope immediately above the village, and an obstinate engagement ensued. This effort was supported by part of Vandamme's infantry, and by his reserve cavalry. The Prussian right being thereby endangered, Marshal Blücher himself charged the enemy with two brigades, and, after a fierce contest, succeeded in driving them back. The gallant Girard fell dangerously wounded, and his division was nearly annihilated.

Meanwhile a desperate struggle was maintained at the village of Ligny, whose substantial houses and walled farm-yards were well adapted for defence. Most of these were alternately in possession of the French and Prussian troops. Both sides

received reinforcements, and for a long time neither party could boast of any decided advantage. At length, after some hours' fighting, the enemy were enabled to establish themselves firmly on the Prussian side of the stream, which secured a sheltered situation for the formation of their columns, preparatory to assailing the heights of the mill of Bussy, a short distance behind Ligny.

Disappointed in his expectation of receiving assistance from Ney, to envelop the Prussian right, Napoleon saw that the success of the battle must depend on the exertions of the troops under his immediate direction. He now determined, therefore, to bring an overwhelming force to bear on Ligny; and, after carrying that village, to endeavour to break through the centre of the Prussian line. To execute this plan the Imperial guards were moved towards Ligny; and columns of attack being rapidly formed, that place was assailed with redoubled fury. Again the Prussians opposed a vigorous defence, but numbers finally prevailed; and this post, which had been so stoutly maintained, and was now reduced to piles of ruins, remained in possession of the French. During this decisive assault on the village, a division of Gérard's corps, supported by a massive column of the Imperial guards and two divisions of cuirassiers under Milhaut, had turned it by the right, and pushing up the sloping ground, succeeded in gaining the summit of the Prussian position in spite of a brave opposition. Upon seeing his infantry borne back by the steady advance of the enemy, the gallant Marshal Blücher placed himself at the head of a body of cavalry, and, sword in hand, endeavoured to check their progress; but his horse being killed

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in an unsuccessful charge, some squadrons of the French actually passed over him as he lay on the ground, stunned and bruised, by the side of his dead charger. Happily he remained unnoticed in the confusion of the *mélée*, and a momentary reflux of the tide of battle enabled his troops to relieve their venerable and heroic commander from his dangerous situation.

It was past 9 o'clock ere victory finally rewarded the efforts of the French; and darkness favouring the retreat of the beaten army, the corps of Zeithen and Pirch retired on Tilly, and the 3d under Thielmann towards Gembloux, leaving rear guards in possession of Bry and Sombref, which were not withdrawn till a little before dawn on the following morning. This battle was highly creditable to the valour of the Prussian troops, notwithstanding their defeat. It was a ruthless contest, little quarter being given by either party; for between the Prussians and French a deadly animosity prevailed, of which the wretched and helpless wounded became the victims. The vanquished army had full 15,000 men put *hors de combat*, and also lost fifteen pieces of cannon. The enemy's loss may have been about 12,000.

We have but briefly touched on the chief incidents of the battle, in which there was nothing remarkable; no manœuvres were attempted, nor was any tactical science displayed by Buonaparte. Any one of his generals, in short, could have fought it equally well. A little episode occurred during the course of it which shows the uncertainty attending military operations, even when they are directed by the most skilful masters of the art of war. General Gourgaud informs us, that just as Napoleon's ar-

rangements had been made for an attack on the Prussians with his reserves, a messenger arrived from Vandamme with intelligence of an enemy's column, about 20,000 strong, being then débouching from the woods at the distance of a league on his left, which appeared to be marching on Fleurus, thus turning the French army. It is stated that Buonaparte, on receiving this astounding news, halted his guard and made dispositions to receive the supposed enemy, who had contrived to penetrate between Ney's corps and his own army. At half-past 6 o'clock an aide-de-camp, who had been sent to reconnoitre the approaching force, returned to announce that it was the 1st French corps, commanded by the Comte d'Erlon.

Campagne de 1815, p. 59.

In reference to the general operations of the day, it seems surprising that so much precious time should have been lost by Napoleon in the morning. Why was the French army not collected in front of Fleurus until after one o'clock? and why did Ney remain inactive until an hour later? Had that marshal made his attack before two o'clock, he would have had no opponents but Perponcher's Dutch division, and might, therefore, if he pleased, have gone to Quatre Bras at the *pas de charge*. Then, with a division posted across the Nivelles chaussée, and another overlooking Genappe, not only would all communication between the Prussian and Anglo-allied army have been prevented, but the divisions of the latter must have sought a point of concentration between Genappe and Waterloo.

Buonaparte's sole chance of success depended on the celerity of his movements, and the vigour of his attacks: by these only could he hope to beat two such adversaries in succession — the object aimed at

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in his able plan for the campaign. He charged Ney with supineness; but Soult's* letter to that commander, written at two o'clock on the 16th, shows that no attack on the force in his front was intended to take place before that hour. He is therein directed to fall on whatever troops should be before him; but is not asked why he had not already done so. Ney, in recrimination, complains that he lost the action of Quatre Bras owing to his reserve, under D'Erlon, having been carried off towards Ligny by order of Napoleon, without his knowledge; while Buonaparte's apologist states that D'Erlon's movement was totally unexpected at Lingy. "Napoleon ne put se rendre raison d'un tel mouvement." Whose assertion are we to credit? We feel assured that so good a soldier as Drouet could not have marched without orders, and it is most improbable that Ney should have detached him; hence little doubt can remain of his having moved towards Ligny by order of Napoleon†, and the statement of General Gourgaud relative to the *mistake* respecting D'Erlon's movement, falls to the ground.

Gourgaud, p. 59.

* Marshal Soult was major-general of the army.

† Posted near Frasne, D'Erlon's corps was conveniently situated as a support either of the attack on Quatre Bras, or of that on the Prussian position. There can be little question of Buonaparte's having ordered up this reserve to reinforce his left, after the first unsuccessful attack on Blücher's right; but finding the day far advanced ere it approached, and that it would arrive too late to be of use, he ordered D'Erlon to retrace his route towards Ney. Wherever the truth may lie, there is no doubt of the fact that 20,000 men were prevented from taking part in either battle.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

THE ANGLO-ALLIED ARMY FALLS BACK TO WATERLOO, AND THAT OF PRINCE BLÜCHER TO WAVRE. — POSITION OF WATERLOO, AND DISPOSITION OF THE HOSTILE ARMIES. — THE BATTLE. — LATE ARRIVAL OF THE PRUSSIANS. — MARSHAL GROUCHY'S OPERATIONS. — OBSERVATIONS ON THE CAMPAIGN. — ON THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. — PART TAKEN IN IT BY THE PRUSSIAN ARMY. — NOTE THEREON. — THE ALLIED COMMANDERS ENTER FRANCE. — ARE FOLLOWED BY LOUIS XVIII. — NARROW ESCAPE OF THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON AT PERONNE. — CONDITION OF THE FRENCH ARMY. — ABDICATION OF NAPOLEON IN FAVOUR OF HIS SON. — THE ALLIES CONTINUE THEIR MARCH ON PARIS. — DEPARTURE OF NAPOLEON. — MILITARY CONVENTION. — THE ALLIES ENTER PARIS. — CONCLUSION.

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THE unfortunate issue of the battle of Ligny was communicated to the Duke of Wellington by Lieut. Hardinge of the Royal Artillery on the night of the 16th; that officer having been despatched by Sir Henry Hardinge* to the Duke's head-quarters at Genappe with the disagreeable intelligence, immediately after the action. In the course of that night the remainder of the allied army reached Quatre Bras, and stood ready at daylight on the following morning to support the Prussians, could they have rallied; but about 7 o'clock on the 17th, Lieut.-Col. Sir Alexander Gordon, who, with a strong escort of the 10th Hussars, had been sent out early to ascertain their situation, returned and reported that Marshal Blücher had retreated, but that Sombref was not occupied by the enemy, whose videttes had fallen back as he advanced. The Duke, knowing that his colleague would retire by the Wavre road in case of necessity, made

* Sir Henry Hardinge was attached to the Prussian head-quarters; he lost his left hand from a wound he received in this battle.

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immediate dispositions for a corresponding retrograde movement upon Waterloo; where he trusted, when attacked, to be supported by the Prussian army. Accordingly, about 10 o'clock, his troops began to evacuate their position.

Napoleon, having directed Marshal Grouchy to follow the Prussians with the 3d and 4th corps and a body of cavalry, amounting to 35,000 men, with a proportion of cannon, put the rest of his army in motion about 11 o'clock towards Quatre Bras; where, from information he had received, he expected to find the Anglo-allied troops, whose left he proposed turning by the Namur chaussée. But a rear guard of cavalry and horse artillery alone remained on the position, and these drew off and defiled through Genappe as his advanced troops moved forward. The enemy's horse followed closely, however, and after passing that village pushed rapidly forward; when a smart cavalry action occurred, in which a regiment of lancers repelled an attack by the 7th Hussars. Lord Uxbridge then ordered the 2d Life Guards to charge the lancers, who were in an instant routed with considerable loss.

The whole of the allied army did not reach the position of Mont St. Jean, in front of Waterloo, until 5 o'clock; and it was after 7 ere the enemy's advanced guard appeared on the elevated ground near the farm of La Belle Alliance, proving that the retreat was not pressed. The main body of the French did not arrive in the vicinity of Planchenoit, where it bivouacked, till some hours later. A few cannon shot from the enemy, fired after it grew dusk, drew a reply from a battery of British guns, and showed them that the high ground

in their front was occupied. The night was stormy, and the rain fell in torrents on the comfortless bivouacks of the hostile armies.

Meanwhile Marshal Blücher had reached Wavre, and been joined by his 4th corps under Bülow. His army passed the Dyle at that place, leaving a strong division on its right bank to observe the enemy when they should appear. So well, however, was the retreat of the Prussian rear guard from Sombref managed, that the French at first imagined Blücher to have fallen back on Namur; and it was not till 3 o'clock in the afternoon of the 17th that Grouchy, who had marched in that direction, became certain of the Prussians having taken the road to Wavre. He then retraced his steps, reached Gembloux, and remained there for the night.

Wavre is only 12 miles distant from the position of Mont St. Jean; the Duke of Wellington had therefore every reason to calculate on being early and strongly supported by Marshal Blücher, with whom he was in communication on the 17th. Still, it was a bold resolve of the Duke to make a stand with so inferior an army, in order to afford time for the Prussians to arrive; for the force of the enemy not only outnumbered his own, but contained the flower of the generals and soldiery of France, and was animated by the presence of Napoleon himself, who, long held to be invincible, had only at last (in 1813 and 1814) been vanquished by superior numbers. But the Duke had a good position, and 33,000 excellent troops, including the "old German Legion;" and although the rest of his army was chiefly made up of raw soldiers of several nations, yet he trusted the firm-

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ness of his own battalions would inspire confidence in all, and that he should at least be able to maintain his position until Blücher's arrival.

The allied army was drawn up on a range of heights of moderate elevation, overlooking a shallow and irregular valley, the descent into which is by gentle slopes. The chaussées from Genappe and Nivelles traverse the position, uniting at the hamlet of Mont St. Jean, about half a mile in the rear; whence a wide and excellent road, which enters the forest of Soignies nearly a mile farther on, conducts through the village of Waterloo to Brussels. The whole of the ground in this part is every where practicable for troops of all arms, being of an undulating character. Both hill and dale were covered with luxuriant crops of grain.

When placed in order of battle, the right of the allied army was thrown back *en potence*, in consequence of the valley in front making a return on that side. Part of the 2d corps under Lord Hill, consisting of the 2d division (Sir H. Clinton), a brigade of the 4th commanded by Colonel Mitchell, and one of Hanoverians, constituted this portion of the line; whose right stretched to the hamlet of Merbe-Braine, which was occupied.

The allied centre comprised the division of British Guards (the 1st) under General Cooke, and the 3d division commanded by Count Alten; the former occupying with its four light companies the château, out-buildings, and inclosures of Hougomont *, situated in the low ground, a few hundred yards in advance of the right centre of the

* Properly Gomont; but having become immortalized as Hougomont, we think it right to let its new appellation stand.

line; which being covered in front by a wood occupied by a strong battalion of Nassau troops, was a very defensible post. These divisions filled the space between the Nivelles and Genappe chaussées, General Cooke's right resting on the first, and Alten's left upon the latter; which was protected by a substantial farm-house, having a high-walled quadrangular yard, standing on the chaussée, about an hundred paces down the slope of the hill, called La Haie Sainte.

The left wing consisted of the 5th division under Sir Thomas Picton, General Lambert's brigade of the 6th division, and a Belgian brigade. Some Nassau troops, commanded by Prince Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, occupied the hamlet of Smohain in the ravine below the left of the position.

The Hanoverians were distributed by brigades among the British divisions; and the troops of Brunswick were chiefly in the second line, supporting the Guards and the 3d division. During the early part of the battle General Chassé's* Dutch division was stationed at Braine-la-Leud; whence a roughly paved road, but practicable for troops and artillery, traversed the forest to Brussels.† The occupation of that village in force covered the right of the allied position, and served to link with the main body two large detachments posted in observation before Hal; one of which, commanded by Sir Charles Colville, was at Tubise, and the other, composed of Dutch troops under Prince Frederick of Orange, near Braine-le-Château. The cavalry

* The gallant defender of the citadel of Antwerp in 1831.

† The St. Helena writers, and others, do not seem to have known of this road; which being a rough *pavé* was, at all seasons, passable for troops and artillery.

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was placed in rear of the left and left centre; and the artillery stood by batteries along the front. The army thus formed two lines; but the second was not continuous, the troops composing it being posted in such a manner as should best enable them to support those in their front. Communication with the Prussian army at Wavre was open by way of Ohain.

The weather continued very wet for some time after dawn on the 18th, but as the morning advanced a drizzling rain succeeded. The enemy remained quiet in bivouack until between 9 and 10 o'clock, when their troops were observed moving forward to occupy some heights running nearly parallel to those on which the allies were posted, but of rather lower elevation: the distance between the two positions averaged 1400 yards. The corps of Comte d'Erlon formed the enemy's right, stretching towards Smohain, and having its left at the farm of La Belle Alliance, on the chaussée. Reille's corps extended from thence to the high ground above Hougomont. These troops constituted the first line. The 6th corps (incomplete), under Comte Lobau, and the "young guard," stood in reserve in rear of the right wing. The cavalry was in second line; and the "old guard" remained in reserve behind the whole.

With regard to the respective strength of the two armies about to engage, we do not greatly err in estimating that of the enemy at 75,000 men, including 15,000 cavalry; and the allies at 60,000, comprising Chassé's division at Braine-la-Leud, but exclusive of the troops covering Hal. Of this number 12,000 were cavalry. The French had

250 guns, many of which were 12-pounders; the allies but 150*, the heaviest being 9-pounders.

About half-past 10 the day in some degree improved; and the enemy being ready for action, were soon after seen in motion above Hougomont. Presently an imposing display of heavy masses of infantry rivetted the attention of the allied troops, who admired the precision of manœuvring and gallant bearing of the enemy's divisions as they advanced to the attack; without at the same time forgetting that thousands of hardy veterans in their own ranks had aided to overthrow armies little less formidable than the one which now so proudly looked defiance, confidently trusting, under the auspices of Napoleon, to efface the stains which had sullied the French arms in the Spanish contest by annihilating the motley force that now dared to await its onset.

But there was one who, from a commanding situation, stood scanning with eagle eye the fine array before him,— the victor of an hundred fields, from whose well-earned chaplet of laurels a single leaf had never been plucked by a foe; who had triumphed alike over the turbaned warriors of the East, and the ablest leaders of France; who having vanquished a Junot, a Victor, a Massena, a Ney, a Marmont, a Jourdan, and a Soult, was about to measure swords with the great master spirit himself. Napoleon, it is true, crushed by overwhelming numbers, had already been overcome; but his power, Phœnix-like, was now risen from its ashes, and, with victory in its train, stood pre-

* The whole allied army possessed 164 guns; but some pieces were with the corps near Hal.

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pared to grasp once more at the sceptre of the world.

How vast a stake had Wellington hanging on the issue of the impending contest! The honour of the British arms, — his own great reputation, — the cause of Europe, — all were about to be perilled. With a mind totally absorbed at that moment by duty, it is probable that none of these reflections occurred to the Duke, who made the requisite dispositions to meet the coming enemy with his characteristic coolness and decision; while the yet tanned faces of a few regiments of his "old Spanish infantry" wore a confident expression, which seemed to assure him of a triumph that day, to crown with a glorious capital the noble column of his fame, and thereby perfect a monument of surpassing grandeur, that will perpetuate his own great deeds and the renown of Britain, when her proud empire shall have passed away, and only live in story.

The battle began about 11 o'clock by the advance of Jerome Buonaparte's division upon Hougomont, the wood and outer fence in front of which were lined with skirmishers, who for a short time resisted the attacks of Jerome's tirailleurs. His columns being moved forward to support the light troops, came within range of an English battery posted on the height above, close to the division of Guards, the guns of which were admirably served. The French artillery, which had been advanced to points from whence its fire could cover the attack in progress, pealed forth in reply; musketry rolled in the valley below; and the day having brightened up, a grand coup d'œil was presented to thousands of both armies who covered the heights on each hand,

Meanwhile the Nassau battalion, entrusted with the defence of the wood, gave way, and it was instantly filled with the enemy's troops, who eagerly rushed on with animating cries to assail the hedge enclosures of the château gardens: these were lined by the light companies of the Guards; and the French being met by a steady fire, their ardour experienced a timely check. Every care had been previously taken to strengthen this important post; its walls were loop-holed; trees were felled; and, in short, the best dispositions had been made to enable a small body of determined troops to resist an attack from superior numbers. After repeated attempts on the enclosures, and likewise upon the château itself, the enemy were compelled to desist from their fruitless efforts; and the Guards, issuing from the enclosures, recovered a large portion of the wood. Exposed as were the enemy's columns during the attack, to a most destructive fire of round and spherical case-shot from the British artillery, as well as to a hot fire of musketry from the defenders of Hougomont, their loss was necessarily severe.

After this discomfiture, a heavy cannonade was maintained by the batteries disposed along the centre of the enemy's line, which was answered from the opposite heights; and for some time the roar of artillery was incessant. At this period of the battle a large force of cavalry being displayed by the French, the two centre divisions of the allied army were directed to form battalion squares to repel the expected attack. But their appearance proved to be a mere demonstration; and as the squares suffered greatly from the enemy's shot, the Duke of Wellington had recourse to a plan adopted in

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his former defensive battles, — which was to move the troops back and place them on the reverse slope of the ground, so as to interpose its crest between them and the guns; leaving, however, his own artillery in forward positions, whence it commanded the valley in front. A cross road ran along the rear of the allied line, some sixty or seventy yards from the crest of the position, whose banks were of great use in affording cover.

This movement took place between one and two o'clock, and was at first mistaken by the French for one of retreat; under which impression columns of attack were immediately formed from D'Erlon's corps on their right: these were soon perceived making for the left of the allied position, where the post of honour had been assigned to a Belgian brigade; the 5th division being in rear of the continuation of the cross road above mentioned, which in that part ran along the crest of the hill, and was moreover lined with hedges. Although well flanked by some English riflemen, the Belgians yielded their ground; but the gallant Picton, in preparation for this, held the brigades of Generals Kempt and Pack in readiness; which, moving steadily up in line to the cross road, found the enemy within forty yards of them. The first discharge from the British brought the assailants to a halt, and produced confusion in their leading ranks; and a steady fire being continued, the most advanced column was speedily thrown into disorder. Picton aware, from much experience, of the effect created by the fire of his troops, although the smoke prevented him from seeing the condition of the enemy at that moment, now loudly called out "Charge;"— the next instant he fell dead, a ball having entered his

temple. Thus gloriously died one of England's best and bravest soldiers. The command of his division devolved on Sir James Kempt.

The Duke of Wellington had early moved to the point threatened by D'Erlon's columns, and from the right of the 5th division was enabled to mark the confusion into which the fire of the British had thrown them, thereby presenting a favourable opportunity for cavalry to act; he therefore directed Lord Uxbridge to bring up Sir William Ponsonby's brigade, consisting of the Royal dragoons, Scotch Greys, and Inniskillings. These fine regiments, passing down by La Haie Sainte, supported by the 11th and 16th Light Dragoons under General Vandeleur, fell with great fury on the enemy's left flank. A scene of confusion then arose such as rarely occurs in battle: several thousand infantry, in a state of total disorganization, knew not whither to fly to escape the English sabres. Hundreds were cut down; and upwards of 2000, numbers of whom exhibited horrid gashes, were captured, as were also two eagles. But now, as had been the case so often in Spain, it was found impossible to restrain the boiling courage of the dragoons; who, elated by their brilliant success, dashed forward, and attacking D'Erlon's artillery, (which stood on a rising ground in advance of the French position,) sought to dismount the guns. But this chivalrous effort being unsupported, they paid dearly for their temerity, as they not only exposed themselves to the fire of a battalion of infantry, but also to a charge of cuirassiers and lancers. These coming upon them when exhausted by their recent exertions, an unequal combat ensued, and after an obstinate conflict the British retired after sustaining severe loss;

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the gallant General Ponsonby himself being killed by the lancers, his horse having become fixed in the deep saturated soil of a ploughed field.

While these events were passing on the left of the high road, a portion of D'Erlon's troops had ineffectually assailed the post of La Haie Sainte, having been driven back by the Germans of General Alten's division; who, while following up their advantage, were charged by Milhaut's cuirassiers. Squares being rapidly formed, the troops remained untouched; but instead of reining up, the assailants actually passed through the intervals, and mounted the crest of the position in rear. This bravado was, however, endured but a brief space. The Duke of Wellington ordered the heavy cavalry of England to the front; and moving up in admirable order, the brigade of Lord Edward Somerset, composed of the Life Guards, Blues, and 1st Dragoon Guards, met, face to face and sword to sword, the steel-cased horsemen of France. Short but tremendous was the conflict that ensued, and great the slaughter. The size and strength of the English troopers, and the greater power of their horses, gave them, however, an evident advantage; and in a few minutes the cuirassiers were borne down the hill by their huge opponents with immense loss.

The allied position being thus freed from the enemy's cavalry (which was driven in great disorder within their own line), Lord Edward's brigade — with sensibly diminished numbers — resumed its situation in rear of the infantry. Meanwhile the 12th Light Dragoons had also been warmly engaged farther to the left, whither Colonel Ponsonby, who commanded them, had been detached from his brigade. Seeing an opportunity of acting

with advantage, that officer, supported by a Belgian regiment, charged with success a body of infantry commanded by General Durutte; but ere the dragoons could re-form, they were in turn fallen upon by two regiments of lancers, and driven back to their original position on the extreme left, with the loss of their colonel (who was severely wounded) and many men.

While the battle raged thus furiously on the left, renewed demonstrations were made by Jerome's troops against Hougomont; more, however, with the view of deterring the British general from weakening his centre in order to reinforce the left, than with any serious intention of forcing that post. But no sooner was there a pause in the battle on the allied left, than dispositions were ordered by Napoleon for a second and more vigorous effort upon Hougomont. Anticipating this, the Duke of Wellington had already sent thither General Byng's brigade of Guards, together with a battalion of the German Legion, one of Brunswickers, and one of Nassau troops *, amounting in all to 4000 men. This strong reinforcement being advantageously posted, partly in the wood and partly in good situations for flanking the defence of the château and enclosures, being at the same time well sheltered from the enemy's fire, it was clear that the maintenance of this vital point was amply secured. Nevertheless, the enemy having, by means of howitzers, succeeded in setting fire to the château, as also to some corn stacks in

* Soon after the repulse of the first attack on Hougomont, the Duke sent down an order that the post was to be held to the last, as upon it depended the security of the whole position. — "Tell his Grace," said Lieut.-Colonel Home, who received this command, to the aide-de-camp, "that unless we have something much worse to encounter than the late attack, he may rely on our holding it."

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the farm-yard, their columns again advanced resolutely to the attack; but when endeavouring to surround the château, they were assailed by a reinforcement from the Coldstream Guards, led by Colonel Woodford *, which repulsed them with great gallantry. A sharp contest still, however, went on under the walls of the château, whose enclosures were briskly assailed; and one small party actually got into the court-yard by bursting open the gate in spite of its strong barricades; but the brave fellows composing it being all killed, the gate was again secured. The flames now raged with great violence, consuming the whole interior of the building, and destroying many wounded men who had crawled into it for shelter. A heavy cannonade was kept up on the allied centre during this attack, by which the British troops in position immediately above Hougomont sustained much loss. General Cooke had an arm taken off by a round shot, when the command of the 1st division devolved on General Byng, and that of Hougomont on Colonel Woodford.

Batty, p. 100.

Four hours had already been spent, and Napoleon began to manifest much impatience, as well as to feel considerable anxiety for the result of the battle. Two powerful attacks upon Hougomont, and a vigorous effort to force the allied left, had all signally failed: he determined, therefore, to try whether his obstinate opponent might not be found more vulnerable in his left centre; but he could not hope to prevail in that quarter without previously obtaining possession of La Haie Sainte, which post

* Lieut.-General Sir A. W. Woodford, K.C.B.

he now resolved to have at any cost. It was between three and four o'clock when a strong division, supported by two others of D'Erlon's corps, were seen moving towards that point, preceded by some light infantry; which latter, pressing on, passed this farm and took post immediately under the crest of the allied position, where they not only found cover from the fire above, but cut the communication between La Haie Sainte and the division in its rear. At this time, owing to some improvidence, its little garrison ran short of ammunition; when, being fiercely assailed, the enemy effected an entrance by escalade, and the gallant Germans, who had hitherto so stoutly held the post under Major Baring of the Legion, were savagely bayoneted.

Having possession of this farm, Marshal Ney was enabled to assemble a large body of cuirassiers in a slight hollow between it and Hougomont, where they were but little exposed to the fire of the British guns; while, from their proximity to the allied position, they stood ready to support the efforts of the infantry, and to take advantage of any disorder that might occur in its centre, whether from the play of artillery upon the squares or otherwise. A series of attacks followed in rapid succession by both infantry and cavalry, covered by a thundering cannonade from the enemy's position. Some of the onsets were very formidable, — no troops surpassing the French in the impetuosity of their attacks; but the cool courage of the British and German Legion baffled every effort. The enemy suffered severely, particularly in their cavalry, which being fruitlessly pushed against squares, that, steady as on the drill ground, re-

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pelled each successive attack, was uselessly frittered away.

We are aware of no parallel to the extraordinary scene that was now witnessed. The troops composing the two centre divisions, both of the first and second line, were in squares, and "the French cavalry were on the plateau, in the centre between the two high roads, for nearly three quarters of an hour, riding about among our squares of infantry, all firing having ceased on both sides;" while the artillery stood in position, necessarily abandoned by the gunners, who were forced to seek refuge with the infantry squares. The Duke of Wellington moved these forward to protect the guns; and this extraordinary exhibition continued until the British and German cavalry, which Lord Uxbridge had despatched to the flanks, was brought back to the centre, when the enemy's squadrons were driven off without difficulty.

Despatches, &c. Aug. 17.

It was now between five and six o'clock: this tremendous struggle had therefore lasted six hours, and not a battalion of the British or German troops had been shaken, nor had the enemy gained a single advantage, save the capture (by an accidental circumstance) of La Haie Sainte. But their attacks had not been repulsed without very severe loss to the troops who had borne the brunt of the action, and also for so many hours endured a murderous

* At first the cuirassiers were very bold, and came almost up to the bayonets; but they afterwards grew more cautious, and their squadrons would begin to waver as they came near, and halt at the distance of forty or fifty paces. Some officers might then be seen to move out of the ranks, and by voice and gesture — sometimes rearing aloft their bear-skin caps upon their swords — striving to animate their men. In a few minutes they would wheel off, their departure being quickened by musketry from the squares; when fewer saddles were emptied than might have been expected.

cannonade. That Napoleon should have given expression to his admiration of our infantry—as he is said to have done—is not surprising, when Wellington himself, who had directed its energies on many trying occasions, declared afterwards that he had "never seen it behave so well." Almost a third of its numbers had fallen; but animated by the presence of the Duke—who was always at hand wherever the fire was hottest, and in whose preservation the hand of Providence was that day most manifest—the British soldiers shrank not: each felt that the honour of his country was at stake, and resolved to maintain it or perish.

Despatches, &c. July 2.

Throughout the day, the Duke of Wellington had held frequent communication with Marshal Blücher, by means of the Prussian General Müffling, who was attached to his head-quarters, and who had led his Grace to expect the support of Bülow's corps, 30,000 strong, by two o'clock. But that hour had long passed without any appearance of the Prussians; and the Duke, impatient of delay, despatched Major Stavely, of the Royal Staff Corps*, to ascertain where this corps was, and when it might be expected to operate on the enemy's flank. This officer, on his return, reported that *at four o'clock* he had fallen in with the Marshal himself, who, at the head of a portion only of Bülow's corps, was then crossing the ravine between St. Lambert and Lasne, and had signified an intention to attack, the moment his troops, who had performed a difficult march, could be formed.

On observing Blücher's demonstration, Napoleon threw back part of his right wing *en potence*. But

* Colonel Staveley, C. B., Dy. Qr. Mr. Genl. at Mauritius.

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it was soon evident that the Prussians were not in sufficient strength to operate with effect; and they were readily kept in check, without creating any interruption in his battle with the Anglo-allied troops in front. The day, however, was fast waning, and there was no sign of Grouchy coming to his support, as he rather hoped than expected*; and every attempt hitherto made to force the British position having signally failed, he clearly saw that a desperate effort to break through their line could alone now prevent the defeat which the arrival of the Prussians would render inevitable, and he made his dispositions accordingly. He had, as usual, husbanded his celebrated guards, and these he determined to push without delay against the allied centre, conceiving that a powerful body of fresh troops must prevail over battalions already so much weakened by previous attacks.

The preparations for the effort upon which all his hopes now rested were not completed by Napoleon until after seven o'clock; when two columns of the Imperial guards, headed by the Emperor himself, moved towards the allied position. Steadily they advanced, having a portion of Reille's corps as a support, and for some time it remained doubtful what part of the line was to be assailed. When arrived about mid-way between the two armies Napoleon moved aside, and committed to Ney the fate of the battle. Meanwhile some of D'Erlon's troops, preceded by a cloud of skirmishers and a battery of horse artillery, pushed past La Haie Sainte to menace the left centre of the allied position, which the Duke of Wellington had just re-

* Soult had written to Grouchy at one o'clock, urging him to march towards the field of battle with all possible expedition.

inforced by bringing forward a brigade of Brunswick infantry. Becoming suddenly exposed to a brisk fire from the tirailleurs, some of these young troops gave way; but the Duke rallied them in person, and they resumed their ground. Part of a Nassau brigade, which had been posted in the front line, at the same time fell back, and the Prince of Orange received a wound while rallying it.

Before proceeding with our account of the final effort of the Imperial guards, it is requisite to mention that, about two hours previously to their attack, the Duke, finding there was no prospect of his right flank being disturbed, had directed Lord Hill to withdraw General Clinton's division, Colonel Mitchell's brigade, and the Hanoverians from the right, and dispose them so as to strengthen the right centre, which had been weakened when Byng's brigade of Guards and the Germans were sent down to Hougomont. Chassé's Dutch division had also been removed from Braine-la-Leud, and posted in the low ground, so as to form a third line on what had been the right centre, but was now the right of the position. The cavalry of Generals Vivian and Vandeleur had also at a later hour been brought to the same quarter; and thus the point towards which Napoleon's guards were evidently moving had been rendered far stronger than any other part of the line.

The Duke of Wellington, seeing nothing to change in his dispositions when it became certain that the enemy's purpose was to assail the part of his position occupied by General Maitland's brigade of Guards, tranquilly awaited their approach, suffering the troops to remain recumbent on the reverse slope of the position, where they were in a

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a great measure sheltered from the hot cannonade maintained by the enemy.

Meanwhile, the Imperial guards, having passed between La Haie Sainte and Hougomont, were seen mounting the gentle slope exposed to the fire of our artillery, which, although every shot struck one or other of the masses, was apparently disregarded. At the proper moment, the Duke gave the word for the Guards to move forward. They reached the summit of the ground just in time — another minute, and the grenadiers of the Imperial guard would have crowned the British position. For an instant there was no firing on either side, as the Guards, French and English, confronted each other at the distance of fifty paces; the former shouting their usual war cry of "Vive l'Empereur;" their opponents, silent, steady, and resolved, waiting but the word to pour their destructive fire into the solid mass of men before them. There was no punctilious hesitation, as at Fontenoy, whether the French or British guards should fire first: Maitland's troops gave a volley with such effect that the foremost ranks of the enemy instantly lost all order. The column then attempted to deploy, which, under the heavy fire kept up, was impossible. For a brief space the French stood paralyzed — unable to advance, unwilling to retire, and vainly endeavouring to return their opponents' fire from the leading ranks; while their officers bravely strove to remedy the disorder. This state of things had continued some minutes, when General Maitland led his brigade to the charge; — the discomfiture of the enemy's column was then completed, and the whole mass went off in indescribable confusion. General Maitland halted his brigade in time to

avoid being taken in flank by the second column of the enemy, which, undismayed by the rout of the preceding one, intrepidly held on its course; and the Guards fell back to their original situation.

None of Lord Hill's infantry had as yet been engaged; but, prior to the defeat of the enemy's leading column, his lordship had already moved forward General Adam's brigade, consisting of the 52d and 71st regiments, and a battalion of Rifles, which, formed four deep, now stood ready and eager to take an active part in the battle. Again were the French suffered to reach almost the crest of the position; but the Duke of Wellington having directed General Adam to throw forward the right of his brigade, pivoting on the left, this movement was executed with admirable precision at the proper moment, and hence had the effect of placing the enemy in an angle formed by the Guards and Adam's troops. The fate of the enemy's column, composed of several battalions of chasseurs of the guard, was speedily decided. A heavy front fire from the former swept off its leading ranks, while that of the 52d and Rifles directed upon its flank was yet more destructive; and at the same time a battery planted at the angular point ravaged it with rounds of grape. It broke and fled like the first, leaving the ground strewed with hundreds of dead and wounded men. General Adam's battalions instantly rushed forward, followed by the Guards; and the Duke of Wellington having called up the light cavalry of Generals Vivian and Vandeleur, it dashed past the infantry, and was soon up with the routed enemy.

Perceiving that disorder had extended to the

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supporting divisions of the enemy's defeated columns, and judging from the distant firing on his left that Bülow's attack had at last begun to take effect, the Duke saw that the moment was arrived for deciding the battle without waiting for the arrival in line of Ziethen's corps, which was now moving upon his left by way of Ohain. The word to advance was therefore immediately given; and being passed along the line, the troops loudly cheered as they obeyed the welcome summons to victory.

Meanwhile the cavalry, directed by Lord Uxbridge, who soon after fell severely wounded by a cannon shot, was amongst the now terror-stricken enemy, who offered but a feeble resistance to their attacks. Adam's brigade, comparatively fresh, and flushed by success, kept the lead of the infantry, and mounting the enemy's position was about to charge a body of their troops, when the latter turned and went off. By this time the whole French army was in full retreat; for D'Erlon's troops, seeing their left flank about to be turned by the most forward British troops, who were making for La Belle Alliance, drew off in time, leaving many guns in position and upon the high road. Four battalions of the "old guard," however, which had remained in reserve, were now formed in squares, and bravely strove to check the general rush to the rear: these held their ground for a brief space against the English cavalry; but when the British infantry came up and prepared to charge, they also gave way. A panic had now seized the whole of the enemy's troops, and "*sauve qui peut*" was the general cry. All order was lost. Napoleon and his marshals—infantry, cavalry, artillery, and baggage—all crowded in wild

disorder towards Genappe: 150 pieces of cannon, and all the matériel of the army, fell into the hands of the victors.

Meanwhile the impetuous onset of the Anglo-allied army having relieved the Prussians from the effectual resistance previously offered to them by the French right, the leading regiments of Bülow's Prussians, moving across from Frischermont and Planchenoit, now joined in the pursuit of the enemy, which was not, however, long continued by the British, whom the Duke of Wellington halted about two miles beyond Rossomme; at which time it was dark. The chaussée was then cleared of the allied troops, who were directed to move to their right, that the advance of the Prussians might not be impeded. Leaving to them the task of following up the beaten enemy, the Duke slowly rode back towards Waterloo. Near La Belle Alliance, he met Marshal Blücher: their conference was brief, but the Marshal assured his Grace that the Prussians should pursue the French without intermission throughout the night.

At Genappe a feeble attempt was made by the enemy to check the pursuit by barricading the entrance to the village; or rather, their guns and tumbrils got jammed in its long street, which gave them a little breathing time. But the Prussians speedily overcame all obstacles and passed onward, capturing sixty pieces of cannon.

Such were the principal events of this great and decisive battle, which was fought by the troops on both sides with the utmost courage and determination. Never before were the enduring powers of our infantry put to so trying a test, as while standing passive in squares exposed to the heavy

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fire of the enemy's artillery,—from which alone some battalions in second line suffered very severely, without having had the satisfaction of discharging a musket during the day. A perfect account of such a battle cannot be expected, and we have confined ourselves to a brief description of its main circumstances. "It is impossible to say," the Duke of Wellington writes, "when each important occurrence took place, nor in what order. We were attacked first with infantry only; then with cavalry only; lastly and principally with cavalry and infantry mixed."

Despatches, &c. Aug. 17.

Despatches, &c. Aug. 8.

On another occasion the Duke observes, "The history of a battle is not unlike the history of a ball. Some individuals may recollect all the little events of which the great result is the battle won or lost; but no individual can recollect the order in which or the exact moment at which they occurred, which makes all the difference as to their value."

The loss of the Anglo-allied army in this well-contested battle was about 13,000 men, two thirds of whom were British. That of the enemy, who suffered dreadfully* from the exposed manner in which their attacks were made, could not have been less than 25,000, including 7000 taken. Generals Comte Lobau and Cambronne (to the latter of whom is attributed the often-quoted exclamation, "*La garde meurt mais ne se rend jamais*") were amongst the prisoners. This estimate is, however, exclusive of the loss inflicted by the Prussians in the pursuit. Several distinguished and valuable officers fell on the side of the British: Picton,

* Marshal Ney, in his letter to Fouché, said that he had never before witnessed so frightful a carnage.

Ponsonby, De Lancey *, and Ellis † were all in high estimation with the army. The list of wounded comprised the Prince of Orange, Lord Uxbridge, Generals Alten, Cooke, Kempt, Pack, Barnes, Dörnberg, Halkett, and Adam. Of the staff and other officers in attendance on the Duke of Wellington, few escaped without a wound: two of his aides-de-camp, the Hon. Sir A. Gordon and Lieut.-Colonel Canning, were killed; and Lord Fitz Roy Somerset lost an arm. Generals Pozzo di Borgo, Vincent, Müffling, and Alava,—the representatives respectively of Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Spain,—were in the field during the battle; and Baron Vincent was wounded. It is remarkable that no French officer of note was killed, and few of rank were wounded.‡

Marshal Grouchy's operations require now to be noticed. It will be remembered that the retreat of the Prussian army upon Wavre was not ascertained by the enemy until 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 17th. Grouchy's head-quarters were that night at Gembloux, about seven miles from Sombref. Next day the marshal continued his march upon Wavre; and at noon his advanced guard came up with a body of Prussians posted in observation on the right bank of the Dyle, near that place, which was immediately forced across the river. The French then made an attempt to follow it, but were repulsed in their endeavour to pass the Dyle. They next tried to cross at the mill of Bielge, and were again defeated in their ob-

* Colonel Sir W. De Lancey, K.C.B., Quarter-Master-General. He died of his wound a few days after the battle.

† Colonel Sir H. W. Ellis, K.C.B. He commanded the 23d R.W. Fusiliers.

‡ General Duhesme was killed at Genappe on the retreat.

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ject by the 3d Prussian corps under General Thielmann. While thus seeking to pass this insignificant stream, Grouchy heard the cannonade of Waterloo; but imagining that the whole Prussian army was in his front, he attacked with renewed vigour, conceiving that he should best fulfil Napoleon's views by occupying Blücher's attention, and thereby preventing his detaching troops to support the Anglo-allied army. At length, finding himself unable to effect the passage of the river near Wavre, he left a portion of his force at that point, and marched with the remainder to Limale; where he crossed over, and carried some heights on which the Prussians were posted. According to Grouchy's statement it was after seven in the evening ere he received a letter from Soult, directing him to march on St. Lambert, and to attack Bülow. Grouchy bivouacked that night on the left bank of the Dyle: he was assailed by the Prussians at daylight on the morning of the 19th, both parties being still ignorant of the result of the battle of Waterloo. The Prussians were repelled, and the French attacked in return, which forced their opponents to retire upon Rosieres. Grouchy did not learn the total defeat of Buonaparte till 11 o'clock, when he directly commenced his retreat on Namur, closely followed by Thielmann. At that place his rear guard stood firm until the whole of his corps had passed the Sambre, when it moved upon Dinant.

We shall now hazard a few observations respecting the operations of this the shortest, but perhaps the most important, campaign recorded in history.

Notwithstanding that a coalition of nearly the whole of Europe — which for unity of purpose has

never been exceeded — existed against Buonaparte, and that the great powers, moreover, made every exertion to bring forward their several armies with a determination to crush him; yet the vigour of his genius, operating upon the vast military resources of France, enabled him to forestall his enemies; and well knowing that generally, the best system of defence is to act energetically on the offensive, he daringly threw himself upon his nearest and most formidable adversaries, trusting by an unexpected and well-ordered operation, to separate their armies, and vanquish them in succession; — an ably conceived project, which was very nearly carried out to a prosperous issue.

Cantoned as were the Prussian and Anglo-allied armies for the purposes already stated, Napoleon conceived that to make a combined effort to resist the sudden attack he meditated, Blücher and Wellington must consent to sacrifice Brussels and concentrate on some point in rear of that city, which would deliver the whole of Belgium into his hands; a country that, besides being eminently French in feeling, was dissatisfied with the almost unnatural union into which it had recently been forced.* So that whether the allied commanders should strive to preserve Brussels, or retire behind that place, it was equally his game to dash into the Netherlands.

The French army was assembled with consummate ability, and such secrecy that not a whisper of the movements of its several corps passed the frontiers. However, that the allied generals should

* By an act of the congress of Vienna Belgium was united with Holland, to form the kingdom of the Netherlands.

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have received no intelligence of what was taking place will not excite surprise, when it is considered that a belt of fortresses masked the enemy's movements; that all the roads into Belgium were narrowly watched; and that not even the generals of the French corps knew either for what purpose their own troops were in motion, or that others were likewise marching: further, it must be borne in mind that hostilities not having commenced, the advanced posts of the allies were unable by strong patroles or otherwise, to obtain a knowledge of movements within the French frontier, even had they suspected that any were going forward. *

Napoleon had thus an army of 130,000 men assembled upon his frontier, while the allies continued still in their cantonments. This gave him the *initiative* of the first operations; which, with unity of command against two armies commanded by independent generals, together with the superiority of his troops to a large proportion of theirs, afforded him advantages that almost counterbalanced his numerical inferiority.

It is easy with a map before us, and possessing a knowledge of many circumstances which were unknown to the allied generals during the course of their operations, to point out how things might have been better conducted. Possibly neither Napoleon, nor the commanders opposed to him, would have again acted precisely as they did, could

* Some idea of the difficulty of obtaining intelligence of the movements of the French on this occasion, may be formed from the circumstance of the desertion of General Bourmont (chief of the staff to the 4th corps) and other officers from the enemy's ranks, on the 14th of June; who could give no information beyond what related to their own corps, although the whole French army was then within half a day's march of Charleroi!

they have fought the campaign over again; and yet, notwithstanding the errors attributed to Blücher and Wellington by some pseudo critics, the result was so complete, and their triumph so glorious, that had they been gifted with prescience itself, they could not possibly have brought their great task to a more satisfactory termination.

When Blücher so bravely resolved to accept battle at Ligny with only three corps of his army, he thereby determined the course of his great colleague, and in a manner necessitated the battle of Waterloo. In making this observation we are, however, far from seeking to impugn the judgment of the Prussian general on that occasion; for, circumstanced as he then was, to fight was perhaps the best measure he could adopt. To have attempted a junction with the Anglo-allied army by a flank march to Quatre Bras on the morning of the 16th, was not to be thought of. To have fallen back in the direction of his 4th corps, would have caused an entire and irremediable separation between the two armies. And, lastly, had he retired upon Wavre, Napoleon would have sent after him a corps of observation, while he himself pushed the main body of his army through Genappe towards Brussels; by which the separation of the allies would have been equally accomplished.

We have already remarked on the delay in assembling the French army near Fleurus on the 16th, and then waiting till half-past 3 o'clock ere the Prussians were attacked.* We do not here recognize the Buonaparte of Jena. Indeed, throughout

* Napoleon's hesitation then was of immense importance to the allied generals. Until 12 o'clock Blücher had only two of his corps in position.

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this brief campaign, there seems to have been a lack of that boldness in the enemy's operations which the emergency demanded. It was no time for the dictates of prudence to be listened to: those should have been cast aside upon passing the Sambre. The statements among the French respecting the occurrences of this period are so conflicting, and show generally so little regard for truth, that it is impossible to ascertain by whom faults were committed, though all agree in thinking that errors did occur. For instance, no one can say positively, from the testimony hitherto given, whether Napoleon or Ney is chargeable with the flagrant blunder of not securing the important point of Quatre Bras early on the 16th; the possession of which would have been fatal to the Prussian right wing at Ligny, as was planned by Napoleon, provided he could also have attacked Blücher at an earlier hour. Probably neither Ney on the 15th and 16th, nor Grouchy on the two succeeding days, acted with sufficient vigour. Their operations were characterized by a degree of prudence quite unsuited to the extraordinary circumstances under which the French army was acting; that called for the nicest skill, combined with the utmost daring, on the part of its several leaders. But the boldness of action which their condition required need not, however, have prevented their keeping up a constant communication between the army and its detached corps; and in this essential point it is notorious that a surprising neglect was evinced. A better look-out would have prevented D'Erlon's corps being mistaken for British troops on the 16th; would have enabled the French to ascertain by what road Blücher had retreated be-

fore 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 17th; and would have saved Napoleon on the 18th from the error of supposing Bülow's advanced troops were those of Grouchy. Gourgaud, p. 89.

The position of Mont St. Jean was admirably suited to the Duke of Wellington's purpose, being of just sufficient extent to enable him to have a good front line of British and German Legion troops. From its plateau being somewhat higher than the ground upon which the enemy stood, all their movements could be seen and provided against; while they were unable to observe what was going forward on the reverse slope and in the rear of the allied army. The posts of Hougomont and La Haie Sainte were of the highest use, particularly the former. An eminent military writer says, "Posts that can be readily defended are of greater value in battle than insurmountable obstacles; since it is sufficient if such posts can be maintained for a few hours by means of mere detachments. Hougomont with its enclosures, the farm of La Haie Sainte, and the rivulet of Papelotte, presented more serious impediments to Ney, than did the celebrated position of Elchingen." Napoleon attempted no manœuvres; but had he sought to turn either flank of his opponent's army, an easy change of front would have placed Wellington's right or left, as the case might have required, resting upon the forest, with good posts to strengthen his front. In short, when defended by such troops as bore the brunt of the battle of Waterloo, we doubt whether there exists, throughout the whole of Belgium, a position possessing one half of the advantages of the one in question. With respect to the objection urged by the Longwood writers, that it was dangerous in Jomini, Précis de l'Art de la Guerre, 376.

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case of a reverse, having a forest in its rear, we find some excellent remarks by General Jomini. That highly talented military writer observes, —

Précis de l'Art de la Guerre, p. 368.

"We have said that one of the essentials in a position is that it should offer the means of retreat; which brings us to the consideration of a question created by the battle of Waterloo. Supposing an army to be posted in front of a forest, having a good road behind its centre and each of its wings; would it be compromised, as Napoleon asserts, in the event of its losing the battle? For my own part, I think, on the contrary, that such a position would be more favourable for retreating than if the country were perfectly open; since a beaten army cannot traverse a plain without being exposed to the utmost danger. Doubtless, if the retreat should degenerate into a disorderly flight, a portion of the guns remaining in battery in front of the forest would probably be lost; but the infantry, the cavalry, and the rest of the artillery, would be able to retire with as much facility as across a plain. But if, on the contrary, the retreat takes place with order, nothing could possibly protect it better than a forest: provided always, that there exist at least two good roads behind the line; that the enemy be not allowed to press too close before the requisite measures preparatory to retiring are thought of; and that no lateral movement shall enable the enemy to anticipate the army at the outlets from the forest, as happened at Hohenlinden. It would also greatly tend to secure the retreat if, as was the case at Waterloo, the forest should form a concave line behind the centre; for such a bend would then become a regular *place d'armes* in which to collect the troops, and afford time to file them successively into the high road."

We should not have deemed it necessary to support the Duke of Wellington's opinion of a position by adducing the authority of the distinguished foreigner from whose scientific work the above extract is taken, had not the judgment of Napoleon with reference to the position of Waterloo, at least as it has been given to us by Generals de Montholon and Gourgaud, been at variance with that so practically evinced by the

Duke. We may observe in addition, that until we see troops, and those moreover English, beaten in front of an open forest like that of Soignies*, pierced by a chaussée 50 feet wide running from the centre of their position, and by another *paved* road leading from Braine-la-Leud to Brussels, which, though rough, was practicable for guns and troops, it must remain problematical whether to fight in such a situation be really advantageous or otherwise.† To be beaten in the field not having occurred to an English force since the battle of Fontenoy in 1745, when a body of our troops necessarily shared in a defeat which their valour could not avert, we are unable to bring forward instances to show what is their usual conduct when vanquished; but we cannot bring ourselves to imagine such a thing as a British army completely routed like the French at Vitoria and at Waterloo; and we incline to believe that under any circumstances short of a "*sauve qui peut*" flight, the nature of the forest of Soignies, and its indentation behind the allied position, would have afforded great advantages for covering a retreat. A commander such as Wellington, with 25,000 determined troops, would have been at no loss to keep the enemy at bay, even if reduced to the necessity of forming a parapet of his artillery. We may add, that it little availed the French that an open country and two excellent roads lay in their rear on the evening of

* The forest is almost every where practicable for infantry and cavalry, consisting of lofty trees without any underwood.

† The Duke of Wellington was asked some few years after the battle, during one of his annual banquets on the 18th of June, what he would have done had he been driven from his position at Waterloo? "I should have gone into the wood," was his Grace's instant reply.

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the 18th of June; and cannot therefore help thinking that a forest of Soignies would have afforded a desirable shelter on that occasion.

A few lines written by the Duke of Wellington to Marshal Beresford, shortly after the battle of Waterloo, show the grand error committed by Buonaparte on that occasion. "Napoleon did not manœuvre at all; he just moved forward in the old style, in columns, and was driven off in the old style. The only difference was, that he mixed cavalry with his infantry, and supported both with an enormous quantity of artillery." Thus the experience of the English defensive battles of Vimeiro, Talavera, Busaco, and Albuera, failed to convince the French of the folly of assailing steady and determined lines of infantry with "colonnes serrées." We will not go so far as to say that a different formation of the attacking bodies would have gained them the battle; but we think that by "moving forward in the old style," they had no chance of victory. The first failure against Hougomont was most discreditable to the enemy. That post was a mere country house, with its dependencies of a farm and enclosures; and when the Nassau battalion had abandoned the wood in its front, 400 of the British guards alone formed the garrison, and stood firm in the presence of a host of enemies.

Despatches, &c. July 2.

The attack made by the Imperial guard at so late an hour, on the British right centre, was useless and ruinous; for had the allied line been penetrated, the victors, instead of pursuing their advantage, must have turned to face the Prussians, who had for some time been collecting in front of Planchenoit. The guard should either have charged

earlier, or not at all. That attack lost Buonaparte his army.

There was a great contrast in the personal exertions of the two commanders on that day. Wellington was always to be seen in the hottest of the fight, encouraging his troops by his calm intrepidity, and evincing his perfect reliance on their steady gallantry by repeatedly throwing himself into the infantry squares.* Napoleon, on the contrary, kept aloof from danger, consulting rather the safety of the emperor than the reputation of the soldier.

The foundation for our triumph at Waterloo was undoubtedly laid during the Peninsular contest, which early established a moral superiority on the side of the British; but it was the genius of Wellington that formed, and breathed Promethean fire into the machine with which he wrought such wonders. Hence it is no derogation from the transcendent merit of our great commander to say, that the victory of Waterloo was achieved by the unyielding courage of the British and a few Ger-

* "On more than one occasion, I noticed much anxiety amongst the Duke's staff for the safety of his person. Once his Grace rode up to Picton's division (I think about 4 o'clock), just as a hot fire of musketry opened on the 92d regiment. I expected every instant to see him drop, as he sat coolly watching its effect; but he remained untouched, as did also the only individual who accompanied him to the crest of the ground (Lord Arthur Hill). Another time, when riding along the line, he came to a Nassau battalion which stood in square on the right of Alten's division; two or three voices were instantly raised to entreat that he would not move across their front. The Nassau troops, as then regimented, had served with the French, and did not possess our confidence.

"As the most trifling particulars relating to a great man are interesting, it may be mentioned that the Duke wore on the day of Waterloo a plain blue coat, a short cloak of the same colour, and a low cocked-hat without feather or ornament, save the British, Spanish, Portugueze, and Netherlands cockades; the three foreign ones being very small, and attached to the black cockade of England. He was mounted on his favourite chesnut charger, "Copenhagen," and carried throughout the day a large field telescope, which was generally drawn out ready for use.' —(*Notes of Major B. Jackson.*)

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man troops. The Duke planted them on advantageous ground, and then set them a glorious example. They would have fallen to a man in its defence; but no one thought of flinching.

The result of most great battles, since military science arose, has depended as much, if not more, on the ability of the general, as on the bravery and discipline of his soldiers; but at Waterloo there was no manœuvring on either side,—hence that struggle may be deemed to have been a fair trial of strength between the two armies engaged.

Despatches, &c. July 2.

"Never did I see such a pounding match. Both were what the boxers call gluttons. * * * * I never saw the British infantry behave so well." So wrote the Duke in one of his familiar letters. And certainly the conduct of those troops who occupied the first line in that furious contest was beyond all praise.

In a military point of view, the great merit of the allied army in this battle consisted in the maintenance of its position during so many hours against fearful odds, and not in the *routing* of the French;—ergo, the same measure of true glory would have been earned, had the enemy not been attacked in turn and put to flight; although greater eclat was thereby thrown over the victory, and—which was of more consequence—an end was put to the war. This naturally leads to a consideration of the amount and value of Prussian co-operation on that occasion, respecting which there has been much discussion. On this question it must not be forgotten that our gallant friends have a powerful interest in making common cause with the French; since, by assuming to themselves a large share of the glory of Waterloo, they pro-

portionally cover the disaster of Ligny; while, as regards the enemy, it is a soothing unction to their deeply wounded vanity to have it appear that they were only defeated by the joint efforts of the Prussian and Anglo-allied armies.

The army of the Duke of Wellington was justified in maintaining, that the defeat of Buonaparte's reserve, composed of the Imperial guards, about 8 o'clock, decided the battle; for the lateness of the hour, and the dispirited as well as exhausted condition of the French, would have rendered any after attempt upon the allied position impossible. Napoleon was therefore, to all intents and purposes, defeated by the Duke's army, without any aid from the Prussians; and he must, had the latter never moved from Wavre, have drawn off his discomfited army on the following day. From the Prussian official account of the battle, it appears that at half-past 4 o'clock only two brigades of General Bülow's corps and some cavalry had arrived at the "covered position assigned to them;" and we are told that these troops were soon after advanced rapidly against the rear of the enemy's right, and that by half-past 7 the whole of Bülow's corps, and part of the 2d corps under General Pirch, had successively come up.

Report of Gen. Gneisenau.

We do not presume to impugn the Prussian statement; but it seems to us that our brave allies have thereby created for themselves a dilemma. If Blücher had so large a force ready to act previous to or during Napoleon's last desperate attack on the allied position, why did he not roll up the French army as Pakenham's division did at Salamanca? At that time Wellington had not more than from 35,000 to 40,000 men remaining,

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allowing 14,000 to have been *hors de combat*, and 10,000 or 12,000 who had ascertained that the forest was not *impenetrable**; yet with these, of whom less than 20,000 were British, he showed a determined front and repulsed the Imperial guards. Now let us suppose what might have resulted if, by some magical process, Lord Hill with 20,000 British bayonets could have been placed in rear of the French right at the moment of this attack. We think it is not too much to assert that Napoleon and Jerome, Soult, Ney, D'Erlon, Reille, and the rest, would have supped that night with the Duke of Wellington,—not a man would have escaped. For ourselves we entertain too high an opinion of the talents and zeal of the Prussian generals, as also of the bravery of their troops, not to feel assured that some mistake has been made, as to the time of their reaching the scene of action.

But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that near 40,000 Prussians were prepared to fall upon the rear of the French right at the time in question; what then, we ask the French historians, becomes of Napoleon's reputation as a general? Reckless as he probably became towards the close of the battle, he could never have committed so

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* General Müffling (p. 32.) estimates the runaways at 10,000.

"Having been sent before daylight, on the morning after the battle, to communicate the Duke's orders for his army to move on Nivelles, with instructions to show the document I carried to every officer in command of a division, a brigade, or a regiment, I had an opportunity of witnessing how disgraceful had been the conduct of many of the foreign troops. I saw thousands making their way to the front who had quitted their colours during the battle, and fled to the forest. The commanding officer of a cavalry regiment showed me 140 men, stating that his loss in the battle had reduced it to that number. I believe this regiment was not engaged, for very nearly the original complement of 800 were forthcoming a few days after! The Duke degraded it, by turning it over to the commissariat to furnish escorts." — (*Notes of Major Basil Jackson.*)

great an absurdity as to attack Mont St. Jean while the Prussians in such force were assailing Planchenoit. Why it would have been an act of self-immolation; and it has been thought that of his own person he was somewhat careful, however little he might consult the safety of his army on so pressing an occasion. The most unmilitary person has only to glance at the relative situations of Mont St. Jean, Planchenoit, and the French army, to perceive that Buonaparte would have been insane to have made his last effort under the circumstances we have supposed.

In the Prussian official account of the battle, although some credit is given to the allied army for maintaining its position, all the merit of the victory is claimed for that of Prince Blücher. It represents the corps of Generals Bülow and Pirch as defeating the enemy's right near Planchenoit; while that of Ziethen charges and breaks what may be called their right centre in three places. Now we have strong grounds for believing that no part of the 1st corps came into collision with the French that evening, and append a note which will throw some light on its movements; trusting it will afford sufficient evidence to show, or at least bear us out in thinking, that D'Erlon's troops retreated from the high ground overlooking Smohain, not because they were so vigorously charged by Ziethen's corps, but in consequence of finding their left flank on the point of being turned by the advance of the British troops upon La Belle Alliance after defeating the Imperial guards.*

* "All was quiet in our front about 7 o'clock, at which time I was employed on the look-out for a Prussian corps we had for some time been expecting to come upon our left by way of Ohain. Perceiving no in-

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There can exist no doubt whatever that — paradoxical as it may at first sight appear — the co-

dication of its approach, I rode in the direction of that village; and having proceeded more than a mile, saw, but still a good way off, a body of cavalry, that I rightly concluded to be the advance of the corps of which I was in search; for upon riding towards it, I fell in with a line of skirmishers, and learnt from an infantry officer whom I accosted, that the cavalry I saw was commanded by General Von Röder, who immediately afterwards appeared on a rising ground near me, at the head of his staff; and I recognized his person, having met him before at Brussels. After exchanging a few words with the Prussian officer, who was anxious to learn something of our battle, and having told him that his men might spare themselves the trouble of looking in the standing corn for an enemy, — as I saw them doing — there being none within two miles of them, I retraced my steps. All this time I had heard no firing, except of a few cannon from the direction of Mont St. Jean; but on my way back I could see the flashes, for it was then growing dusk, and hear the report of guns far in advance, but rather to my left, which I conjectured to be from Prussian artillery.

"On regaining our position I found, to my surprise, that it was unoccupied; but on the crest of the opposite hill dark masses were in motion; — the French had been defeated, and our troops were in pursuit. I saw no Prussians crossing the valley towards La Belle Alliance, and was satisfied that none of the troops belonging to the corps moving by Ohain were then up. I had not ridden fast, for my horse was both wearied and wounded; but still I must have been far in front of General Röder's cavalry, which was moving very slowly when I left it.

"What afterwards fell under my observation may not be unworthy of notice. Passing down by La Haie Sainte, around which our Life-guardsmen and French cuirassiers lay very thick, I went along the chaussée towards La Belle Alliance; but was obliged to go off it before I arrived there, in consequencee of the road being blocked up with French guns and tumbrils. I counted 20 pieces as I hastily passed, jammed into a space about 50 yards in length, where the chaussée had low banks. Some distance after passing La Belle Alliance, and near the farm of Rossomme, I came upon a spot to the right of the chaussée, where hundreds of bright French muskets lay almost as if a body of troops had been ordered to ground arms: they must have belonged to the 'old guard.' At this place I crossed to the left of the road, and directly found myself amongst Prussian infantry, who were streaming across the country from the direction of Frischermont, in a state of any thing but order. I saw these troops savagely bayonet the unfortunate wounded Frenchmen as they passed along; and an English light dragoon, who was sitting with his back against a wall, would have shared the same fate — by mistake — but for my interposition. Pushing on I soon after overtook some of our own infantry; and also came up with our glorious commander, who was very thinly attended, most of the staff having been either killed or wounded. It was then dark, and I heard orders given by the Duke for his troops to quit the chaussée and halt. They moved accordingly to the right, and left the road clear for the Prussians. After this his Grace remained for a few minutes immediately in rear of the 52d regiment, conversing with Colonel Colborne, and other persons whom I was unable to distinguish; and saying he would

operation, though somewhat tardy, of the Prussians produced, *not the defeat*, but the total rout of Buonaparte's army; for the Duke of Wellington could not, weakened as his force was at the close of the day, have hazarded an attack with his whole army, had Blücher not been at hand to support the movement. The service rendered by our brave allies was therefore most opportune, and of the highest value; and the persevering manner in which they pursued the beaten enemy during the night, caused them immense loss, and entirely prevented the re-establishment of any thing approaching to order amongst them afterwards. An error of half an hour — and men do not consult their watches during the excitement of battle — made either by the Prussians or ourselves, is sufficient to account for much of the discrepance existing between their statements and our own.

The Duke of Wellington tells us, as we have seen, how impossible it is for any one to note with

order up some provisions for the troops, the Duke turned his horse's head towards Waterloo.

"By this time the Prussians were sweeping across from the direction of Frischermont in vast numbers. When near La Belle Alliance the Duke met with a group of mounted officers, and continued for some time in conversation with the principal individual of the party; but who he was I could not discern on account of the darkness. We were surrounded by Prussian infantry; and upon asking an officer near me who the Duke was speaking to, he said it was Blücher. I imagine it must then have been near 10 o'clock. The interview between the two commanders was brief; and the Duke of Wellington, followed by only five officers, continued on at a foot pace to the village of Waterloo. Darkness shrouded from our view the spectacle presented by the great number of dead as we rode by La Haie Sainte; but the frequent snort and start of our horses served to remind us that the ground they trod was tenanted by dead and dying men.

"It is necessary for me to add, that I was then serving in the Royal Staff Corps, the officers of which were chiefly employed in the duty of reconnoissance; and being attached to head-quarters, I had the opportunity of witnessing much of the battle, as well as of seeing the situation of the 1st Prussian corps; which latter circumstance gave rise to this — perhaps too lengthy — narration." — (*Notes of Major Basil Jackson.*)

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accuracy the circumstances of a battle; and, from the nature of the ground, no Prussian general could observe what was the state of the battle between the French and Anglo-allied armies as he approached the field and made his dispositions for attacking, and it was very natural for him to conclude that these dispositions produced an effect on the enemy. Our own impression is that the Prussians were not up in force, and consequently were not prepared for a strenuous attack on the French, until about the time when the Imperial guard was repulsed *; but that they moved forward afterwards early enough to render essential service, though somewhat later than has been represented. We are willing to share with them the glory reaped at Waterloo, but not *equally*. When, however, by a tacit collusion of Prussian and French writers, it is made to appear that Marshal Blücher and his troops saved the allied army on that day, we must affirm that such a pretension on the part of the Prussians is totally unfounded, and an unjust detraction from the credit due to troops who for eight hours maintained their position against the energies of the finest army and ablest leader ever sent forth by France; during which protracted conflict *not a single British regiment was shaken, nor was the allied line at any time in serious danger of being penetrated.* To represent Napoleon as having been

* Without seeking to deprive the Prussians of their fair share of credit, we cannot help remarking on the extraordinary length of time occupied by their movement from Wavre. The roads were very bad, and they had a numerous artillery, not over well horsed; yet, supposing them to have been put in motion at 8 o'clock in the morning, they were ten or eleven hours in marching little more than a like number of miles! May we not, therefore, be allowed to conjecture that there was some hesitation on the part of Blücher in marching upon Waterloo, until he could feel assured of his army being in little danger from Grouchy?

defeated by the joint efforts of the Prussian and Anglo-allied army, is robbing the latter of its well-earned glory without adding to that of the former. We can see no merit in 120,000 of the allies beating 75,000 French; and yet, but with variations, such is what the French have asserted, and Prussian writers have echoed the cry. But to single out the truth from among the various statements* that have been put forth is hopeless: for ourselves, we can only exclaim with a gallant French monarch, "*Voilà ce que c'est que l'histoire.*"

The duty of pursuing the routed enemy could not have been committed to better hands than those of the Prussian troops; between whom and the French a bitter hatred had long subsisted, which was by no means diminished by the battle of Ligny. Napoleon and his beaten army re-crossed the frontier at Charleroi *à la débandade*, closely followed by Blücher; and so complete was its disorganization, that no effort was even attempted to rally the fugitives. Indeed officers of all grades were seen making their way on foot, or as they could, mingled with their soldiers in one universal confusion.

* It may perhaps be remarked, that we have attached little authority to the accounts of this campaign which emanated from St. Helena. The writer of this portion of the present work had the honour of being intimately acquainted with some of the persons composing Napoleon's suite at Longwood; and although he has reason to believe the volumes given to the world with the names of Generals de Montholon and Gourgaud prefixed to them to be genuine — that is, that they were prepared from Napoleon's notes and dictation, — yet he conceives he has equal reason for rejecting them as testimony. An officer of Buonaparte's establishment told him at Longwood that the termination of the battle of Waterloo had occasioned the utmost perplexity among them; and that he himself having been employed by the ex-Emperor to write an account of the campaign, had presented no less than SIX distinct modes of ending the battle, all of which had been rejected. — "*Ex uno disce omnes.*"

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Several of the Duke of Wellington's letters, written immediately after the sanguinary battle we have been describing, show that his Grace was deeply affected by the loss of many valuable officers, some of whom had long been linked to him by the tie of friendship.

Despatches, &c. June 19.

"I cannot express to you," (he writes on the day after the battle to the Earl of Aberdeen,) "the regret and sorrow with which I look round me, and contemplate the loss which I have sustained, particularly in your brother.* The glory resulting from such actions, so dearly bought, is no consolation to me, and I cannot suggest it as any to you and his friends; but I hope that it may be expected that this last one has been so decisive, as that no doubt remains that our exertions and our individual losses will be rewarded by the early attainment of our just object. It is then that the glory of the actions in which our friends and relations have fallen will be some consolation for their loss."

On the same day, his Grace thus writes to the Duke of Beaufort: —

Despatches, &c. June 19.

"I am very sorry to have to acquair you that your brother FitzRoy † is very severely wounded, and has lost his right arm. I have just seen him, and he is perfectly free from fever, and as well as any body could be under such circumstances. You are aware how useful he has always been to me, and how *much* I shall feel the want of his assistance, and what a regard and affection I feel for him; and you will readily believe how much concerned I am for his misfortune. Indeed, the losses I have sustained have quite broken me down; and I have no feeling for the advantages we have acquired. I hope, however, that your brother will soon be able to join me again; and that he will long live to become an honor to his country, as he is a satisfaction to his family and friends."

Having annihilated the "army of Flanders," the allied commanders, aware that Napoleon had succeeded in his usurpation by means of the military

* Lieut.-Colonel the Honourable Sir Alexander Gordon, K.C.B.

† Lieut.-General Lord FitzRoy Somerset, K.C.B.

alone, resolved to push with all expedition towards Paris; with the view not only of preventing the formation of a fresh army by the usurper, but also of taking advantage of the anarchy which might be expected to prevail there after so terrible a disaster. Under different circumstances, the invasion of France—a country possessed of vast warlike resources—by armies so weakened as were those of the allies by such severe fighting, would have been too hazardous a measure; particularly when, by waiting a few weeks longer, the arrival of the Russians and Austrians on the scene of operations would, without any further risk, have ensured the attainment of the great objects contemplated by the confederation. In accordance, however, with their determination, the army of Marshal Blücher entered France by way of Charleroi and Beaumont, and that of the Duke of Wellington moved from Nivelles to Bavay, the main bodies of both armies crossing the frontier on the 21st June.

While at Nivelles on the 20th the Duke issued a general order to his troops, reminding them that the allied sovereigns were in alliance with the king of France, and that the country they were about to enter ought to be treated as a friendly one; he therefore directed that nothing should be taken from its inhabitants without payment. On entering upon the French territory, his Grace also put forth a proclamation, to the effect that he did not come as an enemy, except of the usurper, — "the common enemy," — to whom neither truce nor peace would be granted; and the inhabitants were assured that, all who remained peaceably at their homes would receive protection, while those who should absent themselves or continue to serve the

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usurper would be treated as enemies, and as such their property would be applied to the subsistence of his army.

The fortresses on the northern frontier of France having been left weakly guarded, some of them merely by invalids or national guards, could oppose no serious obstacle to the advance of the allied armies. Avesnes surrendered to the Prussians on the 21st June, and Blücher left troops to blockade Landrecy and Maubeuge; while a portion of the Anglo-allied army, under Prince Frederick of the Netherlands, remained to observe Le Quesnoi and Valenciennes. The Emperor of Russia was now pleased to place under the Duke of Wellington's command Prince Eugene of Wurtemburg's corps d'armée, which was advancing towards the Rhine; and the Saxon army, then on its march, was also destined to reinforce His Grace.

Meanwhile the remains of the French host reached Laon, but in no condition to resume the appearance even of an organized army. Grouchy's corps, therefore, which was also directed on Laon, and the 3d under Comte Rapp, posted near Strasbourg, were the only troops to whom Buonaparte could look for immediate support. But the usurper, upon reaching Paris on the 21st June, found his hopes of prolonging the contest at once cut short by the Chamber of Deputies declaring itself permanent, and refusing to acknowledge the Imperial authority;—a step which was followed on the same day by a similar declaration from the Chamber of Peers. Seeing himself thus without an army, and abandoned by the chambers, Napoleon felt that he must succumb; and after a brief deliberation, came to the resolution of resigning the throne

in favour of his son: a determination which was made known in a declaration addressed to the French people, dated the 22d of June.

While these important proceedings were taking place at Paris, the allied commanders were vigorously carrying on their operations; and, at the desire of the Duke of Wellington, Louis XVIII. had quitted Ghent, and followed in the rear of the Anglo-allied army. Cambray having been gallantly carried by escalade on the 24th, and its citadel being surrendered the next day, that fortress was immediately given up to the French king, who fixed his court there on the 26th; upon which day Peronne also surrendered, after a horn-work had been stormed by General Maitland's brigade of Guards with trifling loss.

On this occasion the Duke had a very narrow escape. The commandant having consented to the proposed conditions, and his Grace being anxious to obtain immediate possession of that important fortress, he proceeded in person to one of its gates to wait until it should be opened. Directing his staff to get under shelter in the ditch of an unoccupied outwork, he posted himself in a sallyport of the glacis. A staff officer having a communication to make to his Grace, and fancying he had already entered the place, came suddenly upon him while stationed as aforesaid, which drew the attention of the enemy, who treacherously discharged a howitzer loaded with grape at that point, and shattered the wall against which the Duke was standing, making (to use the words of one who saw him immediately after) his blue coat completely *red*.

Marshal Blücher, in the mean time, took St. Quentin and the castle of Guise; and thus the two

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armies were enabled to pursue their march upon the French capital with their rear well secured. A proposition to suspend hostilities had been made to both commanders on the 25th, in consequence of Napoleon's abdication in favour of his son; when it was stated that the provisional government named by Buonaparte had sent ministers to the several allied powers to treat for peace,—an overture which was not listened to by the allied generals, who regarded the abdication and the measures consequent upon that act as mere artifices. The objects contemplated by the powers of Europe, as declared by the 1st article of the treaty of the 25th March, being to compel Napoleon Buonaparte to desist from his projects, and to place him in a situation where he should no longer have it in his power to disturb the peace of the world; and the allies having by the 3d article of the same treaty bound themselves not to lay down their arms until that object should be attained, and till it should have been rendered "impossible for Buonaparte to excite fresh troubles, and to renew his attempts to acquire supreme power in France," the Duke of Wellington did not consider his abdication of an usurped power in favour of his son, and his handing over the government provisionally to five persons named by himself, to be the description of security contemplated by the coalition, and such as should induce them to lay down their arms: he decided, therefore, to continue his operations. Blücher, on his own part, announced that on reaching Paris he would suspend hostilities upon certain conditions only,—one of which was that Buonaparte should be delivered up to him.

Despatches, &c. June 28.

An effort was now made to negotiate for the

safety of Napoleon's person, and a passport for him to proceed to the United States of America, was solicited from the Duke of Wellington. Notwithstanding that his Grace had no authority to grant such a request, nor to dispose of the ex-Emperor in any way, yet he was determined as far as lay in his power to protect him from violence;—a resolution not wholly uncalled for, Blucher having signified an intention of putting him to death, if taken. The Duke expressed a determination to remonstrate against so unjustifiable a proceeding, and to "insist upon his being disposed of by common accord;" and, as a private friend, he advised his wrathful colleague to have nothing to do with so "foul a transaction;"—urging that both the marshal and himself "had acted too distinguished parts in the late transactions to become executioners;" and indignantly declared, that if the sovereigns wished to put Buonaparte to death, he at least would not be his executioner.

Despatches, &c. June 28.

The prevailing feeling at this time in Paris was certainly against the recall of Louis to the throne; but as the Duke of Wellington saw no prospect of safety to Europe from any other measure, he was determined to hearken to no plan for a different arrangement. It was in vain, therefore, that five commissioners besieged him on the 29th with proposals for a suspension of hostilities upon any terms short of the unconditional recall of their legitimate prince.

The Anglo-allied army having crossed the Oise at Pont St. Maxence on the 30th June, took up a position before Paris on the following day; its right being near St. Denis, and its left upon Bondy. The advanced guard of the Prussians had been at

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tacked at Villers Coterets, on the 28th June, by some French troops who were marching from Soissons towards the capital. These were driven off with loss; and being subsequently encountered on the Meaux road by General Bülow, were compelled to cross the Marne; but they eventually succeeded in reaching Paris, where the enemy had now collected about 50,000 troops of the line, besides national guards and other armed bodies.

The fortifications, already mentioned as covering Paris on the right bank of the Seine, were now found to be very formidable. Besides the intrenchments thrown up on the heights of Montmartre and around the town of St. Denis, an inundation had been effected by damming up two little streams; and parapets protected by batteries, existed along the Canal de l'Ourcq. But as no works had been formed on the left bank of the Seine, the obvious mode of attacking the city was by passing that river and assailing it on its most vulnerable side. Accordingly, Marshal Blücher, after taking the village of Aubervilliers on the morning of the 30th June, had moved to the right and crossed the Seine at St. Germains. On the 2d of July his right was established at Plessis Piquet, his left at St. Cloud, and the reserve at Versailles, having some troops posted in advance at Montrouge and Issy. Meanwhile the Duke of Wellington had caused a pontoon bridge to be thrown over the Seine at Argenteuil, which established a communication between the two armies. Thus were all the formidable defences created by Napoleon on the right bank of that river rendered useless, and Paris lay open to the attack of the allied commanders.

But the great obstacle to any suspension of hostilities had already been removed by the departure of Napoleon, who quitted Paris for Rochefort on the 29th June, with the purpose of endeavouring to escape to the United States; and the Duke of Wellington therefore signified to the French commissioners on the 2d July, that in reference to the armistice previously proposed by them, there now only remained a question as to the terms; the chief points of which he considered ought to be—1st, The allies to halt in their present positions; 2d, The French army to retire from Paris and cross the Loire; 3d, The city to be held by the national guards until the King should order otherwise. If these conditions were assented to, the Duke offered to use his influence with Marshal Blücher to procure his consent to the arrangement. The commissioners contended against the measure of sending away the army; but his Grace told them that he would not suspend hostilities so long as a French soldier remained in Paris.

This communication by the Duke of Wellington produced no immediate decision in Paris, where nothing but anarchy prevailed; and at dawn on the morning of the 3d July the enemy attacked the Prussian advance at Issy, but were defeated with considerable loss. The same morning Davoust, who commanded the French army, seeing the inutility of prolonging the contest, (Marshal Blücher being established on the defenceless side of Paris, while a British corps by moving along the left bank of the Seine towards the bridge of Neuilly was ready to support him,) despatched an officer to the Duke with a request that hostilities might immediately cease on both banks of the river,

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with a view to the negotiation of a *military convention*, under which the French army should evacuate the capital. Accordingly General Müffling and Colonel F. B. Hervey * were immediately deputed, on the part of Marshal Blücher and the Duke of Wellington, to meet three French commissioners at the palace of St. Cloud; and a convention consisting of eighteen articles being settled in the course of the day, it was approved by Marshal Davoust, and afterwards by the allied commanders, on the same evening. On the 4th, St. Denis, Neuilly, and other posts held by the enemy, were given up to the allies; and the French army having commenced its march towards the Loire, the barriers of Paris were delivered over to the allied armies on the 6th.† On the following day, the white replaced the tricoloured cockade, and on the 8th Louis XVIII. made his public re-entry into his capital.

Napoleon remained many days at Rochefort, undecided what course to pursue; but finding there was no chance of evading the British cruizers, he relinquished his design of attempting an escape to America; and on the 15th July he delivered himself up to Captain Maitland, commanding H. M.

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* The late Colonel Sir Felton B. Hervey, K.C.B.

† Previously to the evacuation of Paris the following disgraceful circumstance occurred. Lieut.-Colonel Torrens [a] and Major Stavely, attended by an orderly dragoon, were sent into the city on a mission by the Duke of Wellington, escorted by a French field-officer, who had been sent out to accompany them. The soldiers menaced them when passing the first barricades; but, on entering the faubourg St. Denis, they were surrounded and fired upon: the French officer disappeared, the orderly dragoon was killed, and Major Stavely fell severely wounded. Colonel Torrens happily made his escape by setting spurs to his horse, and galloping into Paris.

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[a] Colonel Robert Torrens, C.B.

ship Bellerophon, who immediately sailed for England with his prize. In a short time the French army gave in its reluctant submission to the king's authority, and the whole kingdom became eventually tranquillized beneath the influence of half a million of foreign bayonets. Such were the great and speedy results of the battle of Waterloo.

Never, perhaps, considering the amount of perjury and treason that had accomplished the overthrow of the Bourbons, was greater lenity manifested at the hour of retribution than on the present occasion. Of the most notorious traitors, three only were condemned to suffer death:—La Vallette, the director of the Post, and mainspring of the plot which brought back Napoleon to Paris; Labédoyère, the first officer that broke his oath of allegiance to Louis XVIII.; and Marshal Ney, to whom, at his own request, the confiding monarch had entrusted the command of the army directed against Buonaparte, and who had pledged his word to bring him to Paris "*in an iron cage.*" Of these the first succeeded in eluding the punishment to which he was condemned; the other two met the fate they so well merited.

Many amongst the French, and not a few of our own countrymen, have attempted to cast a slur on the character of the Duke of Wellington for not interfering to prevent the execution of Marshal Ney, alleging that the proceeding against him was an infraction of the convention under which Paris surrendered to the English and Prussian armies.

No argument could be more futile. The convention was purely a military one between the commanders of the French and allied armies, and related exclusively to the occupation of Paris by

Despatches, &c. Nov. 19.

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the latter; providing at the same time against any measures of severity on the part of the allies towards the inhabitants, or any persons in the city, on account of the offices they had filled, their conduct, or their political opinions.* So cautious, indeed, were the allied generals, that an article was introduced† which subjected the convention to the approval of the powers on which those armies depended.

It cannot, therefore, for one moment be supposed that the Duke of Wellington, who, in the case of the convention of Cintra, had sagaciously pointed out the inconveniences likely to result from the admission of articles relating to the internal policy of a country in a military convention, should in this instance have been less guarded. Indeed, his Grace's despatches fully prove that he was not so, and that the convention was never intended to screen political offenders from punishment; for in a letter written to Earl Bathurst on the day after it had been signed (and of course long before the case of Marshal Ney was contemplated), he says, "This convention decides all the military questions at this moment existing here, and *touches nothing political.*"

Despatches, &c. July 4.

In fact, Louis XVIII., in a declaration dated 28th of June, had already announced an intention of punishing some of the persons who had been concerned in the plot to replace Napoleon on the

* Art. 12. "Seront pareillement respectées les personnes et les propriétés particulières; les habitans, et, en général, tous les individus qui se trouvent dans la capitale, continueront à jouir de leurs droits et libertés, sans pouvoir être inquiétés ni recherchés en rien relativement aux fonctions qu'ils occupent, ou auraient occupées, ou à leurs conduites, et à leurs opinions politiques."

† Art. 16. "La présente convention est déclarée commune à toutes les armées alliées, sauf en ratification des puissances dont ces armées dependent."

throne; and any article introduced in a military convention that would have deprived the King of the power of so doing, after this public announcement of his purpose, would have lowered him in the eyes of the French nation, and have had a very bad effect at such a critical moment.

That a plea founded on the 12th article should have been advanced by Marshal Ney, when the forfeiture of his life had been pronounced, is not surprising. A condemned criminal will catch at any pretext to avert his fate. But that Ney did not put the construction which he afterwards forced upon that article, at the time the convention was signed, is obvious, from his having left Paris in disguise, with a passport under a feigned name furnished by Fouché, on the 6th of July; that is, two days after the convention was ratified, and one before the allies entered Paris.

France, at this time, was in a very distracted state — civil war, in fact, raged in one part of the country; and it was absolutely necessary that the government should show its strength by punishing those who had been mainly instrumental in disturbing its tranquillity, and as a warning to such as were likely to keep up the feverish excitement which prevailed; and certainly no one deserved punishment more richly than Ney.

The Duke of Wellington would doubtless have gained golden opinions from the Buonapartists by interposing his commanding influence with the restored monarch, to arrest the hand of justice, and save the life of this brave but disloyal soldier, and with the unreflecting of all nations, he might thereby have obtained a meretricious reputation for humanity; but it was ever this truly great man's rule of conduct to set aside all selfish feel-

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ings where they interfered with the public good; and in this case he thought, and assuredly thought rightly, that an act of mercy towards Ney would have been one of irreparable injury to France.

Our task here closes. The Duke of Wellington's history as a statesman belongs to that of Europe, and can neither be truly known nor justly appreciated at the present day. But we may observe, that whoever has carefully studied the actions of his Grace, throughout his long, arduous, and unrivalled military career, must have remarked that the warrior and statesman were so equally blended in his character, as to render it doubtful which part of the mighty whole had predominance. When, therefore, he had sheathed his ever victorious sword, it naturally followed that the undivided energies of his commanding mind should be immediately thrown into the only field remaining open for their exercise; and it was not till then — when divested of the halo which military glory cast around his actions — that the vigorous, skilful, and enlightened statesman stood forth in full relief. Men of all parties have at last learned to admire and venerate the man to whom, under Divine Providence, our country is indebted for its present grandeur as well as glory; — one and all look up to him as the great pillar of the state. May he long continue, by his wisdom and honesty, to uphold the empire and the British character! since to him there exists on earth *nihil simile aut secundum.*

THE END.

London:
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BATTLE
of
BUSACO.
Convent of Busaco
Villa nova
Penacova
Sulla
Salgueiras
St Antonio de Cantaro
Sequedo
Moita
Neys Corps
Reymers Corps
Junots Corps
French Cavalry
Riv Mondego
Scale of Miles
References
a Gen! Hills Div!
b Leiths D!
c Pictons D!
d Spencers D!
e Packs Brig!
f The Light Div
g A Brig! of Germans
h Gen! Coles Div!
i Lefors Portug! Brig
k Portuguese Cav!
Sketch of the Country
in the vicinity of
ALMEIDA,
explanatory of the movements
which led to the Battle of
FUENTES DE HONOR.
Almeida
Fuentes de Honor
Castel Bon
Alameda
Villeiros
Ciudad Rodrigo
Guarda
Alfayates
Sabugal
Almedilla
Aldea velha
Navas frias
Pena parda
Sorriedo
Scale of Miles


BATTLE
OF
ALBUERA.
16 May 1811.
River Albuera
To Almendral
From Seville
From Almendralejo
Albuera
To Valverde
Baggage
River Albuera
Cortijo de Cabrera
From Badajoz
To Badajoz
Scale of One Mile.
A. Original Position of the Allied Army.
b. Change of front effected by the Spaniards, to meet the attack on the right of the Allies
c. Colonel Colborne's Brigade moved to the support of the Spaniards.
d. General Houghton's Brig.e follows the movement.
e. Colonel Abercrombie's Brigade d.o
F. General Cole's Division arriving from Badajos.
g. Fuzilier Brigade of Cole's Division moved to the support of the right.
H. Position of the enemy previous to the battle.
I. Feigned attack on the centre of the Allies.
K. Concealed formation preparatory to the attack on the right of the Allies.
L. French attack. M. Reserve.
O. P. Positions, after the action.
English. Portugueze. Spaniards. French Cav.y Inf.y

B. King Lithr. from a Drawing by Capt.n C. R. Scott.
Lith.c Press 2 Francis's Pl.t Gower Street.



a. Position of the Allied Army previous to the battle.
b. Advance of the Enemy's columns.
c. The Southern Peak of Arapiles, seized on by the enemy, and under cover of which they advanced to,
C.C. purposing to cut off the Allied Army from the road to Cuidad Rodrigo
d. The Northern Peak of Arapiles, occupied by a brigade of the 4th Division
The rest of the Allied Army effects a change of front perpendicular to its original position, and eventually reaches
D.D. to attack the Enemy in front, while the 3rd Division and D'Urban's Brigade
f. having been withdrawn from the right bank of the Tormes, and taken post at Aldea Tejada, move forward and fall suddenly upon the Enemy's left flank.

E. The French Army, forced to abandon its position, attempts to take up a new alignement.
G. The Allies attack and dislodge them from this new position.
H. Flight of the Enemy.
g. The Light Division. Lt Genl Baron Alten
h. " 1st — Do — M. Genl Campbell
i. " 4th — Do — Lt Genl Cole.
j. M. Genl Packs Portugueze Brigade.
k. The 5th Division. Lt Genl Leith
m. " 6th — Do — M. Genl H. Clinton
n. " 7th — Do — M. Genl Hope.
o. M. Genl Bradford's Portugueze Brigade
p. Spanish Corps of Carlos de España.
r. British Cavalry.

§ King ex Litho from a Drawing by Captn C. R. Scott

† Francis St. Gower St.


SKETCH
OF THE
WESTERN PYRENEES
Scale
Miles
Chaussée
Road through the mountains practicable for Light Guns
Mule track
Adour Riv.
Bidasoa Riv.
Nive Riv.
Ebro Riv.
Arga Riv.
Ulzama Riv.
Mountains
a Haya.
b S.Marcial.
c Mendalle.
d Commissari.
e Great La Rhune.
f Little Dº
St Sebastian
Passages
Pamplona
Burtada
Bayonne
St Jean Pied de Port
Roncesvalles
Bourguet
Espinal
Urdanitz
Vera
Irun
Hernani
Arraro
Arhgarringa
Zubieta
Doña Maria
Leumberri
Anglet
Biarritz
Bidart
Ascain
Urtarith
Arhansia
Arhansia
Arrivon
Mendi
Mendi
Mendi


MAP
of the South of
FRANCE.
Scale of Miles.
Bordeaux
Garonne River
Langon
Bazas
Les Landes
Arguillon
Agen
Montauban
Mont de Marsan
Tartas
Adour R.
Condom
Beaumont
Grenade
Auch
Toulouse
Pau
Orthes
Navarrens
Tarbes
Lourdes
Martres
Muret
Lombez
Plaisance
Mirande
Rabastens
Gaillac
Lavaur
Castelnaudary
Carcassonne
Narbonne
Montpellier
Cette
Nismes
Avignon
Marseilles
Toulon
Nice
Genoa
Milan
Turin
Lyons
Paris
Bordeaux
Rochelle
Nantes
Brest
Rennes
Caen
Dieppe
Calais
Boulogne
Dunkirk
Ostend
Antwerp
Brussels
Amsterdam
Rotterdam
Hague
Utrecht
Arnhem
Nimeguen
Cologne
Coblentz
Mayence
Frankfort
Strasbourg
Metz
Nancy
Dijon
Geneva
Berne
Basle
Zurich
Constance
Munich
Augsburg
Ulm
Stuttgart
Carlsruhe
Manheim
Wurtzburg
Nuremberg
Ratisbon
Passau
Linz
Vienna
Prague
Dresden
Leipsic
Berlin
Hamburg
Lubeck
Copenhagen
Stockholm
Gottenburg
Christiania
Drontheim
Bergen
Tornea
Archangel
Petersburg
Moscow
Smolensko
Wilna
Grodno
Warsaw
Cracow
Vienna
Presburg
Buda
Pesth
Belgrade
Constantinople
Adrianople
Gallipoli
Smyrna
Aleppo
Damascus
Jerusalem
Alexandria
Cairo
Suez
Mecca
Medina
Bassorah
Bagdad
Ispahan
Teheran
Astrakan
Caspian Sea
Black Sea
Odessa
Kiow
Riga
Mitau
Memel
Dantzic
Konigsberg
Stettin
Hanover
Brunswick
Cassel
Wesel
Aix la Chapelle
Liege
Namur
Mons
Ghent
Bruges
Ostend
Dunkirk
Calais
Boulogne
Dieppe
Rouen
Havre
Caen
Cherbourg
Rennes
Nantes
Rochelle
Bordeaux
Brest
Plymouth
Portsmouth
London
Dover
Canterbury
Ramsgate
Margate
Yarmouth
Lowestoft
Harwich
Ipswich
Colchester
Chelmsford
Gravesend
Rochester
Maidstone
Tunbridge
Brighton
Chichester
Southampton
Salisbury
Bath
Bristol
Gloucester
Worcester
Birmingham
Coventry
Oxford
Reading
Windsor
Hounslow
Kingston
Guildford
Dorking
Epsom
Croydon
Sydenham
Greenwich
Deptford
Blackheath
Woolwich
Erith
Dartford
Rochester
Chatham
Sheerness
Margate
Ramsgate
Deal
Dover
Folkestone
Hythe
Romney
Rye
Hastings
Battle
Lewes
Eastbourne
Seaford
Newhaven
Shoreham
Worthing
Arundel
Portsmouth
Gosport
Southampton
Lymington
Christchurch
Poole
Weymouth
Dorchester
Exeter
Plymouth
Falmouth
Penzance
Land's End
Scilly Isles
Lundy Isle
Ilfracombe
Barnstaple
Bideford
Clovelly
Hartland Point
Tenby
Milford Haven
Pembroke
Haverfordwest
Fishguard
Cardigan
Aberystwith
Barmouth
Harlech
Carnarvon
Bangor
Holyhead
Anglesea
Conway
Rhyl
Liverpool
Chester
Shrewsbury
Ludlow
Hereford
Worcester
Gloucester
Cheltenham
Tewkesbury
Evesham
Stratford
Warwick
Leamington
Coventry
Northampton
Oxford
Aylesbury
Buckingham
Bedford
Hertford
Ware
Hoddesdon
Enfield
Edmonton
Tottenham
Hackney
Islington
Chelsea
Kensington
Hammersmith
Brentford
Richmond
Kingston
Epsom
Reigate
Godstone
Tunbridge
Sevenoaks
Maidstone
Ashford
Canterbury
Faversham
Sittingbourne
Rochester
Chatham
Gravesend
Dartford
Erith
Woolwich
Greenwich
Deptford
Blackheath
Croydon
Sydenham
Dorking
Guildford
Godalming
Farnham
Alton
Winchester
Romsey
Andover
Basingstoke
Reading
Henley
Maidenhead
Windsor
Slough
Uxbridge
Harrow
Watford
St Albans
Hatfield

References.

A. Position of the Allied Army on the night preceding the battle

a. 1st Genl Sir T. Graham's Corps

b. The 7th and 3rd British Divisions

c. 4th Division and Allied Cavalry

d. Light Division

e. 1st Genl Sir R. Hill's Corps

f. Army of Portugal, comdd by Comte Reille.

B. Position in which the Enemy awaited the Attack

g. Army of the South comdd by Comte Gazan.

h. Do of the Centre do D'Erlon

i. Attempted formation of the Enemy under the protection of a numerous Artillery

k. Retreat of the Enemy

s. Genl Girons Spanish Corps.

W. M. Ing. es litho from a drawing by Captn C. R. Scott.

J. Francis Sr Gower Sr

BATTLES
OF
QUATRE BRAS
AND
LIGNY,
16th June, 1815.
Scale of Miles.
Fleurus
Onoy
Gembloux
Tilly
Villers
Marbais
Sart D'Avelines
Hautain
Nivelles
Genappe
Villeroux
Chaussée Brunehaut
Villers Perwin
Frasnes
Liberchies
Thimeon
Mellet
Wagnelée
Sombrer
Bry
Corry le Chateau
Noirmont
Contil
Ste Gery
Bellery
Aude Villers
Suisy
Leupoigne
Ways
Dyle Riv.
Thy
Ste Genappe
Chaussée Dame
Rosaire
Prussian Pd. after the Bottle
4 Bras
Rangeoses
Wauferson
Tongeinne
Boisy
Vamur
Onoy
Bolgnée
Guard
Corps
Ligny
Riboeds
Mellet
Rosaire
Thimeon
Rebecques
Buzet
Reves
Canal to Mal.


BATTLE OF WATERLOO.
18th June, 1815.
Allied
French
Positions before the Battle
Allied Position at five o'clock
Prussian Do at Do
French advanced troops Do
Allies
Prussians
French
During the last attack
Scale
½ Mile
Rossomme
Mont Plaisir
Planchenoit
Labelle alliance
Hougomont
La Haye Sainte
Frischermont
Smeuhert
Papelotte
La Haye
Mt St Jean
Merbe braine
Braine la Leud
Village of Mt St Jean
Ter la Haye
Couture
Lasnes
Jeanloo
St Lambert
Ohain
From Wavre
W.M.King ex litho from a drawing by Chas. J.B. Scott

00141713

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